

KraneShares Trust

STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

August 1, 2025

KRANESHARES 2X LONG BABA DAILY ETF – (KBAB)

KRANESHARES 2X LONG PDD DAILY ETF – (KPDD)

Shares of each Fund are traded on the NASDAQ Stock Market LLC.

This Statement of Additional Information (“SAI”) relates to the above listed funds (collectively, the “Funds”), each a series of the KraneShares Trust (the “Trust”). This SAI is not a prospectus and should be read in conjunction with the current prospectus for the Funds, dated August 1, 2025, as it may be revised from time to time (the “Prospectus”). Capitalized terms used herein that are not defined have the same meaning as in the Prospectus, unless otherwise noted. The audited financial statements with respect to the Funds for the most recent fiscal year or period are incorporated in this SAI by reference to the Funds’ Form N-CSR for the period ending March 31, 2025. A copy of the Prospectus, this SAI, and/or the most recent annual and semi-annual reports to shareholders may be obtained, without charge, by calling 1.855.857.2638, visiting www.kraneshares.com, or writing to the Trust at 280 Park Ave, 32nd Floor, New York, New York 10017.

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GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE TRUST AND THE FUNDS

The Trust was organized as a Delaware statutory trust on February 3, 2012 and is permitted to offer multiple, separate series (*i.e.*, funds). As of the date of this SAI, the Trust offers 40 separate funds, including the Funds and other funds not offered in this SAI. The Trust is an open-end management investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended (the “1940 Act”), and each Fund is a non-diversified series of the Trust. The offering of the Trust’s shares is registered under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”). All payments received by the Trust for shares of any fund belong to that fund. Each Fund will have its own assets and liabilities. Shares of each Fund will only be issued against full payment, as further described in the Prospectus and this Statement of Additional Information.

Krane Funds Advisors, LLC (“Krane” or the “Adviser”) serves as the investment adviser to each Fund and is responsible for continuously reviewing, supervising and administering each Fund’s investment program. SEI Investments Distribution Co. serves as the distributor (the “Distributor”) of the shares of each Fund.

Exchange-Traded Fund (“ETF”) Operations

Each Fund issues and redeems Shares at net asset value (“NAV”) only in aggregations of a specified number of Shares (“Creation Units”), generally in exchange for a basket of securities (“Basket”), together with a specified cash payment, or, in certain circumstances, for an all cash payment. Unlike mutual funds, Shares are not individually redeemable.

Certain employees of the Adviser are responsible for interacting with market participants that transact in Baskets for one or more Creation Units. As part of these discussions, these employees may discuss with a market participant the securities a Fund is willing to accept in connection with a purchase (“creation”) of shares, and securities that the Fund will provide on a redemption of shares. The Adviser’s employees may also discuss portfolio holdings-related information with broker/dealers in connection with settling the Fund’s transactions, as may be necessary to conduct business in the ordinary course.

Shares of each Fund are listed on a national securities exchange, such as NASDAQ Stock Market LLC (“Exchange”), and trade in the secondary market, where most investors will buy and sell them at market prices that change throughout the day. Such market prices may be lower, higher or equal to NAV. Accordingly, when transacting in the secondary market, investors may pay more than NAV when purchasing shares and receive less than NAV when selling shares. They may also be subject to brokerage commissions and charges.

INVESTMENT POLICIES, TECHNIQUES AND RISK FACTORS

General

Each Fund’s principal investment strategies and risks are discussed in its Prospectus. The investment techniques discussed below and in the Prospectus may, consistent with a Fund’s investment objectives and investment limitations, be used by a Fund. Each Fund is free to reduce or eliminate its activity with respect to any of the investment techniques discussed below consistent with its fundamental investment policies. There is no assurance that a Fund’s strategies or any other methods of investment will result in the achievement of the Fund’s objective. Each Fund may change its investment objective.

Cash and Cash Equivalents

Each Fund may hold cash or cash equivalents. Generally, such positions offer less potential for gain than other investments. Holding cash or cash equivalents, even strategically, may lead to missed investment opportunities. This is particularly true when the market for other investments in which a Fund may invest is rapidly rising. If a Fund holds cash uninvested it will be subject to the credit risk of the depositing institution holding the cash.

Debt Securities

Each Fund may invest in debt securities. A debt security is a security consisting of a certificate or other evidence of a debt (secured or unsecured) on which the issuer promises to pay the holder thereof a fixed, variable, or floating rate of interest for a specified length of time, and to repay the debt on the specified maturity date. Some debt securities, such as zero coupon bonds, do not make regular interest payments but are issued at a discount to their principal or maturity value. Debt securities include a variety of fixed income obligations, including, but not limited to, corporate bonds, government securities, municipal securities, convertible securities, mortgage-backed securities, and asset-backed securities. Debt securities include investment-grade securities, non-investment-grade securities, and unrated securities. Debt securities are subject to a variety of risks, such as interest rate risk, income risk, call/prepayment risk, inflation risk, credit risk, and (in the case of foreign securities) country risk and currency risk.

The market value of the debt securities in which a Fund invests will change in response to interest rate changes and other factors. During periods of falling interest rates, the values of outstanding debt securities generally rise. Conversely, during periods of rising interest rates, the values of such securities generally decline. Moreover, while securities with longer maturities tend to produce higher yields, the prices of longer maturity securities are also subject to greater market fluctuations as a result of changes in interest rates. Changes in the value of these securities will not necessarily affect cash income derived from these securities but will affect a Fund's NAV. Additional information regarding debt securities is described below.

Credit Ratings. Credit risk is the risk that a borrower or issuer of a debt will be unable or unwilling to repay its obligations under the debt. Certain debt securities may be rated by a credit rating agency. Changes by such agencies in the rating of any debt security and in the ability of an issuer to make payments of interest and principal, or the perception thereof, may affect the value of these investments.

U.S. Credit Ratings. The rating criteria and methodology used by U.S. rating agencies may not be fully transparent and such ratings may not accurately reflect the risk of investing in such instruments.

Chinese Credit Ratings. The rating criteria and methodology used by Chinese rating agencies may be different from those adopted by most of the established international credit rating agencies. Therefore, such rating systems may not provide an equivalent standard for comparison with securities rated by international credit rating agencies. The rating criteria and methodology used by Chinese credit ratings agencies also may not be fully transparent and such ratings may not accurately reflect the risk of investing in such instruments.

Duration. Duration is a measure of the expected change in value of a debt security for a given change in interest rates. For example, if interest rates changed by one percent, the value of a security having an effective duration of two years generally would vary by two percent. Duration takes the length of the time intervals between the present time and time that the interest and principal payments are scheduled, or in the case of a callable bond, expected to be received, and weighs them by the present values of the cash to be received at each future point in time.

Pay-In-Kind and Step-Up Coupon Securities. A pay-in-kind security pays no interest in cash to its holder during its life. Similarly, a step-up coupon security is a debt security that may not pay interest for a specified period of time and then, after the initial period, may pay interest at a series of different rates. Accordingly, pay-in-kind and step-up coupon securities will be subject to greater fluctuations in market value in response to changing interest rates than debt obligations of comparable maturities that make current, periodic distribution of interest in cash.

Perpetual Bonds. Perpetual bonds offer a fixed return with no maturity date. Because they never mature, perpetual bonds can be more volatile than other types of bonds that have a maturity date and may be more sensitive to changes in interest rates. If market interest rates rise significantly, the interest rate paid by a perpetual bond may be much lower than the prevailing interest rate. Perpetual bonds are also subject to credit risk with respect to the issuer. In addition, because perpetual bonds may be callable after a set period of time, there is the risk that the issuer may recall the bond.

Variable and Floating Rate Securities. Variable and floating rate instruments involve certain obligations that may carry variable or floating rates of interest, and may involve a conditional or unconditional demand feature. Such instruments bear interest at rates which are not fixed, but which vary with changes in specified market rates or indices. The interest rates on these securities may be reset daily, weekly, quarterly, or some other reset period, and may have a set floor or ceiling on interest rate changes. There is a risk that the current interest rate on such obligations may not accurately reflect existing market interest rates.

Corporate Debt Securities. Each Fund may invest in corporate debt securities. The selection of such securities will generally not be dependent on independent credit analysis or fundamental analysis performed by Krane or a Fund sub-adviser, if applicable. Each Fund may invest in all grades of corporate debt securities including below investment grade as discussed below. See Appendix B for a description of corporate bond ratings. Each Fund may also invest in unrated securities.

Corporate debt securities are typically fixed-income securities issued by businesses to finance their operations, but may also include bank loans to companies. Notes, bonds, debentures and commercial paper are the most common types of corporate debt securities. The primary differences between the different types of corporate debt securities are their maturities and secured or un-secured status. Commercial paper has the shortest term and is usually unsecured. The broad category of corporate debt securities includes debt issued by domestic or foreign companies of all kinds, including those with small-, mid- and large-capitalizations. Corporate debt may be rated investment-grade, below investment-grade or unrated and may carry variable or floating rates of interest.

Because of the wide range of types, and maturities, of corporate debt securities, as well as the range of creditworthiness of its issuers, corporate debt securities have widely varying potentials for return and risk profiles. For example, commercial paper issued by a large established domestic corporation that is rated investment-grade may have a modest return on principal, but is intended to carry relatively limited risk. On the other hand, a long-term corporate note issued by a small foreign corporation from an emerging market country that has not been rated may have the potential for relatively large returns on principal, but carries a relatively high degree of risk.

Corporate debt securities carry both credit risk and interest rate risk. Credit risk is the risk that a Fund could lose money if the issuer of a corporate debt security does not pay interest or principal when it is due. The credit risk of a particular issuer's debt security may vary based on its priority for repayment. For example, higher ranking (senior) debt securities have a higher priority than lower ranking (subordinated) securities. This means that the issuer might not make payments on subordinated securities while continuing to make payments on senior securities. In addition, in the event of bankruptcy, holders of higher-ranking senior securities may receive amounts otherwise payable to the holders of more junior securities. Interest rate risk is the risk that the value of certain corporate debt securities will tend to fall when interest rates rise. In general, corporate debt securities with longer terms tend to fall more in value when interest rates rise than corporate debt securities with shorter terms.

High Yield Securities. High yield securities are commonly referred to as "junk bonds." Investing in these securities involves special risks in addition to the risks associated with investments in higher-rated fixed income securities. While offering a greater potential opportunity for capital appreciation and higher yields, high yield securities typically entail greater credit risk and potential price volatility and may be less liquid than higher-rated securities. A Fund may have difficulty selling certain junk bonds because they may have a thin trading market. The lack of a liquid secondary market may have an adverse effect on the market price and a Fund's ability to dispose of particular issues, including to honor redemptions, and may also make it more difficult for the Fund to obtain accurate market quotations in valuing these assets. High yield securities are regarded as inherently speculative with respect to the issuer's continuing ability to meet principal and interest payments. They may also be more susceptible to real or perceived adverse economic and competitive industry conditions and changes than higher-rated securities. Issuers of securities in default may fail to resume principal or interest payments, in which case a Fund may lose its entire investment.

Companies that issue high yield bonds are often highly leveraged and may not have more traditional methods of financing available to them. During an economic downturn or recession, highly leveraged issuers of high-yield securities may experience financial stress, and may not have sufficient revenues to meet their interest payment obligations. Economic downturns tend to disrupt the market for high yield bonds, lowering their values and increasing their price volatility. The risk of issuer default is higher with respect to high yield bonds because such issues may be subordinated to other creditors of the issuer and because they may be issued by less financially stable entities.

The credit rating of a high yield bond does not necessarily address its market value risk, and ratings may from time to time change to reflect developments regarding the issuer's financial condition. The lower the rating of a high yield bond, the more speculative its characteristics.

Unrated debt securities may face the same or more severe risks than high yield securities.

U.S. Dollar-Denominated Foreign Debt Securities. Foreign debt securities denominated in U.S. dollars may behave very differently from debt securities issued in local currencies, and there may be little to no correlation between the performance of the two. For example, changes to currency exchange rates may impact issuers of foreign debt securities denominated in U.S. dollars differently than issuers of debt securities issued in local currencies. Currency exchange rates can be very volatile and can change quickly and unpredictably, which may adversely affect the Fund. In addition, if the U.S. dollar increases in value against the local currency of a U.S. dollar-denominated debt issue, the issuer may be subject to a greater risk of default on their obligations (*i.e.*, are unable to make scheduled interest or principal payments to investors).

Commercial Paper. Each Fund may invest in commercial paper of U.S. or foreign issuers. U.S. commercial paper generally consists of unsecured short-term promissory notes with a fixed maturity of no more than 270 days issued by corporations, generally to finance short-term business needs. Chinese commercial paper that may be purchased by a Fund generally will have no more than one year of remaining maturity. A Fund may purchase commercial paper of any rating or that is unrated. Commercial paper issues in which a Fund may invest include securities issued by corporations without registration under the Securities Act in reliance on the exemption from such registration afforded by Section 3(a)(3) thereof, and commercial paper issued in reliance on the so-called "private placement" exemption from registration, which is afforded by Section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act ("Section 4(a)(2) paper"). Section 4(a)(2) paper is restricted as to disposition under the federal securities laws in that any resale must similarly be made in an exempt transaction. Section 4(a)(2) paper is normally resold to other institutional investors through or with the assistance of investment dealers who make a market in Section 4(a)(2) paper, which may provide some liquidity.

Mortgage-Backed Securities. Each Fund may invest in mortgage-backed securities, including collateralized mortgage obligations and mortgage pass-through securities. These securities represent interests in pools of mortgage loans. The payments of principal and interest on the underlying loans pass through to investors. Although the underlying mortgage loans are for specified periods of time, such as fifteen to thirty years, the borrowers can, and often do, repay them sooner. Thus, the security holders may receive prepayments of principal, in addition to the regular interest and principal.

There are three types of interest rate-related risks associated with mortgage-backed securities. The first is interest rate risk. The values of mortgage-backed securities will generally fluctuate inversely with interest rates. The second is prepayment risk. This is the risk that borrowers will repay their mortgages earlier than anticipated. A borrower is more likely to prepay a mortgage that bears a relatively high rate of interest. Thus, in times of declining interest rates, some higher yielding mortgages might be repaid resulting in larger cash payments to the Fund, and a Fund will be forced to accept lower interest rates when that cash is used to purchase additional securities. The third is extension risk. When interest rates rise, prepayments often drop, which should extend the average maturity of the mortgage-backed security. This makes mortgage-backed securities more sensitive to interest rate changes.

Mortgage-backed securities may also be subject to credit risk. Payment of principal and interest on many mortgage pass-through securities (but not the market value of the securities themselves) may be guaranteed by U.S. Government agencies whose obligations are backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. Government (in the case of securities guaranteed by the Government National Mortgage Association) or may be guaranteed by agencies or instrumentalities of the U.S. Government whose obligations are not backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. Government (such as the Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) or the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”)). Mortgage pass-through securities may also be issued by non-governmental issuers (such as commercial banks, savings and loan institutions, private mortgage insurance companies, mortgage bankers and other secondary market issuers). Some of these mortgage pass-through securities may be supported by various forms of insurance or guarantees but may otherwise be subject to a greater risk of loss.

Other Asset-Backed Securities. Each Fund may invest in other forms of asset-backed securities in addition to asset-based commercial paper and mortgage-backed securities. These securities, issued by trusts and special purpose corporations, are backed by a pool of assets, such as credit card receivables, automobile loans, airplane leases, equipment leases, or other forms of receivables. These securities present certain risks in addition to those normally associated with debt securities. For instance, these securities may not have the benefit of any security interest in any collateral that could ensure payment of the receivable. For example, credit card receivables are generally unsecured. The obligors may also be entitled to the protection of a number of state and federal credit laws. Moreover, even if there are perfected security interests in the underlying collateral, there is the possibility that recoveries on repossessed collateral may not be sufficient to support payments on these securities.

To lessen the effect of failures by obligors on underlying assets to make payments, asset-backed securities may contain elements of credit support which fall into two categories: (i) liquidity protection and (ii) protection against losses resulting from ultimate default by an obligor on the underlying assets. Liquidity protection refers to the provision of advances, to ensure that the receipt of payments on the underlying pool occurs in a timely fashion. Protection against losses resulting from ultimate default ensures payment through insurance policies or letters of credit obtained by the issuer or sponsor from third parties. The degree of credit support provided for each issue is generally based on historical information respecting the level of credit risk associated with the underlying assets. Delinquency or loss in excess of that anticipated or failure of the credit support could adversely affect the return on an investment in such a security. Credit supports, if any, do not protect against fluctuation in the market values of asset-backed securities. Moreover, a credit support depends upon the financial ability of its issuer to honor the support.

Sovereign and Quasi-Sovereign Debt Obligations. Each Fund may invest in sovereign and quasi-sovereign debt obligations. Sovereign debt obligations are issued or guaranteed by a foreign government or one of its agencies, authorities, instrumentalities, political subdivisions or by a supra-national organization. Investments in sovereign and quasi-sovereign debt obligations involve special risks not present in corporate debt obligations. The issuer of the sovereign or quasi-sovereign debt or the governmental authorities that control the repayment of the debt may be unable or unwilling to repay principal or interest when due, and a Fund may have limited recourse in the event of a default. Quasi-sovereign debt typically is not guaranteed by a sovereign entity. During periods of economic uncertainty, the market prices of sovereign and quasi-sovereign debt, and a Fund’s net asset value, may be more volatile than prices of U.S. debt obligations. In the past, certain non-U.S. markets have encountered difficulties in servicing their debt obligations, withheld payments of principal and interest and declared moratoria on the payment of principal and interest on their sovereign debts.

A sovereign or quasi-sovereign debtor’s willingness or ability to repay principal and pay interest in a timely manner may be affected by, among other factors, its cash flow situation, the extent of its foreign currency reserves, the availability of sufficient foreign exchange, the relative size of the debt service burden, politics, the sovereign debtor’s policy toward principal international lenders and local political constraints. Sovereign and quasi-sovereign debtors may also be dependent on expected disbursements from foreign governments, multilateral agencies and other entities to reduce principal and interest arrearages on their debt. The failure of a sovereign or quasi-sovereign debtor to implement economic reforms, achieve specified levels of economic performance or repay principal or interest when due may result in the cancellation of third-party commitments to lend funds to the sovereign or quasi-sovereign debtor, which may further impair such debtor’s ability or willingness to service its debts.

Debt Securities Issued by the World Bank for Reconstruction and Development (“World Bank”). Each Fund may invest in debt securities issued by the World Bank. Debt securities issued by the World Bank may include high quality global bonds backed by member governments, including the United States, Japan, Germany, France and the United Kingdom, as well as in bonds in “non-core” currencies, including emerging markets and European accession countries, structured notes, and discount notes represented by certificates, in bearer form only, or in un-certified form (Book Entry Discount Notes) with maturities of 360 days or less at a discount, and in the case of Discount Notes, in certified form only and on an interest bearing basis in the U.S. and Eurodollar markets.

U.S. Government Securities. The Funds may invest in U.S. government securities. Securities issued or guaranteed by the U.S. government or its agencies or instrumentalities include U.S. Treasury securities, which are backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. Treasury and which differ only in their interest rates, maturities, and times of issuance. U.S. Treasury bills have initial maturities of one-year or less; U.S. Treasury notes have initial maturities of one to ten years; and U.S. Treasury bonds generally have initial maturities of greater than ten years. Certain U.S. government securities are issued or guaranteed by agencies or instrumentalities of the U.S. government including, but not limited to, obligations of U.S. government agencies or instrumentalities such as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the government National Mortgage Association (“Ginnie Mae”), the Small Business Administration, the Federal Farm Credit Administration, the Federal Home Loan Banks, Banks for Cooperatives (including the Central Bank for Cooperatives), the Federal Land Banks, the Federal Intermediate Credit Banks, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the Commodity Credit Corporation, the Federal Financing Bank, the National Credit Union Administration and the Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation.

Some obligations issued or guaranteed by U.S. government agencies and instrumentalities, including, for example, Ginnie Mae pass-through certificates, are supported by the full faith and credit of the U.S. Treasury. Other obligations issued by federal agencies, such as those securities issued by Fannie Mae, are not guaranteed by the U.S. government. No assurance can be given that the U.S. government will provide financial support to such issuers since the U.S. government is not so obligated by law. U.S. Treasury notes and bonds typically pay coupon interest semi-annually and repay the principal at maturity.

Since 2008, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been in conservatorship and have received significant capital support through U.S. Treasury preferred stock purchases, as well as U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve purchases of their mortgage-backed securities. The Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”) and the U.S. Treasury (through its agreement to purchase Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac preferred stock) have imposed strict limits on the size of their mortgage portfolios. The mortgage-backed security purchase programs ended in 2010. An FHFA stress test suggested that in a “severely adverse scenario” significant additional Treasury support might be required. No assurance can be given that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will remain successful in meeting their obligations with respect to the debt and mortgage-backed securities that they issue.

In addition, the problems faced by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, resulting in their being placed into federal conservatorship and receiving significant U.S. government support, have sparked serious debate among federal policy makers regarding the continued role of the U.S. government in providing liquidity for mortgage loans. In December 2011, Congress enacted the Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act of 2011 which, among other provisions, requires that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac increase their single-family guaranty fees by at least 10 basis points and remit this increase to Treasury with respect to all loans acquired by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac on or after April 1, 2012 and before January 1, 2022. Nevertheless, discussions among policymakers have continued as to whether Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac should be nationalized, privatized, restructured, or eliminated altogether. Fannie Mae has reported that there is “significant uncertainty regarding the future of our company, including how long the company will continue to exist in its current form, the extent of our role in the market, how long we will be in conservatorship, what form we will have and what ownership interest, if any, our current common and preferred stockholders will hold in us after the conservatorship is terminated, and whether we will continue to exist following conservatorship.” Freddie Mac faces similar uncertainty about its future role. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac also are the subject of several continuing legal actions and investigations related to certain accounting, disclosure, or corporate governance matters, which (along with any resulting financial restatements) may continue to have an adverse effect on the guaranteeing entities. Congress is currently considering several pieces of legislation that would reform U.S. government sponsored enterprises, proposing to address their structure, mission, portfolio limits, and guarantee fees, among other issues.

U.S. Treasury Obligations. U.S. Treasury obligations consist of bills, notes and bonds issued by the U.S. Treasury and separately traded interest and principal component parts of such obligations that are transferable through the federal book-entry system known as Separately Traded Registered Interest and Principal Securities (“STRIPS”) and Treasury Receipts (“TRs”).

Interests in separately traded interest and principal component parts of U.S. government obligations that are issued by banks or brokerage firms and are created by depositing U.S. government obligations into a special account at a custodian bank. The custodian holds the interest and principal payments for the benefit of the registered owners of the certificates or receipts. The custodian arranges for the issuance of the certificates or receipts evidencing ownership and maintains the register. TRs and STRIPS are interests in accounts sponsored by the U.S. Treasury. Receipts are sold as zero coupon securities.

U.S. Government Zero Coupon Securities. STRIPS and receipts are sold as zero coupon securities, that is, fixed income securities that have been stripped of their unmatured interest coupons. Zero coupon securities are typically sold at a (usually substantial) discount and redeemed at face value at their maturity date without interim cash payments of interest or principal. The amount of this discount is accreted over the life of the security, and the accretion constitutes the income earned on the security for both accounting and tax purposes. Because of these features, the market prices of zero coupon securities are generally more volatile than the market prices of securities that have similar maturity but that pay interest periodically. Zero coupon securities are likely to respond to a greater degree to interest rate changes than are non-zero coupon securities with similar maturity and credit qualities.

U.S. Government Agencies. Some obligations issued or guaranteed by agencies of the U.S. government are supported by the full faith and credit of the U.S. Treasury, others are supported by the right of the issuer to borrow from the U.S. Treasury, while still others are supported only by the credit of the instrumentality. Guarantees of principal by agencies or instrumentalities of the U.S. government may be a guarantee of payment at the maturity of the obligation so that in the event of a default prior to maturity there might not be a market and thus no means of realizing on the obligation prior to maturity. Guarantees as to the timely payment of principal and interest do not extend to the value or yield of these securities nor to the value of a Fund’s shares.

Foreign Securities

Each Fund may invest in non-U.S. securities and instruments, or in instruments that provide exposure to such securities and instruments. These instruments may include debt or equity securities. Investments in non-U.S. securities involve certain risks that may not be present with investments in U.S. securities. For example, investments in non-U.S. securities may be subject to risk of loss due to foreign currency fluctuations or to political or economic instability. There may be less information publicly available about non-U.S. issuers. Non-U.S. issuers may be subject to different accounting, auditing, financial reporting and investor protection standards than U.S. issuers. Investments in non-U.S. securities may be subject to withholding or other taxes and may be subject to additional trading, settlement, custodial, and operational risks (including restrictions on the transfers of securities). With respect to certain countries, there is the possibility of government intervention and expropriation or nationalization of assets. Because legal systems differ, there is also the possibility that it will be difficult to obtain or enforce legal judgments in certain countries.

Non-U.S. markets may not be as developed or efficient as, and may be more volatile than, those in the U.S. While the volume of shares traded on non-U.S. markets generally have been growing, such markets usually have substantially less volume than U.S. markets. Therefore, a Fund’s investments in non-U.S. securities may be less liquid and subject to more rapid and erratic price movements than comparable securities trading in the U.S. For example, non-U.S. equity securities may trade at price/earnings multiples higher than comparable U.S. securities and such levels may not be sustainable. There may be less government supervision and regulation of foreign stock exchanges, brokers, banks and listed companies abroad than in the U.S. Moreover, settlement practices for transactions in foreign markets may differ from those in U.S. markets. Such differences may include delays beyond periods customary in the U.S. and practices, such as delivery of securities prior to receipt of payment, that increase the likelihood of a failed settlement, which can result in losses to a Fund. Foreign exchanges may be open on days when a Fund does not price its shares, thus, the value of the securities in a Fund’s portfolio may change on days when shareholders will not be able to purchase or sell a Fund’s shares. Conversely, Fund shares may trade on days when foreign exchanges are closed. Each of these factors can make investments in a Fund more volatile and potentially less liquid than other types of investments. In addition, a Fund may change its creation or redemption procedures without notice in connection with restrictions on the transfer of securities. For more information on creation and redemption procedures, see “Creation and Redemption of Creation Units” herein.

Foreign brokerage commissions, custodial expenses and other fees are also generally higher than for securities traded in the U.S. This may cause a Fund to incur higher portfolio transaction costs than domestic funds. Fluctuations in exchange rates may also affect the earning power and asset value of the foreign entity issuing a security, even one denominated in U.S. dollars. Dividend and interest payments may be repatriated based on the exchange rate at the time of disbursement, but restrictions on capital flows may be imposed.

Economic conditions, such as volatile currency exchange rates and interest rates, political events and other conditions may, without prior warning, lead to government intervention and the imposition of “capital controls.” Countries use these controls to restrict volatile movements of capital entering (inflows) and exiting (outflows) their country to respond to certain economic conditions. Capital controls include the prohibition of, or restrictions on, the ability to transfer currency, securities or other assets. Levies may be placed on profits repatriated by foreign entities (such as a Fund). Capital controls may impact the ability of a Fund to create and redeem Creation Units, adversely affect the trading market for shares of a Fund, and cause shares of a Fund to trade at prices materially different from NAV. There can be no assurance that a country in which a Fund invests will not impose a form of capital control to the possible detriment of a Fund and its shareholders. A Fund may also be subject to delays in converting or transferring U.S. dollars to foreign currencies for the purpose of purchasing foreign securities. This may hinder a Fund’s performance, since any delay could result in a Fund missing an investment opportunity and purchasing securities at a higher price than originally intended, or incurring cash drag.

Investing in foreign companies may involve risks not typically associated with investing in companies domiciled in the United States. The value of securities denominated in foreign currencies, and of dividends from such securities, can change significantly when foreign currencies strengthen or weaken relative to the U.S. dollar. Foreign securities markets generally have less trading volume and less liquidity than U.S. markets, and prices in some foreign markets can be very volatile. Many foreign countries lack uniform accounting and disclosure standards comparable to those that apply to U.S. companies, and it may be more difficult to obtain reliable information regarding a foreign issuer’s financial condition and operations. In addition, the costs of foreign investing, including withholding taxes, brokerage commissions, and custodial fees, generally are higher than for U.S. investments. Investing in companies located abroad also carries political and economic risks distinct from those associated with investing in the United States. Foreign investment may be affected by actions of foreign governments adverse to the interests of U.S. investors, including the possibility of seizure, expropriation or nationalization of assets, including foreign deposits, confiscatory taxation, restrictions on U.S. investment, or on the ability to repatriate assets or to convert currency into U.S. dollars. There may be a greater possibility of default by foreign governments or foreign-government sponsored enterprises. Investments in foreign countries also involve a risk of local political, economic, or social instability, military action or unrest, or adverse diplomatic developments.

Geographic Focus. Funds that are less diversified across countries or geographic regions are generally riskier than more geographically diversified funds. To the extent a Fund focuses on a specific region, it will be more exposed to that region’s economic cycles, currency exchange rates, stock market valuations and political risks, among others, compared with a more geographically diversified fund. The economies and financial markets of certain regions, such as Asia, can be interdependent and may be adversely affected by the same events. Set forth below for certain markets in which a Fund may invest are brief descriptions of some of the conditions and risks in each such market.

Investments in Emerging Markets Securities. A Fund may invest in markets that are considered to be “emerging.” Investing in securities listed and traded in emerging markets may be subject to additional risks associated with emerging market economies. Such risks may include: (i) greater market volatility, (ii) greater risk of asset seizures and capital controls, (iii) lower trading volume and liquidity, (iv) greater social, political and economic uncertainty, (v) governmental controls on foreign investments and limitations on repatriation of invested capital, (vi) lower disclosure, corporate governance, auditing and financial reporting standards, (vii) fewer protections of property rights, (viii) restrictions on the transfer of securities or currency, and (ix) settlement and trading practices that differ from U.S. markets. Emerging markets are generally less liquid and less efficient than developed securities markets.

Investments in Frontier Market Securities. Frontier market countries generally have smaller economies and less developed capital markets or legal, regulatory and political systems than traditional emerging market countries. As a result, the risks of investing in emerging market countries are magnified in frontier market countries.

Investments in Asia. Investments in securities of issuers in Asian countries involve risks not typically associated with investments in securities of issuers in other regions. Such heightened risks include, among others, expropriation and/or nationalization of assets, confiscatory taxation, political instability, including authoritarian and/or military involvement in governmental decision-making, armed conflict and social instability as a result of religious, ethnic and/or socio-economic unrest. Certain Asian economies have experienced rapid rates of economic growth and industrialization in recent years, and there is no assurance that these rates of economic growth and industrialization will be maintained.

Certain Asian countries have democracies with relatively short histories, which may increase the risk of political instability. These countries have faced political and military unrest, and further unrest could present a risk to their local economies and securities markets. Indonesia and the Philippines have each experienced violence and terrorism, which has negatively impacted their economies. North Korea and South Korea each have substantial military capabilities, and historical tensions between the two countries present the risk of war; in the recent past, these tensions have escalated. Any outbreak of hostilities between the two countries could have a severe adverse effect on the South Korean economy and securities market. Increased political and social unrest in these geographic areas could adversely affect the performance of investments in this region.

Certain governments in this region administer prices on several basic goods, including fuel and electricity, within their respective countries. Certain governments may exercise substantial influence over many aspects of the private sector in their respective countries and may own or control many companies. Future government actions could have a significant effect on the economic conditions in this region, which in turn could have a negative impact on private sector companies. There is also the possibility of diplomatic developments adversely affecting investments in the region.

Corruption and the perceived lack of a rule of law in dealings with international companies in certain Asian countries may discourage foreign investment and could negatively impact the long-term growth of certain economies in this region. In addition, certain countries in the region are experiencing high unemployment and corruption, and have fragile banking sectors. Their securities markets are not as developed as those of other countries and, therefore, are subject to additional risks such as trading halts.

Some economies in this region are dependent on a range of commodities, including oil, natural gas and coal. Accordingly, they are strongly affected by international commodity prices and particularly vulnerable to any weakening in global demand for these products. The market for securities in this region may also be directly influenced by the flow of international capital, and by the economic and market conditions of neighboring countries. Adverse economic conditions or developments in neighboring countries may increase investors' perception of the risk of investing in the region as a whole, which may adversely impact the market value of the securities issued by companies in the region.

Investments in Brazil. Brazil has experienced economic instability resulting from, among other things, periods of very high inflation, persistent structural public sector deficits and significant devaluations of its currency, leading also to a high degree of price volatility in both the Brazilian equity and foreign currency markets. Brazilian companies may also be adversely affected by high interest and unemployment rates, fluctuations in commodity prices, significant public health concerns, and associated declines in tourism.

Investments in China. The Chinese economy is generally considered an emerging market and can be significantly affected by economic and political conditions and policy in China and surrounding Asian countries. Investments in Chinese securities, including those that are Hong Kong-listed and U.S.-listed securities, subject the Fund to risks specific to China. The economy of China, which has been in a state of transition from a planned economy to a more market oriented economy, differs from the economies of most developed countries in many respects, including the level of government involvement, its state of development, its growth rate, control of foreign exchange, and allocation of resources.

Although the majority of productive assets in China are still owned by the Chinese government at various levels, the Chinese government has implemented economic reform measures emphasizing utilization of market forces in the development of the economy of China and a high level of management autonomy. The economy of China has experienced significant growth in the past 20 years, but growth has been uneven both geographically and among various sectors of the economy. Economic growth has often been accompanied by periods of high inflation in China. The Chinese government has implemented various measures from time to time to control inflation and restrain the rate of economic growth.

The Chinese government has carried out economic reforms to achieve decentralization and utilization of market forces to develop the economy of China. These reforms have resulted in significant economic growth and social progress. There can, however, be no assurance that the Chinese government will continue to pursue such economic policies or, if it does, that those policies will continue to be successful. Any such adjustment and modification of those economic policies may have an adverse impact on the securities market in China, the portfolio securities of a Fund or a Fund itself. Further, the Chinese government may from time to time adopt corrective measures to control the growth of the Chinese economy, which may also have an adverse impact on the capital growth and performance of a Fund. Political changes, social instability and adverse diplomatic developments in China could result in the imposition of additional government restrictions including expropriation of assets, confiscatory taxes or nationalization of some or all of the property held by the underlying issuers of a Fund's portfolio securities. As the Chinese economy develops, its growth may slow significantly and sometimes unexpectedly. The laws, regulations, including the investment regulations allowing foreigners to invest in Chinese securities, government policies and political and economic climate in China may change with little or no advance notice. Any such change could adversely affect market conditions and the performance of the Chinese economy and, thus, the value of securities in a Fund's portfolio.

The Chinese government continues to be an active participant in many economic sectors through ownership positions and regulation. The allocation of resources in China is subject to a high level of government control. The Chinese government strictly regulates the payment of foreign currency denominated obligations and sets monetary policy. Through its policies, the government may provide preferential treatment to particular industries or companies. The policies set by the government could have a substantial effect on the Chinese economy and a Fund's investments. The Chinese government strictly regulates the payment of foreign currency denominated obligations and sets monetary policy, and may introduce new laws and regulations that have an adverse effect on a Fund.

In addition, the Chinese economy is export-driven and highly reliant on trade. Recent developments in relations between the United States and China have heightened concerns of increased tariffs and restrictions on trade between the two countries. An increase in tariffs or trade restrictions, or even the threat of such developments, could lead to a significant reduction in international trade, oversupply of certain manufactured goods, substantial price reductions of goods and possible failure of individual companies and/or large segments of China's export industry, all of which could have a negative impact on China's export industry and a commensurately negative impact on a Fund. In addition, worsening trade relations between the two countries could adversely impact a Fund, particularly to the extent that the Chinese government restricts foreign investments in on-shore Chinese companies or the U.S. government restricts investments by U.S. investors in China including by limiting the ability of Chinese issuers to list on the U.S. exchanges. Worsening trade relations may also result in market volatility and volatility in the price of Fund shares. In addition, the U.S. government has imposed restrictions on the ability of U.S. investors to hold and/or acquire securities of certain Chinese companies, which may adversely impact a Fund, may mean that the Fund's underlying index, if any, may need to adjust its methodology or could increase tracking error for the Fund.

A Fund's underlying index, if any, may include companies that are subject to economic or trade restrictions (but not investment restrictions) imposed by the U.S. or other governments due to national security, human rights or other concerns of such government and a Fund that seeks to track an underlying index is generally expected to invest in such companies as long as these restrictions do not include restrictions on investments.

There has been increased attention to Chinese companies from the U.S. government and U.S. regulators, including the Department of the Treasury (“DOT”) and its Office of Foreign Assets Control. On June 3, 2021, an amending executive order was issued to an executive order that was issued in November 2020, which established a new sanctions program designed to prohibit U.S. persons from entering into transactions in certain publicly traded securities, as well as derivatives and securities designed to provide investment exposure to such securities, of certain companies specified in the executive order. A number of Chinese issuers have been designated under this program and more could be added. Under current guidance, U.S. investors may purchase interests in an investment fund that does not make any new purchases of designated securities and is “seeking to” divest its holdings of such securities during the applicable divestment period. On August 9, 2023, the DOT issued regulations which will prohibit or require notification of investments by certain U.S. persons in certain sub-sets of national security technologies and products including semiconductors and microelectronics, quantum information technologies and certain artificial intelligence systems in or related to “countries of concern,” defined as China including Hong Kong and Macau. These regulations are in effect as of January 2, 2025. As a result, the executive orders and related guidance may significantly reduce the liquidity of such securities, force a Fund to sell certain positions at inopportune times or for unfavorable prices, and restrict future investments by a Fund.

The performance of the Chinese economy may differ favorably or unfavorably from the U.S. economy in such respects as growth of gross domestic product, rate of inflation, currency depreciation, capital reinvestment, resource self-sufficiency and balance of payments position. Adverse changes to the economic conditions of its primary trading partners, such as the United States, Japan and South Korea, would adversely impact the Chinese economy and a Fund’s investments. A downturn in the economies of China’s primary trading partners could also slow or eliminate the growth of the Chinese economy and adversely impact a Fund’s investments. Moreover, the slowdown in other significant economies of the world, such as the United States, the European Union (“EU”) and certain Asian countries, may adversely affect economic growth in China. An economic downturn in China would likely adversely affect a Fund’s investments.

The regulatory and legal framework for capital markets in China may not be as well developed as those of developed countries. Chinese laws and regulations affecting securities markets are relatively new and evolving, and enforcement of these regulations involve significant uncertainties. No assurance can be given that changes in such laws and regulations, their interpretation or their enforcement will not have a material adverse effect on their business operations or on a Fund.

A Fund may obtain exposure to companies based or operated in the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) by investing through legal structures known as variable interest entities (“VIEs”). Because of Chinese governmental restrictions on non-Chinese ownership of companies in certain industries in the PRC, certain Chinese companies have used VIEs to facilitate foreign investment without distributing direct ownership of companies based or operated in the PRC. In such cases, the Chinese operating company establishes an offshore entity, and the offshore entity enters into contractual arrangements (such as powers of attorney, equity pledge agreements and other services or business cooperation agreements) with the operating company. These contractual arrangements are intended to give the offshore entity the ability to exercise power over and obtain economic rights from the operating company. Shares of the offshore entity, in turn, are listed and traded on exchanges outside of the PRC and are available to non-Chinese investors such as a Fund. This arrangement allows non-Chinese investors in the offshore entity to obtain economic exposure to the Chinese company without direct equity ownership in the Chinese company.

Although VIEs are a longstanding industry practice and well known to officials and regulators in the PRC, VIEs are not formally recognized under Chinese law. There is a risk that the PRC may cease to tolerate VIEs at any time or impose new restrictions on the structure, in each case either generally or with respect to specific industries, sectors or companies. Investments involving a VIE may also pose additional risks because such investments are made through an entity whose interests in the underlying operating company are established through contract rather than through equity ownership. For example, in the event of a dispute, the offshore entity’s contractual claims with respect to the operating company may be deemed unenforceable in the PRC, thus limiting (or eliminating) the remedies and rights available to the offshore entity and its investors. Such legal uncertainty may also be exploited against the interests of the offshore entity and its investors. Further, the interests of the equity owners of the operating company may conflict with the interests of the investors of the offshore entity, and the fiduciary duties of the officers and directors of the operating company may differ from, or conflict with, the fiduciary duties of the officers and directors of the offshore entity. Foreign companies listed on U.S. exchanges, including offshore entities that utilize a VIE structure, also could face delisting or other ramifications for failure to meet the requirements of the SEC, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”) or other United States regulators or due to worsening relations between the countries, which would significantly decrease the liquidity and value of the securities. Audits performed by PCAOB-registered accounting firms in mainland China and Hong Kong may be less reliable than those performed by firms subject to PCAOB inspection. Accordingly, information about the Chinese securities in which a Fund invests may be less reliable or complete. Under amendments to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act enacted in December 2020, which requires that the PCAOB be permitted to inspect the accounting firm of a U.S.-listed Chinese issuer, Chinese companies with securities listed on U.S. exchanges may be delisted if the PCAOB is unable to inspect the accounting firm. Any of the foregoing risks and events could negatively impact a Fund’s performance.

Although China has begun the process of privatizing certain sectors of its economy, privatized entities may lose money and/or be re-nationalized. Accordingly, an investment in a Fund involves a risk of total loss. In the Chinese securities markets, a small number of issuers may represent a large portion of the entire market. The Chinese securities markets are characterized by relatively frequent trading halts and low trading volume, resulting in substantially less liquidity and greater price volatility. These risks may be more pronounced for the A Share market than for Chinese equity securities markets generally because the A Share market is subject to greater government restrictions and control, including the risk of nationalization or expropriation of private assets which could result in a total loss of an investment in a Fund.

Internal social unrest or confrontations with other neighboring countries, including military conflicts in response to such events, may also disrupt economic development in China and result in a greater risk of currency fluctuations, currency convertibility, interest rate fluctuations and higher rates of inflation. China has experienced security concerns, such as terrorism and strained international relations. Incidents involving China's or the region's security may cause uncertainty in Chinese markets and may adversely affect the Chinese economy and the Fund's investments.

Repatriations of gains and income on PRC securities may require the approval of China's State Administration of Foreign Exchange ("SAFE") and principal invested pursuant to the PRC securities quota may be subject to repatriation restrictions, depending on the license used and the period from remittance of funds into China.

Currently, there are two stock exchanges in mainland China, the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. The Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges are supervised by the China Securities Regulatory Commission ("CSRC") and are highly automated with trading and settlement executed electronically. The Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges are substantially smaller, less liquid and more volatile than the major securities markets in the United States.

The Shanghai Stock Exchange commenced trading on December 19, 1990, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange commenced trading on July 3, 1991 and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange commenced trading on April 2, 1986. The Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges divide listed shares into two classes: A-Shares and B-Shares. Companies whose shares are traded on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges that are incorporated in mainland China may issue both A-Shares and B-Shares. In China, the A-Shares and B-Shares of an issuer trade on one exchange. A-Shares and B-Shares may both be listed on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Both classes represent an ownership interest comparable to a share of common stock. A-Shares are traded on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges in Chinese currency. B-Shares are traded on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges in Hong Kong dollars and U.S. dollars, respectively.

Foreign investors had historically been unable to participate in the PRC securities market. However, in late 2002, Investment Regulations promulgated by the CSRC came into effect, which were replaced by the updated Investment Regulations (i.e., "Measures for the Administration of the Securities Investments of Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors in the PRC"), which came into effect on September 1, 2006, that provided a legal framework for certain Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors ("QFIIs") to invest in PRC securities and certain other securities historically not eligible for investment by non-Chinese investors, through quotas granted by SAFE to those QFIIs which have been approved by the CSRC. The RMB QFII ("RQFII") program was instituted in December 2011 and is substantially similar to the QFII program, but provides for greater flexibility in repatriating assets. In 2020, the PRC government eliminated QFII and RQFII quotas, meaning that entities registered with the appropriate Chinese regulator will no longer be subject to quotas when investing in PRC securities (but will remain subject to foreign shareholder limits), and merged the two programs into the Qualified Foreign Investor regime ("QFI").

In November 2014, the PRC government launched the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect program, which allows investors with brokerage accounts in Hong Kong to invest in certain A-Shares without a QFI license. A similar stock connect program, the Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Connect program, launched in November 2016, and the Shanghai-London Stock Connect Program and the China-Japan Stock Connect both launched in June 2019 (together, the "Stock Connect Programs").

In February 2016, the People's Bank of China established a program that permits foreign investors to invest directly in securities traded on the Chinese Interbank Bond Market ("CIBM"), even without a QFI license ("CIBM Program"). If a Fund participates in the CIBM Program, a PRC onshore settlement agent will be appointed for a Fund, which is required by the CIBM Program.

Bond Connect, a mutual market access scheme, commenced trading on July 3, 2017 and represents an exception to Chinese laws that generally restrict foreign investment in RMB Bonds. In August 2018, Bond Connect enhanced its settlement system to fully implement real-time delivery-versus-payment settlement of trades, which has resulted in increased adoption of Bond Connect by investors. However, if a Fund participates in Bond Connect, there is a risk that Chinese regulators may alter all or part of the structure and terms of, as well as the Fund's access to, Bond Connect in the future or eliminate it altogether, which may limit or prevent the Fund from investing directly in or selling its RMB Bonds.

There is no guarantee that any applicable quota received by Krane to invest in PRC securities will not be modified or revoked in the future. Additionally, given that the PRC securities markets are considered volatile and unstable, the creation and redemption of Creation Units may also be disrupted. A participating dealer may not redeem or create Creation Units of a Fund for securities if it believes PRC securities are not available.

PRC Custodian and Dealer/Settlement Agent

A Fund is responsible for selecting the PRC Dealer/Settlement Agent to execute certain transactions for a Fund in the PRC markets. Krane can currently only use a limited number of PRC Dealers/Settlement Agents and may use more than one PRC Dealer/Settlement Agent for accessing some securities. Should, for any reason, a Fund's ability to use a given PRC Dealer/Settlement Agent be affected, this could disrupt the operations of a Fund or cause a premium or a discount to the trading price of a Fund's shares. A Fund may also incur losses due to the acts or omissions of either the relevant PRC Dealer/Settlement Agent or the PRC Custodian in the execution or settlement of any transaction or in the transfer of any funds or securities. Subject to the applicable laws and regulations in the PRC, Krane will make arrangements to ensure that the PRC Dealers/Settlement Agents and PRC Custodian have appropriate procedures to properly seek to safe-keep a Fund's assets.

According to the applicable Chinese regulations and market practice, the securities and cash accounts for a Fund held in the PRC pursuant to a QFI license are to be maintained in the joint names of Krane as the QFI holder and the Fund. Krane may not use the account for any other purpose than for maintaining a Fund's assets. However, given that the securities trading account will or would be maintained in the joint names of Krane and the Fund, the Fund's assets may not be as well protected as they would be if it were possible for them to be registered and held solely in the name of the Fund. In particular, there is a risk that creditors of Krane or the sub-adviser may assert that the securities are owned by Krane and not the Fund, and that a court would uphold such an assertion, in which case creditors of Krane or the sub-adviser could seize assets of the Fund. Because the QFI license would be in the name of Krane or the sub-adviser and the Fund, there is also a risk that regulatory actions taken against Krane or the sub-adviser by PRC government authorities may affect the Fund.

Investors should note that cash deposited in the cash account of a Fund with the PRC Custodian will not be segregated but will be a debt owing from the PRC Custodian to a Fund as a depositor. Such cash will be co-mingled with cash belonging to other clients of the PRC Custodian. In the event of bankruptcy or liquidation of the PRC Custodian, a Fund will not have any proprietary rights to the cash deposited in such cash account, and a Fund will become an unsecured creditor, ranking pari passu with all other unsecured creditors, of the PRC Custodian. A Fund may face difficulty and/or encounter delays in recovering such debt, or may not be able to recover it in full or at all, in which case a Fund will suffer losses.

In the event of any default of either the relevant PRC Dealer/Settlement Agent or the PRC Custodian (directly or through its delegate) in the execution or settlement of any transaction or in the transfer of any funds or securities in the PRC, a Fund may encounter delays in recovering its assets which may in turn adversely impact the NAV of that Fund.

Specific Risks of Investing in the A-Shares Market

The Funds may invest in A-Shares through a QFI license from CSRC and an A-Shares quota from SAFE, the Stock Connect Programs, and other investment companies, including other exchange-traded funds ("ETFs") which may be advised or otherwise serviced by Krane. The Stock Connect Programs are exceptions to Chinese law, which generally restricts foreign investment in A Shares. These programs are novel. Chinese regulators may alter or eliminate these programs at any time.

Because restrictions continue to exist and capital therefore cannot flow freely into and out of the A-Share market, it is possible that in the event of a market disruption, the liquidity of the A-Share market and trading prices of A-Shares could be more severely affected than the liquidity and trading prices of markets where securities are freely tradable and capital therefore flows more freely. A Fund cannot predict the nature or duration of such a market disruption or the impact that it may have on the A-Share market and the short-term and long-term prospects of its investments in the A-Share market. In the event that a Fund invests in A-Shares directly, a Fund may incur significant losses, or may not be able fully to implement or pursue its investment objectives or strategies, due to investment restrictions on QFIs, illiquidity of the Chinese securities markets, or delay or disruption in execution or settlement of trades. A-Shares may become subject to frequent and widespread trading halts.

The Chinese government has in the past taken actions that benefitted holders of A-Shares. As A-Shares become more available to foreign investors, such as a Fund, the Chinese government may be less likely to take action that would benefit holders of A-Shares. In addition, there is no guarantee that an A-Shares quota will be sufficient for a Fund's intended scope of investment.

The regulations which apply to investments by QFIs are relatively new and are unique to PRC investment schemes. The application and interpretation of such regulations are therefore relatively untested. In addition, there is little precedent or certainty evidencing how such discretion may be exercised now or in the future; and even if there were precedent, it may provide little guidance as PRC authorities would likely continue to have broad discretion.

If a Fund obtains a QFI license to invest in A-Shares, Krane will be required to transfer the entire investment principal into a local sub-custodian account within such time period as specified by SAFE. These limitations may also prevent a Fund from making certain distributions to shareholders.

Repatriations by QFIs are currently permitted daily and are not subject to repatriation restrictions or prior regulatory approval. However, there is no assurance that PRC rules and regulations will not change or that repatriation restrictions will not be imposed in the future. Further, such changes to the PRC rules and regulations may be applied retroactively. Any restrictions on repatriation of a Fund's portfolio investments could have an adverse effect on a Fund's ability to meet redemption requests.

If a Fund invests in A-Shares directly through a QFI license, it would be required to select a PRC sub-custodian for its investments in A-Shares, which is a mainland commercial bank qualified as a custodian for QFIs ("PRC custodian"). Given that the securities in an A-Shares trading account would be maintained in the joint names of Krane and a Fund, a Fund's assets may not be as well protected as they would be if it were possible for them to be registered and held solely in the name of a Fund. In particular, there is a risk that creditors of Krane may assert that the securities are owned by Krane and not a Fund, and that a court would uphold such an assertion, in which case creditors of Krane could seize assets of a Fund. There would also be a risk that regulatory actions taken against Krane might affect a Fund.

The Chinese government limits foreign investment in the securities of certain Chinese issuers and prohibits certain investments entirely. For example, currently, no single underlying foreign investor may hold more than 10% of the total outstanding shares in one listed company and all foreign investors may not hold, in aggregate, more than 30% of the total outstanding shares in one listed company. Such limits may not apply where foreign investors make strategic investment in listed companies in accordance with the Measures for the Administration of Strategic Investments in Listed Companies by Foreign Investors. Any restrictions or limitations could have adverse effects on the liquidity and performance of a Fund's holdings, which would increase the risk of tracking error and, at the worst, result in a Fund not being able to achieve its investment objective.

Regulations adopted by the CSRC and SAFE specify that all A-Shares purchased or sold through a QFI license must be executed through a specified set of brokers per exchange. Should a Fund's ability to use the relevant PRC broker be affected for any reason, it could disrupt the operations of a Fund, causing a premium or discount in the trading price of a Fund's shares relative to NAV. A Fund may also incur losses due to the acts or omissions of the PRC broker in the execution of any transaction or the transfer of funds or securities. In addition, limiting transactions to a particular PRC broker may result in higher brokerage commissions paid by a Fund.

If a Fund purchases A-Shares through a QFI license, a Fund, per Chinese regulations, would be required to maintain its securities and cash accounts in the PRC in the joint names of a Fund and the QFI holder. Although the accounts cannot be used for any purpose other than maintaining a Fund's assets, such assets may not be as well protected as they would be if they were registered and held solely in the name of a Fund. In particular, there is a risk that creditors of the QFI holder may seek to assert ownership in the event of such entity's bankruptcy or the like. Adverse actions taken against the QFI holder may also adversely impact the accounts.

If a Fund purchases A-Shares through a QFI license, cash deposited in the cash account of a Fund with the PRC custodian would not normally be, in fact, segregated for the benefit of a Fund, but will likely be deemed a general debt of the PRC custodian owing to a Fund as depositor. Such cash accordingly would be commingled with the cash of other clients of the PRC custodian. In the event of such custodian's bankruptcy or the like, it is unlikely that a Fund would have proprietary rights to the cash it deposited. Instead, a Fund would likely become an unsecured creditor, ranking pari passu with all other unsecured creditors of the custodian. A Fund may face delays in recovering the cash and may be unable to recover it at all.

In addition to investing directly in A-Shares, a Fund may seek exposure to China A-Shares by investing in depositary receipts, H shares or B-Shares on the component securities. The A Shares market may behave very differently from the B-Shares, H-Shares, and N-Shares and there may be little to no correlation between their performance. A Fund may also use derivatives or invest in ETFs that provide comparable exposures. If necessary, a Fund may suspend the sale of shares in Creation Units until it is determined that the requisite exposure to the component securities of the underlying index, if any, is obtainable. During the period that creations are suspended, Fund shares may trade at a significant premium or discount to net asset value (the "NAV"). Alternatively, a Fund may change its investment objective and track another index of Chinese-related stocks. In extreme circumstances beyond the control of a Fund, a Fund may incur significant losses due to limited investment capabilities, including based on the illiquidity of the Chinese securities markets, or delay or disruption in execution or settlement of trades. A-Shares may be subject to more frequent and/or extended trading halts than other exchange-traded securities.

The ability of a Fund to buy and sell A-Shares through the Stock Connect Programs on a particular day may be affected by public holidays of the participating exchanges, which differ.

Tax Risk. Per a circular (Caishui [2014] 79), the Fund is temporarily exempt from the Chinese tax on capital gains ("CGT") on trading in A-Shares as a QFI on the Shanghai Stock Exchange through the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect as of November 17, 2014, and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange through the Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Connect as of December 5, 2016. There is no indication as to how long the temporary exemption will remain in effect. Accordingly, the Funds may be subject to such taxes in the future.

When the QFI transfers A-Shares and B-Shares, PRC Stamp Duty is currently imposed on the seller but not on the purchaser, at a rate of 0.1% on the transacted value. In addition, under the current PRC Business Tax ("BT") Law, which came into effect on January 1, 2009, taxpayer would be subject to PRC BT at a rate of 5% in respect of capital gains derived from the trading of A-Shares. However, Caishui [2005] 155 grants BT exemption to QFIs in respect of their gains derived from the trading of PRC securities (including A-Shares). The new BT Law, which came into effect on January 1, 2009, has not changed this exemption treatment at the time of this Prospectus. Dividend income or profit distributions on equity investment derived from China are not included in the taxable scope of BT.

Urban maintenance and construction tax (currently at the rate ranging from 1% to 7%), educational surcharges (currently at the rate of 3%) and local educational surcharges (currently at the rate of 2%) are imposed based on the business tax liabilities.

Each Fund reserves the right to establish a reserve for taxes which present uncertainty as to whether they will be assessed, although it currently does not do so. If a Fund establishes such a reserve but is not ultimately subject to these taxes, shareholders who redeemed or sold their shares while the reserve was in place will effectively bear the tax and may not benefit from the later release, if any, of the reserve. Conversely, if a Fund does not establish such a reserve but ultimately is subject to the tax, shareholders who redeemed or sold their shares prior to the tax being withheld, reserved or paid will have effectively avoided the tax. Investors should note that such provision, if any, may be excessive or inadequate to meet actual tax liabilities (which could include interest and penalties) on a Fund's investments. As a result, investors may be advantaged or disadvantaged depending on the final rules of the relevant tax authorities.

Investments in swaps and other derivatives may be subject to special U.S. federal income tax rules that could adversely affect the character, timing and amount of income earned by a Fund (e.g., by causing amounts that would be capital gain to be taxed as ordinary income or to be taken into income earlier than would otherwise be necessary). Also, a Fund may be required to periodically adjust its positions in its swaps and derivatives to comply with certain regulatory requirements which may further cause these investments to be less efficient than a direct investment in the securities themselves. For example, swaps in which a Fund may invest may need to be reset on a regular basis in order to maintain compliance with the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended (the “1940 Act”), which may increase the likelihood that a Fund will generate short-term capital gains. In addition, because the application of these special rules may be uncertain, it is possible that the manner in which they are applied by a Fund may be determined to be incorrect. In that event, a Fund may be found to have failed to maintain its qualification as a RIC or to be subject to additional U.S. tax liability. Moreover, a Fund may make investments, both directly and through swaps or other derivative positions, in companies classified as passive foreign investment companies (“PFICs”) for U.S. federal income tax purposes. Investments in PFICs are subject to special tax rules which may result in adverse tax consequences to a Fund and its shareholders.

Currency, Capital Controls and Currency Conversion Risk. Economic conditions and political events may lead to foreign government intervention and the imposition of additional or renewed capital controls in China, which may impact the ability of a Fund to buy, sell or otherwise transfer securities or currency, and limit a Fund’s ability to pay redemptions, and cause a Fund to decline in value. Although the RMB is not presently freely convertible, there is no assurance that repatriation restrictions will not be (re-)imposed in the future. Because each Fund’s NAV is determined on the basis of U.S. dollars, a Fund may lose value if the RMB depreciates against the U.S. dollar, even if the local currency value of a Fund’s holdings goes up. A Fund may also be subject to delays in converting or transferring U.S. dollars to RMB for the purpose of purchasing A Shares. This may hinder its performance, including because any delay could result in the Fund missing an investment opportunity and purchasing securities at a higher price than originally intended, or incurring cash drag.

China B-Shares. The Funds may invest in shares of companies incorporated in mainland China that are traded in the mainland B-Share markets. B-Shares were originally intended to be available only to foreign investors or foreign institutions. However, since February 2001, B-Shares have been available to domestic individual investors who trade through legal foreign currency accounts. Unlike prices in the A-Share market, the prices of B-Shares are quoted in foreign currencies. The B-Share market commenced operations in April 1991 and was originally opened exclusively for foreign investors. In 2001, the B-Share market opened to Chinese domestic individual investors as well. However, Chinese domestic individual investors must trade with legal foreign currency accounts. The China B-Share market is composed of the Shanghai Stock Exchange (which settles in U.S. dollars) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (which settles in Hong Kong dollars). The China B-Share market is generally smaller, less liquid and has a smaller issuer base than the China A-Share market. The A-Shares market may behave very differently from the B-Shares market, and there may be little to no correlation between the performance of the two.

China H-Shares. The Funds may invest in shares of companies incorporated in mainland China and listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. H-Shares are traded in Hong Kong dollars on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, and must meet Hong Kong’s listing and disclosure requirements. H-Shares may be traded by foreigners and offer a vehicle to foreigners to gain exposure to Chinese securities. Because they are traded on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, H-Shares involve a number of risks not typically associated with investing in countries with more democratic governments or more established economies or securities markets. Such risks may include the risk of nationalization or expropriation; greater social, economic and political uncertainty; increased competition from Asia’s other low-cost emerging economies; currency exchange rate fluctuations; higher rates of inflation; controls on foreign investment and limitations on repatriation of invested capital; and greater governmental involvement in and control over the economy. Fluctuations in the value of the Hong Kong dollar will affect a Fund’s holdings of H-Shares. The Hong Kong stock market may behave very differently from the domestic Chinese stock market and there may be little to no correlation between the performance of the Hong Kong stock market and the domestic Chinese stock market.

China N-Shares. The Funds may invest in shares of companies with business operations in mainland China and listed on an American stock exchange, such as NYSE or Nasdaq. N-Shares are traded in U.S. dollars. N-Shares are issued by companies incorporated anywhere, but many are registered in Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, the British Virgin Islands, or the United States. Because companies issuing N-Shares often have business operations in China, they are subject to certain political and economic risks in China.

P-Chip Companies. The Funds may invest in shares of companies with controlling private Chinese shareholders that are incorporated outside mainland China and listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. These businesses are often run by the private sector and have a majority of their business operations in mainland China. P-Chip shares are traded in Hong Kong dollars on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, and may also be traded by foreigners. Because they are traded on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, P-Chips are also subject to risks similar to those associated with investments in H-Shares. They are also subject to risks affecting their jurisdiction of incorporation, including any legal or tax changes. Private Chinese companies may be more indebted, more susceptible to adverse changes in the economy, subject to asset seizures and nationalization, and negative political or legal developments.

Red Chip Companies. The Funds may invest in shares of companies with controlling Chinese shareholders that are incorporated outside mainland China, have a majority of their business operations in mainland China, and listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. These businesses are controlled, either directly or indirectly, by the central, provincial or municipal governments of the PRC. Red Chip shares are traded in Hong Kong dollars on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and may also be traded by foreigners. Because Red Chip companies are controlled by various PRC governmental authorities, investing in Red Chips involves risks that political changes, social instability, regulatory uncertainty, adverse diplomatic developments, asset expropriation or nationalization, or confiscatory taxation could adversely affect the performance of Red Chip companies. Red Chip companies may be less efficiently run and less profitable than other companies.

S-Chip Companies. The Funds may invest in shares of companies with business operations in mainland China and listed on the Singapore Exchange (“S-Chips”). S-Chip shares are issued by companies incorporated anywhere, but many are registered in Singapore, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, or Bermuda. They are subject to risks affecting their jurisdiction of incorporation, including any legal or tax changes. S-Chip companies may or may not be owned at least in part by a Chinese central, provincial or municipal government and be subject to the types of risks that come with such ownership described herein. There may be little or no correlation between the performance of the Singapore stock market and the mainland Chinese stock market.

Disclosure of Interests and Short Swing Profit Rule. The Funds may be subject to shareholder disclosure of interest regulations promulgated by the CSRC. These regulations currently require a Fund to make certain public disclosures when a Fund and parties acting in concert with a Fund acquire 5% or more of the issued securities of a listed company. If the reporting requirement is triggered, a Fund will be required to report information which includes, but is not limited to: (a) information about a Fund and the type and extent of its holdings in the company; (b) a statement of a Fund’s purposes for the investment and whether a Fund intends to increase its holdings over the following 12-month period; (c) a statement of a Fund’s historical investments in the company over the previous six months; (d) the time of, and other information relating to, the transaction that triggered a Fund’s holding in the listed company reaching the 5% reporting threshold; and (e) other information that may be required by the CSRC or the stock exchange. Additional information may be required if a Fund and its concerted parties constitute the largest shareholder or actual controlling shareholder of the listed company. The report must be made to the CSRC, the stock exchange, the invested company, and the CSRC local representative office where the listed company is located. A Fund would also be required to make a public announcement through a media outlet designated by the CSRC. The public announcement must contain the same content as the official report.

The relevant PRC regulations presumptively treat all affiliated investors and investors under common control as parties acting in concert. As such, under a conservative interpretation of these regulations, a Fund may be deemed as a “concert party” of other funds managed by Krane and/or its affiliates and therefore may be subject to the risk that a Fund’s holdings may be required to be reported in the aggregate with the holdings of such other funds should the aggregate holdings trigger the reporting threshold under the PRC law.

If the 5% shareholding threshold is triggered by a Fund and parties acting in concert with the Fund, the Fund would be required to file its report within three days of the date the threshold is reached. During the time limit for filing the report, a trading freeze applies and the Fund would not be permitted to make subsequent trades in the invested company's securities. Any such trading freeze may impair the ability of the Fund to achieve its investment objective and undermine the Fund's performance, if a Fund would otherwise make trades during that period but is prevented from doing so by the regulation.

Once a Fund and parties acting in concert reach the 5% trading threshold as to any listed company, any subsequent incremental increase or decrease of 5% or more will trigger a further reporting requirement and an additional three-day trading freeze, and also an additional freeze on trading within two days of a Fund's report and announcement of the incremental change. These trading freezes may undermine a Fund's performance as described above. Also, Shanghai Stock Exchange requirements currently require a Fund and parties acting in concert, once they have reach the 5% threshold, to disclose whenever their shareholding drops below this threshold (even as a result of trading which is less than the 5% incremental change that would trigger a reporting requirement under the relevant CSRC regulation). CSRC regulations also contain additional disclosure (and tender offer) requirements that apply when an investor and parties acting in concert reach thresholds of 20% and greater than 30% shareholding in a company.

Subject to the interpretation of PRC courts and PRC regulators, the operation of the PRC short swing profit rule may prevent a Fund from reducing its holdings in a PRC company within six months of the last purchase of shares of the company if the Fund's holding in that company exceeds the threshold prescribed by the relevant exchange on which the PRC company's shares are listed. If a Fund's holdings are aggregated with other investors deemed as acting as concert parties of a Fund, a Fund will be subject to these restrictions even though it may not have caused or benefited by the activity. If a Fund violates the rule, it may be required by the listed company to return any profits realized from such trading to the listed company. In addition, the rule limits the ability of a Fund to repurchase securities of the listed company within six months of such sale. Moreover, under PRC civil procedures, a Fund's assets may be frozen to the extent of the claims made by the company in question. These risks may greatly impair the performance of a Fund.

Investments in Eastern Europe. Many countries in Eastern Europe are in their infancy and are developing rapidly, but such countries may lack the social, political and economic stability of more developed countries. Emerging market countries in Europe will be significantly affected by the fiscal and monetary controls of the European Monetary Union. Changes in regulations on trade, decreasing imports or exports, changes in the exchange rate of the euro and recessions among European countries may have a significant adverse effect on the economies of other European countries including those of Eastern Europe. The markets in Eastern Europe remain relatively undeveloped and can be particularly sensitive to political and economic developments, including those relating to Russia. Additionally, the small size and inexperience of the securities markets in Eastern European countries and the limited volume of trading in securities in those markets may make a Fund's investments in such countries illiquid or more volatile than investments in more developed countries.

Investments in Germany. Investment in German issuers subjects a Fund to legal, regulatory, political, currency, security, and economic risks specific to Germany. Recently, new concerns have emerged in relation to the economic health of the European Union. These concerns have led to downward pressure on the earnings of certain European issuers, including German financial services companies. Secessionist movements, such as the Catalan movement in Spain, may have an adverse effect on the German economy. The German economy is dependent to a significant extent on the economies of certain key trading partners, including the Netherlands, China, United States, United Kingdom, France, Italy and other European countries. Reduction in spending on German products and services, or changes in any of its key trading partners' economies may have an adverse impact on the German economy. Recent developments in relations between the United States and its trading partners have heightened concerns of increased tariffs and restrictions on trade between the countries. An increase in tariffs or trade restrictions, or even the threat of such developments, could lead to a significant reduction in international trade, which could have a negative impact on Germany's export industry and a commensurately negative impact on a Fund. In addition, heavy regulation of labor, energy and product markets in Germany may have an adverse impact on German issuers. Such regulations may negatively impact economic growth or cause prolonged periods of recession.

Investments in Hong Kong. The Funds may invest in securities listed and traded on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. In addition to the risks of investing in non-U.S. securities, investing in securities listed and traded in Hong Kong involves special considerations not typically associated with investing in countries with more democratic governments or more established economies or securities markets. Such risks may include: (i) the risk of nationalization or expropriation of assets or confiscatory taxation; (ii) greater social, economic and political uncertainty (including the risk of war); (iii) dependency on exports and the corresponding importance of international trade; (iv) increasing competition from Asia's other low-cost emerging economies; (v) currency exchange rate fluctuations and the lack of available currency hedging instruments; (vi) higher rates of inflation; (vii) controls on foreign investment and limitations on repatriation of invested capital and on a Fund's ability to exchange local currencies for U.S. dollars; (viii) greater governmental involvement in and control over the economy; (ix) the risk that the Chinese government may decide not to continue to support the economic reform programs implemented since 1978 and could return to the prior, completely centrally planned, economy; (x) the fact that Chinese companies, particularly those located in China, may be smaller, less seasoned and newly organized; (xi) the differences in, or lack of, auditing and financial reporting standards which may result in unavailability of material information about issuers, particularly in China; (xii) the fact that statistical information regarding the economy of China may be inaccurate or not comparable to statistical information regarding the U.S. or other economies; (xiii) the less extensive, and still developing, regulation of the securities markets, business entities and commercial transactions; (xiv) the fact that the settlement period of securities transactions in foreign markets may be longer; (xv) the fact that the willingness and ability of the Chinese government to support the Chinese and Hong Kong economies and markets is uncertain; (xvi) the risk that it may be more difficult, or impossible, to obtain and/or enforce a judgment than in other countries; (xvii) the rapidity and erratic nature of growth, particularly in China, resulting in inefficiencies and dislocations; (xviii) the risk that, because of the degree of interconnectivity between the economies and financial markets of China and Hong Kong, any sizable reduction in the demand for goods from China, or an economic downturn in China, could negatively affect the economy and financial market of Hong Kong as well; and (xix) the risk that certain companies in a Fund's underlying index, if any, may have dealings with countries subject to sanctions or embargoes imposed by the U.S. Government or identified as state sponsors of terrorism.

Investments in Hong Kong are also subject to certain political risks. Following the establishment of the People's Republic of China by the Communist Party in 1949, the Chinese government renounced various debt obligations incurred by China's predecessor governments, which obligations remain in default, and expropriated assets without compensation. There can be no assurance that the Chinese government will not take similar action in the future. An investment in a Fund involves risk of a total loss. China has committed by treaty to preserve Hong Kong's autonomy and its economic, political and social freedoms for 50 years from the July 1, 1997 transfer of sovereignty from Great Britain to China. However, if China would exert its authority so as to alter the economic, political or legal structures or the existing social policy of Hong Kong, or is followed by political or economic disruptions, investor and business confidence in Hong Kong could be negatively affected, which in turn could negatively affect markets and business performance. These and other factors could have a negative impact on a Fund's performance.

Investments in India. Foreign investment in the securities of issuers in India is usually restricted or controlled to some degree. Under normal circumstances, income, gains and initial capital with respect to such investments are freely repatriable, subject to payment of applicable Indian taxes. There can be no assurance that these investment control regimes will not change in a way that makes it more difficult or impossible for a Fund to implement its investment objective or repatriate its income, gains and initial capital from India.

The Indian government exercises significant influence over many aspects of the economy. Government actions, bureaucratic obstacles and inconsistent economic reform could have a significant effect on the economy and a Fund's investments in India. There can be no assurance that the Indian government in the future, whether for purposes of managing its balance of payments or for other reasons, will not impose restrictions on foreign capital remittances abroad or otherwise modify the exchange control regime applicable to foreign institutional investors in such a way that may adversely affect the ability of a Fund to repatriate its income and capital.

Founders and their families control many Indian companies. Corporate governance standards of family-controlled companies may be weaker and less transparent, which increases the potential for loss and unequal treatment of investors. The securities market in India is substantially smaller, less liquid and significantly more volatile than the securities market in the U.S. Exchanges have also experienced problems such as temporary exchange closures, broker defaults, settlement delays and broker strikes that, if they occur again in the future, could affect the market prices and liquidity of the Indian securities in which a Fund invests. In addition, the governing bodies of the various Indian stock exchanges have from time to time imposed restrictions on trading in certain securities, limits on price movements and margin requirements. The relatively small market capitalizations of, and trading values on, the principal stock exchanges may cause a Fund's investments in securities listed on these exchanges to be comparatively less liquid and subject to greater price volatility than comparable U.S. investments.

Religious, cultural and border disputes persist in India. The Indian government has confronted separatist movements in several Indian states. The longstanding dispute with Pakistan over the bordering Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir remains unresolved. If the Indian government is unable to control the violence and disruption associated with these tensions (including both domestic and external sources of terrorism), the results could destabilize the economy and, consequently, adversely affect a Fund's investments. Both India and Pakistan have tested nuclear weapons, and the threat of deploying such weapons could hinder development of the Indian economy, and escalating tensions could impact the broader region, including China.

Investments in Indonesia. Indonesia is subject to a considerable degree of economic, political and social instability. Indonesia has experienced currency devaluations, substantial rates of inflation, widespread corruption and economic recessions. Indonesia is considered an emerging market, and its securities laws are unsettled. Judicial enforcement of contracts with foreign entities is inconsistent and, as a result of pervasive corruption, subject to the risk that cases will not be judged impartially. Indonesia has a history of political and military unrest and has recently experienced acts of terrorism that have targeted foreigners. Such acts of terrorism have had a negative impact on tourism, an important sector of the Indonesian economy. Additionally, Indonesia has faced violent separatist movements on the islands of Sumatra and Timor, as well as outbreaks of violence amongst religious and ethnic groups. Although the Indonesian government has recently revised policies intended to coerce cultural assimilation of ethnic minorities, a history of discrimination, official persecution, and populist violence continues to heighten the risk of economic disruption in Indonesia due to ethnic tensions. In addition, the Indonesian economy is heavily dependent on trading relationships with certain key trading partners, including China, Japan, Singapore and the United States.

Investment in Japan. The Japanese yen has shown volatility over the past two decades and such volatility could affect returns in the future. The yen may also be affected by currency volatility elsewhere in Asia. Depreciation of the yen, and any other currencies in which a Fund's securities are denominated, will decrease the value of the Fund's holdings.

Japan's growth prospects appear to be dependent on its export capabilities. Japan's neighbors, in particular China, have become increasingly important export markets. Despite a strengthening in the economic relationship between Japan and China, the countries' political relationship has at times been strained in recent years. Should political tension increase, it could adversely affect the economy and destabilize the region as a whole. Japan also remains heavily dependent on oil imports, and higher commodity prices could therefore have a negative impact on the economy. The natural disasters that have impacted Japan and the ongoing recovery efforts have had a negative effect on Japan's economy. Japan has an aging population and, as a result, Japan's workforce is shrinking. Japan's economy may suffer if this trend continues.

Investments in Latin America. Latin America, including Brazil and Mexico, has long suffered from political, economic, and social instability. For investors, this has meant additional risk caused by periods of regional conflict, political corruption, totalitarianism, protectionist measures, nationalization, hyperinflation, debt crises and defaults, sudden and large currency devaluation, and intervention by the military in civilian and economic spheres. For example, the government of Brazil imposes a tax on foreign investment in Brazilian stocks and bonds, which may affect the value of a Fund's investments in Brazilian issuers. While some Latin American governments have experienced privatization of state-owned companies and relaxation of trade restrictions, future free-market economic reforms are uncertain, and political unrest could result in significant disruption in securities markets in the region. The economies of certain Latin American countries have experienced high interest rates, economic volatility, inflation and high unemployment rates. Adverse economic events in one country may have a significant adverse effect on other Latin American countries.

Commodities (such as oil, gas and minerals) represent a significant percentage of the region's exports and many economies in this region are particularly sensitive to fluctuations in commodity prices. Some markets are in areas that have historically been prone to natural disasters or are economically sensitive to environmental events, and a natural disaster could have a significant adverse impact on the economies in the geographic region.

Many Latin American countries have high levels of debt, which may stifle economic growth, contribute to prolonged periods of recession and adversely impact a Fund's investments. Most countries have been forced to restructure their loans or risk default on their debt obligations. Interest on debt is subject to market conditions and may reach levels that would impair economic activity and create a difficult and costly environment for borrowers. Governments may be forced to reschedule or freeze their debt repayment, which could negatively affect local markets.

Investments in Middle East. Many Middle Eastern countries are prone to political turbulence, which may have an adverse impact on a Fund. Many economies in the Middle East are highly reliant on income from the sale of oil or trade with countries involved in the sale of oil, and their economies are therefore vulnerable to changes in the market for oil and foreign currency values. As global demand for oil fluctuates, many Middle Eastern economies may be significantly impacted.

In addition, many Middle Eastern governments have exercised and continue to exercise substantial influence over many aspects of the private sector. In certain cases, a Middle Eastern country's government may own or control many companies, including some of the largest companies in the country. Accordingly, governmental actions in the future could have a significant effect on economic conditions in Middle Eastern countries. This could affect private sector companies and a Fund, as well as the value of securities in a Fund's portfolio.

Certain Middle Eastern markets are in the earliest stages of development. As a result, there may be a high concentration of market capitalization and trading volume in a small number of issuers representing a limited number of industries, as well as a high concentration of investors and financial intermediaries. Brokers in Middle Eastern countries typically are fewer in number and less well capitalized than brokers in the United States.

The legal systems in certain Middle Eastern countries also may have an adverse impact on a Fund. For example, the potential liability of a shareholder in a U.S. corporation with respect to acts of the corporation generally is limited to the amount of the shareholder's investment. However, the notion of limited liability is less clear in certain Middle Eastern countries. A Fund therefore may be liable in certain Middle Eastern countries for the acts of a corporation in which it invests for an amount greater than its actual investment in that corporation. Similarly, the rights of investors in Middle Eastern issuers may be more limited than those of shareholders of a U.S. corporation. It may be difficult or impossible to obtain or enforce a legal judgment in a Middle Eastern country. Some Middle Eastern countries prohibit or impose substantial restrictions on investments in their capital markets, particularly their equity markets, by foreign entities such as a Fund. For example, certain countries may require governmental approval prior to investment by foreign persons or limit the amount of investment by foreign persons in a particular issuer. Certain Middle Eastern countries may also limit the investment by foreign persons to only a specific class of securities of an issuer that may have less advantageous terms (including price) than securities of the issuer available for purchase by nationals.

The manner in which foreign investors may invest in companies in certain Middle Eastern countries, as well as limitations on those investments, may have an adverse impact on the operations of a Fund. For example, in certain of these countries, a Fund may be required to invest initially through a local broker or other entity and then have the shares that were purchased re-registered in the name of a Fund. Re-registration in some instances may not be possible on a timely basis. This may result in a delay during which a Fund may be denied certain of its rights as an investor, including rights as to dividends or to be made aware of certain corporate actions. There also may be instances where a Fund places a purchase order but is subsequently informed, at the time of re-registration, that the permissible allocation of the investment to foreign investors has been filled.

Substantial limitations may exist in certain Middle Eastern countries with respect to a Fund's ability to repatriate investment income or capital gains. A Fund could be adversely affected by delays in, or a refusal to grant, any required governmental approval for repatriation of capital, as well as by the application to a Fund of any restrictions on investment.

Certain Middle Eastern countries may be heavily dependent upon international trade and, consequently, have been and may continue to be negatively affected by trade barriers, exchange controls, managed adjustments in relative currency values and other protectionist measures imposed or negotiated by the countries with which they trade. These countries also have been and may continue to be adversely impacted by economic conditions in the countries with which they trade. In addition, certain issuers located in Middle Eastern countries in which a Fund invests may operate in, or have dealings with, countries subject to sanctions and/or embargoes imposed by the U.S. government and the United Nations, and/or countries identified by the U.S. government as state sponsors of terrorism. As a result, an issuer may sustain damage to its reputation if it is identified as an issuer which operates in, or has dealings with, such countries. A Fund, as an investor in such issuers, will be indirectly subject to those risks.

Certain Middle Eastern countries have strained relations with other Middle Eastern countries due to territorial disputes, historical animosities or defense concerns, which may adversely affect the economies of these Middle Eastern countries. Certain Middle Eastern countries experience significant unemployment, as well as widespread underemployment. Recently, many Middle Eastern countries have experienced political, economic and social unrest as protestors have called for widespread reform. These protests may adversely affect the economies of these Middle Eastern countries.

Investments in Russia. Russia has experienced political and economic turbulence and has endured decades of communist rule under which its citizens were collectivized into state agricultural and industrial enterprises. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia's government has been faced with the task of stabilizing and modernizing its economy. Investors in Russia have experienced significant losses due to expropriation, nationalization, confiscation of assets and property or the imposition of restrictions on foreign investments and repatriation of capital invested. There is no assurance that similar losses will not recur. The current government regime has become increasingly authoritarian, especially in its dealings with successful Russian companies. In this environment, there is always a risk that the government will abandon elements of a market economy and replace them with radically different political and economic policies that would be detrimental to the interests of foreign investors.

The Russian economy is heavily dependent upon the export of a range of commodities including industrial metals, forestry products, oil, and gas. Accordingly, it is strongly affected by international commodity prices and is particularly vulnerable to any weakening in global demand for these products. Foreign investors also face a high degree of currency risk when investing in Russian securities and a lack of available currency hedging instruments. In addition, Eastern European markets remain relatively underdeveloped and can be particularly sensitive to political and economic developments; adverse events in Eastern European countries may greatly impact the Russian economy.

Because of the recent formation of the Russian securities market as well as the underdeveloped state of the banking and telecommunications systems, settlement, clearing and registration of securities transactions are subject to significant risks. There is no central registration system for shareholders and these services are carried out by the companies themselves or by registrars located throughout Russia. These registrars are not necessarily subject to effective state supervision nor are they licensed with any governmental entity and it is possible for a Fund to lose share registration through fraud or negligence. In addition, while applicable Russian regulations impose liability on registrars for losses resulting from their errors, it may be difficult for a Fund to enforce any rights it may have against the registrar or issuer of the securities in the event of loss of share registration. Furthermore, significant delays or problems may occur in registering the transfer of securities, which could cause a Fund to incur losses due to a counterparty's failure to pay for securities a Fund has delivered or a Fund's inability to complete its contractual obligations because of theft or other reasons.

Poor accounting standards, inept management, pervasive corruption, insider trading and crime, and inadequate regulatory protection all pose significant risks, particularly to foreign investors. In addition, there is a risk that the Russian tax system will not be reformed to prevent inconsistent, retroactive and/or punitive taxation, or, in the alternative, a risk that a reformed tax system may result in inconsistent and unpredictable enforcement of the new tax laws. The Russian securities market is relatively new and a substantial proportion of securities transactions in Russia are privately negotiated outside the stock exchanges. The inexperience of the Russian securities market and the limited volume of trading in securities in the market may make obtaining accurate prices on portfolio securities from independent sources more difficult than in more developed markets. Additionally, little information is available to investors. As a result, it may be difficult to assess the value of an investment in Russian companies. Because of the recent formation of the Russian securities market and the underdeveloped state of the banking and telecommunications systems, securities transactions are subject to significant risks.

In addition, Russia also may attempt to assert its influence in the region through economic or even military measures, as it did with Georgia in the summer of 2008 and the Ukraine in 2014 and 2022. Russia launched a large-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. The extent and duration of the military action, resulting sanctions and resulting future market disruptions, including declines in its stock markets and the value of the ruble against the U.S. dollar, are impossible to predict, but could be significant. Any such disruptions caused by Russian military action or other actions (including cyberattacks and espionage) or resulting actual and threatened responses to such activity, including purchasing and financing restrictions, boycotts or changes in consumer or purchaser preferences, sanctions, tariffs or cyberattacks on the Russian government, Russian companies or Russian individuals, including politicians, may impact Russia's economy and Russian issuers of securities in which the Fund invests. Actual and threatened responses to such activity, including purchasing restrictions, sanctions, tariffs or cyberattacks on the Russian government or Russian companies, may impact Russia's economy and Russian issuers of securities in which the Fund invests. Actual and threatened responses to such military action may also impact the markets for certain Russian commodities, such as oil and natural gas, as well as other sectors of the Russian economy, and may likely have collateral impacts on such sectors globally.

The United States and the European Union have imposed sanctions on certain Russian individuals and issuers, particularly in response to its invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The United States and other nations or international organizations may impose additional, broader economic sanctions or take other actions that may adversely affect Russian-related issuers in the future. These sanctions, any future sanctions or other actions, or even the threat of further sanctions or other actions, may negatively affect the value and liquidity of a Fund's investments. For example, a Fund may be prohibited from investing in securities issued by companies subject to such sanctions. In addition, the sanctions may require a Fund to freeze its existing investments in Russian companies, prohibiting a Fund from buying, selling or otherwise transacting in these investments. Russia may undertake countermeasures or retaliatory actions which may further impair the value and liquidity of a Fund's portfolio and potentially disrupt its operations.

For these or other reasons, to the extent permitted by law, a Fund could seek to suspend creations and/or redemptions of Creation Units, including in the event that an emergency exists in which it is not reasonably practicable for a Fund to dispose of its securities or to determine its net asset value. During the period that creations or redemptions are affected, a Fund's shares could trade at a significant premium or discount to their net asset value. In the case of a period during which creations are suspended, a Fund could experience substantial redemptions, which may cause a Fund to experience increased transaction costs and make greater taxable distributions to shareholders of a Fund. A Fund could liquidate all or a portion of its assets, which may be at unfavorable prices.

Investments in South Africa. South Africa's two-tiered economy, with one rivaling developed countries and the other exhibiting many characteristics of developing countries, is characterized by uneven distribution of wealth and income and high rates of unemployment. This may cause civil and social unrest, which could adversely impact the South African economy. Ethnic and civil conflict could result in the abandonment of many of South Africa's free market reforms. In addition, South Africa has experienced high rates of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and HIV remains a prominent health concern. Although economic reforms have been enacted to promote growth and foreign investments, there can be no assurance that these programs will achieve the desired results. South Africa's inadequate currency reserves have left its currency vulnerable, at times, to devaluation. South Africa has privatized or has begun the process of privatization of certain entities and industries.

In some instances, investors in certain newly privatized entities have suffered losses due to the inability of the newly privatized entities to adjust quickly to a competitive environment or to changing regulatory and legal standards. There is no assurance that such losses will not recur. Despite significant reform and privatization, the South African government continues to control a large share of South African economic activity. Heavy regulation of labor and product markets is pervasive and may stifle South African economic growth or cause prolonged periods of recession. The agriculture and mining sectors of South Africa's economy account for a large portion of its exports, and thus the South African economy is susceptible to fluctuations in these commodity markets. Moreover, the South African economy is heavily dependent upon the economies of Europe, Asia (particularly Japan) and the United States. Reduction in spending by these economies on South African products and services or negative changes in any of these economies may cause an adverse impact on the South African economy. South Africa has historically experienced acts of terrorism and strained international relations related to border disputes, historical animosities, racial tensions and other defense concerns. These situations may cause uncertainty in the South African market and may adversely affect the South African economy.

Investments in South Korea. The South Korean economy is heavily dependent on trading exports and on the economies of other Asian countries, especially China or Southeast Asia, and the United States as key trading partners. Distributions in trade activity, reductions in spending by these economies on South Korean products and services or negative changes in any of these economies may have an adverse impact on the South Korean economy. Furthermore, South Korea's economy may be impacted by currency fluctuations and increasing competition from Asia's other low-cost emerging economies. Finally, South Korea's economic growth potential has recently been on a decline due to, among other factors, a rapidly aging population and structural problems.

Substantial tensions with North Korea may cause further uncertainty in the political and economic climate of South Korea. North and South Korea each have substantial military capabilities, and historical tensions between the two present the ongoing risk of war. Recent events involving the North Korean military have escalated tensions between North and South Korea. Any outbreak of hostilities between the two countries, or even the threat of an outbreak of hostilities, may have a severe adverse effect on the South Korean economy and any investments in South Korea.

Investments in Taiwan. The political reunification of China and Taiwan, over which China continues to claim sovereignty, remains tense and is unlikely to be settled in the near future. China has staged frequent military drills off the coast of Taiwan and relations between China and Taiwan have been hostile at times. This continuing hostility between China and Taiwan may have an adverse impact on the values of a Fund's investments in China or Taiwan, or make such investments impracticable or impossible. Any escalation of hostility between China and Taiwan would likely have a significant adverse impact on the value of a Fund's investments in both countries and the region. In addition, certain Asian economies have experienced over-extension of credit, currency devaluations and restrictions, high unemployment, high inflation, decreased exports and economic recessions. Economic events in any one country may have a significant economic effect on the entire Asian region and any adverse events in the Asian markets may have a significant adverse effect on Taiwanese companies.

Taiwan's growth has been export-driven to a significant degree. As a result, Taiwan is affected by changes in the economies of its main trading partners. If growth in the export sector declines, future growth will be increasingly reliant on domestic demand. Taiwan has limited natural resources, resulting in dependence on foreign sources for certain raw materials and vulnerability to global fluctuations of price and supply. This dependence is especially pronounced in the energy sector. Any fluctuations or shortages in the commodity markets could have a negative impact on Taiwan's economy. A significant increase in energy prices could have an adverse impact on Taiwan's economy.

Investments in the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom has one of the largest economies in Europe and is heavily dependent on trade with the European Union (“EU”), and to a lesser extent the United States and China. As a result, the economy of the United Kingdom may be impacted by changes to the economic health of EU member countries, the United States and China. In 2016, the United Kingdom voted via referendum to exit the EU, commonly referred to as “Brexit”. On December 31, 2020, the United Kingdom left the European Union. The United Kingdom and the European Union reached a trade agreement on December 31, 2020, which became effective on May 1, 2021 after being ratified by all applicable United Kingdom and European Union governmental bodies. The period following the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union is expected to be one of significant political and economic uncertainty particularly until the United Kingdom government and European Union member states agree and implement the terms of the United Kingdom’s future relationship with the European Union. Brexit may create additional economic stresses for the United Kingdom, which may include causing a contraction of the United Kingdom economy and price volatility in United Kingdom stocks, decreased trade, capital outflows, devaluation of pounds sterling, and wider corporate bond spreads due to uncertainty and declines in business and consumer spending as well as foreign direct investment. The Fund may be negatively impacted by changes in law and tax treatment resulting from or following Brexit. Until the economic effects of Brexit become clearer, and while a period of political, regulatory and commercial uncertainty continues, there remains a risk that Brexit may negatively impact the value of investments held by the Fund. In addition, if one or more other countries were to exit the EU or abandon the use of the euro as a currency, the value of investments tied to those countries or the euro could decline significantly and unpredictably.

Currency Transactions

The Funds may enter into spot currency transactions, foreign currency forward and foreign currency futures contracts. Foreign currency forward and foreign currency futures contracts are derivatives and are subject to derivatives risk.

Forward Foreign Currency Contracts. A forward foreign currency exchange contract (“forward contract”) involves an obligation to purchase or sell a specific currency at a future date, which may be any fixed number of days from the date of the contract agreed upon by the parties, at a price set at the time of the contract. These contracts are principally traded in the interbank market conducted directly between currency traders (usually large commercial banks) and their customers. A forward contract generally has no margin deposit requirement.

A non-deliverable forward contract is a forward contract where there is no physical settlement of two currencies at maturity. Non-deliverable forward contracts are contracts between parties in which one party agrees to make a payment to the other party (the “Counterparty”) based on the change in market value or level of a specified currency. In return, the Counterparty agrees to make payment to the first party based on the return of a different specified currency. Non-deliverable forward contracts will usually be done on a net basis, with a Fund receiving or paying only the net amount of the two payments. The net amount of the excess, if any, of a Fund’s obligations over its entitlements with respect to each non-deliverable forward contract is accrued on a daily basis and an amount of cash or highly liquid securities having an aggregate value at least equal to the accrued excess is maintained in an account at the Trust’s custodian bank. The risk of loss with respect to non-deliverable forward contracts generally is limited to the net amount of payments that a Fund is contractually obligated to make or receive.

Foreign Currency Futures Contracts. A foreign currency futures contract is a contract involving an obligation to deliver or acquire the specified amount of a specific currency, at a specified price and at a specified future time. Futures contracts may be settled on a net cash payment basis rather than by the sale and delivery of the underlying currency.

Currency exchange transactions involve a significant degree of risk and the markets in which currency exchange transactions are effected are highly volatile, specialized and technical. Significant changes, including changes in liquidity and prices, can occur in such markets within very short periods of time, often within minutes. Currency exchange trading risks include, but are not limited to, exchange rate risk, maturity gap, interest rate risk, and potential interference by foreign governments through regulation of local exchange markets, foreign investment or particular transactions in foreign currency. If a Fund utilizes foreign currency transactions at an inappropriate time, such transactions may lower a Fund’s return. A Fund could experience losses if the value of any currency forwards and futures positions is poorly correlated with its other investments or if it could not close out its positions because of an illiquid market. Such contracts are subject to the risk that the counterparty will default on its obligations. In addition, a Fund will incur transaction costs, including trading commissions, in connection with certain foreign currency transactions.

Foreign Exchange Spot Transactions. The Funds may settle trades of holdings denominated in foreign currencies on a spot (*i.e.*, cash) basis at the prevailing rate in the foreign currency exchange market. A foreign exchange spot transaction, also known as FX spot, is an agreement between two parties to buy one currency against selling another currency at an agreed price for settlement on the spot date. The exchange rate at which the transaction is done is called the spot exchange rate. Unlike forward foreign currency exchange contracts and foreign currency futures contracts, which involve trading a particular amount of a currency pair at a predetermined price at some point in the future, the underlying currencies in a spot FX are exchanged following the settlement date.

Equity Securities

The Funds may invest in equity securities. Equity securities represent ownership interests in a company or partnership and include common stocks, preferred stocks, warrants to acquire common stock, securities convertible into common stock, and investments in master limited partnerships. Investments in equity securities in general are subject to market risks that may cause their prices to fluctuate over time. Fluctuations in the value of equity securities in which a Fund invests will cause the NAV of a Fund to fluctuate. Global stock markets, including the U.S. stock market, tend to be cyclical, with periods when stock prices generally rise and periods when stock prices generally decline. The Funds may purchase equity securities traded on exchanges or the over-the-counter (“OTC”) market. The Funds may invest in the types of equity securities described in more detail below.

Common Stock. Common stock represents an equity or ownership interest in an issuer. In the event an issuer is liquidated or declares bankruptcy, the claims of owners of bonds and preferred stock take precedence over the claims of those who own common stock.

Preferred Stock. Preferred stock represents an equity or ownership interest in an issuer that pays dividends at a specified rate and that has precedence over common stock in the payment of dividends. In the event an issuer is liquidated or declares bankruptcy, the claims of owners of bonds take precedence over the claims of those who own preferred and common stock.

Convertible Securities. Convertible securities are bonds, debentures, notes, preferred stocks or other securities that may be converted or exchanged (by the holder or by the issuer) into shares of the underlying common stock (or cash or securities of equivalent value) at a stated exchange ratio. A convertible security may also be called for redemption or conversion by the issuer after a particular date and under certain circumstances (including a specified price) established upon issue. If a convertible security held by a Fund is called for redemption or conversion, a Fund could be required to tender it for redemption, convert it into the underlying common stock, or sell it to a third party.

Convertible securities generally have less potential for gain or loss than common stocks. Convertible securities generally provide yields higher than the underlying common stocks, but generally lower than comparable non-convertible securities. Because of this higher yield, convertible securities generally sell at a price above their “conversion value,” which is the current market value of the stock to be received upon conversion. The difference between this conversion value and the price of convertible securities will vary over time depending on changes in the value of the underlying common stocks and interest rates. When the underlying common stocks decline in value, convertible securities tend not to decline to the same extent because of the interest or dividend payments and the repayment of principal at maturity for certain types of convertible securities. However, securities that are convertible other than at the option of the holder generally do not limit the potential for loss to the same extent as securities convertible at the option of the holder. When the underlying common stocks rise in value, the value of convertible securities may also be expected to increase. At the same time, however, the difference between the market value of convertible securities and their conversion value will narrow, which means that the value of convertible securities will generally not increase to the same extent as the value of the underlying common stocks. Because convertible securities may also be interest-rate sensitive, their value may increase as interest rates fall and decrease as interest rates rise. Convertible securities are also subject to credit risk, and are often lower-quality securities.

Small and Medium Capitalization Issuers. Investing in equity securities of small and medium capitalization companies often involves greater risk than is customarily associated with investments in larger capitalization companies. This increased risk may be due to the greater business risks of smaller size, limited markets and financial resources, narrow product lines and frequent lack of depth of management. The securities of smaller companies are often traded in the OTC market and even if listed on a national securities exchange may not be traded in volumes typical for that exchange. Consequently, the securities of smaller companies are less likely to be liquid, may have limited market stability, and may be subject to more abrupt or erratic market movements than securities of larger, more established growth companies or the market averages in general.

Warrants. Warrants are instruments that entitle the holder to buy an equity security at a specific price for a specific period of time. Changes in the value of a warrant do not necessarily correspond to changes in the value of its underlying security. The price of a warrant may be more volatile than the price of its underlying security, and a warrant may offer greater potential for capital appreciation as well as capital loss. Warrants do not entitle a holder to dividends or voting rights with respect to the underlying security and do not represent any rights in the assets of the issuing company. A warrant ceases to have value if it is not exercised prior to its expiration date. These factors can make warrants more speculative than other types of investments.

Rights. A right is a privilege granted to existing shareholders of a corporation to subscribe to shares of a new issue of common stock before it is issued. Rights normally have a short life of usually two to four weeks, are freely transferable and entitle the holder to buy the new common stock at a lower price than the public offering price. An investment in rights may entail greater risks than certain other types of investments. Generally, rights do not carry the right to receive dividends or exercise voting rights with respect to the underlying securities, and they do not represent any rights in the assets of the issuer. In addition, their value does not necessarily change with the value of the underlying securities, and they cease to have value if they are not exercised on or before their expiration date. Investing in rights increases the potential profit or loss to be realized from the investment as compared with investing the same amount in the underlying securities.

Depository Receipts. The Funds may invest in issuers located outside the United States directly, or in financial instruments that are indirectly linked to the performance of foreign issuers. Examples of such financial instruments include ADRs, Global Depository Receipts (“GDRs”), European Depository Receipts (“EDRs”), International Depository Receipts (“IDRs”), “ordinary shares,” and “New York shares” issued and traded in the United States. ADRs are U.S. dollar-denominated receipts typically issued by U.S. banks and trust companies that evidence ownership of underlying securities issued by a foreign issuer. The underlying securities may not necessarily be denominated in the same currency as the securities into which they may be converted. The underlying securities are held in trust by a custodian bank or similar financial institution in the issuer’s home country. The depository bank may not have physical custody of the underlying securities at all times and may charge fees for various services, including forwarding dividends and interest and corporate actions. Generally, ADRs in registered form are designed for use in domestic securities markets and are traded on exchanges or over-the-counter in the United States. GDRs, EDRs, and IDRs are similar to ADRs in that they are certificates evidencing ownership of shares of a foreign issuer; however, GDRs, EDRs, and IDRs may be issued in bearer form and denominated in other currencies, and are generally designed for use in specific or multiple securities markets outside the United States. EDRs, for example, are designed for use in European securities markets while GDRs are designed for use throughout the world. Ordinary shares are shares of foreign issuers that are traded abroad and on a U.S. exchange. New York shares are shares that a foreign issuer has allocated for trading in the United States. ADRs, ordinary shares, and New York shares all may be purchased with and sold for U.S. dollars.

Depository receipts may be sponsored or unsponsored. Although the two types of depository receipt facilities (unsponsored or sponsored) are similar, there are differences regarding a holder’s rights and obligations and the practices of market participants. A depository may establish an unsponsored facility without participation by (or acquiescence of) the underlying issuer; typically, however, the depository requests a letter of non-objection from the underlying issuer prior to establishing the facility. Holders of unsponsored depository receipts generally bear all the costs of the facility. The depository usually charges fees upon the deposit and withdrawal of the underlying securities, the conversion of dividends into U.S. dollars or other currency, the disposition of non-cash distributions, and the performance of other services. The depository of an unsponsored facility frequently is under no obligation to distribute shareholder communications received from the underlying issuer or to pass through voting rights to depository receipt holders with respect to the underlying securities.

Sponsored depositary receipt facilities are created in generally the same manner as unsponsored facilities, except that sponsored depositary receipts are established jointly by a depository and the underlying issuer through a deposit agreement. The deposit agreement sets out the rights and responsibilities of the underlying issuer, the depository, and the depositary receipt holders. With sponsored facilities, the underlying issuer typically bears some of the costs of the depositary receipts (such as dividend payment fees of the depository), although most sponsored depositary receipts holders may bear costs such as deposit and withdrawal fees. Depositories of most sponsored depositary receipts agree to distribute notices of shareholder meetings, voting instructions, and other shareholder communications and information to the depositary receipt holders at the underlying issuer's request.

Depositary receipts may be unregistered and unlisted. A Fund's investments may also include ADRs that are not purchased in the public markets and are restricted securities that can be offered and sold only to "qualified institutional buyers" under Rule 144A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended. Depositary receipts may become illiquid. If adverse market conditions were to develop during the period between a Fund's decision to sell these types of ADRs and the point at which a Fund is permitted or able to sell such security, a Fund might obtain a price less favorable than the price that prevailed when it decided to sell.

Real Estate Investment Trusts

The Funds may invest in the securities of real estate investment trusts ("REITs"). Risks associated with investments in securities of REITs include decline in the value of real estate, risks related to general and local economic conditions, overbuilding and increased competition, increases in property taxes and operating expenses, changes in zoning laws, casualty or condemnation losses, variations in rental income, changes in neighborhood values, the appeal of properties to tenants, and increases in interest rates. In addition, equity REITs may be affected by changes in the values of the underlying property owned by the trusts, while mortgage REITs may be affected by the quality of credit extended. REITs are dependent upon management skills, may not be diversified and are subject to the risks of financing projects. REITs are also subject to heavy cash-flow dependency, defaults by borrowers, self-liquidation and the possibility of failing to qualify for tax-free pass-through of income and net gains under the Code and to maintain exemption from the 1940 Act. If an issuer of debt securities collateralized by real estate defaults, it is conceivable that the REITs could end up holding the underlying real estate. Because REITs have ongoing fees and expenses, which may include management, operating and administration expenses, REIT shareholders, including a Fund, will indirectly bear a proportionate share of those expenses in addition to the expenses of a Fund. However, such expenses are not considered to be Acquired Fund Fees and Expenses and, therefore, are not reflected as such in a Fund's fee table.

Privately-Issued Securities

The Funds may invest in privately-issued securities, including those that are normally purchased pursuant to Rule 144A or Regulation S under the Securities Act. Privately-issued securities typically may be resold only to "qualified institutional buyers," in a privately negotiated transaction, to a limited number of purchasers or in limited quantities after they have been held for a specified period of time and other conditions are met for an exemption from registration. Because there may be relatively few potential purchasers for such securities, especially under adverse market or economic conditions or in the event of adverse changes in the financial condition of the issuer, a Fund may find it more difficult to sell such securities when it may be advisable to do so or it may be able to sell such securities only at prices lower than if such securities were more widely held and traded. At times, it also may be more difficult to determine the fair value of such securities for purposes of computing the Fund's NAV due to the absence of an active trading market. There can be no assurance that a privately-issued security that is deemed to be liquid when purchased will continue to be liquid for as long as it is held by the Fund, and its value may decline as a result.

Derivatives

The Funds may use derivative instruments as part of their investment strategies. Generally, derivatives are financial contracts the value of which depends upon, or is derived from, the value of an underlying asset, reference rate or index, and may relate to bonds, interest rates, currencies, commodities, and related indexes. Examples of derivative instruments include forward currency contracts, currency and interest rate swaps, currency options, futures contracts, including index futures, options, options on futures contracts, structured notes, and swap contracts.

Because a Fund may enter into (or “open”) certain derivatives contracts with an initial investment that is less than the notional value of the contract, such contracts provide inherent economic leverage equal to the difference between the initial investment requirement (also known as initial margin requirement) and the notional value of the contract. A Fund’s use of derivatives may be limited by the requirements of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the “Code”) for qualification as a regulated investment company for U.S. federal tax purposes.

The SEC adopted Rule 18f-4 under the 1940 Act, which regulates the use of derivatives for certain funds registered under the Investment Company Act (“Rule 18f-4”). Unless a fund qualifies as a “limited derivatives user” as defined in Rule 18f-4, Rule 18f-4, among other things, requires the fund to establish a comprehensive derivatives risk management program, to comply with certain value-at-risk based leverage limits, to appoint a derivatives risk manager and to provide additional disclosure both publicly and to the SEC regarding its derivatives positions. For funds that qualify as limited derivatives users, Rule 18f-4 requires a fund to have policies and procedures to manage its aggregate derivatives risk.

To the extent a Fund transacts in commodity interests (e.g., futures contracts, swap agreements, non-deliverable forward contracts), it will do so only in accordance with Rule 4.5 of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”). Krane, on behalf of each Fund, has filed or will file a notice of eligibility for exclusion from the definition of the term “commodity pool operator” in accordance with Rule 4.5 so that it is not subject to registration or regulation as a commodity pool operator under the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”) with respect to such Funds.

Swap Agreements. The Funds may enter into swap agreements to manage or gain exposure to particular types of investments (including commodities, equity securities, interest rates or indices of equity securities in which a Fund otherwise could not invest efficiently), to help enhance the value of its portfolio or to help achieve its investment objective. The Funds may also enter into other types of swap agreements, including total return swaps, asset swaps, currency swaps and credit default swaps, and may write (sell) and purchase options thereon for hedging and non-hedging purposes.

Swap agreements historically have been individually negotiated and structured to include exposure to a variety of different types of investments or market factors. Swap agreements are two party contracts entered into primarily by institutional investors. Swap agreements can vary in term like other fixed-income investments. Most swap agreements are currently traded over-the-counter. In a standard “swap” transaction, two parties agree to exchange one or more payments based, for example, on the returns (or differentials in rates of return) earned or realized on particular predetermined investments or instruments (such as securities, indices, or other financial or economic interests). The gross payments to be exchanged (or “swapped”) between the parties are calculated with respect to a notional amount, which is the predetermined dollar principal of the trade representing the hypothetical underlying quantity upon which payment obligations are computed. If a swap agreement provides for payment in different currencies, the parties may agree to exchange the principal amount. A swap also includes an instrument that is dependent on the occurrence, nonoccurrence or the extent of the occurrence of an event or contingency associated with a potential financial, economic or commercial consequence, such as a credit default swap.

Depending on how they are used, swap agreements may increase or decrease the overall volatility of a Fund’s investments and its share price and yield. Swap agreements are subject to liquidity risk, meaning that a Fund may be unable to sell a swap agreement to a third party at a favorable price. Swap agreements may involve leverage and may be highly volatile; depending on how they are used, they may have a considerable impact on a Fund’s performance. The risks of swap agreements depend upon a Fund’s ability to terminate its swap agreements or reduce its exposure through offsetting transactions. Swaps are highly specialized instruments that require investment techniques and risk analyses different from those associated with stocks, bonds, and other traditional investments.

Some swaps currently are, and more in the future will be, centrally cleared. Swaps that are centrally cleared are subject to the creditworthiness of the clearing organization involved in the transaction. For example, an investor could lose margin payments it has deposited with its futures commission merchant as well as the net amount of gains not yet paid by the clearing organization if the clearing organization becomes insolvent or goes into bankruptcy. In the event of bankruptcy of the clearing organization, the investor may be entitled to the net amount of gains the investor is entitled to receive plus the return of margin owed to it only in proportion to the amount received by the clearing organization’s other customers, potentially resulting in losses to the investor.

To the extent a swap is not centrally cleared, the use of a swap involves the risk that a loss may be sustained as a result of the insolvency or bankruptcy of the counterparty or the failure of the counterparty to make required payments or otherwise comply with the terms of the agreement. If a counterparty's creditworthiness declines, the value of the swap might decline, potentially resulting in losses to a Fund. Changing conditions in a particular market area, whether or not directly related to the referenced assets that underlie the swap agreement, may have an adverse impact on the creditworthiness of the counterparty. If a default occurs by the counterparty to such a transaction, a Fund may have contractual remedies pursuant to the agreements related to the transaction.

Following the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act and promulgation of related CFTC regulations, U.S. swap markets have undergone substantial change in recent years. Reporting and recordkeeping requirements are now required for all swap transactions in the U.S., and certain swaps may also be subject to margin, clearing and trade execution mandates, among other regulatory obligations. Regulations adopted by the CFTC, SEC and prudential regulators may require certain Fund counterparties to post and collect margin on OTC swaps, and exchanges also have minimum margin requirements for exchange-traded and cleared swaps. The prudential regulators issued final rules that require banks subject to their supervision to exchange variation and initial margin in respect of their obligations arising under OTC swap agreements with certain of their counterparties. The CFTC adopted similar rules that apply to CFTC-registered swap dealers that are not banks. Such rules will generally require a Fund to set aside additional eligible assets in order to meet the new variation and initial margin requirements when they enter into OTC swap agreements. The European Supervisory Authorities ("ESA"), various national regulators in Europe, the Australian Securities & Investment Commission, the Japanese Financial Services Agency and the Canadian Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions adopted rules and regulations that are similar to that of the U.S. prudential regulators. All such variation and initial margin requirements are now effective. Due to these regulations, a Fund may be required by its swap dealer counterparties to enter into additional documentation (including ISDA Credit Support Annexes), and post and collect margin related to its swap agreements.

CFTC regulations now also allow for the minimum transfer amount ("MTA") of initial and variation margin to apply separately to each separately managed investment account or sleeve ("SMA") that an asset manager is responsible for, rather than having to calculate the MTA across all accounts of a Fund or other counterparty. An SMA's MTA may be calculated separately from other SMAs of the same legal entity so long as it meets the following conditions: (1) the SMA is managed by an asset manager and is governed by an investment management agreement, pursuant to which the SMA owner has granted the asset manager authority with respect to certain of the owner's assets; (2) swaps are entered into by the asset manager on behalf of the SMA pursuant to the investment management agreement, and (3) the swaps of such SMA are subject to a master netting agreement that does not permit netting of initial or variation margin obligations across SMAs of the legal entity that have swaps outstanding with the applicable swap dealer counterparty; and (4) the MTA is no greater than \$50,000 for each applicable SMA. As of the date of this SAI, the prudential regulators have not provided similar relief, although swaps dealers subject to a prudential regulator are expected to act in a manner consistent with the relief provided by the CFTC.

Regulations adopted by the prudential regulators require certain banks to include in a range of financial contracts, including swap agreements, terms delaying or restricting default, termination and other rights in the event that the bank and/or its affiliates become subject to certain types of resolution or insolvency proceedings. The regulations could limit a Fund's ability to exercise a range of cross-default rights if its counterparty, or an affiliate of the counterparty, is subject to bankruptcy or similar proceedings. Such regulations could further negatively impact a Fund's use of swaps.

Swap agreements can take many different forms and are known by a variety of names including, but not limited to, interest rate swaps, mortgage swaps, total return swaps, inflation swaps, asset swaps (where parties exchange assets, typically a debt security), currency swaps, equity swaps, credit default swaps, commodity-linked swaps, and contracts for differences. The Funds may also write (sell) and purchase options on swaps (swaptions).

Interest Rate Swaps, Mortgage Swaps, and Interest Rate "Caps," "Floors," and "Collars." In a typical interest rate swap agreement, one party agrees to make regular payments equal to a floating rate on a specified amount in exchange for payments equal to a fixed rate, or a different floating rate, on the same amount for a specified period. Mortgage swap agreements are similar to interest rate swap agreements, except the notional principal amount is tied to a reference pool of mortgages or index of mortgages. In an interest rate cap or floor, one party agrees, usually in return for a fee, to make payments under particular circumstances. For example, the purchaser of an interest rate cap has the right to receive payments to the extent a specified interest rate exceeds an agreed level; the purchaser of an interest rate floor has the right to receive payments to the extent a specified interest rate falls below an agreed level. An interest rate collar entitles the purchaser to receive payments to the extent a specified interest rate falls outside an agreed range.

Among other techniques, a Fund may use interest rate swaps to offset declines in the value of fixed income securities held by the Fund. In such an instance, a Fund may agree with a counterparty to pay a fixed rate (multiplied by a notional amount) and the counterparty to pay a floating rate multiplied by the same notional amount. If long-term interest rates rise, resulting in a diminution in the value of a Fund's portfolio, the Fund would receive payments under the swap that would offset, in whole or in part, such diminution in value; if interest rates fall, a Fund would likely lose money on the swap transaction. The Funds may also enter into constant maturity swaps, which are a variation of the typical interest rate swap. Constant maturity swaps are exposed to changes in long-term interest rate movements.

Total Return Swaps. The Funds may enter into total return swaps ("TRS") to obtain exposure to a security or market without owning or taking physical custody of such security or market. The Funds may be either a total return receiver or a total return payer. Generally, the total return payer sells to the total return receiver an amount equal to all cash flows and price appreciation on a defined security or asset payable at periodic times during the swap term (*i.e.*, credit risk) in return for a periodic payment from the total return receiver based on a designated index (*e.g.*, the London Interbank Offered Rate, known as LIBOR or the Secured Overnight Financing Rate, known as SOFR) and spread, plus the amount of any price depreciation on the reference security or asset. The total return payer does not need to own the underlying security or asset to enter into a total return swap. The final payment at the end of the swap term includes final settlement of the current market price of the underlying reference security or asset, and payment by the applicable party for any appreciation or depreciation in value. Usually, collateral must be posted by the total return receiver to secure the periodic interest-based and market price depreciation payments depending on the credit quality of the underlying reference security and creditworthiness of the total return receiver, and the collateral amount is marked-to-market daily equal to the market price of the underlying reference security or asset between periodic payment dates.

TRS may effectively add leverage to a Fund's portfolio because, in addition to its net assets, the Fund would be subject to investment exposure on the notional amount of the swap. If a Fund is the total return receiver in a TRS, then the credit risk for an underlying asset is transferred to the Fund in exchange for its receipt of the return (appreciation) on that asset. If a Fund is the total return payer, it is hedging the downside risk of an underlying asset but it is obligated to pay the amount of any appreciation on that asset.

Inflation Swaps. In an inflation swap, one party agrees to pay the cumulative percentage increase in a price index, such as the Consumer Price Index, over the term of the swap (with some lag on the referenced inflation index) and the other party agrees to pay a compounded fixed rate. Inflation swaps may be used to protect a Fund's NAV against an unexpected change in the rate of inflation measured by an inflation index.

Credit Default Swaps. In a credit default swap, the credit default protection buyer makes periodic payments, known as premiums, to the credit default protection seller. In return, the credit default protection seller will make a payment to the credit default protection buyer upon the occurrence of a specified credit event. A credit default swap can refer to a single issuer or asset, a basket of issuers or assets or index of assets, each known as the reference entity or underlying asset. The Funds may act as either the buyer or the seller of a credit default swap. A Fund may buy or sell credit default protection on a basket of issuers or assets, even if a number of the underlying assets referenced in the basket are lower-quality debt securities. In an unhedged credit default swap, a Fund buys credit default protection on a single issuer or asset, a basket of issuers or assets or index of assets without owning the underlying asset or debt issued by the reference entity. Credit default swaps involve greater and different risks than investing directly in the referenced asset, because, in addition to market risk, credit default swaps include liquidity, counterparty and operational risk.

Credit default swaps allow a Fund to acquire or reduce credit exposure to a particular issuer, asset or basket of assets. If a swap agreement calls for payments by a Fund, the Fund must be prepared to make such payments when due. If a Fund is the credit default protection seller, the Fund will experience a loss if a credit event occurs and the credit of the reference entity or underlying asset has deteriorated. If a Fund is the credit default protection buyer, the Fund will be required to pay premiums to the credit default protection seller. In the case of a physically settled credit default swap in which a Fund is the protection seller, the Fund must be prepared to pay par for and take possession of debt of a defaulted issuer delivered to the Fund by the credit default protection buyer. Any loss would be offset by the premium payments a Fund receives as the seller of credit default protection.

Commodity-Linked Swaps. Commodity-linked swaps are two party contracts in which the parties agree to exchange the return or interest rate on one instrument for the return of a particular commodity, commodity index or commodity futures or options contract. The payment streams are calculated by reference to an agreed upon notional amount. A one-period swap contract operates in a manner similar to a forward or futures contract because there is an agreement to swap a commodity for cash at only one forward date. The Funds may engage in swap transactions that have more than one period and therefore more than one exchange of payments. A Fund may invest in total return commodity swaps to gain exposure to the overall commodity markets. In a total return commodity swap, a Fund will receive the price appreciation of a commodity index, a portion of the index, or a single commodity in exchange for paying an agreed-upon fee. If a commodity swap is for one period, a Fund will pay a fixed fee, established at the outset of the swap. However, if the term of a commodity swap is more than one period, with interim swap payments, a Fund will pay an adjustable or floating fee. With “floating” rate, the fee is pegged to a base rate such as LIBOR or SOFR, and is adjusted each period. Therefore, if interest rates increase over the term of the swap contract, a Fund may be required to pay a higher fee at each swap reset date.

Currency Swaps. A currency swap involves the exchange by a Fund and another party of the cash flows on a notional amount of two or more currencies based on the relative value differential among them, such as exchanging a right to receive a payment in foreign currency for the right to receive U.S. dollars. The Funds may enter into currency swaps (where the parties exchange their respective rights to make or receive payments in specified currencies). Currency swap agreements may be entered into on a net basis or may involve the delivery of the entire principal value of one designated currency in exchange for the entire principal value of another designated currency. In such cases, the entire principal value of a currency swap is subject to the risk that the counterparty will default on its contractual delivery obligations.

Equity Swaps. Equity swaps are contracts that allow one party to exchange the returns, including any dividend income, on an equity security or group of equity securities for another payment stream. Under an equity swap, payments may be made at the conclusion of the equity swap or periodically during its term. The Funds may enter into equity swaps. An equity swap may be used to invest in a market without owning or taking physical custody of securities in circumstances in which direct investment may be restricted for legal reasons or is otherwise deemed impractical or disadvantageous. Furthermore, equity swaps may be illiquid and a Fund may be unable to terminate its obligations when desired. In addition, the value of some components of an equity swap (such as the dividends on a common stock) may also be sensitive to changes in interest rates.

Options on Swaps (Swaptions). A swaption is an option to enter into a swap agreement. The purchaser of a swaption pays a premium for the option and obtains the right, but not the obligation, to enter into an underlying swap on agreed-upon terms. The seller of a swaption, in exchange for the premium, becomes obligated (if the option is exercised) to enter into an underlying swap on agreed-upon terms. Depending on the terms of the particular option agreement, a Fund generally will incur a greater degree of risk when it writes a swaption than when it purchases a swaption. When a Fund purchases a swaption, it risks losing only the amount of the premium it has paid should it decide to let the option expire unexercised.

Contracts for Differences. The Funds may purchase contracts for differences (“CFDs”). A CFD is a form of equity swap in which its value is based on the fluctuating value of some underlying instrument (e.g., a single security, stock basket or index). A CFD is a privately negotiated contract between two parties, buyer and seller, stipulating that the seller will pay to or receive from the buyer the difference between the nominal value of the underlying instrument at the opening of the contract and that instrument’s value at the end of the contract. The buyer and seller are both required to post margin, which is adjusted daily, and adverse market movements against the underlying instrument may require the buyer to make additional margin payments. The buyer will also pay to the seller a financing rate on the notional amount of the capital employed by the seller less the margin deposit. A CFD is usually terminated at the buyer’s initiative.

A CFD can be set up to take either a short or long position on the underlying instrument and enables a Fund to potentially capture movements in the share prices of the underlying instrument without the need to own the underlying instrument. By entering into a CFD transaction, a Fund could incur losses because it would face many of the same types of risks as owning the underlying instrument directly.

As with other types of swap transactions, CFDs also carry counterparty risk, which is the risk that the counterparty to the CFD transaction may be unable or unwilling to make payments or to otherwise honor its financial obligations under the terms of the contract, that the parties to the transaction may disagree as to the meaning or application of contractual terms, or that the instrument may not perform as expected. If the counterparty were to do so, the value of the contract, and of a Fund’s shares, may be reduced.

Futures, Options and Options on Futures Contracts. The Funds may enter into U.S. or foreign futures contracts, options and options on futures contracts. When a Fund purchases a futures contract, it agrees to purchase a specified underlying instrument at a specified future date. When a Fund sells a futures contract, it agrees to sell the underlying instrument at a specified future date. The price at which the purchase and sale will take place is fixed when a Fund enters into the contract. Futures can be held until their delivery dates, or can be closed out before then if a liquid secondary market is available.

The risk of loss in trading futures contracts or uncovered call options in some strategies (*e.g.*, selling uncovered stock index futures contracts) is potentially unlimited. The risk of a futures position may still be large as traditionally measured due to the low margin deposits required. In many cases, a relatively small price movement in a futures contract may result in immediate and substantial loss or gain to the investor relative to the size of a required margin deposit.

When a Fund writes a call option, it is obligated to sell a security to a purchaser at a specified price at any time until a certain date if the purchaser decides to exercise the option. A Fund will receive a premium for writing a call option. So long as the obligation of the call option continues, a Fund may be assigned an exercise notice, requiring it to deliver the underlying security against payment of the exercise price. A Fund may be obligated to deliver securities underlying an option at less than the market price.

A call option is “covered” if a Fund simultaneously holds an equivalent position in the security underlying the option. When writing a covered call option, a Fund, in return for the premium, gives up the opportunity for profit from a price increase in the underlying security above the exercise price, but retains the risk of loss should the price of the security decline.

If a call option that a Fund has written expires unexercised, the Fund will realize a gain in the amount of the premium; however, that gain may be offset by a decline in the market value of the underlying security during the option period. If a call option that a Fund has written is exercised, the Fund will realize a gain or loss from the sale of the underlying security.

When a Fund purchases a call option, it pays a premium to the writer for the right to purchase a security from the writer for a specified amount at any time until a certain date. A Fund generally would purchase a call option to offset a previously written call option or to protect itself against an increase in the price of a security it intends to purchase.

When a Fund writes a put option, it is obligated to acquire a security at a certain price at any time until a certain date if the purchaser decides to exercise the option. A Fund will receive a premium for writing a put option. When writing a put option, a Fund, in return for the premium, takes the risk that it must purchase the underlying security at a price that may be higher than the current market price of the security. If a put option that a Fund has written expires unexercised, the Fund will realize a gain in the amount of the premium.

When a Fund purchases a put option, it pays a premium to the writer for the right to sell a security to the writer for a specified amount at any time until a certain date. A Fund generally would purchase a put option to protect itself against a decrease in the market value of a security it owns.

Utilization of futures and options on futures by a Fund involves the risk of imperfect or even negative correlation to the underlying index, if any, if the index underlying the futures contract differs from the underlying index, if any. There is also the risk of loss by a Fund of margin deposits in the event of bankruptcy of a broker with whom a Fund has an open position in the futures contract or option. The purchase of put or call options will be based upon predictions by a Fund as to anticipated trends, which predictions could prove to be incorrect.

The potential for loss related to the purchase of an option on a futures contract is limited to the premium paid for the option plus transaction costs. Because the value of the option is fixed at the point of sale, there are no daily cash payments by the purchaser to reflect changes in the value of the underlying contract; however, the value of the option changes daily and that change would be reflected in the NAV of a Fund. The potential for loss related to writing options is unlimited.

General Information About Options on Securities. The exercise price of an option may be below, equal to, or above the market value of the underlying security at the time the option is written. Options normally have expiration dates between three and nine months from the date written. American-style options are exercisable at any time prior to their expiration date. European-style options are exercisable only immediately prior to their expiration date. The obligation under any option written by a Fund terminates upon expiration of the option or, at an earlier time, when the Fund offsets the option by entering into a “closing purchase transaction” to purchase an option of the same series. If an option is purchased by a Fund and is never exercised or closed out, the Fund will lose the entire amount of the premium paid.

Options are traded both on U.S. national securities exchanges and in the OTC market. Options also are traded on non-U.S. exchanges. Exchange-traded options are issued by a clearing organization affiliated with the exchange on which the option is listed; the clearing organization in effect guarantees completion of every exchange-traded option. In contrast, OTC options are contracts between a Fund and a counterparty, with no clearing organization guarantee. Thus, when a Fund sells (or purchases) an OTC option, it generally will be able to “close out” the option prior to its expiration only by entering into a closing transaction with the dealer to whom (or from whom) the Fund originally sold (or purchased) the option. There can be no assurance that a Fund would be able to liquidate an OTC option at any time prior to expiration. Unless a Fund is able to effect a closing purchase transaction in a covered OTC call option it has written, it will not be able to liquidate securities used as cover until the option expires or is exercised or until different cover is substituted. In the event of the counterparty’s insolvency, a Fund may be unable to liquidate its options position and the associated cover.

The premium a Fund receives (or pays) when it writes (or purchases) an option is the amount at which the option is currently traded on the applicable market. The premium may reflect, among other things, the current market price of the underlying security, the relationship of the exercise price to the market price, the historical price volatility of the underlying security, the length of the option period, the general supply of and demand for credit, and the interest rate environment.

Closing transactions are effected in order to realize a profit (or minimize a loss) on an outstanding option, to prevent an underlying security from being called, or to permit the sale or the put of the underlying security. Furthermore, effecting a closing transaction permits a Fund to write another call option on the underlying security with a different exercise price or expiration date or both. There is, of course, no assurance that a Fund will be able to effect closing transactions at favorable prices. If a Fund cannot enter into such a transaction, it may be required to hold a security that it might otherwise have sold (or purchase a security that it might otherwise not have bought), in which case it would continue to be at market risk on the security.

A Fund will realize a profit or loss from a closing purchase transaction if the cost of the transaction is less or more than the premium received from writing the call or put option. Because increases in the market price of a call option generally reflect increases in the market price of the underlying security, any loss resulting from the repurchase of a call option is likely to be offset, in whole or in part, by appreciation of the underlying security owned by a Fund; however, a Fund could be in a less advantageous position than if it had not written the call option.

A Fund pays brokerage commissions or spreads in connection with purchasing or writing options, including those used to close out existing positions. From time to time, a Fund may purchase an underlying security for delivery in accordance with an exercise notice of a call option assigned to it, rather than deliver the security from its inventory. In those cases, additional brokerage commissions are incurred.

The hours of trading for options may not conform to the hours during which the underlying securities are traded. To the extent that the options markets close before the markets for the underlying securities close, significant price and rate movements can take place in the underlying markets that cannot be reflected in the options markets.

Additionally, volatility in the market for equity securities, which can impact a single stock or certain segments of stocks and can happen suddenly, can meaningfully increase the risk of loss associated with options.

Structured Notes and Securities. The Funds may invest in structured instruments, including, without limitation, participation notes, certificates and warrants and other types of notes on which the amount of principal repayment and interest payments are based on the movement of one or more specified factors, such as the movement of a particular stock or stock index. Structured instruments may be derived from or based on a single security or securities, an index, a commodity, debt issuance or a foreign currency (a “reference”), and their interest rate or principal may be determined by an unrelated indicator. Structured securities may be positively or negatively indexed, so that appreciation of the reference may produce an increase or a decrease in the value of the structured security at maturity, or in the interest rate of the structured security. Structured securities may entail a greater degree of risk than other types of securities because a Fund bears the risk of the reference in addition to the risk that the counterparty to the structured security will be unable or unwilling to fulfill its obligations under the structured security to a Fund when due. A Fund bears the risk of loss of the amount expected to be received in connection with a structured security in the event of the default or bankruptcy of the counterparty to the structured security. Structured securities may also be more volatile, less liquid, and more difficult to accurately price than less complex securities or more traditional debt securities.

Exchange-Traded Notes

A Fund may invest in exchange-traded notes (“ETNs”). ETNs are senior, unsecured, unsubordinated debt securities whose returns are linked to the performance of a particular market benchmark or strategy, minus applicable fees. ETNs are traded on an exchange (e.g., the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”)) during normal trading hours; however, investors can also hold the ETN until maturity. At maturity, the issuer pays to the investor a cash amount equal to the principal amount, subject to the day’s market benchmark or strategy factor. ETNs do not make periodic coupon payments or provide principal protection. ETNs are subject to credit risk, including the credit risk of the issuer, and the value of the ETN may drop due to a downgrade in the issuer’s credit rating, despite the underlying market benchmark or strategy remaining unchanged. The value of an ETN may also be influenced by time to maturity, level of supply and demand for the ETN, volatility and lack of liquidity in underlying assets, changes in the applicable interest rates, changes in the issuer’s credit rating, and economic, legal, political, or geographic events that affect the referenced underlying asset. When a Fund invests in ETNs, it will bear its proportionate share of any fees and expenses borne by the ETN. A decision by a Fund to sell ETN holdings may be limited by the availability of a secondary market. In addition, although an ETN may be listed on an exchange, the issuer may not be required to maintain the listing, and there can be no assurance that a secondary market will exist for an ETN.

ETNs are also subject to tax risk. No assurance can be given that the IRS will accept, or a court will uphold, how a Fund characterizes and treats ETNs for tax purposes.

An ETN that is tied to a specific market benchmark or strategy may not be able to replicate and maintain exactly the composition and relative weighting of securities, commodities or other components in the applicable market benchmark or strategy. Some ETNs that use leverage can, at times, be relatively illiquid, and thus they may be difficult to purchase or sell at a fair price. Leveraged ETNs are subject to the same risk as other instruments that use leverage in any form.

The market value of ETNs may differ from their market benchmark or strategy. This difference in price may be due to the fact that the supply and demand in the market for ETNs at any point in time is not always identical to the supply and demand in the market for the securities, commodities or other components underlying the market benchmark or strategy that the ETN seeks to track. As a result, there may be times when an ETN trades at a premium or discount to its market benchmark or strategy.

Investments in Other Investment Companies

The Funds may invest in the securities of other investment companies to the extent that such an investment would be consistent with the requirements of Section 12(d)(1) of the 1940 Act, or any rule, regulation or order of the SEC or interpretation thereof. Generally, a Fund may invest in the securities of another investment company (the “acquired company”) provided that a Fund, immediately after such purchase or acquisition, does not own: (i) more than 3% of the total outstanding voting stock of the acquired company; (ii) securities issued by the acquired company having an aggregate value in excess of 5% of the value of the total assets of a Fund; or (iii) securities issued by the acquired company and all other investment companies having an aggregate value in excess of 10% of the value of the total assets of a Fund. Section 12(d)(1)(B) prohibits another investment company from selling its shares to a Fund if, after the sale (i) a Fund owns more than 3% of the other investment company’s voting stock or (ii) a Fund and other investment companies, and companies controlled by them, own more than 10% of the voting stock of such other investment company. In addition, a Fund will not purchase a security issued by a closed-end fund if after such purchase a Fund and any other investment companies with the same investment adviser would own more than 10% of the voting shares of the closed-end investment company.

The Fund, however, is permitted to invest in shares of certain investment companies beyond the limits contained in the 1940 Act and the rules and regulations thereunder, if the Fund complies with the adopted framework for fund of funds arrangements under Rule 12d1-4. Pursuant to Rule 12d1-4, the Fund is permitted to exceed the limits of Section 12 of the 1940 Act if the Fund complies with Rule 12d1-4’s conditions, which contain elements from the SEC’s prior exemptive orders permitting fund of funds arrangements, including (i) limits on control and voting; (ii) required evaluations and findings; (iii) required fund of funds investment agreements; and (iv) limits on complex structures.

If a Fund invests in, and thus, is a shareholder of, another investment company, a Fund’s shareholders will indirectly bear a Fund’s proportionate share of the fees and expenses paid by such other investment company, including advisory fees, in addition to both the management fees payable directly by a Fund to a Fund’s own investment adviser and the other expenses that a Fund bears directly in connection with a Fund’s own operations.

Consistent with the restrictions discussed above, a Fund may invest in several different types of investment companies from time to time, including mutual funds, ETFs, closed-end funds, foreign investment companies and business development companies (“BDCs”). For example, a Fund may elect to invest in another investment company when such an investment presents a more efficient investment option than buying securities individually. A Fund also may invest in investment companies that are included as components of an index, such as BDCs, to seek to track the performance of that index. A BDC is a less common type of closed-end investment company that more closely resembles an operating company than a typical investment company. BDCs generally focus on investing in, and providing managerial assistance to, small, developing, financially troubled, private companies or other companies that may have value that can be realized over time and with management assistance. Similar to an operating company, a BDC’s total annual operating expense ratio typically reflects all of the operating expenses incurred by the BDC, and is generally greater than the total annual operating expense ratio of a mutual fund that does not bear the same types of operating expenses.

The main risk of investing in other investment companies is that a Fund will be exposed to the risks of the investments held by the other investment companies. The market prices of ETFs will fluctuate in accordance with both changes in the market value of their underlying portfolio securities and due to supply and demand for the instruments on the exchanges on which they are traded (which may result in their trading at a discount or premium to their NAVs). Index-based investment companies may not replicate exactly the performance of their specific index because of transaction costs, and because of the temporary unavailability of certain component securities of the index, or strategy used to track the index.

Krane and a sub-adviser, if applicable, are subject to a conflict of interest in allocating a Fund’s assets to investment companies from which they or their affiliates receive compensation or other benefits.

Borrowing

The Funds may borrow money to the extent permitted by the 1940 Act. Borrowing for investment purposes is a form of leverage. Leveraging investments, by purchasing securities with borrowed money, is a speculative technique that increases investment risk. Because substantially all of a Fund’s assets will fluctuate in value, whereas the interest obligations on borrowings may be fixed, the NAV of a Fund will increase more when a Fund’s portfolio assets increase in value and decrease more when a Fund’s portfolio assets decrease in value than would otherwise be the case. Moreover, interest costs on borrowings may fluctuate with changing market rates of interest and may partially offset or exceed the returns on the borrowed funds. A Fund also may be required to maintain minimum average balances in connection with a borrowing or to pay a commitment or other fee to maintain a line of credit, which would further increase the cost of borrowing. Under adverse conditions, a Fund might have to sell portfolio securities to meet interest or principal payments at a time when investment considerations would not favor such sales.

Although it has not entered into a credit facility (other than any overdrafts permitted by the Funds’ custodian), a Fund may borrow money to facilitate management of a Fund’s portfolio by enabling a Fund to meet redemption requests when the liquidation of portfolio instruments would be inconvenient or disadvantageous, and for temporary or emergency purposes, such as trade settlements and as necessary to distribute to shareholders any income required to maintain the Fund’s status as a RIC. In this regard, a Fund may enter into a credit facility to borrow money for temporary or emergency purposes, including the funding of shareholder redemption requests, trade settlements, and as necessary to distribute to shareholders any income required to maintain a Fund’s status as a RIC. Such borrowing is not for investment purposes and will be repaid by a Fund promptly. As required by the 1940 Act, a Fund must maintain continuous asset coverage (total assets, including assets acquired with borrowed funds, less liabilities exclusive of borrowings) of 300% of all amounts borrowed. If, at any time, the value of a Fund’s assets should fail to meet this 300% coverage test, a Fund, within three days (not including Sundays and holidays), will reduce the amount of a Fund’s borrowings to the extent necessary to meet this 300% coverage requirement. Maintenance of this percentage limitation may result in the sale of portfolio securities at a time when investment considerations otherwise indicate that it would be disadvantageous to do so.

While the Funds do not anticipate doing so, each Fund is authorized to pledge (*i.e.*, transfer a security interest in) portfolio securities in an amount up to one-third of the value of the Fund’s total assets in connection with any borrowing.

Bank Deposits and Obligations

The Funds may invest in deposits and other obligations of U.S. and non-U.S. banks and financial institutions. Deposits and obligations of banks and financial institutions include certificates of deposit, time deposits, and bankers' acceptances. Certificates of deposit and time deposits represent an institution's obligation to repay funds deposited with it that earn a specified interest rate. Certificates of deposit are negotiable certificates, while time deposits are non-negotiable deposits. A banker's acceptance is a time draft drawn on and accepted by a bank that becomes a primary and unconditional liability of the bank upon acceptance. Investments in obligations of non-U.S. banks and financial institutions may involve risks that are different from investments in obligations of U.S. banks. These risks include future unfavorable political and economic developments, seizure or nationalization of foreign deposits, currency controls, interest limitations or other governmental restrictions that might affect the payment of principal or interest on the securities held in a Fund. All investments in deposits and other obligations are subject to credit risk, which is the risk that a Fund may lose its investments in these instruments if, for example, the issuing financial institution collapses and is unable to meet its obligations. This risk is more acute for investments in deposits and other obligations that are not insured by a government or private entity. For a discussion of the risks of a Fund holding cash in mainland China, please see the "PRC Custodian and Dealer/Settlement Agent" section above.

Illiquid Securities

A Fund may invest up to an aggregate amount of 15% of its net assets in illiquid investments. An illiquid investment is any investment that the Fund reasonably expects cannot be sold or disposed of in current market conditions in seven calendar days or less without the sale or disposition significantly changing the market value of the investment. The liquidity of an investment will be determined based on relevant market, trading, and investment specific considerations as set forth in the Fund's liquidity risk management program (the "Liquidity Program") as required by Rule 22e-4 under the 1940 Act (the "Liquidity Rule"). Illiquid investments may trade at a discount to comparable, more liquid investments and the Fund may not be able to dispose of illiquid investments in a timely fashion or at their expected prices.

If illiquid investments exceed 15% of a Fund's net assets (including, for example, because of changes in the market value of its investments or because of redemptions), the Liquidity Rule and the Liquidity Program will require that certain remedial actions be taken. A Fund may not acquire illiquid investments if, immediately after the acquisition, more than 15% of the Fund's net assets would be in illiquid investments.

Portfolio Turnover

In general, Krane manages each Fund without regard to restrictions on portfolio turnover. The Funds' investment strategies may produce high portfolio turnover rates. To the extent a Fund invests in derivative or other instruments with short maturities, the instruments generally will have short-term maturities and, thus, be excluded from the calculation of portfolio turnover. The value of portfolio securities received or delivered as a result of in-kind creations or redemptions of a Fund's shares also is excluded from the calculation of the Fund's portfolio turnover rate. As a result, a Fund's reported portfolio turnover may be low despite relatively high portfolio activity which would, in turn, produce correspondingly greater expenses for a Fund, including brokerage commissions or dealer mark-ups and other transaction costs on the sale of securities and reinvestments in other securities. Generally, the higher the rate of portfolio turnover of a fund, the higher these transaction costs borne by a fund and its long-term shareholders. Such sales may result in the realization of taxable capital gains (including short-term capital gains, which, when distributed, are generally taxed to shareholders at ordinary income tax rates) for certain taxable shareholders.

"Portfolio Turnover Rate" is defined under the rules of the SEC as the lesser of the value of the securities purchased or of the securities sold, excluding all securities whose maturities at the time of acquisition were one-year or less, divided by the average monthly value of such securities owned during the year. Based on this definition, derivatives and instruments with a remaining maturity of less than one-year are excluded from the calculation of the portfolio turnover rate. Instruments excluded from the calculation of portfolio turnover may include commercial paper, futures contracts and option contracts because they generally have a remaining maturity of less than one-year.

Repurchase Agreements

The Funds may enter into repurchase agreements. A repurchase agreement is a transaction in which a Fund purchases securities or other obligations from a bank or securities dealer (or its affiliate) and simultaneously commits to resell them to a counterparty at an agreed-upon date or upon demand and at a price reflecting a market rate of interest unrelated to the coupon rate or maturity of the purchased obligations. A Fund maintains custody of the underlying obligations prior to their repurchase, either through its regular custodian or through a special “triparty” custodian or sub-custodian that maintains separate accounts for both a Fund and its counterparty. Thus, the obligation of the counterparty to pay the repurchase price on the date agreed to or upon demand is, in effect, secured by such obligations.

Repurchase agreements carry certain risks not associated with direct investments in securities, including a possible decline in the market value of the underlying obligations. If their value becomes less than the repurchase price, plus any agreed-upon additional amount, the counterparty must provide additional collateral so that at all times the collateral is at least equal to the repurchase price plus any agreed-upon additional amount. The difference between the total amount to be received upon repurchase of the obligations and the price that was paid by a Fund upon acquisition is accrued as interest and included in its net investment income. Repurchase agreements collateralized by instruments other than U.S. government securities (such as commercial paper and corporate bonds) are subject to special risks as they may not have the benefit of certain protections in the event of the counterparty’s insolvency. If the seller or guarantor becomes insolvent, a Fund may suffer delays, costs and possible losses in connection with the disposition of collateral.

Reverse Repurchase Agreements

The Funds may enter into reverse repurchase agreements, which involve the sale of securities held by a Fund subject to its agreement to repurchase the securities at an agreed-upon date or upon demand and at a price reflecting a market rate of interest. Reverse repurchase agreements are subject to a Fund’s limitation on borrowings and may be entered into only with banks or securities dealers or their affiliates.

Reverse repurchase agreements involve the risk that the buyer of the securities sold by a Fund might be unable to deliver them when a Fund seeks to repurchase. If the buyer of securities under a reverse repurchase agreement files for bankruptcy or becomes insolvent, the buyer or trustee or receiver may receive an extension of time to determine whether to enforce the Fund’s obligation to repurchase the securities, and the Fund’s use of the proceeds of the reverse repurchase agreement may effectively be restricted pending such decision.

Lending of Portfolio Securities

Each Fund may lend securities from its portfolio to brokers, dealers and other financial institutions. In connection with such loans, a Fund remains the beneficial owner of the loaned securities and continues to be entitled to payments in amounts approximately equal to the interest, dividends or other distributions payable on the loaned securities. A Fund also has the right to terminate a loan at any time. A Fund does not have the right to vote on securities while they are on loan. Loans of portfolio securities will not exceed 33 1/3% of the value of a Fund’s total assets (including the value of all assets received as collateral for the loan). A Fund will receive collateral in an amount equal to at least 100% of the current market value of the loaned securities. If the collateral consists of cash, a Fund will reinvest the cash and pay the borrower a pre-negotiated fee or “rebate” from any return earned on the investment. Should the borrower of the securities fail financially, a Fund may experience delays or trouble in recovering the loaned securities or exercising its rights in the collateral. In a loan transaction, a Fund will also bear the risk of any decline in value of securities acquired with cash collateral. Krane and a sub-adviser, if applicable, are subject to potential conflicts of interest because the compensation paid to them increases in connection with any net income received by a Fund from a securities lending program.

Cyber-Security Risk

Each Fund, and its service providers, may be prone to operational and information security risks resulting from cyber-attacks. Cyber-attacks include, among other behaviors, stealing or corrupting data maintained online or digitally, denial of service attacks on websites, the unauthorized release of confidential information or various other forms of cyber security breaches. Cyber-attacks affecting a Fund or its advisors, custodian, transfer agent, intermediaries and other third-party service providers may adversely impact a Fund. For instance, cyber-attacks may interfere with the processing of shareholder transactions, impact a Fund's ability to calculate its NAV, cause the release of private shareholder information or confidential business information, impede trading, subject a Fund to regulatory fines or financial losses and/or cause reputational damage. A Fund may also incur additional costs for cyber security risk management purposes. While a Fund's service providers have established business continuity plans, there are inherent limitations in such plans and systems including the possibility that certain risks have not been identified. Furthermore, a Fund cannot control the cyber security plans and systems put in place by its service providers or any other third parties whose operations may affect a Fund or its shareholders. Similar types of cyber security risks are also present for issues or securities in which a Fund may invest, which could result in material adverse consequences for such issuers and may cause a Fund's investment in such companies to lose value.

INVESTMENT LIMITATIONS

Unless otherwise noted, whenever a fundamental or non-fundamental investment policy or limitation states that a maximum percentage of a Fund's assets that may be invested in any security or other asset, or sets forth a policy regarding quality standards, such standard or percentage limitation will be determined immediately after and as a result of a Fund's acquisition of such security or other asset. Accordingly, other than with respect to a Fund's limitations on borrowings, any subsequent change in values, net assets, or other circumstances will not be considered when determining whether the investment complies with a Fund's investment policies and limitations.

Fundamental Policies

The investment limitations below are fundamental policies of each Fund, and cannot be changed without the consent of the holders of a majority of each Fund's outstanding shares. The term "majority of the outstanding shares" means the vote of (i) 67% or more of each Fund's shares present at a meeting, if more than 50% of the outstanding shares of each Fund are present or represented by proxy, or (ii) more than 50% of each Fund's outstanding shares, whichever is less.

Each Fund may not:

1. Issue senior securities, except as permitted under the 1940 Act, the rules, regulations and interpretations thereunder, and any applicable exemptive relief.
2. Borrow money, except as permitted under the 1940 Act, the rules, regulations and interpretations thereunder, and any applicable exemptive relief.
3. Act as an underwriter of another issuer's securities, except to the extent that the Fund may be considered an underwriter within the meaning of the Securities Act in the disposition of portfolio securities.
4. Purchase the securities of any issuer (other than securities issued or guaranteed by the U.S. government, or any non-U.S. government, or their respective agencies or instrumentalities) if, as a result, more than 25% of the Fund's total assets would be invested in the securities of companies whose principal business activities are in the same industry (excluding investment companies) or group of industries, except that the Fund will concentrate its investment in the particular industry to which its Underlying Stock is assigned.

5. Purchase or sell real estate unless acquired as a result of ownership of securities or other instruments (but this shall not prevent the Fund from investing in securities or other instruments backed by real estate, real estate investment trusts or securities of companies engaged in the real estate business).
6. Purchase or sell physical commodities unless acquired as a result of ownership of securities or other instruments (but this shall not prevent the Fund from purchasing or selling options, futures contracts, forward contracts, swaps and other financial instruments or from investing in issuers engaged in the commodities business or securities or other instruments backed by physical commodities).
7. Lend any security or make any other loan except as permitted under the 1940 Act, the rules, regulations and interpretations thereunder, and any applicable exemptive relief. This limitation does not apply to purchases of debt securities or to repurchase agreements, or to acquisitions of loans, loan participations or other forms of debt instruments permissible under the Fund's investment policies.

Each Fund's fundamental policies will be interpreted broadly. For example, the policies will be interpreted to refer to the 1940 Act and the related rules as they are in effect from time to time, and to interpretations of or relating to the 1940 Act by the SEC and others as they are given from time to time. When a policy provides that an investment practice may be conducted as permitted by the 1940 Act, the policy will be interpreted to mean either that the 1940 Act expressly permits the practice or that the 1940 Act does not prohibit the practice.

CONTINUOUS OFFERING

The method by which Creation Units of shares are created and traded may raise certain issues under applicable securities laws. Because new Creation Units of shares are issued and sold by a Fund on an ongoing basis, at any point a "distribution," as such term is used in the Securities Act, may occur. Broker-dealers and other persons are cautioned that some activities on their part may, depending on the circumstances, result in their being deemed participants in a distribution in a manner which could render them statutory underwriters and subject them to the prospectus delivery requirement and liability provisions of the Securities Act.

For example, a broker-dealer firm or its client may be deemed a statutory underwriter if it takes Creation Units after placing an order with the Funds' Distributor, breaks them down into constituent shares, and sells such shares directly to customers, or if it chooses to couple the creation of a supply of new shares with an active selling effort involving solicitation of secondary market demand for shares. A determination of whether one is an underwriter for purposes of the Securities Act must take into account all the facts and circumstances pertaining to the activities of the broker-dealer or its client in the particular case, and the examples mentioned above should not be considered a complete description of all the activities that could lead to a categorization as an underwriter.

Broker-dealer firms should also note that dealers who are not "underwriters" but are effecting transactions in shares, whether or not participating in the distribution of shares, generally are required to deliver a prospectus. This is because the prospectus delivery exemption in Section 4(3) of the Securities Act is not available in respect of such transactions as a result of Section 24(d) of the 1940 Act.

MANAGEMENT OF THE TRUST

Board Responsibilities

The Board of Trustees is responsible for overseeing the management and affairs of each Fund and the Trust. The Board considers and approves contracts, as described herein, under which certain companies provide essential management and administrative services to the Trust. Like most ETFs, the day-to-day business of the Trust, including the day-to-day management of risk, is performed by third-party service providers, such as Krane, a sub-adviser, if applicable, the Distributor and the Administrator (as defined below). The Board oversees the Trust's service providers and overall risk management. Risk management seeks to identify and eliminate or mitigate the potential effects of risks, *i.e.*, events or circumstances that could have material adverse effects on the business, operations, shareholder services, investment performance or reputation of the Trust or a Fund. Under the overall supervision of the Board and the Audit Committee (discussed in more detail below), the service providers to the Funds employ a variety of processes, procedures and controls to identify risks relevant to the operations of the Trust and a Fund to lessen the probability of their occurrence and/or to mitigate the effects of such events or circumstances if they do occur. Each service provider is responsible for one or more discrete aspects of the Trust's business (*e.g.*, Krane is responsible for the oversight of a sub-adviser) and, consequently, for managing the risks associated with that activity.

Consistent with its responsibility for oversight of the Trust and the Funds, the Board oversees the management of risks relating to the administration and operations of the Trust and the Funds. Krane, as part of its responsibilities for the day-to-day operations of the Funds, is responsible for day-to-day risk management for the Funds. The Board performs its risk management oversight directly and, as to certain matters, through its committees. The following provides an overview of the principal, but not all, aspects of the Board's oversight of risk management for the Trust and the Funds.

In general, each Fund's risks include, among others, investment risk, liquidity risk, valuation risk and operational risk. The Funds' service providers, including Krane and any sub-adviser, as applicable, are responsible for adopting policies, procedures and controls designed to address various risks within their purview. Further, Krane is responsible for overseeing and monitoring the investments and operations of any sub-adviser. The Board also oversees risk management for the Trust and the Funds through review of regular reports, presentations and other information from officers of the Trust and other persons. In addition to reports from Krane, the Board also receives reports regarding other service providers to the Trust on a periodic or regular basis.

The Board is responsible for overseeing the nature, extent and quality of the Fund services provided to the Funds by Krane and any sub-adviser and receives information from them on a periodic basis. In connection with its consideration of whether to approve and/or renew the advisory agreements with Krane and any sub-adviser, the Board will request information allowing the Board to review such services. The Board also receives reports related to Krane's and any sub-adviser's adherence to each Fund's investment restrictions and compliance with the stated policies of a Fund. In addition, the Board regularly receives information about each Fund's performance and investments.

The Trust's Chief Compliance Officer meets regularly with the Board to review and discuss compliance and other issues. At least annually, the Trust's Chief Compliance Officer provides the Board with a report reviewing the adequacy and effectiveness of the Trust's policies and procedures and those of its service providers, including the Adviser and any sub-adviser. The report generally seeks to address: the operation of the policies and procedures of the Trust and each service provider since the date of the last report; material changes to the policies and procedures since the date of the last report; any recommendations for material changes to the policies and procedures; and material compliance matters since the date of the last report.

The Board normally also receives reports from the Trust's service providers regarding Fund operations, portfolio valuation and other matters. Annually, an independent registered public accounting firm reviews with the Audit Committee its audit of the Trust's financial statements, focusing on certain areas of risk to the Trust and the Trust's internal controls.

The Board recognizes that not all risks that may affect a Fund can be identified, that it may not be practical or cost-effective to eliminate or mitigate certain risks, that it may be necessary to bear certain risks (such as investment-related risks) to achieve a Fund's goals, and that the processes, procedures and controls employed to address certain risks may be limited in their effectiveness. Moreover, despite the periodic reports the Board receives and the Board's discussions with the service providers to a Fund, it may not be made aware of all relevant information about certain risks. Most of the Trust's investment management and business affairs are carried out by or through Krane and other service providers, each of which has an independent interest in risk management but whose policies and methods by which one or more risk management functions are carried out may differ from the Trust's and each other's in the setting of priorities, the resources available or the effectiveness of relevant controls. As a result of the foregoing and other factors, the Board's risk management oversight is subject to substantial limitations.

Members of the Board and Officers of the Trust

Set forth below are the names, years of birth, position with the Trust, term of office, the principal occupations for a minimum of the last five years, number of portfolios overseen by, and other directorships of each of the persons currently serving as members of the Board and as Executive Officers of the Trust. Also included below is the term of office for each of the Executive Officers of the Trust. The members of the Board serve as Trustees for the life of the Trust or until retirement, removal, or their office is terminated pursuant to the Trust's Amended and Restated Declaration of Trust.

The Chairman of the Board, Jonathan Krane, is an interested person of the Trust as defined in the 1940 Act. No single Independent Trustee serves as a lead Independent Trustee. The Board has determined its leadership structure is appropriate given the specific characteristics the Trust and its operations. The Board made this determination in consideration of, among other things, Trustees who are not interested persons of the Trust (*i.e.*, "Independent Trustees") constitute at least fifty percent (50%) of the Board, the Audit Committee is composed of the Independent Trustees, and the Board oversees only a certain number of funds (and classes of shares).

Name, Address and Year of Birth of Trustee/Officer	Position(s) Held with the Trust, Term of Office and Length of Time Served (or Year Service Began)	Principal Occupation(s) During Past 5 Years	Number of Portfolios in Fund Complex Overseen by Trustee/Officer	Other Directorships Held by Trustee/Officer During Past 5 Years
Interested Trustee				
Jonathan Krane* (1968) 280 Park Avenue, 32nd Floor, New York, New York 10017	Trustee and Chairman of the Board, No set term; served since 2012	Chief Executive Officer of Krane Funds Advisors, LLC from 2011 to present.	40	Director of Krane California Carbon Allowance Fund, Ltd. from 2024 to present. Director of KraneShares ETC plc from 2024 to present. Director of KraneShares ICAV from 2021 to present.
Independent Trustees				
Luis Berruga (1977) 280 Park Avenue, 32nd Floor, New York, New York 10017	Trustee, No set term; served since 2024	Founder and Managing Partner of LBS Capital (family office and advisory business) from 2024 to present. Chief Executive Officer of Global X ETFs from 2018 to 2023. Chief Executive Officer of Global X Management Company LLC ("Global X") from 2014 to 2023; Chief Operating Officer of Global X in 2018; Chief Financial Officer and Chief Operating Officer of Global X from 2014 to 2018.	40	Independent Director of Sol Strategies from 2025 to present. Independent Director of VistaOne Fund from 2025 to present. Independent Director of Tidal Trust IV from 2025 to present. Interested Trustee of Global X Funds from 2018 to 2023.

Name, Address and Year of Birth of Trustee/Officer	Position(s) Held with the Trust, Term of Office and Length of Time Served (or Year Service Began)	Principal Occupation(s) During Past 5 Years	Number of Portfolios in Fund Complex Overseen by Trustee/Officer	Other Directorships Held by Trustee/Officer During Past 5 Years
John Ferguson (1966) 280 Park Avenue, 32nd Floor, New York, New York 10017	Trustee, No set term; served since 2012	President and CCO of Three Fifty Eight Investment Group, LLC from 2024 to present. Advisor to CEO and CCO of Covey Advisors LLC from 2023 to 2024. Chief Operating Officer of Shrewsbury River Capital from 2017 to 2020. Chief Operating Officer of Kang Global Investors LP (hedge fund adviser) from 2014 to 2016. President of Alden Global Capital, LLC (hedge fund adviser) from 2012 to 2014 (formerly, Chief Operating Officer from 2011 to 2012). Senior Managing Director and Chief Operating Officer of K2 Advisors, LLC from 2005 to 2011.	40	Independent Director of Pula Capital Offshore Fund Ltd. (Cayman) from 2024 to present. Independent Director of K2 Advisors Offshore Fund Complex from 2022 to present.
Matthew Stroyman (1968) 280 Park Avenue, 32nd Floor, New York, New York 10017	Trustee, No set term; served since 2012	Founder and President of BlackRidge Ventures from 2018 to present (principal investment activities and strategic advisory services in a variety of industries to clients and partners that include institutional investment firms, family offices and high net-worth individuals).	40	None
Officers				
Jonathan Krane (1968) 280 Park Avenue, 32nd Floor, New York, New York 10017	Principal Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer, No set term; served since 2012	Chief Executive Officer of Krane Funds Advisors, LLC from 2011 to present.	40	None
Jennifer Tarleton (formerly Krane) (1966) 280 Park Avenue, 32nd Floor, New York, New York 10017	Vice President and Secretary, No set term; served since 2012	Vice President of Krane Funds Advisors, LLC from 2011 to present.	40	None
Michael Quain (1957) 280 Park Avenue, 32nd Floor, New York, New York 10017	Chief Compliance Officer and Anti-Money Laundering Officer, No set term; served since 2015	Principal/President of Quain Compliance Consulting, LLC from 2014 to present.	40	None

Name, Address and Year of Birth of Trustee/Officer	Position(s) Held with the Trust, Term of Office and Length of Time Served (or Year Service Began)	Principal Occupation(s) During Past 5 Years	Number of Portfolios in Fund Complex Overseen by Trustee/Officer	Other Directorships Held by Trustee/Officer During Past 5 Years
John Bourgeois (1973) SEI Investments Company One Freedom Valley Drive, Oaks, PA 19456	Assistant Treasurer, No set term; served since 2024	Director of Accounting, SEI Investments Global Fund Services from May 2024 to present. Fund Accounting Manager, SEI Investments Global Fund Services from June 2001 to May 2024.	40	None
David Adelman (1964) 280 Park Avenue, 32nd Floor, New York, New York 10017	Assistant Secretary, No set term; served since 2021	Managing Director and the General Counsel, Krane Fund Advisors, LLC from 2021 to present. Partner, Reed Smith LLP from 2015 to 2021.	40	None
Jonathan Shelon (1974) 280 Park Avenue, 32nd Floor, New York, New York 10017	Assistant Secretary, No set term; served since 2019	Chief Operating Officer, Krane Funds Advisors, LLC from 2015 to present. Chief Investment Officer of Specialized Strategies, J.P. Morgan from 2011 to 2015.	40	None

* Mr. Krane is an “interested” person of the Trust, as that term is defined in the 1940 Act, by virtue of his ownership and controlling interest in Krane.

Board Standing Committees

The Board has established the following standing committees:

Audit Committee. Messrs. Berruga, Ferguson and Stroyman are members of the Trust’s Audit Committee (the “Audit Committee”) and Mr. Ferguson is the Chairman of the Audit Committee. The principal responsibilities of the Audit Committee are to oversee the financial reporting process and internal controls of the Trust, including recommending the appointment and compensation of the Trust’s independent auditors, and reviewing any significant disputes regarding financial reporting between Trust management and such independent auditors. Under the terms of the Audit Committee charter adopted by the Board, the Audit Committee is authorized to, among other things, (i) oversee the accounting and financial reporting processes of the Trust and its internal control over financial reporting; (ii) oversee the quality and integrity of a Fund’s financial statements and the independent audits thereof; (iii) assist the Board with oversight of the Trust’s compliance with legal and regulatory requirements that relate to the Trust’s accounting and financial reporting, internal control over financial reporting and independent audits; (iv) approve, prior to appointment, the engagement of the Trust’s independent auditors and, in connection therewith, review and evaluate the qualifications, independence and performance of the Trust’s independent auditors; and (v) act as a liaison between the Trust’s independent auditors and the full Board. The Board of the Trust has adopted a written charter for the Audit Committee. During the fiscal year ended March 31, 2025, the Audit Committee held four meetings.

The Audit Committee also serves as the Qualified Legal Compliance Committee (“QLCC”) for the Trust. The function of the QLCC is to receive, review and recommend resolution with respect to any report made or referred to the QLCC by an attorney of evidence of a material violation of applicable U.S. federal or state securities law, material breach of a fiduciary duty under U.S. federal or state law or a similar material violation by the Trust or by any officer, trustee, employee, or agent of the Trust. The QLCC meets as needed and during the fiscal year ended March 31, 2025, did not meet.

Nominating Committee. Messrs. Berruga, Ferguson and Stroyman are members of the Trust’s Nominating Committee and Mr. Stroyman is the Chairman of the Nominating Committee. The principal responsibilities of the Nominating Committee are to (i) identify, select and nominate the appropriate number of candidates for election or appointment as members of the Board and (ii) recommend to the Board for its consideration any appropriate changes to the number or qualification of Board members. The Nominating Committee is solely responsible for the selection and nomination of the Trust’s Independent Trustees and does not consider nominations for the office of Trustee made by Trust shareholders. During the fiscal year ended March 31, 2025, the Nominating Committee held two meetings.

Individual Trustee Qualifications

The Board has concluded that each of the Trustees should serve on the Board because of his ability to review and understand information about the Trust and each Fund provided by management, to identify and request other information he may deem relevant to the performance of the Trustees' duties, to question management and other service providers regarding material factors bearing on the management and administration of a Fund, and to exercise his business judgment in a manner that serves the best interests of a Fund's shareholders. The Board has concluded that each of the Trustees should serve as a Trustee based on his experience, qualifications, attributes and skills as described below.

The Board has concluded that Mr. Krane should serve as Trustee because of his knowledge of, and the executive positions he holds, or has held, in the financial services industry. Specifically, Mr. Krane currently serves as Chief Executive Officer of the Adviser. Mr. Krane contributes expertise and institutional knowledge relating to both the Adviser and the Trust. Prior to founding the Adviser, Mr. Krane also served as Chief Executive Officer of the China division of a multinational company, where he gained valuable experience in managing a business and critical knowledge of business and investment opportunities in China. In addition, he has served on the boards of different corporations and, in doing so, has first-hand knowledge of the fiduciary duties and responsibilities bestowed upon trustees and directors. The Board believes that Mr. Krane's experience serving as Chief Executive Officer for multiple businesses in the financial services industry, his familiarity with the KraneShares complex, and his experience in serving on the boards of various companies qualify him to serve as a Trustee of the Trust.

The Board has concluded that Mr. Ferguson should serve as Trustee because of the experience he has gained working in the financial services and legal industries over the years. In particular, Mr. Ferguson has extensive experience in managing global investment adviser firms, including the management, creation and operation of hedge funds. Mr. Ferguson has also served as a corporate securities and tax attorney assisting and counseling clients with the organization and creation of both domestic and offshore funds. In addition, Mr. Ferguson has served as an officer for two registered investment companies and, in doing so, has gained experience and knowledge regarding the mutual fund industry. The Board believes that Mr. Ferguson's experience in the financial services, fund and legal industries and his day-to-day work in managing investment advisory firms, qualify him to serve as a Trustee of the Trust.

The Board has concluded that Mr. Stroyman should serve as Trustee because of the experience he has gained working in the financial services and real estate industries. Working as an investment banker early in his career, Mr. Stroyman developed a strong base of knowledge regarding corporate finance, structuring, public and private securities, and company valuations. Through his work in the real estate industry and relationships with large investment management firms, Mr. Stroyman has gained an understanding of sophisticated financial products. He has advised institutional clients including pension funds, endowments and other qualified investors in asset management, risk assessment, and repositioning and disposition of underperforming assets. The Board believes that the knowledge Mr. Stroyman has gained over the years working in the financial services and real estate industries and his value and understanding of fiduciary duties and responsibilities assigned to board members qualify him to serve as Trustee of the Trust.

The Board has concluded that Mr. Berruga should serve as Trustee because of his extensive knowledge of and experience in the financial services industry. In particular, Mr. Berruga has extensive experience managing a global investment advisory firm and exchange-traded fund sponsor, giving him a strong understanding of product development related to and operation of exchange-traded funds. In addition, Mr. Berruga serves or has served as a board member of various operating companies, exchange-traded funds and private funds, and thus has first-hand knowledge of the fiduciary duties and responsibilities bestowed upon trustees and directors. The Board believes that the knowledge Mr. Berruga has gained over the years working in the exchange-traded fund industry and his value and understanding of fiduciary duties and responsibilities assigned to board members qualify him to serve as Trustee of the Trust.

As of March 31, 2025, none of the Independent Trustees or members of their immediate family, beneficially owned or owned of record securities representing interests in Krane, any sub-adviser or distributor of the Trust, or any person controlling, controlled by or under common control with such persons. For this purpose, "immediate family member" includes an Independent Trustee's spouse, children residing in the same household and dependents of the Independent Trustee.

Fund Shares Owned by Board Members

As of December 31, 2024, the Trustees beneficially owned the following amounts of Fund shares and shares of other series of the Trust:

Trustee	Funds	Aggregate Dollar Range of Beneficial Ownership of Funds
Luis Berruga	None	None
John Ferguson	KraneShares Electric Vehicles and Future Mobility Index ETF	\$10,001-\$50,000
	KraneShares MSCI All China Health Care Index ETF	\$10,001-\$50,000
	KraneShares CSI China Internet ETF	\$50,001-\$100,000
Jonathan Krane	KraneShares Bosera MSCI China A 50 Connect Index ETF	\$10,001-\$50,000
	KraneShares Asia Pacific High Income USD Bond ETF	\$1-\$10,000
	KraneShares CSI China Internet ETF	\$1-\$10,000
	KraneShares Electric Vehicles and Future Mobility Index ETF	\$1-\$10,000
	KraneShares Emerging Markets Consumer Technology Index ETF	\$1-\$10,000
	KraneShares Global Carbon Strategy ETF	\$1-\$10,000
	KraneShares MSCI Emerging Markets ex China Index ETF	\$1-\$10,000
	KraneShares SSE Star Market 50 Index ETF	\$1-\$10,000
Matthew Stroyman	None	None

“Beneficial ownership” is determined in accordance with Rule 16a-1(a)(2) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “1934 Act”).

Board Compensation

Trustees who are “interested persons” of Krane are not compensated by the Trust for their service as a Trustee. For the fiscal year ended March 31, 2025: (a) Mr. Berruga received aggregate compensation from the Trust in the amount of \$108,049; (b) Mr. Ferguson received aggregate compensation from the Trust in the amount of \$190,000; (c) Mr. Stroyman received aggregate compensation from the Trust in the amount of \$190,000; and (d) Patrick Campo (who retired from his position as Trustee effective December 31, 2024) received aggregate compensation from the Trust in the amount of \$142,500. None of the Trustees accrued or received any retirement or pension benefits.

Effective September 1, 2023, the Trustees receive compensation from the Trust in the amount of \$190,000 per year. Each Fund bears a proportionate share of Trustee compensation and expenses based on its relative net assets.

INVESTMENT ADVISER

Krane Funds Advisors, LLC (“Krane” or “Adviser”) serves as investment adviser to each Fund pursuant to an Investment Advisory Agreement between the Trust and Krane (the “Investment Advisory Agreement”). Krane is a Delaware limited liability company registered as an investment adviser under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended (the “Advisers Act”). Krane’s offices are located at 280 Park Ave, 32nd Floor, New York, New York 10017.

Under the Investment Advisory Agreement, Krane is responsible for reviewing, supervising and administering each Fund’s investment program and the general management and administration of the Trust. Krane may engage a subadviser to assist it in managing a Fund’s investments, but will be responsible for overseeing any subadvisers. Krane arranges for transfer agency, custody, fund administration and accounting, and other non-distribution related services necessary for each Fund to operate. Krane manages each Fund’s business affairs, provides office facilities and equipment and certain clerical, bookkeeping and administrative services, and permits its officers and employees to serve as officers or Trustees of the Trust. Under the Investment Advisory Agreement, Krane bears all of its own costs associated with providing advisory services to the Funds. As part of the Investment Advisory Agreement, Krane has contractually agreed to pay all expenses of each Fund, except (i) interest and taxes (including, but not limited to, income, excise, transaction, transfer and withholding taxes); (ii) expenses of a Fund incurred with respect to the acquisition and disposition of portfolio securities and the execution of portfolio transactions, including brokerage commissions and short sale dividend or interest expense; (iii) expenses incurred in connection with any distribution plan adopted by the Trust in compliance with Rule 12b-1 under the 1940 Act, including distribution fees; (iv) Acquired Fund Fees and Expenses; (v) litigation expenses; (vi) the compensation payable to the Adviser under the Investment Advisory Agreement; (vii) compensation and expenses of the Independent Trustees (including any Trustees’ counsel fees); and (viii) any expenses determined to be extraordinary expenses by the Board. Nevertheless, there exists a risk that a Trust service provider will seek recourse against the Trust if it is not timely paid by Krane for the fees and expenses for which it is responsible, which could materially adversely affect a Fund.

Under the Investment Advisory Agreement, each Fund pays Krane the fee shown in the table below, which is calculated daily and paid monthly, at an annual rate based on a percentage of the average daily net assets of the Fund.

KraneShares 2x Long BABA Daily ETF*	1.25%
KraneShares 2x Long PDD Daily ETF	1.25%

* Krane has contractually agreed to waive its advisory fee by 0.27% of the Fund’s average daily net assets (“Fee Waiver”). The Fee Waiver will continue until August 1, 2026, and may only be terminated prior thereto by the Board.

In addition to the advisory fee rate paid to Krane, as shown in the table above, under the Investment Advisory Agreement, each Fund pays Krane 10% of the monthly investment income received from the investment of cash collateral and loan fees received from borrowers in respect of securities loans (net of any amounts paid to the custodian and/or securities lending agent or rebated to borrowers) as compensation for the services provided by Krane in connection with any securities lending-related activities.

To the extent a Fund engages in securities lending, Krane will: (i) determine which securities are available for loan and notify the securities lending agent for a Fund (the “Agent”), (ii) monitor the Agent’s activities to ensure that securities loans are effected in accordance with Krane’s instructions and in accordance with applicable procedures and guidelines adopted by the Board, (iii) make recommendations to the Board regarding the Fund’s participation in securities lending, (iv) prepare appropriate periodic reports for, and seek appropriate periodic approvals from, the Board with respect to securities lending activities, (v) respond to Agent inquiries concerning Agent’s activities, and (vi) such other related duties as Krane deems necessary or appropriate. In addition, Krane may provide additional securities lending-related services as requested by the Trustees from time to time.

Under the Investment Advisory Agreement, while the fees and expenses related to a Fund’s securities lending-related activities reduce the revenues and income of the Fund from such activities, they are not fees and expenses for which Krane is responsible.

For the fiscal period ended March 31, 2025, Krane received the following compensation under the Investment Advisory Agreement:

	Fiscal Period Ended 3/31/25	
	Advisory Fees	Fees from Securities Lending
KraneShares 2x Long BABA Daily ETF	\$1,578	\$0
KraneShares 2x Long PDD Daily ETF	\$1,785	\$0

The Investment Advisory Agreement with respect to each Fund will continue in effect for two years from its initial effective date, and thereafter is subject to annual approval by (i) the Board of Trustees of the Trust or (ii) the vote of a majority of the outstanding voting securities (as defined in the 1940 Act) of the Fund, provided that in either event such continuance also is approved by a vote of a majority of the Trustees of the Trust who are not interested persons (as defined in the 1940 Act) of the Fund. If the shareholders of a Fund fail to approve the Investment Advisory Agreement, Krane may continue to serve in the manner and to the extent permitted by the 1940 Act and rules and regulations thereunder.

Krane waived the following amount of fees for each Fund listed below pursuant to that Fund’s fee waiver agreement:

	Fiscal Period Ended 3/31/25
KraneShares 2x Long BABA Daily ETF	\$341

The Investment Advisory Agreement with respect to a Fund is terminable without any penalty, by vote of the Board of Trustees of the Trust or by vote of a majority of the outstanding voting securities (as defined in the 1940 Act) of a Fund, or by Krane, in each case on not less than sixty (60) days’ prior written notice to the other party; provided that a shorter notice period shall be permitted for a Fund in the event its shares are no longer listed on a national securities exchange or in such other circumstances where a Fund waives such notice period. The Investment Advisory Agreement will terminate automatically and immediately in the event of its “assignment” (as defined in the 1940 Act).

China International Capital Corporation (USA) Holdings Inc., a wholly-owned, indirect subsidiary of China International Capital Corporation Limited owns a majority stake in Krane. As of March 31, 2025, Central Huijin Investment Limited, a mainland Chinese-domiciled entity, and HKSCC Nominees Limited, held approximately 40.11% and 39.42%, respectively, of the shares of China International Capital Corporation Limited. Central Huijin Investment Limited is a wholly-owned subsidiary of China Investment Corporation, which is a mainland Chinese sovereign wealth fund. KFA One Holdings, LLC, located at 280 Park Avenue, 32nd Floor, New York, New York 10017, holds the remaining equity interests in Krane and Jonathan Krane, through his equity interests in KFA One Holdings, LLC, beneficially owns more than 10% of the equity interests in Krane.

Krane has received “manager of managers” exemptive relief from the SEC that permits Krane, subject to the approval of the Board of Trustees, to appoint a “wholly-owned” or unaffiliated sub-adviser, as defined in the exemptive relief, or to change the terms of a sub-advisory agreement with a “wholly-owned” or unaffiliated sub-adviser without first obtaining shareholder approval. The exemptive order further permits Krane to add or to change a “wholly-owned” or unaffiliated sub-adviser or to change the fees paid to such parties from time to time without the expense and delays associated with obtaining shareholder approval of the change and to disclose sub-advisers’ fees only in the aggregate in its registration statement. Any increase in the aggregate advisory fee paid by any Fund remains subject to shareholder approval. Krane continues to have ultimate responsibility (subject to oversight by the Board of Trustees) to oversee the sub-advisers and recommend their hiring, termination, and replacement. A Fund will notify shareholders of any change of a Fund sub-adviser.

PORFOLIO MANAGERS

Portfolio Manager Fund Ownership. The Funds are required to show the dollar range of each portfolio manager’s “beneficial ownership” of shares of a Fund as of the end of the most recently completed fiscal period. Dollar amount ranges disclosed are established by the SEC.

Krane’s Portfolio Managers		
Name	Funds Covered by this SAI	Dollar Range of Fund Ownership (dollars)
James Maund	KraneShares 2x Long BABA Daily ETF	None
	KraneShares 2x Long PDD Daily ETF	None
Jonathan Shelon	KraneShares 2x Long BABA Daily ETF	None
	KraneShares 2x Long PDD Daily ETF	None

Other Accounts. The portfolio managers are responsible for the day-to-day management of certain other accounts, as follows:

Krane’s Portfolio Managers						
Name	Registered Investment Companies*		Other Pooled Investment Vehicles*		Other Accounts*	
	Number of Accounts	Total Assets (\$ millions)	Number of Accounts	Total Assets (\$ millions)	Number of Accounts	Total Assets (\$ millions)
James Maund*	23	\$9,082.71	10	\$623.49	NA	NA
Jonathan Shelon*	23	\$9,082.71	10	\$623.49	10	\$0.133

* The information provided is as of March 31, 2025. None of the accounts paid advisory fees based on the performance of the accounts.

Portfolio Manager Compensation

The portfolio managers receive a fixed base salary and incentive awards based on the profitability of Krane and the satisfaction of the account objectives. The potential conflicts of interest arising with respect to each portfolio manager's compensation are relatively limited given each Fund's investment objective, which makes it unlikely, but not impossible, that the portfolio manager would take undue risks in investing a Fund's assets to increase performance. Nevertheless, to the extent a portfolio manager would derive additional compensation from managing other accounts, the portfolio manager may be motivated to favor the other accounts. To address these and other conflicts of interest, Krane has adopted various policies and procedures designed so that all clients are treated equitably and that no client is systematically favored or disadvantaged over time.

Description of Material Conflicts of Interest

A portfolio manager's management of "other accounts" may give rise to potential conflicts of interest in connection with his management of a Fund's investments, on the one hand, and the investments of the other accounts, on the other. The other accounts may have the same investment objective as a Fund. Therefore, a potential conflict of interest may arise as a result of the similar investment objectives, whereby the portfolio manager could favor one account over another. Another potential conflict could include the portfolio manager's knowledge of the size, timing and possible market impact of a Fund's trades, whereby the portfolio manager could use this information to the advantage of other accounts, including personal trading, and to the disadvantage of a Fund. However, Krane has established policies and procedures to ensure that the purchase and sale of securities among all accounts it manages are fairly and equitably allocated. Krane monitors and limits personal trading in accordance with its Code of Ethics, as described below.

CODES OF ETHICS

The Trust and Krane have each adopted a Code of Ethics pursuant to Rule 17j-1 under the 1940 Act. The Codes of Ethics apply to the personal investing activities of trustees, directors, officers and certain employees ("access persons"). Rule 17j-1 and the Codes of Ethics are designed to prevent unlawful practices in connection with the purchase or sale of securities by access persons. Under the Codes of Ethics, access persons are permitted to engage in personal securities transactions (including investments in securities that may be purchased and held by a Fund), but are required to report their personal securities transactions for monitoring purposes. Each Code of Ethics is on file with the SEC and is available to the public.

PROXY VOTING POLICY

The Trust has adopted the proxy voting policies of Krane, a summary of which is set forth in the appendix to this SAI. The Trust is required to disclose annually a Fund's complete proxy voting record on Form N-PX covering the period from July 1 of one year through June 30 of the next and to file Form N-PX with the SEC no later than August 31 of each year. The Form N-PX is available, or will be available, (1) without charge, upon request, by calling 1.855.857.2638 and contacting info@kraneshares.com; (2) on or through the Funds' website at www.kraneshares.com; and (3) on the SEC's website at www.sec.gov.

ADMINISTRATOR

SEI Investments Global Funds Services (the "Administrator") serves as administrator for the Funds. SEI Investments Management Corporation ("SIMC"), a wholly-owned subsidiary of SEI Investments Company ("SEI Investments"), is the owner of all beneficial interest in the Administrator. The principal address of the Administrator is One Freedom Valley Drive, Oaks, Pennsylvania 19456. Under an Amended and Restated Administration Agreement with the Trust dated July 9, 2014, as amended (the "Administration Agreement"), the Administrator provides necessary administrative and accounting services for the maintenance and operations of the Trust and the Funds. In addition, the Administrator makes available the office space, equipment, personnel and facilities required to provide such services.

For its services under the Administration Agreement, the Administrator is entitled to a fee, based on assets under management, subject to a minimum fee. The Administrator may be reimbursed by the Funds for its out-of-pocket expenses. The Investment Advisory Agreement provides that Krane will pay certain operating expenses of the Trust, including the fees due to the Administrator under the Administration Agreement.

CUSTODIAN AND TRANSFER AGENT

Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. (“BBH”) serves as custodian and transfer agent for the Trust. The principal address of BBH is 50 Post Office Square, Boston, Massachusetts 02110. Under the Custodian and Transfer Agent Agreement with the Trust dated December 12, 2012, BBH, in its capacity as custodian, maintains in separate accounts cash, securities and other assets of the Funds, keeps all necessary accounts and records, and provides other services. BBH is required, upon the order of the Trust, to deliver securities held by it, in its capacity as custodian, and to make payments for securities purchased by the Trust for a Fund.

Under the Custodian and Transfer Agent Agreement, foreign securities held by the Funds are generally held by sub-custodians in BBH’s sub-custodian network.

BBH further acts as a transfer agent for the Trust’s authorized and issued shares of beneficial interest, and as dividend disbursing agent of the Trust, under the Custodian and Transfer Agent Agreement. The Investment Advisory Agreement provides that Krane will pay certain operating expenses of the Trust, including the fees due to BBH under the Custodian and Transfer Agent Agreement.

SECURITIES LENDING ARRANGEMENTS

BBH serves as the securities lending agent for the Trust. The principal address of BBH is 50 Post Office Square, Boston, Massachusetts 02110. As the securities lending agent, BBH, among other matters, negotiates the specific loan terms for the Funds to loan their securities and receive compensation therefor, arranges for deliveries of securities and collateral under the securities lending program, and effects the investment of cash collateral received in connection with loaned securities, all as specified in the Securities Lending Agency Agreement and within the parameters established under the Trust’s securities lending program. BBH is authorized to lend Fund securities only to such borrowers as have been approved by the Trust.

DISTRIBUTOR AND DISTRIBUTION ARRANGEMENTS

SEI Investments Distribution Co., a wholly-owned subsidiary of SEI Investments, and an affiliate of the Administrator, serves as Distributor for the Trust. The principal address of the Distributor is One Freedom Valley Drive, Oaks, Pennsylvania 19456. The Distributor has entered into an Amended and Restated Distribution Agreement with the Trust dated July 9, 2014, (the “Distribution Agreement”) pursuant to which it distributes shares of the Funds. The Distribution Agreement will continue for two years from its effective date and is renewable annually. Shares are continuously offered for sale by the Funds through the Distributor only in Creation Units, as described in the Prospectus and below in the “Creation and Redemption of Creation Units” section. Shares in less than Creation Units are not distributed by the Distributor. The Distributor is a broker-dealer registered under the 1934 Act and a member of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”). The Distributor is not affiliated with Krane or any national securities exchange.

The Distribution Agreement provides that it may be terminated at any time, without the payment of any penalty: (i) by a vote of a majority of the independent Trustees; (ii) by a vote of a majority of the outstanding voting securities (as defined in the 1940 Act) of a Fund; or (iii) on at least thirty (30) days’ prior written notice to the other party. The Distribution Agreement will terminate automatically in the event of its assignment (as defined in the 1940 Act).

The Distributor also may enter into agreements with securities dealers (“Soliciting Dealers”) who will solicit purchases of Creation Units of shares. Such Soliciting Dealers also may be Authorized Participants (as defined below) or DTC Participants (as defined below).

Distribution Plan. Each Fund has adopted a Distribution Plan applicable to the Fund's shares. Under the Distribution Plan, the Distributor, or designated service providers, may receive up to 0.25% of a Fund's assets attributable to shares as compensation for distribution services pursuant to Rule 12b-1 of the 1940 Act. Distribution services may include: (i) services in connection with distribution assistance, or (ii) payments to financial institutions and other financial intermediaries, such as broker-dealers, fund "supermarkets" and the Distributor's affiliates and subsidiaries, as compensation for services or reimbursement of expenses incurred in connection with distribution assistance. The Distributor may, at its discretion, retain a portion of such payments to compensate itself for distribution services and distribution related expenses such as the costs of preparation, printing, mailing or otherwise disseminating sales literature, advertising, and prospectuses (other than those furnished to current shareholders of a Fund), promotional and incentive programs, and such other marketing expenses that the Distributor may incur. The plan is a compensation plan, which means that the Distributor is compensated regardless of its expenses, as opposed to a reimbursement plan which reimburses only for expenses incurred.

No distribution fees are currently charged to the Funds and there are currently no plans to impose these fees. The Plan was adopted in order to permit the implementation of each Fund's method of distribution. In the event that 12b-1 fees are charged in the future, because a Fund pays these fees out of assets on an ongoing basis, over time these fees may cost you more than other types of sales charges and will increase the cost of your investment in a Fund.

The Plan will remain in effect for a period of one year and is renewable from year to year with respect to a Fund, so long as its continuance is approved at least annually (1) by the vote of a majority of the Trustees and (2) by a vote of the majority of those Independent Trustees who have no direct or indirect financial interest in the Plan ("Rule 12b-1 Trustees"). The Plan may not be amended to increase materially the amount of fees that may be paid by a Fund under the Plan unless such amendment is approved by a 1940 Act majority vote of the outstanding shares and by a Fund's Trustees in the manner described above. The Plan is terminable with respect to a Fund at any time by a vote of a majority of the Rule 12b-1 Trustees or by a 1940 Act majority vote of the outstanding shares.

Intermediary Compensation. Krane and/or its affiliates, out of its own resources and not out of a Fund's assets (*i.e.*, without additional cost to a Fund or its shareholders), may pay certain broker dealers, banks and other financial intermediaries ("Intermediaries"), to the extent permitted by applicable law, for certain activities related to a Fund, including marketing and education support and the sale of a Fund's shares. These arrangements are sometimes referred to as "revenue sharing" arrangements. Revenue sharing arrangements are not financed by a Fund and, thus, do not result in increased Fund expenses. They are not reflected in the fees and expenses listed in the fees and expenses sections of a Fund's Prospectus and they do not change the price paid by investors for the purchase of a Fund's shares or the amount received by a shareholder as proceeds from the redemption of shares of a Fund.

Such compensation may be paid to Intermediaries that provide services to a Fund, including marketing and education support (such as through conferences, webinars and printed communications). Such compensation may also be paid to Intermediaries for inclusion of a Fund on a sales list, including a preferred or select sales list, in other sales programs. Krane periodically assesses the advisability of continuing to make these payments.

Payments to an Intermediary may be significant to the Intermediary, and amounts that Intermediaries pay to your adviser, broker or other investment professional, if any, may also be significant to such adviser, broker or investment professional. Because an Intermediary may make decisions about what investment options it will make available or recommend, and what services to provide in connection with various products, based on payments it receives or is eligible to receive, such payments create conflicts of interest between the Intermediary and its clients. For example, these financial incentives may cause the Intermediary to recommend a Fund over other investments. The same conflict of interest exists with respect to your financial adviser, broker or investment professionals if he or she receives similar payments from his or her Intermediary firm.

Intermediary information is current only as of the date of this SAI. Please contact your adviser, broker or other investment professional for more information regarding any payments his or her Intermediary firm may receive. Any payments made by Krane and/or its affiliates to an Intermediary may create an incentive for the Intermediary to encourage customers to buy shares of a Fund.

CONTROL PERSONS AND PRINCIPAL HOLDERS OF SECURITIES

All shares of a Fund that have commenced operations are held of record in the name of the DTC or its nominee, Cede & Co. Although the Funds do not have information concerning the beneficial ownership of shares held in the names of DTC participants, as of June 30, 2025, the name and percentage ownership of each DTC participant* that owned of record 5% or more of the outstanding shares of a Fund were as follows:

Ticker	Fund	Participant Name and Address	Percentage of Ownership
KBAB	KraneShares 2x Long BABA Daily ETF	BOFA SECURITIES, INC. 100 North Tryon Street Charlotte NC 28255	58.8%
		THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON 240 Greenwich Street New York, New York 10286	9.8%
		FUTU CLEARING INC. 12750 Merit Drive, Suite 475, Dallas, TX 75251 United States	6.3%
		NATIONAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LLC 1 World Financial Center - Sandy Hook, New York, New York 10281	5.6%
KPDD	KraneShares 2x Long PDD Daily ETF	FUTU CLEARING INC. 12750 Merit Drive, Suite 475, Dallas, TX 75251 United States	27.6%
		CHARLES SCHWAB & CO., INC. 3000 Schwab Way, Westlake TX 76262	20.1%
		INTERACTIVE BROKERS LLC/RETAIL Two Pickwick Plaza Greenwich CT 06830	18.7%
		CIBC WORLD MARKETS INC./CDS** 300 Madison Avenue, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10017	5.9%

* DTC participants are listed according to their DTC number and may represent multiple companies under a single parent company, which have not been aggregated.

A person owning 25% or more of the voting securities of a Fund is termed a “Control Person” of the Fund. Shareholders owning voting securities in excess of 25% may determine the outcome of any matter affecting and voted on by shareholders of a Fund. The actions of an entity or person that controls a Fund could have an effect on other shareholders. For instance, a Control Person may have effective voting control over a Fund, and large redemptions by a Control Person could cause a Fund’s other shareholders to pay a higher pro rata portion of the Fund’s expenses.

EXCHANGE LISTING AND TRADING

A discussion of exchange listing and trading matters associated with an investment in a Fund is contained in the Prospectus. The discussion below supplements, and should be read in conjunction with, such sections of the Prospectus.

The shares of the Fund are listed and traded on the Exchange identified on the cover of this SAI at prices that may differ from a Fund's NAV. There can be no assurance that the Exchange requirements necessary to maintain the listing of the shares of the Fund will continue to be met. The Exchange may, but is not required to, remove the shares of the Fund from listing if, among other matters: (i) the Exchange becomes aware that the Fund is no longer eligible to operate in reliance on Rule 6c-11 of the Investment Company Act; (ii) if the Fund no longer complies with the requirements set forth by the Exchange; (iii) following the initial 12-month period after commencement of trading of the Fund, there are fewer than fifty (50) Beneficial Owners (as that term is defined below) of the shares of the Fund; or (iv) such other event shall occur or condition exist that, in the opinion of the Exchange, makes further dealings on the Exchange inadvisable. The Exchange will remove the shares of the Fund from listing and trading upon termination of the Fund.

Trading prices of Shares on the Exchange may differ from the Fund's daily NAV. Market forces of supply and demand, economic conditions and other factors may affect the trading prices of Shares.

As in the case of other stocks traded on the Exchange, broker's commissions on purchases or sales of shares in market transactions will be based on investors' negotiated commission rates.

The Trust reserves the right to adjust the price levels of shares in the future to help maintain convenient trading ranges for investors. Any adjustments would be accomplished through stock splits or reverse stock splits, which would have no effect on the net assets of a Fund or the value of investors' individual positions in the Fund.

BOOK ENTRY ONLY SYSTEM

The information below supplements and should be read in conjunction with the section in the Prospectus entitled "Shareholder Information."

The Depository Trust Company ("DTC") acts as securities depository for the Funds' shares. Shares of the Funds are represented by securities registered in the name of the DTC or its nominee, Cede & Co., and deposited with, or on behalf of, the DTC.

The DTC, a limited-purpose trust company, was created to hold securities of its participants ("DTC Participants") and to facilitate the clearance and settlement of securities transactions among the DTC Participants in such securities through electronic book-entry changes in accounts of the DTC Participants, thereby eliminating the need for physical movement of securities' certificates. DTC Participants include securities brokers and dealers, banks, trust companies, clearing corporations and certain other organizations, some of whom (and/or their representatives) own the DTC. More specifically, the DTC is owned by a number of its DTC Participants and by the Exchange, and FINRA. Access to the DTC system is also available to others such as banks, brokers, dealers and trust companies that clear through or maintain a custodial relationship with a DTC Participant, either directly or indirectly (the "Indirect Participants").

Beneficial ownership of shares is limited to DTC Participants, Indirect Participants and persons holding interests through DTC Participants and Indirect Participants. Ownership of beneficial interests in shares (owners of such beneficial interests are referred to herein as "Beneficial Owners") is shown on, and the transfer of ownership is effected only through, records maintained by the DTC (with respect to DTC Participants) and on the records of DTC Participants (with respect to Indirect Participants and Beneficial Owners that are not DTC Participants). Beneficial Owners will receive from or through the DTC Participant a written confirmation relating to their purchase of shares. The laws of some jurisdictions may require that certain purchasers of securities take physical delivery of such securities in definitive form. Such laws may impair the ability of certain investors to acquire beneficial interests in shares.

Conveyance of all notices, statements and other communications to Beneficial Owners is effected as follows. Pursuant to the Depository Agreement between the Trust and the DTC, the DTC is required to make available to the Trust upon request and for a fee to be charged to the Trust a listing of the shares of a Fund held by each DTC Participant. The Trust shall inquire of each such DTC Participant as to the number of Beneficial Owners holding shares, directly or indirectly, through such DTC Participant. The Trust shall provide each such DTC Participant with copies of such notice, statement or other communication, in such form, number and at such place as such DTC Participant may reasonably request, in order that such notice, statement or communication may be transmitted by such DTC Participant, directly or indirectly, to such Beneficial Owners. In addition, the Trust shall pay to each such DTC Participant a fair and reasonable amount as reimbursement for the expenses attendant to such transmittal, all subject to applicable statutory and regulatory requirements.

Share distributions shall be made to the DTC or its nominee, Cede & Co., as the registered holder of all shares. The DTC or its nominee, upon receipt of any such distributions, shall credit immediately DTC Participants' accounts with payments in amounts proportionate to their respective beneficial interests in shares of a Fund as shown on the records of the DTC or its nominee. Payments by DTC Participants to Indirect Participants and Beneficial Owners of shares held through such DTC Participants will be governed by standing instructions and customary practices, as is now the case with securities held for the accounts of customers in bearer form or registered in a "street name," and will be the responsibility of such DTC Participants.

The Trust has no responsibility or liability for any aspect of the records relating to or notices to Beneficial Owners, or payments made on account of beneficial ownership interests in such shares, or for maintaining, supervising or reviewing any records relating to such beneficial ownership interests, or for any other aspect of the relationship between the DTC and DTC Participants or the relationship between such DTC Participants and the Indirect Participants and Beneficial Owners owning through such DTC Participants.

The DTC may decide to discontinue providing its service with respect to shares at any time by giving reasonable notice to the Trust and discharging its responsibilities with respect thereto under applicable law. Under such circumstances, the Trust shall take action to find a replacement for the DTC to perform its functions at a comparable cost.

BROKERAGE TRANSACTIONS

Krane or, if applicable, a Fund sub-adviser assumes general supervision over placing orders on behalf of a Fund for the purchase and sale of portfolio securities.

Although Krane or any sub-adviser strives to obtain the best net price under prevailing circumstances surrounding each trade, the determinative factor is whether a transaction represents the best overall execution for a Fund and not whether the lowest possible transaction cost is obtained. Krane and any sub-adviser consider the full range and quality of a broker-dealer's servicing in selecting the broker to meet best execution obligations, and may not pay the lowest transaction cost available. Krane or any sub-adviser reviews trading to ensure best execution, operational performance, and reasonable commission rates. Order flow may go through traditional broker-dealers, but may also be executed on an Electronic Communication Network, Alternative Trading System or other execution system.

Where multiple broker-dealers are available to execute portfolio transactions, in selecting the brokers or dealers for any transaction in portfolio securities, Krane or any sub-adviser's policy is to make such selection based on factors deemed relevant, which may include the breadth of the market in the security; the price of the security; the reasonableness of the commission or mark-up or mark-down, if any; execution capability; settlement capability; back office efficiency; and the financial condition of the broker or dealer, both for the specific transaction and on a continuing basis. The overall reasonableness of brokerage commissions paid or spreads is evaluated by Krane or any sub-adviser generally based upon its knowledge of available information as to the general level of commissions paid or spreads by other institutional investors for comparable services. Brokers or dealers may also be selected because of their ability to handle special or difficult executions, such as may be involved in large block trades, less liquid securities, broad distributions, or other circumstances. Krane or any sub-adviser may also consider the provision or value of research, products or services a broker or dealer may provide, if any, as a factor in the selection of a broker or dealer or the determination of the reasonableness of commissions paid in connection with portfolio transactions. The Trust has adopted policies and procedures that prohibit the consideration of sales of a Fund's shares as a factor in the selection of a broker or a dealer to execute its portfolio transactions.

When one or more broker-dealers is believed capable of providing the best combination of price and execution, a broker-dealer need not be selected based solely on the lowest commission rate available for a particular transaction. In such cases, Krane may pay a higher commission than otherwise obtainable from other brokers in return for brokerage research services provided to Krane consistent with Section 28(e) of the 1934 Act. Section 28(e) provides that Krane may cause a Fund to pay a broker-dealer a commission for effecting a transaction in excess of the amount of commission another broker or dealer would have charged as long as Krane or the sub-adviser makes a good faith determination that the amount of commission is reasonable in relation to the value of the brokerage and research services provided by the broker-dealer. To the extent Krane obtains brokerage and research services that it otherwise would acquire at its own expense, Krane may have incentive to place a greater volume of transactions or pay higher commissions than would otherwise be the case.

The types of products and services that Krane may obtain from broker-dealers through such arrangements may include research reports and other information on the economy, industries, sectors, groups of securities, individual companies, statistical information, political developments, technical market action, pricing and appraisal services, credit analysis, risk measurement analysis, performance and other analysis. Krane may use products and services provided by brokers in servicing all of its client accounts and not all such products and services may necessarily be used in connection with the account that paid commissions to the broker-dealer providing such products and services. Any advisory or other fees paid to Krane are not reduced as a result of the receipt of brokerage and research services.

In some cases, Krane may receive a product or service from a broker that has both a “research” and a “non-research” use. When this occurs, Krane or the sub-adviser will make a good faith allocation between the research and non-research uses of the product or service. The percentage of the service that is used for research purposes may be paid for with brokerage commissions, while Krane will use its own funds to pay for the percentage of the service that is used for non-research purposes. In making this good faith allocation, Krane faces a potential conflict of interest, but Krane or the sub-adviser believes that its allocation procedures are reasonably designed to appropriately allocate the anticipated use of such products and services to research and non-research uses.

The Trust has adopted policies and procedures that prohibit the consideration of sales of a Fund’s shares as a factor in the selection of a broker or a dealer to execute its portfolio transactions.

Brokerage transactions may be conducted through “affiliated brokers or dealers,” as defined in rules under the 1940 Act. An affiliated broker-dealer will receive compensation from a Fund in connection with the Fund’s portfolio investment transactions conducted through them. This arrangement may present actual or perceived conflicts of interest, but the 1940 Act permits commissions to be paid by a fund to an “affiliated broker or dealer” if such commissions do not exceed the usual and customary broker’s commission. Accordingly, the Funds have adopted compliance policies and procedures to permits such trades so long as, among other matters, the commissions paid to an affiliated broker-dealer are, in the judgment of the Krane or the subadviser (if applicable), reasonable and fair as compared to the commissions charged by other brokers in connection with comparable transactions involving similar securities.

An affiliated broker-dealer may engage in proprietary trading and advise accounts and funds that have investment objectives similar to those of a Fund and/or that engage in and compete for transactions in the same types of securities, currencies and other instruments as the Fund. Such activities could affect the prices and availability of the securities, currencies, and instruments in which a Fund invests, which could have an adverse impact on a Fund’s performance. Such transactions by an affiliated broker-dealer, including for other client accounts, will be executed independently of a Fund’s transactions and thus at prices or rates that may be more or less favorable than those obtained by the Fund.

Brokerage Commissions

Aggregate brokerage commissions paid by each of the following operational Funds on portfolio transactions for the fiscal periods shown are set forth in the table below:

	Fiscal Period Ended March 31, 2025
KraneShares 2x Long BABA Daily ETF	\$1,295*
KraneShares 2x Long PDD Daily ETF	\$1,400**

* For the fiscal period starting from the KraneShares 2x Long BABA Daily ETF’s inception, March 11, 2025 to March 31, 2025.

** For the fiscal period starting from the KraneShares 2x Long PDD Daily ETF’s inception, March 11, 2025 to March 31, 2025.

Directed Brokerage

For the fiscal period ended March 31, 2025, the Funds paid the following in commissions on brokerage transactions directed to brokers pursuant to an agreement or understanding whereby the broker provides research or other brokerage services to Krane:

Fund	Brokerage Commissions for Research Services	Transactions Involving Brokerage Commissions for Research Services
KraneShares 2x Long BABA Daily ETF	\$0	\$0
KraneShares 2x Long PDD Daily ETF	\$0	\$0

Affiliated Brokers

Of the aggregate brokerage commissions paid by each of the following operational Funds on portfolio transactions for the fiscal period shown, below are the commissions paid by the Funds to a broker that is an affiliated person of the Fund:

	Fiscal Period Ended March 31, 2025
KraneShares 2x Long BABA Daily ETF	\$0*
KraneShares 2x Long PDD Daily ETF	\$0**

* For the fiscal period starting from the KraneShares 2x Long BABA Daily ETF's inception, March 11, 2025 to March 31, 2025.

** For the fiscal period starting from the KraneShares 2x Long PDD Daily ETF's inception, March 11, 2025 to March 31, 2025.

Regular Broker-Dealers

Each Fund is required to identify any securities of its "regular brokers and dealers" (as such term is defined in the 1940 Act) which a Fund may hold at the close of its most recent fiscal year. "Regular brokers or dealers" of a Fund are the ten brokers or dealers that, during the most recent fiscal year: (i) received the greatest dollar amounts of brokerage commissions from a Fund's portfolio transactions; (ii) engaged as principal in the largest dollar amounts of portfolio transactions of a Fund; or (iii) sold the largest dollar amounts of a Fund's shares. Such information is set out in the table below:

	Ownership as of March 31, 2025
KraneShares 2x Long BABA Daily ETF	None
KraneShares 2x Long PDD Daily ETF	None

Portfolio Turnover

Portfolio turnover may vary from year to year, as well as within a year. High turnover rates are likely to result in comparatively greater brokerage expenses or dealer mark-ups and other transaction costs. The overall reasonableness of brokerage commissions is evaluated by Krane based upon its knowledge of available information as to the general level of commissions and spreads paid or incurred by the other institutional investors for comparable services.

For the fiscal period ended March 31, 2025, the Funds' portfolio turnover rates were as follows:

	Fiscal Period Ended March 31, 2025
KraneShares 2x Long BABA Daily ETF	0%*
KraneShares 2x Long PDD Daily ETF	0%**

* For the fiscal period starting from the KraneShares 2x Long BABA Daily ETF's inception, March 11, 2025 to March 31, 2025.

** For the fiscal period starting from the KraneShares 2x Long PDD Daily ETF's inception, March 11, 2025 to March 31, 2025.

CREATION AND REDEMPTION OF CREATION UNITS

Except as otherwise noted below, the following applies to any Fund covered by this SAI:

General

The Trust issues and redeems shares of a Fund only in Creation Units on a continuous basis through the Distributor, without a sales load but subject to the transaction fees described below, at the NAV next determined after receipt, on any Business Day (as defined below), of an order in proper form. A "Business Day", as used herein, is any day on which the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") is open for business. As of the date of this SAI, the NYSE observes the following holidays: New Year's Day, Martin Luther King, Jr. Day, Presidents' Day, Good Friday, Memorial Day, Juneteenth, Independence Day, Labor Day, Thanksgiving Day and Christmas Day.

Currently, the number of shares that constitutes a Creation Unit is 25,000 shares. In its discretion, the Board reserves the right to increase or decrease the number of the Fund's shares that constitute a Creation Unit. The Board reserves the right to declare a split or a consolidation in the number of shares outstanding of the Fund, and to make changes in the number of shares constituting a Creation Unit, including in the event that the per share price in the secondary market rises (or declines) to an amount that falls outside the range deemed desirable by the Board.

Creation Units may be purchased and redeemed only by or through a DTC Participant that has entered into an Authorized Participant Agreement with the Distributor (an "Authorized Participant"). Such Authorized Participant will agree, pursuant to the terms of such Authorized Participant Agreement and on behalf of itself or any investor on whose behalf it will act, to certain conditions, including those set forth below, the Authorized Participant Agreement and any handbook governing the Authorized Participants (collectively, the "AP Agreement"). Investors who are not Authorized Participants must make appropriate arrangements with an Authorized Participant to purchase or redeem Creation Units. Investors should be aware that their particular broker may not be a DTC Participant or may not have executed an Authorized Participant Agreement with the Distributor and that Creation Unit orders may have to be placed by the investor's broker through an Authorized Participant. As a result, orders placed through an Authorized Participant may result in additional charges to such investor. A list of current Authorized Participants may be obtained from the Distributor.

Investors who are not Authorized Participants may purchase and sell shares of the Fund through an Authorized Participant or on the secondary market.

Because the portfolio securities of the Fund may trade on days that the Exchange is closed or are otherwise not Business Days for the Fund, shareholders may not be able to purchase or redeem their shares of the Fund, or purchase or sell shares of the Fund on the Exchange, on days when the NAV of the Fund could be significantly affected by events in the relevant non-U.S. markets.

The Basket of securities comprising a Fund Deposit and a Fund Redemption (each, as defined below) may be representative of the Fund's portfolio holdings; or the Fund may utilize "Custom Baskets" provided that certain conditions are met. A Custom Basket is (i) a Basket that is composed of a non-representative selection of the Fund's portfolio holdings, (ii) a representative Basket that is different from the initial Basket used in transactions on the same business day, or (iii) a Basket that contains bespoke cash and/or security substitutions, including for a single Authorized Participant. The Trust has adopted policies and procedures that govern the construction and acceptance of Baskets, including heightened requirements for Custom Baskets. Such policies and procedures provide detailed parameters for the construction and acceptance of Custom Baskets, establish processes for revisions to, or deviations from, such parameters, and specify the titles and roles of the employees of the Adviser who are required to review each Custom Basket for compliance with those parameters. In connection with the construction and acceptance of Custom Baskets, the Adviser may consider various factors, including, but not limited to: (1) whether the securities, assets and other positions comprising a Basket are consistent with the Fund's investment objective, policies and disclosure; (2) whether the securities, assets and other positions can legally and readily be acquired, transferred and held by the Fund and/or Authorized Participant(s), as applicable; (3) whether and to what extent to include cash in the Basket; (4) whether the Custom Basket increases the liquidity of a Fund's portfolio, noting that a Custom Basket may not be accepted which adversely affects the liquidity position of a Fund's portfolio when other Basket options exist; (5) whether the use of Custom Baskets may reduce costs, increase (tax) efficiency and improve trading in Fund shares; and (6) with respect to index-based strategies, whether the securities, assets and other positions aid the Fund to track its underlying index, if any. The policies and procedures apply different criteria to different types of Custom Baskets in order to mitigate against potential overreaching by an Authorized Participant, although there is no guarantee that such policies and procedures will be effective.

Purchases of Creation Units

The consideration for the purchase of Creation Units of the Fund consists of an in-kind deposit of a designated portfolio of securities ("Deposit Securities") or cash for all or any portion of such securities ("Deposit Cash") (collectively, the "Deposit Basket") and the Cash Component, which is an amount equal to the difference between the aggregate NAV of a Creation Unit and the Deposit Basket. Together, the Deposit Basket and the Cash Component constitute the "Fund Deposit."

The Custodian or the Administrator makes available through the National Securities Clearing Corporation ("NSCC") on each Business Day, prior to the opening of regular trading on the Exchange, the list of names and the required number of shares of each Deposit Security and Deposit Cash in the Deposit Basket, and the estimated amount of the Cash Component to be included in the current Fund Deposit. Such Fund Deposit will normally be applicable, subject to any adjustments as described below, in order to effect purchases of Creation Units of the Fund until such time as the next-announced Fund Deposit is made available. The means by which the Deposit Basket and Cash Component are to be delivered by the Authorized Participant to the Fund are set forth in the AP Agreement, except to the extent the Distributor and the Authorized Participant otherwise agree. Fund shares will be settled through the DTC system.

The identity and number of shares of the Deposit Securities change pursuant to, among other matters, changes in the composition of the Fund's portfolio and as rebalancing adjustments and corporate action events are reflected from time to time. The composition of the Deposit Securities may also change in response to adjustments to the weighting or composition of the component securities constituting a Fund's underlying index, if any.

Cash purchases of Creation Units will be effected in essentially the same manner as in-kind purchases. The Authorized Participant will pay the cash equivalent of the Deposit Securities as Deposit Cash plus or minus the same Cash Component.

Krane or the sub-adviser, as applicable, on behalf of the Fund, will convert subscriptions that are made in whole or in part in cash, including Deposit Cash, into the relevant foreign currency prior to investment at the applicable exchange rate and subject to the applicable spread. Those purchasing Creation Units of the Fund bear the risk associated with changes in the currency exchange rate between the time they place their order and the time that the Fund converts any cash received into foreign investments.

Placement of Purchase Orders

To initiate an order for a Creation Unit, an Authorized Participant must submit to the Distributor an irrevocable order in proper form to purchase shares of the Fund before the earlier of (a) 3:00 p.m. Eastern Time or (b) one hour before the close of the trading session on the Exchange. For a purchase order to be processed based on the NAV calculated on a particular Business Day, the purchase order must be received in proper form and accepted by the Trust prior to the time as of which the NAV is calculated (“Cutoff Time”). Investors who are not Authorized Participants and seek to place a purchase order for a Creation Unit through an Authorized Participant should allow sufficient time to permit proper submission of the purchase order to the Distributor by the Cutoff Time on such Business Day. Custom Orders must normally be received in proper form and accepted by the Trust at least two hours prior to Cutoff Time.

The AP Agreement sets forth the different methods whereby Authorized Participants can submit purchase orders. A purchase order is considered to be in “proper form” if a request in a form satisfactory to the Fund is (1) received by the Distributor from an Authorized Participant on behalf of itself or another person within the time period set above, and (2) all the procedures and other requirements applicable to the method used by the Authorized Participant to submit the purchase order, such as, in the case of purchase orders submitted through the Distributor’s website, the completion of all required fields, including as set forth in the AP Agreement, are properly followed.

Creation Unit orders must be transmitted by an Authorized Participant by telephone or other transmission method acceptable to the Distributor. Economic or market disruptions or changes, or telephone or other communication failure, may impede transmissions between the Distributor and an Authorized Participant. Orders to create shares of the Fund that are submitted on the Business Day immediately preceding a holiday or a day (other than a weekend) when the securities markets in a foreign market in which the Fund may invest are closed may not be accepted or may be charged the maximum transaction fee. The Distributor, in its discretion, may permit the submission of orders and requests by or through an Authorized Participant via communication through the facilities of the Distributor’s proprietary website maintained for this purpose.

Acceptance of Orders for, and Issuance of, Creation Units

All questions as to whether an order has been submitted in proper form and the number of shares of each security in the Deposit Securities and the validity, form, eligibility and acceptance for deposit of any securities to be delivered shall be determined by the Fund and the Fund’s determination shall be final and binding.

The Fund reserves the right to reject or revoke acceptance of a creation order, for any reason, provided that such action is not in contravention of Rule 6c-11. For example, the Fund may reject or revoke acceptance of a creation order including, but not limited to, when (i) the order is not in proper form; (ii) the investor(s), upon obtaining the shares ordered, would own 80% or more of the currently outstanding shares of the Fund; (iii) the Deposit Securities delivered do not conform to the identity and number of shares specified; (iv) acceptance of the Fund Deposit is not legally required or would, in the opinion of counsel, be unlawful; or (v) circumstances outside the control of the Fund, the Distributor and Krane make it impracticable to process purchase orders. The Distributor shall notify a prospective purchaser of a Creation Unit and/or the Authorized Participant acting on behalf of such purchaser of the rejection or revocation of acceptance of such order. The Fund, the Custodian, the sub-custodian and the Distributor are under no duty, however, to give notification of any defects or irregularities in the delivery of Fund Deposits nor shall any of them incur any liability for failure to give such notification.

Except as provided in the following paragraph, a Creation Unit will not be issued until the transfer of good title to the Fund of the Deposit Securities and the payment of the Cash Component, Deposit Cash and creation transaction fees have been completed. In this regard, the Custodian will require, prior to the issuance of a Creation Unit, that the sub-custodian confirm to the Custodian that the Deposit Securities have been delivered to the account of the Fund at the sub-custodian(s). If the Fund does not receive the foregoing by the time specified herein the Creation Unit may not be delivered or the purchase order may be rejected.

The Fund may issue Creation Units to an Authorized Participant, notwithstanding the fact that all Deposit Securities have not been received, in reliance on the undertaking of the Authorized Participant to deliver the missing Deposit Securities as soon as possible, which undertaking shall be secured by such Authorized Participant's delivery and maintenance of collateral having a value of up to 115% of the value of the missing Deposit Securities. The only collateral that is acceptable is cash in U.S. dollars. Such cash collateral must be delivered no later than 2:00 p.m., Eastern Time on the contractual settlement date of the Creation Unit(s). The Fund may buy the missing Deposit Securities at any time, and the Authorized Participant will be liable for any shortfall between the cost to the Fund of purchasing such securities and the cash collateral. In addition, the cash collateral may be invested at the risk of the Authorized Participant, and any income on invested cash collateral will be paid to that Authorized Participant. Information concerning the Fund's current procedures for collateralization of missing Deposit Securities is available from the Distributor.

In certain cases, an Authorized Participant may create and redeem Creation Units on the same trade date. In these instances, the Fund reserves the right to settle these transactions on a net basis or require a representation from the Authorized Participant that the creation and redemption transactions are for separate Beneficial Owners.

Once the Fund has accepted a purchase order, upon the next determination of the NAV of the shares, the Fund may confirm the issuance of a Creation Unit, against receipt of payment, at such NAV. The Distributor will then transmit a confirmation of acceptance to the Authorized Participant that placed the order. Creation Units typically are settled on a "T+1" basis (*i.e.*, one Business Day after trade date), subject to certain exceptions. However, the Fund reserves the right to settle Creation Unit transactions on a basis other than T+1, including in order to accommodate non-U.S. market holiday schedules, closures and settlement cycles, and to account for different treatment among non-U.S. and U.S. markets of dividend record dates and ex-dividend dates.

Creation Transaction Fees

A standard creation transaction fee is imposed to offset transfer and other costs associated with the issuance of Creation Units. The standard creation transaction fee is charged to the Authorized Participant on the day such Authorized Participant creates a Creation Unit, and is the same, regardless of the number of Creation Units purchased by the Authorized Participant on the applicable Business Day.

The Authorized Participant may also be required to pay a variable transaction fee (up to the maximum amount shown in the table below) to cover certain brokerage, tax, foreign exchange, execution, market impact and other costs and expenses. Authorized Participants will also bear the costs of transferring the Deposit Securities, including any stamp duty or other similar fees and expenses.

The standard creation transaction fee and maximum variable transaction fee for a Creation Unit are set forth below:

FUND	STANDARD TRANSACTION FEE	MAXIMUM VARIABLE TRANSACTION FEE*
KraneShares 2x Long BABA Daily ETF	\$100	2.00%
KraneShares 2x Long PDD Daily ETF	\$100	2.00%

* As a percentage of the Creation Unit(s) purchased.

The Adviser may adjust the transaction fees from time to time based on actual experience.

Redemptions of Creation Units

The consideration paid by the Fund for the redemption of Creation Units consists of an in-kind basket of designated securities (“Redemption Securities”) or cash for all or any portion of such securities (“Redemption Cash”) (collectively, the “Fund Securities”) and the Cash Component, which is an amount equal to the difference between the aggregate NAV of a Creation Unit and the Fund Securities. Together, the Fund Securities and the Cash Component constitute the “Fund Redemption.”

The Custodian or the Administrator normally makes available through NSCC on each Business Day, prior to the opening of regular trading on the Exchange, the list of names and the number of shares of each Redemption Security and Redemption Cash, as applicable, and the estimated amount of the Cash Component to be included in the current Fund Redemption. Such Fund Redemption is applicable, subject to any adjustments as described below, for redemptions of Creation Units of the Fund until such time as the next-announced Fund Redemption is made available. The delivery of Fund shares will be settled through the DTC system. The means by which the Fund Securities and Cash Component are to be delivered to the Authorized Participant by the Fund are set forth in the AP Agreement, except to the extent the Distributor and the Authorized Participant otherwise agree.

The identity and number of shares of the Redemption Securities change pursuant to, among other matters, changes in the composition of the Fund’s portfolio and as rebalancing adjustments and corporate action events are reflected from time to time. The composition of the Redemption Securities may also change in response to adjustments to the weighting or composition of the component securities constituting a Fund’s underlying index, if any, or investments and may not be the same as the Deposit Securities.

Cash redemptions of Creation Units will be effected in essentially the same manner as in-kind redemptions. The Authorized Participant will receive the cash equivalent of the Fund Securities as Redemption Cash plus or minus the same Cash Component.

Krane or the sub-adviser, as applicable, on behalf of the Fund, will sell investments denominated in foreign currencies and convert such proceeds into U.S. Dollars at the applicable exchange rate and subject to the applicable spread for redemptions that are made in whole or in part for cash, including Redemption Cash. Those redeeming Creation Units of the Fund bear the risk associated with changes in the currency exchange rate between the time they place their order and the time that the Fund converts any investments into U.S. Dollars.

Placement of Redemption Orders

To initiate a redemption order for a Creation Unit, an Authorized Participant must submit to the Distributor an irrevocable order in proper form to redeem shares of the Fund before the earlier of (a) 3:00 p.m. Eastern Time or (b) one hour before the close of the trading session on the Exchange. For a redemption order to be processed based on the NAV calculated on a particular Business Day, the redemption order must be received in proper form and accepted by the Trust prior to the time as of which the NAV is calculated (“Cutoff Time”). Investors who are not Authorized Participants and seek to place a redemption order for a Creation Unit through an Authorized Participant should allow sufficient time to permit proper submission of the redemption order to the Distributor by the Cutoff Time on such Business Day.

The AP Agreement sets forth the different methods whereby Authorized Participants can submit redemption requests. A redemption request is considered to be in “proper form” if a request in a form satisfactory to the Fund is (1) received by the Distributor from an Authorized Participant on behalf of itself or another person within the time period set above, and (2) all the procedures and other requirements applicable to the method used by the Authorized Participant to submit the redemption order, such as, in the case of redemption orders submitted through the Distributor’s website, the completion of all required fields, including as set forth in the AP Agreement, are properly followed.

Creation Unit orders must be transmitted by an Authorized Participant by telephone or other transmission method acceptable to the Distributor. Economic or market disruptions or changes, or telephone or other communication failure, may impede transmissions between the Distributor and an Authorized Participant. Orders to redeem shares of the Fund that are submitted on the Business Day immediately preceding a holiday or a day (other than a weekend) when the securities markets in a foreign market in which the Fund may invest are closed may not be accepted or may be charged the maximum transaction fee. The Distributor, in its discretion, may permit the submission of orders and requests by or through an Authorized Participant via communication through the facilities of the Distributor's proprietary website maintained for this purpose. A redemption request, if accepted by the Trust, will be processed based on the NAV as of the next Cutoff Time.

Acceptance of Orders for, and Redemption of, Creation Units

All questions as to whether an order has been submitted in proper form and the requisite number of Fund shares and transaction fees have been delivered shall be determined by the Fund, and the Fund's determination shall be final and binding.

The Fund reserves the right to reject a redemption order if the order is not in proper form. In addition, the right of redemption may be suspended or the date of payment postponed with respect to the Fund (i) for any period during which the NYSE is closed (other than customary weekend and holiday closings), (ii) for any period during which trading on the NYSE is suspended or restricted, (iii) for any period during which an emergency exists as a result of which disposal of the shares of the Fund's portfolio securities or determination of its NAV is not reasonably practicable, or (iv) in such other circumstance as is permitted by the SEC. The Fund or Distributor will notify the Authorized Participant of such rejection, but the Fund, Custodian, sub-custodian and Distributor shall not be liable for any failure to give such notification.

The payment by the Fund of the Fund Securities, including Redemption Securities and Redemption Cash, and Cash Component will not be issued until the transfer of the Creation Unit(s) and the applicable redemption transaction fees has been completed. If the Transfer Agent does not receive the investor's shares through DTC's facilities and the applicable redemption transaction fees by the required time, the redemption request may be rejected.

To the extent contemplated by the AP Agreement, in the event the Authorized Participant has submitted a redemption request in proper form but is unable to transfer all or part of the Creation Unit to be redeemed to the Fund's Transfer Agent, the Transfer Agent will nonetheless accept the redemption request in reliance on the undertaking by the Authorized Participant to deliver the missing shares as soon as possible. Such undertaking may be secured by the Authorized Participant's delivery and maintenance of collateral consisting of cash having a value (marked to market daily) of up to 115% of the value of the missing shares, which the Trust may change from time to time. The current procedures for collateralization of missing shares require, among other things, that any cash collateral shall be in the form of U.S. dollars in immediately available funds and shall be held by the Custodian and marked to market daily, and that the fees of the Custodian and any sub-custodians in respect of the delivery, maintenance and redelivery of the cash collateral shall be payable by the Authorized Participant. The AP Agreement will permit the Trust, on behalf of the Fund, to purchase the missing shares at any time and will subject the Authorized Participant to liability for any shortfall between the cost to the Trust of purchasing such shares, Fund Securities or Cash Component and the value of the collateral.

A redeeming Beneficial Owner or Authorized Participant acting on behalf of such Beneficial Owner must maintain appropriate security arrangements with a qualified broker-dealer, bank or other custody providers in each jurisdiction where Redemption Securities are customarily traded and will be delivered. If neither the redeeming Beneficial Owner nor the Authorized Participant acting on behalf of such redeeming Beneficial Owner has appropriate arrangements to take delivery of Redemption Securities in the applicable non-U.S. jurisdiction and it is not possible to make other such arrangements, or if it is not possible to effect deliveries of Redemption Securities in such jurisdiction, the Trust may redeem shares in Redemption Cash, and the redeeming Beneficial Owner will be required to receive its redemption proceeds as Redemption Cash.

In addition, because redemptions of shares for Redemption Securities will be subject to compliance with applicable U.S. federal and state securities laws, the Fund (whether or not it otherwise permits cash redemptions) reserves the right to redeem Creation Units for cash to the extent that the Fund cannot lawfully deliver specific Redemption Securities or cannot do so without first registering a Fund Security under such laws.

Once the Fund has accepted a redemption order, upon the next determination of the NAV of the shares, the Fund may confirm the redemption of a Creation Unit, against receipt of payment, at such NAV. The Distributor will then transmit a confirmation of acceptance to the Authorized Participant that placed the order. Deliveries of redemption proceeds by the Fund typically are settled on a “T+1” basis (*i.e.*, one Business Day after trade date), but may be made up to seven days later, particularly in stressed market conditions. The Fund reserves the right to settle redemption transactions up to 15 days later to accommodate non-U.S. market holiday schedules (see below for further information), closures and settlement cycles, to account for different treatment among non-U.S. and U.S. markets of dividend record dates and dividend ex-dates (*i.e.*, the last date the holder of a security can sell the security and still receive dividends payable on the security sold), and in certain other circumstances.

In certain cases, an Authorized Participant may create and redeem Creation Units on the same trade date. In these instances, the Fund reserves the right to settle these transactions on a net basis or require a representation from the Authorized Participant that the creation and redemption transactions are for separate Beneficial Owners.

Redemption Transaction Fees

A standard redemption transaction fee is imposed to offset transfer and other costs associated with the redemption of Creation Units. The standard redemption transaction fee is charged to the Authorized Participant on the day such Authorized Participant redeems a Creation Unit, and is the same regardless of the number of Creation Units redeemed by an Authorized Participant on the applicable Business Day.

The Authorized Participant may also be required to pay a variable transaction fee (up to the maximum amount shown in the table below) to cover certain brokerage, tax, foreign exchange, execution, market impact and other costs and expenses. Authorized Participants will also bear the costs of transferring the Redemption Securities, including any stamp duty or other similar fees and expenses. Investors who use the services of a broker or other financial intermediary may be charged a fee for such services.

The standard redemption transaction fee and maximum variable transaction fee for a Creation Unit are set forth below:

FUND	STANDARD TRANSACTION FEE	MAXIMUM VARIABLE TRANSACTION FEE*
KraneShares 2x Long BABA Daily ETF	\$100	2.00%
KraneShares 2x Long PDD Daily ETF	\$100	2.00%

* As a percentage of the Creation Unit(s) redeemed.

The Adviser may adjust the transactions fees from time to time based on actual experience.

Taxation on Creations and Redemptions of Creation Units

An Authorized Participant generally will recognize either gain or loss upon the exchange of Deposit Securities for Creation Units. This gain or loss will generally equal the difference between (i) the sum of the market value of the Creation Units at the time of the exchange and any net amount of cash received by the Authorized Participant in the exchange and (ii) the sum of the Authorized Participant's aggregate basis in the Deposit Securities exchanged therefor and any net amount of cash paid for the Creation Units. However, the U.S. Internal Revenue Service may apply the wash sales rules to determine that any loss realized upon the exchange of Deposit Securities for Creation Units is not currently deductible. Authorized Participants should consult their own tax advisers.

Current U.S. federal tax laws dictate that capital gain or loss realized from the redemption of Creation Units will generally create long-term capital gain or loss if the Authorized Participant holds the Creation Units for more than one year, or short-term capital gain or loss if the Creation Units were held for one year or less, if the Creation Units are held as capital assets.

Postponement of Redemptions

For every occurrence of one or more intervening holidays in the applicable non-U.S. market that are not holidays observed in the U.S. equity market, the redemption settlement cycle will be extended by the number of such intervening holidays. In addition to holidays, other unforeseeable closings in a non-U.S. market due to emergencies may also prevent the Trust from delivering securities within normal settlement period. The securities delivery cycles currently practicable for transferring portfolio securities to redeeming investors, coupled with non-U.S. market holiday schedules, will require a delivery process longer than seven calendar days, in certain circumstances, but in no event longer than fifteen calendar days.

The right of redemption may also be suspended or the date of payment postponed (1) for any period during which the relevant Exchange is closed (other than customary weekend and holiday closings); (2) for any period during which trading on the relevant Exchange is suspended or restricted; (3) for any period during which an emergency exists as a result of which disposal of the Shares of a Fund or determination of its NAV is not reasonably practicable; or (4) in such other circumstance as is permitted by the SEC.

TAXES

The following discussion of certain U.S. federal income tax consequences of investing in a Fund is based on the Code, U.S. Treasury regulations, and other applicable authority, all as in effect as of the date of the filing of this SAI. These authorities are subject to change by legislative or administrative action, possibly with retroactive effect. The following discussion is only a summary of some of the important U.S. federal income tax considerations generally applicable to investments in a Fund. There may be other tax considerations applicable to particular shareholders. Shareholders should consult their own tax advisers regarding their particular situation and the possible application of foreign, state, and local tax laws.

Qualification as a RIC

Each Fund has elected or intends to elect to be treated, and intends to qualify each year, as a regulated investment company (a "RIC") under Subchapter M of the Internal Revenue Code. In order to qualify for the special tax treatment accorded RICs and their shareholders, a Fund must, among other things:

- (a) derive at least 90% of its gross income each year from (i) dividends, interest, payments with respect to securities loans, gains from the sale or other disposition of stock or securities or foreign currencies, or other income (including but not limited to gains from options, futures or forward contracts) derived with respect to its business of investing in such stock, securities or currencies, and (ii) net income derived from interests in "qualified publicly traded partnerships" (as defined below);

(b) diversify its holdings so that, at the end of each quarter of its taxable year, (i) at least 50% of the market value of a Fund's total assets consists of cash and cash items, U.S. government securities, securities of other RICs and other securities, with investments in such other securities limited with respect to any one issuer to an amount not greater than 5% of the value of a Fund's total assets and not greater than 10% of the outstanding voting securities of such issuer, and (ii) not more than 25% of the value of a Fund's total assets is invested in (1) the securities (other than those of the U.S. government or other RICs) of any one issuer or two or more issuers that are controlled by a Fund and that are engaged in the same, similar or related trades or businesses or (2) the securities of one or more qualified publicly traded partnerships; and

(c) distribute with respect to each taxable year at least the sum of 90% of its investment company taxable income (as that term is defined in the Code without regard to the deduction for dividends paid – generally taxable ordinary income and the excess, if any, of net short-term capital gains over net long-term capital losses) and 90% of its net tax-exempt interest income.

In general, for purposes of the 90% of gross income requirement described in (a) above, income derived from a partnership will be treated as qualifying income only to the extent such income is attributable to items of income of the partnership that would be qualifying income if realized directly by a Fund. However, 100% of the net income derived from an interest in a “qualified publicly traded partnership” (generally, a partnership (i) interests in which are traded on an established securities market or are readily tradable on a secondary market or the substantial equivalent thereof, (ii) that derives at least 90% of its income from the passive income sources specified in Code section 7704(d), and (iii) that derives less than 90% of its income from the qualifying income described in (a)(i) of the prior paragraph) will be treated as qualifying income. In addition, although in general the passive loss rules of the Code do not apply to RICs, such rules do apply to a RIC with respect to items attributable to an interest in a qualified publicly traded partnership.

The U.S. Treasury Department has authority to issue regulations that would exclude foreign currency gains from the 90% test described in (a) above if such gains are not directly related to a Fund's business of investing in stock or securities. Accordingly, regulations may be issued in the future that could treat some or all of a Fund's non-U.S. currency gains as non-qualifying income, thereby potentially jeopardizing a Fund's status as a RIC for all years to which the regulations are applicable.

The investment by a Fund in swaps, options and futures positions entails some risk that it might fail to satisfy one or both of the diversification requirements described in (b) above. There is some uncertainty regarding the valuation of such positions for purposes of those requirements; accordingly, it is possible that the method of valuation a Fund uses, pursuant to which each of them would expect to be treated as satisfying the diversification requirements, would not be accepted in an audit by the Internal Revenue Service, which might apply a different method resulting in disqualification of the Funds. In particular, with respect to swaps, the consistent market practice has been to treat a swap's in-the-money (or mark-to-market) value as its market value for diversification purposes, and each Fund follows such market practice. In the 1980s, however the Internal Revenue Service issued informal guidance that certain securities derivatives (such as options) should be valued at notional value, although there is no formal guidance from the Internal Revenue Service on such treatment. If a Fund was required to treat the notional value of its swaps as the market value, it may fail to meet the diversification requirements and, as a result, may fail to qualify as a RIC.

Taxation of a Fund

If a Fund qualifies as a RIC, the Fund will not be subject to federal income tax on income and gains that are distributed in a timely manner to its shareholders in the form of dividends.

If a Fund fails to satisfy the qualifying income test in any taxable year or the diversification requirements for any quarter, the Fund may be eligible for relief provisions if the failures are due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect and if a penalty tax is paid with respect to each failure to satisfy the applicable requirements. If these relief provisions are not available to a Fund for any year in which it fails to qualify as a RIC, all of its taxable income will be subject to tax at regular corporate rates without any deduction for distributions to shareholders, and its distributions (including capital gains distributions) generally will be taxable as ordinary income dividends to its shareholders, subject to the dividends received deduction for corporate shareholders and lower tax rates on qualified dividend income for individual shareholders. In addition, a Fund could be required to recognize unrealized gains, pay substantial taxes and interest and make substantial distributions before requalifying as a RIC that is accorded special tax treatment.

Each Fund intends to distribute at least annually to its shareholders substantially all of its taxable income and its net capital gains. Taxable income that is retained by a Fund will be subject to tax at regular corporate rates. If a Fund retains any net capital gain, that gain will be subject to tax at corporate rates, but the Fund may designate the retained amount as undistributed capital gains in a notice to its shareholders who (i) will be required to include in income for federal income tax purposes, as long-term capital gain, their shares of such undistributed amount, and (ii) will be entitled to credit their proportionate shares of the tax paid by the Fund on such undistributed amount against their federal income tax liabilities, if any, and to claim refunds on a properly filed U.S. tax return to the extent the credit exceeds such liabilities. For federal income tax purposes, the tax basis of shares owned by a shareholder of a Fund will be increased by an amount equal to the difference between the amount of undistributed capital gains included in the shareholder's gross income and the tax deemed paid by the shareholder under clause (ii) of the preceding sentence.

Deferral of Late Year Losses

A Fund may elect to treat part or all of any "qualified late year loss" as if it had been incurred in the succeeding taxable year in determining the Fund's taxable income, net capital gain, net short-term capital gain, and earnings and profits. The effect of this election is to treat any such "qualified late year loss" as if it had been incurred in the succeeding taxable year in characterizing the Fund's distributions for any calendar year. A "qualified late year loss" generally includes net capital loss, net long-term capital loss, or net short-term capital loss incurred after October 31 of the current taxable year (commonly referred to as "post-October losses") and certain other late-year losses.

Capital Loss Carryovers

If a Fund has a "net capital loss" (that is, capital losses in excess of capital gains), the excess (if any) of the Fund's net short-term capital losses over its net long-term capital gains is treated as a short-term capital loss arising on the first day of the Fund's next taxable year, and the excess (if any) of the Fund's net long-term capital losses over its net short-term capital gains is treated as a long-term capital loss arising on the first day of the Fund's next taxable year. Such capital loss carryover can be used to offset capital gains of the Fund in succeeding taxable years. The carryover of capital losses may be limited under the general loss limitation rules if a Fund experiences an ownership change as defined in the Code.

Excise Tax

If a Fund fails to distribute in a calendar year an amount at least equal to the sum of 98% of its ordinary income for such year and 98.2% of its capital gain net income for the one-year period ending October 31 of such year, plus any retained amount from the prior year, the Fund will be subject to a nondeductible 4% excise tax on the undistributed amount. For these purposes, a Fund will be treated as having distributed any amount on which it has been subject to corporate income tax for the taxable year ending within the calendar year. A dividend paid to shareholders in January of a year generally is deemed to have been paid by a Fund on December 31 of the preceding year if the dividend was declared and payable to shareholders of record on a date in October, November, or December of that preceding year. Each Fund intends to declare and pay dividends and distributions in the amounts and at the times necessary to avoid the application of the 4% excise tax, although there can be no assurance that it will be able to do so.

Fund Distributions

Distributions are taxable whether shareholders receive them in cash or reinvest them in additional shares. Moreover, distributions are generally subject to federal income tax as described herein to the extent they do not exceed a Fund's realized income and gains, even though such dividends and distributions may economically represent a return of a particular shareholder's investment. Such distributions are likely to occur in respect of shares purchased at a time when a Fund's NAV reflects gains that are either unrealized, or realized but not distributed. Such realized gains may be required to be distributed even when a Fund's NAV also reflects unrealized losses.

Dividends and other distributions by a Fund are generally treated under the Code as received by the shareholders at the time the dividend or distribution is made. However, if any dividend or distribution is declared by a Fund in October, November or December of any calendar year and payable to its shareholders of record on a specified date in such a month but is actually paid during the following January, such dividend or distribution will be deemed to have been received by each shareholder on December 31 of the year in which the dividend was declared.

Distributions by a Fund of investment income are generally taxable as ordinary income. Taxes on distributions of capital gains are determined by how long a Fund owned the investments that generated those gains, rather than how long a shareholder has owned his or her Fund shares. Distributions of net capital gains from the sale of investments that a Fund owned for more than one year and that are properly designated by the Fund as capital gain dividends ("Capital Gain Dividends") will be taxable as long-term capital gains. Distributions from capital gains are generally made after applying any available capital loss carryovers. Preferential long-term capital gain rates apply to individuals at a maximum rate of 20% for individuals with taxable income exceeding certain thresholds. Distributions of gains from the sale of investments that a Fund owned for one year or less will be taxable as ordinary income.

Distributions of investment income reported by a Fund as derived from "qualified dividend income" will be taxable in the hands of individuals at the rates applicable to long-term capital gains, provided holding period and other requirements are met at both the shareholder and the Fund level.

Qualified dividend income is, in general, dividend income from taxable domestic corporations and certain foreign corporations (*i.e.*, foreign corporations incorporated in a possession of the United States or in certain countries with a comprehensive tax treaty with the United States, which includes China (but not Hong Kong which is treated as a separate jurisdiction), or the stock of which is readily tradable on an established securities market in the United States). In order for some portion of the dividends received by a Fund's shareholders to be qualified dividend income, the Fund must meet holding period and other requirements with respect to the dividend paying stocks in its portfolio, and the shareholder must meet holding period and other requirements with respect to the Fund's shares.

Given the Funds' investment objectives, it is not expected that Fund distributions will be eligible for qualified dividend income treatment or the corporate dividends received deduction on Fund distributions attributable to dividends received.

For U.S. individuals with income exceeding \$200,000 (\$250,000 if married and filing jointly), a 3.8% Medicare contribution tax will apply on all or a portion of their "net investment income," including interest, dividends, and capital gains, which generally includes taxable distributions received from a Fund. This 3.8% tax also applies to all or a portion of the undistributed net investment income of certain shareholders that are estates and trusts.

If a Fund makes distributions to a shareholder in excess of the Fund's current and accumulated earnings and profits in any taxable year, the excess distribution will be treated as a return of capital to the extent of the shareholder's tax basis in its shares, and thereafter as capital gain. A return of capital is not taxable, but reduces a shareholder's tax basis in its shares, thus reducing any loss or increasing any gain on a subsequent taxable disposition by the shareholder of its shares.

Investors considering buying shares just prior to a dividend or capital gain distribution should be aware that, although the price of shares purchased at that time may reflect the amount of the forthcoming distribution, such dividend or distribution may nevertheless be taxable to them. If a Fund is the holder of record of any security on the record date for any dividends payable with respect to such security, such dividends will be included in the Fund's gross income not as of the date received but as of the later of (a) the date such security became ex-dividend with respect to such dividends (*i.e.*, the date on which a buyer of the security would not be entitled to receive the declared, but unpaid, dividends); or (b) the date the Fund acquired such security. Accordingly, in order to satisfy its income distribution requirements, a Fund may be required to pay dividends based on anticipated earnings, and shareholders may receive dividends in an earlier year than would otherwise be the case.

Sale or Exchange of Shares

A sale or exchange of shares in a Fund may give rise to a gain or loss. In general, any gain or loss realized upon a taxable disposition of shares will be treated as long-term capital gain or loss if the shares have been held for more than 12 months. Otherwise, the gain or loss on the taxable disposition of shares will be treated as short-term capital gain or loss. However, any loss realized upon a taxable disposition of shares held for six months or less will be treated as long-term, rather than short-term, to the extent of any long-term capital gain distributions received (or deemed received) by the shareholder with respect to the shares. All or a portion of any loss realized upon a taxable disposition of shares will be disallowed if shares of the same Fund are purchased within 30 days before or after the disposition. In such a case, the basis of the newly purchased shares will be adjusted to reflect the disallowed loss.

As noted above, for U.S. individuals with income exceeding \$200,000 (\$250,000 if married and filing jointly), a 3.8% Medicare contribution tax will apply on “net investment income,” including interest, dividends, and capital gains, which generally includes taxable distributions received from a Fund and taxable gains on the disposition of shares of a Fund.

Backup Withholding

A Fund (or a financial intermediary, such as a broker, through which a shareholder holds Fund shares) generally is required to withhold and to remit to the U.S. Treasury a percentage of the taxable distributions and sale or redemption proceeds paid to any shareholder who fails to properly furnish a correct taxpayer identification number, who has under-reported dividend or interest income, or who fails to certify that he, she or it is not subject to such withholding. The backup withholding tax rate is currently 24%.

Federal Tax Treatment of Certain Fund Investments

Transactions of a Fund in options, futures contracts, hedging transactions, forward contracts, swap contracts, straddles and foreign currencies may be subject to various special and complex tax rules, including mark-to-market, constructive sale, straddle, wash sale and short sale rules. These rules could affect whether gains and losses recognized by a Fund are treated as ordinary income or capital gain, accelerate the recognition of income to a Fund and/or defer a Fund's ability to recognize losses. These rules may in turn affect the amount, timing or character of the income distributed to shareholders by a Fund.

A Fund is required, for federal income tax purposes, to mark to market and recognize as income for each taxable year its net unrealized gains and losses as of the end of such year on certain regulated futures contracts, foreign currency contracts and options that qualify as Section 1256 contracts in addition to the gains and losses actually realized with respect to such contracts during the year. Except as described below under “Certain Foreign Currency Tax Issues,” gain or loss from Section 1256 contracts that are required to be marked to market annually will generally be 60% long-term and 40% short-term capital gain or loss. Application of this rule may alter the timing and character of distributions to shareholders.

The covered call options written by a Fund generally will be treated as equity options governed by Section 1234 of the Code, and not as Section 1256 contracts. Pursuant to Section 1234 of the Code, if a written option expires unexercised, the premium received is short-term capital gain to the Fund. If a Fund enters into a closing transaction, the difference between the amount paid to close out its position and the premium received for writing the option is short-term capital gain or loss. If an option written by a Fund that is not a Section 1256 contract is cash settled, any resulting gain or loss will be short-term capital gain or loss. If a call option written by a Fund is exercised and physically settled, the premium received is included in the sale proceeds, increasing the gain or decreasing the loss realized by the Fund at the time of option exercise.

The Code contains special rules that apply to “straddles,” defined generally as the holding of “offsetting positions with respect to personal property.” For example, the straddle rules normally apply when a taxpayer holds stock and an offsetting option with respect to such stock or substantially identical stock or securities. In general, investment positions will be offsetting if there is a substantial diminution in the risk of loss from holding one position by reason of holding one or more other positions. A Fund may enter into options transactions or certain other investments that may constitute positions in a straddle. If two or more positions constitute a straddle, recognition of a realized loss from one position must generally be deferred to the extent of unrecognized gain in an offsetting position. In addition, long-term capital gain may be recharacterized as short-term capital gain, or short-term capital loss as long-term capital loss. Interest and other carrying charges allocable to personal property that is part of a straddle are not currently deductible but must instead be capitalized. Similarly, “wash sale” rules apply to prevent the recognition of loss by a Fund from the disposition of stock or securities at a loss in a case in which identical or substantially identical stock or securities (or an option to acquire such property) is or has been acquired within a prescribed period.

Some debt obligations that are acquired by a Fund may be treated as having original issue discount (“OID”). Generally, a Fund will be required to include OID in taxable income over the term of the debt security, even though payment of the OID is not received until a later time, usually when the debt security matures. If a Fund holds such debt instruments, it may be required to pay out as distributions each year an amount that is greater than the total amount of cash interest a Fund actually received. Such distributions may be made from the cash assets of a Fund or by liquidation of portfolio securities, if necessary. A Fund may realize gains or losses from such liquidations. In the event a Fund realizes net gains from such transactions, its shareholders may receive larger distributions than they would have in the absence of such transactions.

Any market discount recognized on a bond is taxable as ordinary income. A market discount bond is a bond acquired in the secondary market at a price below redemption value or adjusted issue price if issued with original issue discount. Absent an election by a Fund to include the market discount in income as it accrues, gains on the Fund’s disposition of such an obligation will be treated as ordinary income rather than capital gain to the extent of the accrued market discount.

Certain Foreign Currency Tax Issues

A Fund’s gain or loss on foreign currency denominated debt securities and on certain other financial instruments, such as forward currency contracts and currency swaps, that is attributable to fluctuations in exchange rates occurring between the date of acquisition and the date of settlement or disposition of such securities or instruments generally will be treated under Section 988 of the Code as ordinary income or loss. A Fund may elect out of the application of Section 988 of the Code with respect to the tax treatment of each of its foreign currency forward contracts to the extent that (i) such contract is a capital asset in the hands of the Fund and is not part of a straddle transaction and (ii) the Fund makes an election by the close of the day the contract is entered into to treat the gain or loss attributable to such contract as capital gain or loss.

A Fund’s forward contracts may qualify as Section 1256 contracts if the underlying currencies are currencies for which there are futures contracts that are traded on and subject to the rules of a qualified board or exchange. However, a forward currency contract that is a Section 1256 contract would, absent an election out of Section 988 of the Code as described in the preceding paragraph, be subject to Section 988. Accordingly, although such a forward currency contract would be marked to market annually like other Section 1256 contracts, the resulting gain or loss would be ordinary. If a Fund were to elect out of Section 988 with respect to forward currency contracts that qualify as Section 1256 contracts, the tax treatment generally applicable to Section 1256 contracts would apply to those forward currency contracts: that is, the contracts would be marked to market annually and gains and losses with respect to the contracts would be treated as long-term capital gains or losses to the extent of 60% thereof and short-term capital gains or losses to the extent of 40% thereof. If a Fund were to elect out of Section 988 with respect to any of its forward currency contracts that do not qualify as Section 1256 contracts, such contracts will not be marked to market annually and the Fund will recognize short-term or long-term capital gain or loss depending on the Fund’s holding period therein. A Fund may elect out of Section 988 with respect to some, all or none of its forward currency contracts.

Finally, regulated futures contracts and non-equity options that qualify as Section 1256 contracts and are entered into by a Fund with respect to foreign currencies or foreign currency denominated debt instruments will be subject to the tax treatment generally applicable to Section 1256 contracts unless the Fund elects to have Section 988 apply to determine the character of gains and losses from all such regulated futures contracts and non-equity options held or later acquired by the Fund.

Foreign Investments

Income received by a Fund from sources within foreign countries (including, for example, interest on securities of non-U.S. issuers) may be subject to withholding and other taxes imposed by such countries. Tax treaties between such countries and the U.S. may reduce or eliminate such taxes. If as of the end of a Fund's taxable year more than 50% of the Fund's assets consist of foreign securities, the Fund is expected to make an election to permit shareholders to claim a credit or deduction on their income tax returns for their pro rata portions of qualified taxes paid by the Fund during that taxable year to foreign countries in respect of foreign securities that the Fund has held for at least the minimum period specified in the Code. In such a case, shareholders will include in gross income from foreign sources their pro rata shares of such taxes. A shareholder's ability to claim a foreign tax credit or deduction in respect of foreign taxes paid by a Fund may be subject to certain limitations imposed by the Code, which may result in the shareholder not getting a full credit or deduction for the amount of such taxes. Because a foreign tax credit is only available for foreign taxes paid by a Fund, no such credit may be available for a reduction in a Fund's net asset value to reflect a reserve (if any) for Chinese withholding taxes. Shareholders who do not itemize on their federal income tax returns may claim a credit, but not a deduction, for such foreign taxes.

Passive Foreign Investment Companies

If a Fund purchases shares in a PFIC, it may be subject to U.S. federal income tax on a portion of any "excess distribution" or gain from the disposition of such shares even if such income is distributed as a taxable dividend by the Fund to its shareholders. Additional charges in the nature of interest may be imposed on the Fund in respect of deferred taxes arising from such distributions or gains. If a Fund were to invest in a PFIC and elect to treat the PFIC as a "qualified electing fund" under the Code, in lieu of the foregoing requirements, the Fund would be required to include in income each year a portion of the ordinary earnings and net capital gains of the qualified electing fund, even if not distributed to the Fund, and such amounts would be subject to the 90% and excise tax distribution requirements described above. In order to make this election, a Fund would be required to obtain certain annual information from the PFICs in which it invests, which may be difficult or impossible to obtain. Alternatively, a Fund may make a mark-to-market election that would result in the Fund being treated as if it had sold and repurchased its PFIC stock at the end of each year. In such case, the Fund would report any such gains as ordinary income and would deduct any such losses as ordinary losses to the extent of previously recognized gains. The election must be made separately for each PFIC owned by a Fund and, once made, would be effective for all subsequent taxable years, unless revoked with the consent of the IRS. By making the election, a Fund could potentially ameliorate the adverse tax consequences with respect to its ownership of shares in a PFIC, but in any particular year may be required to recognize income in excess of the distributions it receives from the PFIC and its proceeds from dispositions of PFIC stock. A Fund may have to distribute this "phantom" income and gain to satisfy the 90% distribution requirement and to avoid imposition of the 4% excise tax. Each Fund will make the appropriate tax elections, if possible, and take any additional steps that are necessary to mitigate the effects of these rules.

Tax-Exempt Shareholders

Under current law, income of a RIC that would be treated as unrelated business taxable income ("UBTI") if earned directly by a tax-exempt entity generally will not be attributed as UBTI to a tax-exempt entity that is a shareholder in the RIC. Notwithstanding this "blocking" effect, a tax-exempt shareholder could realize UBTI by virtue of its investment in a Fund if shares in the Fund constitute debt-financed property in the hands of the tax-exempt shareholder within the meaning of Code Section 514(b).

Non-U.S. Shareholders

In general, dividends other than Capital Gain Dividends paid by a Fund to a shareholder that is not a "U.S. person" within the meaning of the Code (a "foreign person") are subject to withholding of U.S. federal income tax at a rate of 30% (or lower applicable treaty rate) even if they are funded by income or gains (such as foreign-source dividend and interest income) that, if paid to a foreign person directly, would not be subject to withholding. If a Fund were to recognize short-term capital gains or U.S.-source portfolio interest, properly reported short-term capital gain dividends and interest-related dividends paid by the Fund would not be subject to such withholding tax.

A beneficial holder of shares who is a non-U.S. person is not, in general, subject to U.S. federal income tax on gains (and is not allowed a U.S. income tax deduction for losses) realized on a sale of shares of a Fund or on Capital Gain Dividends or short-term capital gain dividends unless (i) such gain or dividend is effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business carried on by such holder within the United States or (ii) in the case of an individual holder, the holder is present in the United States for a period or periods aggregating 183 days or more during the year of the sale or the receipt of the Capital Gain Dividend or short-term capital gains dividends and certain other conditions are met.

In order for a non-U.S. investor to qualify for an exemption from backup withholding, the foreign investor must comply with special certification and filing requirements. Foreign investors in a Fund should consult their tax advisers in this regard. Backup withholding is not an additional tax. Any amounts withheld may be credited against the shareholder's U.S. federal income tax liability, provided the appropriate information is furnished to the Internal Revenue Service.

A beneficial holder of shares who is a non-U.S. person may be subject to the U.S. federal estate tax in addition to the federal income tax consequences referred to above. If a shareholder is eligible for the benefits of a tax treaty, any income or gain effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business will generally be subject to U.S. federal income tax on a net basis only if it is also attributable to a permanent establishment maintained by the shareholder in the United States.

Under the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act ("FATCA"), a 30% withholding tax will be imposed on dividends paid by a Fund to (i) foreign financial institutions including non-U.S. investment funds unless they agree to collect and disclose to the Internal Revenue Service information regarding their direct and indirect U.S. account holders and (ii) certain other foreign entities, unless they certify certain information regarding their direct and indirect U.S. owners. A non-U.S. shareholder resident or doing business in a country that has entered into an intergovernmental agreement with the U.S. to implement a similar reporting regime will be exempt from this withholding tax if the shareholder and the applicable foreign government comply with the terms of such agreement. A Shareholder subject to such withholding tax will not receive additional amounts from the Fund to compensate for such withholding. Proposed regulations (which are effective while pending) eliminate the application of the FATCA withholding tax to capital gain dividends and redemption proceeds that was scheduled to take effect in 2019.

Creation and Redemption of Creation Units

An Authorized Participant who exchanges securities for Creation Units generally will recognize a gain or a loss. The gain or loss will be equal to the difference between the market value of the Creation Units at the time and the sum of the exchanger's aggregate basis in the securities surrendered plus the amount of cash paid for such Creation Units. A person who redeems Creation Units will generally recognize a gain or loss equal to the difference between the exchanger's basis in the Creation Units and the sum of the aggregate market value of any securities received plus the amount of any cash received for such Creation Units. The Internal Revenue Service, however, may assert that a loss realized upon an exchange of securities for Creation Units cannot be deducted currently under the rules governing "wash sales," or on the basis that there has been no significant change in economic position. Any capital gain or loss realized upon the creation of Creation Units will generally be treated as long-term capital gain or loss if the securities exchanged for such Creation Units have been held for more than one year.

Any capital gain or loss realized upon the redemption of Creation Units will generally be treated as long-term capital gain or loss if the shares comprising the Creation Units have been held for more than one year. Otherwise, such capital gains or losses will be treated as short-term capital gains or losses.

Persons purchasing or redeeming Creation Units should consult their own tax advisers with respect to the tax treatment of any creation or redemption transaction.

Section 351

The Trust on behalf of a Fund has the right to reject an order for Creation Units if the purchaser (or group of purchasers) would, upon obtaining the shares so ordered, own 80% or more of the outstanding shares of the Fund and if, pursuant to Section 351 of the Code, the Fund would have a basis in the deposit securities different from the market value of such securities on the date of deposit. The Trust also has the right to require information necessary to determine beneficial share ownership for purposes of the 80% determination.

Tax Shelter Reporting Regulations

Under U.S. Treasury regulations, if an individual shareholder recognizes a loss of \$2 million or more in any single tax year or, for a corporate shareholder, \$10 million or more in any single tax year, the shareholder must file with the Internal Revenue Service a disclosure statement on Form 8886. Direct shareholders of portfolio securities are in many cases excepted from this reporting requirement, but under current guidance, shareholders of a RIC are not excepted. Future guidance may extend the current exception from this reporting requirement to shareholders of most or all RICs. The fact that a loss is reportable under these regulations does not affect the legal determination of whether the taxpayer's treatment of the loss is proper. Shareholders should consult their tax advisers to determine the applicability of these regulations in light of their individual circumstances.

General Considerations

The U.S. federal income tax discussion set forth above is for general information only. Prospective investors should consult their tax advisers regarding the specific federal income tax consequences of purchasing, holding and disposing of shares of a Fund, as well as the effect of state, local and foreign tax law and any proposed tax law changes.

DETERMINATION OF NAV

This information supplements and should be read in conjunction with the section in the Prospectus entitled "Calculating NAV."

The NAV per share of each Fund is computed by dividing the value of the net assets of a Fund (*i.e.*, the value of its total assets less total liabilities and withholdings) by the total number of shares of a Fund outstanding, rounded to the nearest cent. Expenses and fees, including without limitation, the management, administration and distribution fees, are accrued daily and taken into account for purposes of determining NAV. The NAV per share for each Fund normally is calculated by the Administrator and determined as of the regularly scheduled close of normal trading on each day that the NYSE is scheduled to be open for business (normally 4:00 p.m., Eastern Time). Any assets or liabilities denominated in currencies other than the U.S. dollar are converted into U.S. dollars at the current market rates on the date of valuation as quoted by one or more sources.

Securities listed on a securities exchange (*i.e.*, exchange-traded equity securities), market or automated quotation system for which quotations are readily available (except for securities traded on NASDAQ), including securities traded over the counter, are valued by independent pricing agents at the last reported sale price on the primary exchange or market (foreign or domestic) on which they are traded (or at the time as of which the Fund's NAV is calculated if a security's exchange is normally open at that time). If there is no such reported sale, such securities are valued at the most recently reported bid price. For securities traded on NASDAQ, the NASDAQ Official Closing Price will be used. If a security price cannot be obtained from an independent, third-party pricing agent, the Fund seeks to obtain bid and ask prices from two broker-dealers who make a market in the portfolio instrument and determines the average of the two.

If available, debt securities are priced based upon valuations provided by independent, third-party pricing agents. Such values generally reflect the last reported sales price if the security is actively traded. The third-party pricing agents may also value debt securities at an evaluated bid price by employing methodologies that utilize actual market transactions, broker-supplied valuations, or other methodologies designed to identify the market value for such securities. Debt obligations with remaining maturities of sixty days or less may be valued at their amortized cost, which approximates market value. The prices for foreign securities are reported in local currency and converted to U.S. dollars using currency exchange rates. The exchange rates used for valuation are captured as of the close of the London Stock Exchange each day normally at 4:00 p.m. Greenwich Mean Time.

The value of a swap contract is equal to the obligation (or rights) under the swap contract, which will generally be equal to the net amounts to be paid or received under the contract based upon the relative values of the positions held by each party to the contract as determined by the applicable independent, third party pricing agent.

Swaps cleared through a central clearing house (“centrally cleared swaps”) are valued at the settlement price established each day by the board of the exchange on which they are listed. The daily settlement prices for centrally cleared swaps are provided by an independent pricing agent. Swaps which are not centrally cleared are priced based on valuations provided by an independent pricing agent.

In a typical equity swap, one party agrees to pay another party the return on a stock, stock index, or basket of stocks (the “equity leg” of the swap) in return for interest payment(s) calculated based on the notional amount of the swap (the “financing leg” of the swap). Each leg of the swap is valued separately, and the net amount of the two legs is included in the Fund’s net asset value. The value of the equity leg of the swap is provided by an independent pricing agent based on the value of the financial instrument underlying the swap. The value of the financing leg of the swap is systematically calculated by the Fund’s accounting agent based on the details of the swap.

Exchange-traded options, except as discussed below for FLEX options, are valued at the mean of their most recent bid and asked price, if available, and otherwise, long positions will be valued at the most-recent bid price, and short positions will be valued at the most-recent ask price. OTC options are valued based upon prices determined by the applicable independent, third party pricing agent. FLEX (short for flexible) options are normally valued using a model-based price provided by a third-party pricing vendor. On days when a trade in a FLEX option occurs, the trade price will be used to value such FLEX options in lieu of the model price.

Futures are valued at the settlement price established by the board of trade on which they are traded. Foreign currency forward contracts are valued at the current day’s interpolated foreign exchange rate, as calculated using the current day’s spot rate and the 30-, 60-, 90- and 180-day forward rates provided by an independent pricing agent.

On certain days, the settlement price for futures may not be available at the time the Fund calculates its NAV. On such days, the best available price (which is typically the last trade price) may be used to value futures.

Securities issued by a wholly owned subsidiary of a Fund will be valued at the subsidiary’s net asset value, which will be determined using the same pricing policies and procedures applicable to the Fund.

Investments in open-end investment companies that do not trade on an exchange are valued at the end of day NAV per share. Investments in open-end investment companies that trade on an exchange are valued in the same manner as other exchange-traded equity securities (described above).

Investments for which market prices are not “readily available,” or are not deemed to reflect current market values, or are debt securities where no evaluated price is available from third-party pricing agents pursuant to established methodologies, are fair valued in accordance with the Adviser’s valuation policies and procedures approved by the Board. Some of the more common reasons that may necessitate that a security be valued using “fair value” pricing may include, but are not limited to: the security’s trading has been halted or suspended; the security’s primary trading market is temporarily closed; or the security has not been traded for an extended period of time.

In addition, a Fund may fair value its securities if an event that may materially affect the value of a Fund's securities that trade outside of the United States (a "Significant Event") has occurred between the time of the security's last close and the time that a Fund calculates its NAV. A Significant Event may relate to a single issuer or to an entire market sector, country or region. Events that may be Significant Events may include: government actions, natural disasters, armed conflict, acts of terrorism and significant market fluctuations. If Krane becomes aware of a Significant Event that has occurred with respect to a portfolio instrument or group of portfolio instruments after the closing of the exchange or market on which the portfolio instrument or portfolio instruments principally trade, but before the time at which a Fund calculates its NAV, it will notify the Administrator and may request that an ad hoc meeting of the Fair Value Pricing Committee be called.

With respect to trade-halted securities, the Adviser typically will fair value a trade-halted security by adjusting the security's last market close price by the security's sector performance, as measured by a predetermined index, unless Krane's Fair Value Pricing Committee determines to make additional adjustments. Certain foreign securities exchanges have mechanisms in place that confine one day's price movement in an individual security to a pre-determined price range based on that day's opening price ("Collared Securities"). Fair value determinations for Collared Securities will generally be capped based on any applicable pre-determined "limit down" or "limit up" prices established by the relevant foreign securities exchange. As an example, China A-Shares can only be plus or minus ten percent in one day of trading in the relevant mainland China equity market. As a result, the fair value price determination on a given day will generally be capped plus or minus ten percent.

Fair value pricing involves subjective judgments and it is possible that a fair value determination for a security is materially different than the value that could actually be realized upon the sale of the security or that another fund that uses market quotations or its own fair value procedures to price the same securities.

Trading in securities on many foreign exchanges is normally completed before the close of business on each Business Day. In addition, securities trading in a particular country or countries may not take place on each Business Day or may take place on days that are not Business Days. Changes in valuations on certain securities may occur at times or on days on which a Fund's NAV is not calculated and on which Fund shares do not trade and sales and redemptions of shares do not occur. As a result, the value of a Fund's portfolio securities and the net asset value of its shares may change on days when share purchases or sales cannot occur.

Fund shares are purchased or sold on a national securities exchange at market prices, which may be higher or lower than NAV. Transactions in Fund shares will be priced at NAV only if shares are purchased or redeemed directly from a Fund in Creation Units. No secondary sales will be made to brokers or dealers at concession by the Distributor or by a Fund. Purchases and sales of shares in the secondary market, which will not involve a Fund, will be subject to customary brokerage commissions and charges.

With respect to the securities of private companies, the Administrator will obtain the price of private company securities from the Valuation Designee, who will determine their fair value using various inputs, including observable data such as cost basis, primary financing rounds, tender offers, and secondary market activity. The Valuation Designee will also consider pricing from independent pricing experts¹, comparables of public and private companies, and relevant market news. While primary financing rounds, tender offers, and cost basis are expected to be the main drivers of fair value, all factors will be considered. A daily dashboard will be stored to record data being considered. In addition to conducting a pricing and trend analysis on the data received from the independent pricing experts, the Valuation Designee will take business cycle, market depth, transaction size and other relevant factors into consideration when reviewing observable data and will periodically assess the pricing methodology used by the independent pricing experts.

¹ It is currently expected that the Valuation Designee will get pricing from two independent pricing agents.

DIVIDENDS AND DISTRIBUTIONS

Each Fund intends to distribute dividends and net realized capital gains, if any, to investors annually. Each Fund may make distributions on a more frequent basis. A Fund may occasionally be required to make supplemental distributions at some other time during the year. Distributions in cash may be reinvested automatically in additional whole shares only if the broker through whom you purchased shares makes such option available. Your broker is responsible for distributing the income and capital gain distributions to you.

The Trust reserves the right to declare special distributions if, in its reasonable discretion, such action is necessary or advisable.

OTHER INFORMATION

Portfolio Holdings

The Board has approved portfolio holdings disclosure policies and procedures that govern the timing and circumstances of disclosure to shareholders and third parties of a Fund's portfolio holdings and the use of material non-public information about a Fund's holdings. These policies and procedures, as described below, are designed to ensure that disclosure of portfolio holdings is in the best interests of Fund shareholders, and address conflicts of interest between the interests of Fund shareholders and those of Krane, any sub-adviser, the Distributor, or any affiliated person of a Fund, Krane, any sub-adviser or the Distributor. The policies and procedures apply to all officers, employees, and agents of a Fund, including Krane and any sub-adviser.

Each Fund discloses on its website at the start of each Business Day the identities and quantities of the securities and other assets held by a Fund that will form the basis of a Fund's calculation of its NAV on that Business Day. The portfolio holdings so disclosed will be based on information as of the close of business on the prior Business Day. This information is generally used in connection with the creation and redemption process and is disseminated on a daily basis through the facilities of the Exchange, the National Securities Clearing Corporation ("NSCC") and/or other fee-based subscription services to NSCC members and/or subscribers to those other fee-based subscription services, including Authorized Participants, and to entities that publish and/or analyze such information in connection with the process of purchasing or redeeming Creation Units or trading shares of a Fund in the secondary market.

Daily access to non-public information concerning a Fund's portfolio holdings also is permitted (i) to certain personnel of those service providers that are involved in portfolio management and providing administrative, operational, risk management, or other support to portfolio management, including affiliated broker-dealers and/or Authorized Participants, and (ii) to other personnel of Krane and other service providers, such as a sub-adviser, the administrator, the custodian and the fund accountant, who deal directly with, or assist in, functions related to investment management, administration, custody and fund accounting, as may be necessary to conduct business in the ordinary course in a manner consistent with agreements with a Fund and/or the terms of a Fund's current registration statement.

From time to time, non-public information concerning Fund portfolio holdings also may be provided to other entities that provide services to a Fund, including, among others, rating or ranking organizations, in the ordinary course of business, no earlier than one business day following the date of the information. Portfolio holdings information made available in connection with the creation and redemption process may be provided to other entities that provide services to a Fund in the ordinary course of business after it has been disseminated to the NSCC.

A Fund's chief compliance officer, or a compliance manager designated by the chief compliance officer, also may grant exceptions to permit additional disclosure of Fund portfolio holdings information at differing times and with different lag times (the period from the date of the information to the date the information is made available), if any, in instances where a Fund has legitimate business purposes for doing so, it is in the best interests of shareholders, and the recipients are subject to a duty of confidentiality, including a duty not to trade on the nonpublic information and are required to execute an agreement to that effect. The Board will be informed of any such disclosures at its next regularly scheduled meeting or as soon as is reasonably practicable thereafter. In no event will a Fund, Krane, any sub-adviser, or any other party receive any direct or indirect compensation in connection with the disclosure of information about a Fund's portfolio holdings.

The Board exercises continuing oversight of the disclosure of a Fund's portfolio holdings by (1) overseeing the implementation and enforcement of the Trust's portfolio holdings policies and procedures by a Fund's chief compliance officer and a Fund, (2) considering reports and recommendations by the chief compliance officer concerning any material compliance matters (as defined in Rule 38a-1 under the 1940 Act and Rule 206(4)-7 under the Advisers Act) that may arise in connection with any portfolio holdings policies and procedures, and (3) considering whether to approve or ratify any amendment to any of the portfolio holdings policies and procedures. The Board and a Fund reserve the right to amend the policies and procedures in their sole discretion at any time and from time to time without prior notice to shareholders. For purposes of the policies and procedures, the term "portfolio holdings" means investment positions held by a Fund that are not publicly disclosed.

In addition to the permitted disclosures described above, a Fund must publicly disclose its complete holdings quarterly in SEC filings. These reports are available, free of charge, on the EDGAR database on the SEC's web site at www.sec.gov.

No person is authorized to disclose a Fund's portfolio holdings or other investment positions except in accordance with the Trust's policies and procedures.

Voting Rights

Each share of a Fund is entitled to one vote with respect to matters upon which a shareholder vote is required consistent with the requirements of the 1940 Act and the rules promulgated thereunder. Shareholders receive one vote for every full Fund share owned. Shareholders of each Fund will vote separately on matters relating solely to that Fund. All shares of a Fund are freely transferable.

As a Delaware statutory trust, the Trust is not required to hold annual shareholder meetings unless otherwise required by the 1940 Act. However, for the purpose of considering removal of a Trustee as provided in Section 16(c) of the 1940 Act, a special meeting may be called by shareholders owning at least 10% of the outstanding shares of the Trust. Shareholder inquiries can be made by contacting the Trust at the number and website address provided under "Shareholder Inquiries" below.

Shareholder Inquiries

Shareholders may visit the Trust's web site at www.kraneshares.com or call 1.855.857.2638 or call to obtain information about account statements, procedures, and other related information.

COUNSEL

K&L Gates LLP, 1601 K Street NW, Washington, DC 20006, serves as counsel to the Trust.

INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

KPMG LLP, 1735 Market Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103, the Trust's independent registered public accounting firm, provides audit and tax services with respect to the Funds.

FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

The Funds' audited financial statements, including the notes thereto and the report of KPMG LLP, the Funds' independent registered public accounting firm, are incorporated by reference into this SAI from the Funds' Form N-CSR for the period ending March 31, 2025.

APPENDIX A – PROXY VOTING POLICY

Form N-1A requires an investment company to describe the policies and procedures that it uses to determine how to vote proxies relating to portfolio securities. In connection with this requirement, the Trust’s Board has delegated voting of the Fund’s proxies to Krane Funds Advisors, LLC (“Adviser” or “KFA”), subject to the Board’s oversight. The Board has directed that proxies be voted consistent with the Fund and its shareholders’ best interests and in compliance with all applicable proxy voting rules and regulations. Below is a summary of the proxy voting policies and procedures adopted by the Adviser:

PROXY VOTING POLICIES AND PROCEDURES SUMMARY

Background

Investment advisers are fiduciaries that owe a duty of care and loyalty to each of their clients with respect to services undertaken on the client’s behalf, including monitoring corporate events and exercising proxy authority. In the context of voting, the specific obligations that flow from the investment adviser’s fiduciary duty depend upon the scope of voting authority assumed by the adviser. To satisfy its fiduciary duty in making any voting determination, an investment adviser must make the determination in the best interest of the client and must not place its own interests ahead of the interest of the client.

Policies and Procedures

Proxy Voting Requirements

Rule 206(4)-6 under the Advisers Act requires each registered investment adviser that exercises proxy voting authority with respect to client securities to:

- Adopt and implement written policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure that the adviser votes client securities in the best interest of clients, including sufficient ongoing oversight of any third party retained to assist with voting responsibilities;
- Disclose to clients how they may obtain information from the adviser about how the adviser voted proxies for their securities; and
- Describe the adviser’s proxy voting policies and procedures to clients and furnish them with a copy of such policies and procedures on request.

Paragraph (c)(2) of Rule 204-2 under the Advisers Act imposes additional recordkeeping requirements on investment advisers that execute proxy voting authority, as described under “Recordkeeping” below and in the *Maintenance of Books and Records* section of this Manual.¹

Policy

Each Adviser complies with Rule 206(4)-6 under the Advisers Act and all other applicable laws and regulations to the extent the Adviser votes proxies on behalf of Clients. KFA votes proxies for the securities in the KraneShares Trust, on behalf of each series of the Trust (the “Funds”) for which it has been granted investment authority. KFA has retained Broadridge Investor Communication Solutions, Inc. (“Broadridge”) to track the Funds’ proxy votes, the subsequent action taken by the Funds upon receipt of the vote, and where applicable, the issuer’s management and shareholder recommendations (system name: ProxyEdge). KFA will provide ongoing oversight of Broadridge with respect to the ProxyEdge system which is used to assist in KFA’s proxy voting duties.

Where KFA has responsibility for voting proxies, KFA will take reasonable steps under the circumstances so that proxies are received and voted in the best interest of its Clients, including the Funds, which generally means voting proxies in accordance with this policy. KFA may abstain from voting to the extent that KFA determines that such abstention is in the Client’s best interest (based on a quantitative/qualitative materiality assessment). KFA generally does not vote proxies on behalf of separate account clients (if any). Separate account clients either vote their own proxies or designate an independent third party to vote proxies at the client’s discretion.

¹ Each Adviser notes that the fiduciary duties described in Section 404(a)(1)(A) and (B) of ERISA require that, in voting proxies, the responsible fiduciary consider those factors that may affect the value of a plan’s investment and not subordinate the interests of the plan’s participants and beneficiaries in their retirement income to unrelated objectives. As such, to the extent that the one or both of the Advisers becomes an ERISA fiduciary, they will consider whether a plan’s vote is expected to have an effect on the value of the plan’s investment that warrants the additional cost of voting before making any proxy vote.

Proxy Advisory Firm - General Guidelines and Oversight

Where KFA has proxy voting authority, KFA generally votes in accordance with pre-determined proxy voting guidelines prepared by Glass Lewis & Co. (“GL Guidelines”), where Glass Lewis serves as an independent, unaffiliated third-party proxy advisory service firm.² KFA believes that utilizing an independent third party’s framework and analysis to support KFA’s assessments of proxy proposals assists KFA in making sure that all proxy voting decisions are made in the best interests of KFA’s Clients and Funds. However, KFA may diverge from the GL Guidelines to the extent that KFA believes it is in the best interest of a Fund or Client account to vote differently. In determining whether to vote in accordance with the GL Guidelines, KFA will take into account all information received with respect to the particular proxy vote, including any information provided by the issuer. KFA will provide ongoing oversight of any proxy advisory firm engaged to ensure the proxy advisory firm has the capacity and competency to adequately analyze proxy issues, including but not limited to reviewing (1) the adequacy and quality of the proxy advisory firm’s staffing and personnel; (2) the robustness of its policies and procedures regarding its ability to (i) ensure that its proxy voting recommendations are based on current and accurate information and (ii) identify and address any conflicts of interest and any other considerations that the investment adviser believes would be appropriate in considering the nature and quality of the services provided by the proxy advisory firm.

Conflicts of Interests

KFA has adopted these policies and procedures that are designed to identify conflicts or potential conflicts that could arise between its own interests and those of its Clients, including the Funds. For example, conflicts of interest may arise when:

- proxy votes where the issuer is an affiliate, or the subject of the proxy measure involved a material economic or business interest of an affiliate;
- proxy votes regarding non-routine matters are solicited by an issuer that has an institutional separate account relationship with KFA;³
- a proponent of a proxy proposal has a business relationship with KFA; or
- KFA has business relationships with participants in proxy contests, corporate directors or director candidates.

The Compliance Team and KFA’s Investment Team are responsible for monitoring and resolving possible material conflicts of interest with respect to proxy voting. KFA will identify any conflicts that exist between its interests and those of a Client by reviewing KFA’s relationship with the issuer of each security to determine if KFA or any of its employees has any financial, business, or personal relationship with the issuer. Any person with knowledge of a personal conflict of interest relating to a particular matter shall disclose that conflict to the Investment Team or the Compliance Team and may be required to recuse him or herself from the proxy voting process.

If it is determined that a conflict of interest or potential conflict of interest is material, the CCO will work with appropriate personnel to agree upon a method to resolve such conflict before voting proxies affected by the conflict. It is KFA’s expectation that voting in accordance with the GL Guidelines will, in most cases, adequately address any possible conflicts of interest.

KFA will maintain a record of the resolution of any conflict of interest with respect to proxy voting.

² As of the dated of these policies and procedures, KFA relies on the 2024 Environmental, Social & Governance (ESG) Thematic Voting Policy (“GL ESG Policy Guidelines”). To the extent the GL ESG Policy Guidelines do not provide a specific approach to a ballot, or an ESG rule does not trigger for a particular ballot, the default vote will come from the In-House Glass Lewis Guidelines.

³ For this purpose, KFA generally will consider as “non-routine” any matter listed in New York Stock Exchange Rule 452.11, relating to when a member adviser may not vote a proxy without instructions from its customer (for example, contested matters are deemed non-routine).

Special Issues with Voting Foreign Proxies

Although KFA has arrangements with BBH (custodian) and Broadridge to vote foreign proxies, voting proxies with respect to shares of foreign stocks may involve significantly greater effort and corresponding cost due to the variety of regulatory schemes and corporate practices in foreign countries with respect to proxy voting. Logistical problems in voting foreign proxies include the following:

- Each country has its own rules and practices regarding shareholder notification, voting restrictions, registration conditions and “share blocking” (as described in the following bullet point).
- To vote shares in some countries, the shares may be “blocked” by the custodian or depository (or bearer shares deposited with a specified financial institution) for a specified number of days (usually five or fewer but sometimes longer) before or after the shareholder meeting. When blocked, shares typically may not be traded until the day after the blocking period. KFA may refrain from voting shares of foreign stocks subject to blocking restrictions where, in KFA’s judgment, the benefit from voting the shares is outweighed by the interest of maintaining liquidity in the shares. This decision generally is made on a case-by-case basis based on relevant factors, including the length of the blocking period, the significance of the holding, and whether the stock is considered a long-term holding.
- Often it is difficult to ascertain the date of a shareholder meeting because certain countries, such as France, do not require companies to publish announcements in any official stock exchange publication.
- Timeframes between shareholder notification, distribution of proxy materials, book closure and the actual meeting date may be too short to allow timely action.
- Language barriers will generally mean that an English translation of proxy information must be obtained or commissioned before the relevant shareholder meeting, if possible.
- Some companies and/or jurisdictions require that, in order to be eligible to vote, the shares of the beneficial holders be registered in the company’s share registry.
- Lack of a “proxy voting service” by custodians in certain countries, which in certain cases may require KFA to have a power of attorney in place with the local custodian for voting.
- Lack of proxy statement information (where KFA is limited to what is available on Proxy Ballot and Issuer’s website).
- Proxy votes for the issuer are suppressed or restricted due to operational constraints, including sanctions.
- Meetings are informational only and/or have to be attended in person.

Because the cost of voting on a particular proxy proposal, including lengthy operational processing, could exceed the expected benefit to a Fund or Client account, KFA may, after weighing the costs and benefits of voting on proxy proposals relating to foreign securities, make the decision not to vote a proxy proposal. At times, KFA may abstain from voting proxies of companies for the reasons stated above.

Affiliated Entities

For the avoidance of doubt, when required by contract or requested in writing, it is KFA’s policy to generally abstain from voting proxies as they relate to affiliated entities of subadvisors who co-manage the portfolios of the Funds.

Voting Contrary to Guidelines

To the extent a proxy is voted contrary to the GL Guidelines for the reasons stated above (i.e. conflicts of interest, foreign proxies with special issues, affiliated entities), or otherwise (for example, proxy is a “case by case” under which the third-party proxy advisory service firm does not provide a recommendation or due to a sanction or operational restriction), such override must be made in the Client account’s or Fund’s best interest. In such cases, the reason for such decision must be agreed on by both the Compliance Team and the Investment Team and recorded. To the extent the contrary vote is determined during monthly reviews, Krane Compliance will communicate that to the Investment Team, if not previously identified.

Proxy Voting Reporting

Information regarding how KFA voted proxies on behalf of the Funds is available on the SEC’s website at <http://sec.gov>. Information regarding how KFA voted proxies on behalf of Client accounts is available upon request.

KFA must provide the Funds’ Board with a report that describes any significant issues that arose during the year as they relate to voting proxies, including any votes that were made inconsistent with this policy. Additionally, on at least an annual basis, any changes to this policy with respect to the Funds must be reported to the Board, which shall review and, in its discretion, approve the use of such amended policy.

KFA’s CCO will meet with the Stewardship Committee periodically, but no less frequently than annually, to review compliance with this policy.

Securities Subject to Lending Arrangements

The investment policies of a Fund may permit the Fund to engage in securities lending transactions from time to time. Securities lending will be conducted in accordance with each Fund’s investment policies, policies adopted by the Board, and the terms and conditions of various SEC interpretive positions.

Under the Securities Lending Policy approved by the Board, in the event that KFA determines that a loaned security would otherwise remain on loan on the proxy record date and the matters involved would have a material effect on the applicable Fund’s investment in the loaned securities, KFA will exercise its best efforts to vote proxies on the securities loaned, either by terminating the loan or by entering into an alternative arrangement with the borrower of the securities in time to be able to cast such vote or to exercise such consent. This assessment would be based on a quantitative and qualitative materiality assessment conducted by the Compliance Team and reviewed by the Investment Team.

Class Actions

KFA does not commit to participate in all class actions that may arise with regard to Client account or Fund portfolio securities. Upon receipt of class action information, the Compliance Team and/or Investment Team will evaluate the costs versus the benefits of participation in the suit for each pertinent Client. Unless it is determined that it would be in the best interest of the Client or Fund, KFA will not participate in the class action on behalf of the Client or Fund. The Compliance Team or Investment Team will either return to the sender any documents inadvertently received by KFA regarding the class action, or forward the documents to the pertinent Client(s). If a determination is made that the benefits of participating in a class action outweigh the cost of participation, KFA will distribute any compensation received pro rata to the investors in the Funds(s) and/or to the Client based on the current percentage holdings in the Fund or Client account, or as otherwise appropriately arranged and disclosed to Clients.

Class Action Notices should be forwarded to the CCO upon receipt.

Recordkeeping

To the extent that KFA exercises proxy voting authority with respect to its Clients, it shall make and retain the following:

- a copy of this policy;
- a copy of each proxy statement that KFA receives regarding Client securities;
- a record of each vote cast by KFA on behalf of a Client;
- a copy of any document created by KFA that was material to making a decision how to vote proxies on behalf of a Client or that memorializes the basis for that decision; and
- a copy of each written Client request for information on how KFA voted proxies on behalf of the Client, and a copy of any written response by KFA to any written or oral Client request for information on how KFA voted proxies on behalf of the requesting Client.


KFA shall retain these records in an easily accessible place for five years from the end of the fiscal year during which the last entry was made on such record, the first two years in KFA's principal office. The CCO will confirm that KFA complies with all applicable recordkeeping requirements associated with proxy voting.




ESG
Thematic Voting Policy Guidelines

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
www.glasslewis.com



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About Glass Lewis

Glass Lewis is the world's choice for governance solutions. We enable institutional investors and publicly listed companies to make informed decisions based on research and data. We cover 30,000+ meetings each year, across approximately 100 global markets. Our team has been providing in-depth analysis of companies since 2003, relying solely on publicly available information to inform its policies, research, and voting recommendations.

Our customers include the majority of the world's largest pension plans, mutual funds, and asset managers, collectively managing over \$40 trillion in assets. We have teams located across the United States, Europe, and Asia-Pacific giving us global reach with a local perspective on the important governance issues.


Investors around the world depend on Glass Lewis' **Viewpoint** platform to manage their proxy voting, policy implementation, recordkeeping, and reporting. Our industry leading **Proxy Paper** product provides comprehensive environmental, social, and governance research and voting recommendations weeks ahead of voting deadlines. Public companies can also use our innovative **Report Feedback Statement** to deliver their opinion on our proxy research directly to the voting decision makers at every investor client in time for voting decisions to be made or changed.

The research team engages extensively with public companies, investors, regulators, and other industry stakeholders to gain relevant context into the realities surrounding companies, sectors, and the market in general. This enables us to provide the most comprehensive and pragmatic insights to our customers.

Join the Conversation

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
Summary of Changes for 2025

Board Diversity

The ESG Policy has updated its policy concerning gender diversity on boards. The policy has been updated to provide that, if less than 33% of the board is gender-diverse the ESG Policy will vote against all incumbent male nominating committee members for large- and mid-cap companies; however, where local market standards dictate a higher level of expected gender diversity, the ESG policy will follow the local market requirement. , Previously, the ESG Policy would vote against male members of the nominating committee in instances where large- and mid-cap companies did not have at least 30% gender diversity. The policy will continue to recommend against male members of the nominating committee when small-cap companies do not have at least one gender-diverse director on their boards.

Vote-No Campaigns

The ESG Policy will carefully review any “vote-no” campaigns launched by shareholders as a result of their concerns regarding a company’s failure to adequately address environmental and social risks or those related to poor compensation or governance practices. When it is determined that such campaigns either address a failure of oversight on behalf of the company or broadly seek to promote more responsible corporate behavior, the ESG Policy may vote in line with the recommendations of the shareholder(s) running the vote-no campaign.




Introduction

Institutional investors are increasingly recognizing the importance of incorporating material environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors into their investment processes. Active ownership on ESG issues will typically include also applying these considerations to proxy voting practices, and the ESG Policy allows clients to apply these enhanced ESG considerations when voting at the annual and special meetings of their portfolio companies.

The ESG Policy was designed for clients with a strong focus on environmental and social issues or as a supplemental voting policy for ESG-focused funds. This policy is also ideal for investors who would like to vote in a stakeholder-focused and progressive manner.

Implementation of the ESG Policy may vary market-to-market in accordance with regulatory requirements, corporate governance best practices, and other relevant standards in individual markets.



Election of Directors

Board of Directors

Boards are established in order to represent shareholders and protect their interests. The ESG Policy seeks boards that have a record for protecting shareholders and delivering value over the medium- and long-term. For boards that wish to protect and enhance the interests of shareholders they must have sufficient levels of independence (the percentage varies by local market practice and regulations), boast a record of positive performance, have directors with diverse backgrounds, and appoint new directors that have a depth of relevant experience.


Board Composition

The ESG Policy examines a variety of elements to the board when voting on director elections. In terms of the directors, the policy looks at each individual on the board and explores their relationship with the company, the company's executives and with other board members. This is to ensure and determine whether a director has an existing relationship with the company that are likely to impact any decision processes of that board member.

The biographical information provided by the company on the individual director is essential for investors to understand the background and skills of the directors of the board. This information should be provided in the company's documents well in advance of the shareholder meeting, in order to give shareholders sufficient time to analyze the information. In cases where the company fails to disclose the names or backgrounds of director nominees, the ESG Policy may vote against or abstain from voting on the directors' elections.

The ESG Policy will vote in favor of governance structures that will drive positive performance and enhance shareholder value. The most crucial test of a board's commitment to the company and to its shareholders is the performance of the board and its members. The performance of directors in their capacity as board members and as executives of the company, when applicable, and in their roles at other companies where they serve is critical to this evaluation.


Directors are formed into three categories based on an examination of the type of relationship they have with the company. The table below includes a breakdown of how Glass Lewis classifies these director relationships with the company.



Insider	Affiliate	Independent
>Someone who serves as a director and as an employee of the Company	>A director who has a material financial, familial or other relationship with the company, or its executives, but is NOT an employee of the company	>No material financial, familial or other current relationships with the company, it's executives or other board members except for service
>May also include executive chairs (who act as an employee of the company or is paid as an employee of the company)	>A director who owns or controls, directly or indirectly 20% or more of the company's voting stock (except where local regulations or best practices set a different threshold).	>A director who owns, directly or indirectly less than 10% of the company's voting stock (local regulations and best practices may set a different threshold)
	>A director who has been employed by the company within the past 5 calendar years	>A director who has not been employed by the company for a minimum of 5 calendar years
	>A director who performs material consulting, legal, advisory, accounting or other professional services for the company	>A director who is not involved in any Related Party Transactions (RPT) with the company (most common RPT's - Consulting, Legal, and Accounting/Advisory services)
	>A director who is involved in an "Interlocking Directorship"	

Common other reasons the ESG Policy will vote against a director:

- (i) A director who attends less than 75% of the board and applicable committee meetings.
- (ii) A director who is also the CEO of a company where a serious restatement has occurred after the CEO certified the pre-restatement financial statements.
- (iii) An affiliated director when the board is not sufficiently independent in accordance with market best practice standards.
- (iv) An affiliate or insider on any of the key committees (audit, compensation, nominating) or an affiliate or insider on any of the key committees and there is insufficient independence on that committee, both of the above can vary in accordance with the markets best practice standards.



The following conflicts of interests may hinder a director's performance and may result in a vote against:

- (i) A director who presently sits on an excessive number of public company boards (see the relevant market guidelines for confirmation of the excessive amount).
- (ii) Director, or a director whose immediate family member, or the firm at which the director is employed, provides material professional services to the company at any time during the past five years.
- (iii) Director, or a director whose immediate family member, engages in airplane, real estate or other similar deals, including perquisite type grants from the company.
- (iv) Director with an interlocking directorship.
- (v) All board members who served at a time when a poison pill with a term of longer than one year was adopted without shareholder approval within the prior twelve months.
- (vi) A director who has received two against recommendations from Glass Lewis for identical reasons within the prior year at different companies.

[Board Independence](#)

A board composed of at least two-thirds independent is most effective in protecting shareholders' interests. Generally, the ESG Policy will vote against responsible directors if the board is less than two-thirds independent, however, this is also dependent on the market best practice standards.

[Board Committee Composition](#)


It is best practice to have independent directors serving on the audit, compensation, nominating and governance committees. As such, the ESG Policy will support boards with this structure and encourage change when this is not the case. However, board committee independence thresholds may vary depending on the market.

With respect to the creation of board committees and the composition thereof, the ESG Policy will generally support shareholder proposals requesting that companies create a committee to oversee material E&S issues, such as committees dedicated to climate change oversight or the oversight of public policy risks. The ESG Policy will also generally support shareholder proposals calling for the appointment of directors with specific expertise to the board, such as those requesting the appointment of an environmental expert or an individual with significant human rights expertise.

[Board Diversity, Tenure and Refreshment](#)

The ESG Policy acknowledges the importance of ensuring that the board is comprised of directors who have a diversity of skills, backgrounds, thoughts, and experiences. As such, having diverse boards benefits companies greatly by encompassing an array of different perspectives and insights.

In terms of board tenure and refreshment, the ESG Policy strongly supports routine director evaluations, including independent external reviews, and periodic board refreshment in order to enable the company to maintain a fresh set of ideas and business strategies in an ever-changing world and market. Having directors with diverse experiences and skills can strengthen the position of a company within the market. Therefore, the ESG Policy promotes refreshment within boards, as a lack of refreshment can lead to poor company performance. Thus, the ESG Policy may consider voting against directors with a lengthy tenure (e.g. over 12



years) when we identify significant performance or governance concerns indicating that a fresh perspective would be beneficial and there is no evidence of any plans of future board refreshment.

The ESG Policy will also evaluate a company's policies and actions with respect to board refreshment and diversity. As a part of this evaluation, we will review the diversity of board members and support shareholder proposals to report on or increase board diversity. The nominating and governance committee, as an agent for the shareholders, is responsible for the governance by the board of the company and its executives. In performing this role, the committee is responsible and accountable for selection of objective and competent board members. To that end, the ESG Policy will: (i) vote against members of the nominating committee in the event that the board has an average tenure of over ten years and the board has not appointed a new nominee to the board in at least five years; (ii) vote against the incumbent male nominating committee members in instances where the board of a large- or mid-cap company is comprised of fewer than 33% gender-diverse directors, or the local market requirement for gender diversity where higher; or (iii) vote against the male members of the nominating committee where there is not at least one gender-diverse director on the board of a small-cap company.

The ESG Policy conducts a further level of analysis for U.S. companies included in the Russel 1000 index. For these companies, the ESG Policy will vote against members of the nominating and governance committee when they receive a "Poor" score in Glass Lewis' Diversity Disclosure Assessment. The Diversity Disclosure Assessment is an analysis of companies' proxy statement disclosure relating to board diversity, skills and the director nomination process. This assessment reflects how a company's proxy statement presents: (i) the board's current percentage of racial/ethnic diversity; (ii) whether the board's definition of diversity explicitly includes gender and/or race/ethnicity; (iii) whether the board has adopted a policy requiring women and minorities to be included in the initial pool of candidates when selecting new director nominees ("Rooney Rule"); and (iv) board skills disclosure.

Director Overboarding

The ESG Policy will generally recommend that shareholders vote against a director who serves as an executive officer (other than executive chair) of any public company while serving on more than one external public company board, a director who serves as an executive chair of any public company while serving on more than two external public company boards, and any other director who serves on more than five public company boards.

Board Size

Although there is not a universally acceptable optimum board size, boards should have a minimum of five directors to ensure sufficient diversity in decision making and to enable the establishment of key committees with independent directors. Further, boards should not be composed of more than 20 directors as the board may suffer as a result of too many voices to be heard and have difficulty reaching consensus on issues with this number of members. As a result, the ESG Policy will generally vote against the chair of the nominating committee at a board with fewer than five directors or more than 20 directors.



Classified Boards

The ESG Policy favors the repeal of staggered boards in favor of the annual election of directors. Staggered boards are generally less accountable to shareholders than annually elected directors to the board. In addition, the annual election of directors encourages board members to focus on protecting the interests of shareholders. Further to this, if shareholders are unsatisfied with board members the annual election of directors allows them to voice these concerns.

Controlled Companies

The ESG Policy allows certain exceptions to the independence standards at controlled companies. The board's main function is to protect shareholder interests, however, when an individual, entity, or group own more than 50% of the voting shares, the interests of majority shareholders are the interests of that entity or individual. As a result, the ESG Policy does not apply the usual two-thirds independence threshold on controlled companies instead it includes the following guidelines:

- (i) As long as insiders and/or affiliates are connected to the controlling entity, the ESG Policy will accept the presence of non-independent board members.
- (ii) The compensation, nominating, and governance committees do not need to consist solely of independent directors. However, the compensation committee should not have any insider members, but affiliates are accepted.
- (iii) The board does not need an independent chair or an independent lead or presiding director.
- (iv) The audit committee should consist solely of independent directors, regardless of the controlled status of the company.


Significant Shareholders

Significant shareholders are either an individual or an entity which holds between 20-50% of a company's voting power, and the ESG Policy provides that shareholders should be allowed proportional representation on the board and in committees (excluding the audit committee) based on their percentage of ownership.

Director Performance and Oversight

Board members performance and their actions in regard to performance of the board is an essential element to understanding the board's commitment to the company and to shareholders. The ESG Policy will look at the performance of individuals as directors and executives of the company and of other companies where they have served. Often a director's past conduct is indicative of future conduct and performance.

The ESG Policy will typically vote against directors who have served on boards or as executives of companies with records of poor performance, inadequate risk oversight, excessive compensation, audit or accounting-related issues, and other actions or indicators of mismanagement. However, the ESG Policy will also reevaluate the directors based on factors such as the length of time that has passed since the incident, the director's role, and the severity of the issue.



Environmental and Social Oversight and Performance

The ESG Policy considers the oversight afforded to environmental and social issues. The ESG Policy looks to ensure that companies maintain appropriate board-level oversight of material risks to their operations, including those that are environmental and social in nature. When it is clear that these risks have not been properly managed or mitigated, the ESG Policy may vote against members of the board who are responsible for the oversight of environmental and social risks. In the absence of explicit board oversight of environmental and social issues, the ESG Policy may vote against members of the audit committee. In making these determinations, the ESG Policy will take into account the situation at hand, its effect on shareholder value, as well as any corrective action or other response made by the company.

Board-Level Oversight of Environmental and Social Risks

The insufficient oversight of environmental and social issues can present direct legal, financial, regulatory and reputational risks that could serve to harm shareholder interests. As a result, the ESG Policy promotes oversight structures that ensure that companies are mitigating attendant risks and capitalizing on related opportunities to the best extent possible.


To that end, the ESG Policy looks to boards to maintain clear oversight of material risks to their operations, including those that are environmental and social in nature. These risks could include, but are not limited to, matters related to climate change, human capital management, diversity, stakeholder relations, and health, safety & environment.

Glass Lewis will review a company's overall governance practices to identify which directors or board-level committees have been charged with oversight of environmental and/or social issues. Given the importance of the board's role in overseeing environmental and social risks, the ESG Policy will vote against members of the governance committee that fails to provide explicit disclosure concerning the board's role in overseeing these issues.

Climate Risk

Given the importance of companies mitigation and management of climate-related risks, the ESG Policy includes specific consideration for companies' disclosure of and policies concerning climate change. For companies included in the Climate Action 100+ focus list and those that operate in industries where the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) has determined that greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions represent a financially material risk, the ESG Policy will vote against the chair of the board in instances where a company has not adopted a net zero emissions target or ambition. For all other companies, the ESG Policy will vote against the chair of the board in instances where companies have not established any forward-looking GHG emissions reduction targets. In both instances, if the chair of the board is also the company's CEO, the ESG Policy will vote against the chair of the audit committee.

The ESG Policy also takes into consideration investors' growing expectation for robust climate and sustainability disclosures. For Climate Action 100+ focus list companies, as well as those where SASB has determined that GHG emissions represent a material risk, the ESG Policy will vote against the chair of the board when the company has failed to produce reporting that is aligned with the recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures ("TCFD") or IFRS S2 framework. For all other companies, the ESG Policy may vote against the chair of the board when they have not produced sufficient sustainability reporting.



Stakeholder Considerations

In order to drive long-term shareholder value, companies require a social license to operate. A lack of consideration for stakeholders can present legal, regulatory, and reputational risks. With this view, the ESG Policy will vote against the chair of the board in instances where companies in major blue chip indices are not signatories or participants in the United Nations Global Compact (“UNG”C) or have not adopted a human rights policy that is aligned with the standards set forth by the International Labour Organization (“ILO”) or the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (“UDHR”).

For U.S. companies listed in the S&P 500 index, the ESG Policy will also evaluate whether companies have provided sufficient disclosure concerning their workforce diversity. In instances where these companies have not disclosed their full EEO-1 reports, the ESG Policy will vote against the nominating and governance chair.

Review of Risk Management Controls

The ESG Policy evaluates the risk management function of a public company on a case-by-case basis. Companies, particularly financial firms, should have a dedicated risk committee, or a committee on the board in charge of risk oversight, as well as a chief risk officer who reports directly to that committee, not to the CEO or another executive of the company. When analyzing the risk management practices of public companies the ESG Policy takes note of any significant losses or write-downs on financial assets and/or structured transactions. In cases where a company has disclosed a sizable loss or write-down, and where the company’s board-level risk committee’s poor oversight contributed to the loss, the ESG Policy will recommend that shareholders vote against such committee members on that basis. In addition, in cases where a company maintains a significant level of financial risk exposure but fails to disclose any explicit form of board-level risk oversight (committee or otherwise), the ESG Policy may vote against the chair of the board on that basis.

Slate Elections

In some countries, in particular Italy, companies elect their board members as a slate, whereby shareholders are unable to vote on the election of an individual director, but rather are limited to voting for or against the board as a whole. The ESG Policy will generally support the slate if no major governance or board-related concerns have been raised in the analysis, and the slate appears to support and protect the best interests of all shareholders.


Board Responsiveness

Majority-Supported Shareholder Proposals

We expect clear action from the board when shareholder proposals receive support from a majority of votes cast (excluding abstentions and broker non-votes). In our view, this may include fully implementing the request of the shareholder proposal and/or engaging with shareholders on the issue and providing sufficient disclosures to address shareholder concerns.

Significantly Supported Shareholder Proposals

When shareholder proposals receive significant support (generally more than 30% but less than majority of votes cast), we believe an initial level of board responsiveness is warranted. In instances where a shareholder



proposal has received at least 30% shareholder support, we generally believe boards should engage with shareholders on the issue and provide disclosure addressing shareholder concerns and outreach initiatives.

Further, as discussed above, at controlled companies and companies that have multi-class share structures with unequal voting rights, we will carefully examine the level of approval or disapproval attributed to unaffiliated shareholders when determining whether board responsiveness is warranted.

Separation of the Roles of CEO and Chair

The separation of the positions of CEO and chair creates a better and more independent governance structure than a combined CEO/chair position. The role of executives is to manage the business based on the course charted by the board. Executives should be in the position of reporting and answering to the board for their performance in achieving their goals as set out by the board. This would become more complicated if they too held the position of chair as it would be difficult for them to fulfil the duty of being both the overseer and policy setter when they, the CEO/chair control both the agenda and boardroom.

The ESG Policy views an independent chair as better able to oversee the executives of the company and set a pro-shareholder agenda without the management conflicts that a CEO and other executive insiders often face. Such oversight and concern for shareholders allows for a more proactive and effective board of directors that is better able to look out for the interests of shareholders.

Furthermore, it is the board's responsibility to select a chief executive to best serve the company and its shareholders and to replace this person when his or her duties have not been appropriately fulfilled. Such a replacement becomes more difficult and happens less frequently when the chief executive is also in the position of overseeing the board.


However, even considering the above, the ESG Policy will not vote against CEOs who also chair the board. The ESG Policy will generally support separating the positions of CEO and chair whenever the question is posed in a shareholder proposal, as in the long-term it is in the best interests of the company.

In the absence of an independent chair, the ESG Policy will support the appointment of a presiding or lead independent director with authority to set the agenda for the meeting and to lead sessions. In the case where the company has neither an independent chair nor independent lead director, the ESG Policy may vote against the chair of the governance committee.

Governance Following an IPO or Spin-Off

Companies that have recently completed an initial public offering (IPO), or spin-off should be given adequate time to fully adjust and comply with marketplace listing requirements and meet basic corporate governance standards. The ESG Policy generally allows the company a one-year period following the IPO to comply with these requirements and as such refrains from voting based on governance standards (e.g., board independence, committee membership and structure, meeting attendance, etc.).

However, there are some cases that warrant shareholder action against the board of a company that have completed an IPO or spin-off in the past year. The ESG Policy will evaluate the terms of applicable governing documents when determining the recommendations and whether the shareholders rights will be severely restricted. In order to come to a conclusion the following points will be considered:



1. The adoption of anti-takeover provisions such as a poison pill or classified board;
2. Supermajority vote requirements to amend governing documents;
3. The presence of exclusive forum or fee-shifting provisions;
4. Whether shareholders can call special meetings or act by written consent;
5. The voting standard provided for the election of directors;
6. The ability of shareholders to remove directors without cause;
7. The presence of evergreen provisions in the company's equity compensation arrangements; and
8. The presence of a multi-class share structure which does not afford common shareholders voting power that is aligned with their economic interest.

Anti-takeover provisions can negatively impact future shareholders who (except for electing to buy or sell the stock) are unable to weigh in on matters that might negatively impact their ownership interest. In cases where the anti-takeover provision was adopted prior to the IPO, the ESG Policy may vote against the members of the board who served when it was adopted if the board:

- (i) Did not also commit to submit the anti-takeover provision to a shareholder vote at the company's next shareholder meeting following the IPO; or
- (ii) Did not provide a sound rationale or sunset provision for adopting the anti-takeover provision.

Financial Reporting

Accounts and Reports

Excluding situations where there are concerns surrounding the integrity of the statements/reports, the ESG Policy will generally vote for Accounts and Reports proposals.


Where the required documents have not been published at the time that the vote is cast, the ESG Policy will abstain from voting on this proposal.

Income Allocation (Distribution of Dividends)

The ESG Policy will generally vote for proposals concerning companies' distribution of dividends. However, particular scrutiny will be given to cases where the company's dividend payout ratio is exceptionally low or excessively high relative to its peers, and where the company has not provided a satisfactory explanation for this disparity.

Appointment of Auditors and Authority to Set Fees

The role of the auditor is crucial in protecting shareholder value. Like directors, auditors should be free from conflicts of interest and should assiduously avoid situations that require them to make choices between their own interests and the interests of the shareholders. Because of the importance of the role of the auditor, rotating auditors is an important safeguard against the relationship between the auditor and the company becoming too close, resulting in a lack of oversight due to complacency or conflicts of interest. Accordingly, the ESG Policy will vote against auditor ratification proposals in instances where it is clear that a company's auditor has not been changed for 20 or more years.



In instances where a company has retained an auditor for fewer than 20 years, the ESG Policy will generally support management's recommendation for the selection of an auditor, as well as the board's authority to fix auditor fees. However, there are a number of exceptions to this policy, and the ESG Policy will vote against the appointment of the auditor and/or the authorization of the board to set auditor fees in the following scenarios:

- The independence of an incumbent auditor or the integrity of the audit has been compromised.
- Audit fees combined with audit-related fees total less than one-half of total fees.
- There have been any recent restatements or late filings by the company and responsibility for such can be attributed to the auditor (e.g., a restatement due to a reporting error).
- The company has aggressive accounting policies.
- The company has poor disclosure or lack of transparency in financial statements.
- There are other relationships, or issues of concern, with the auditor that might suggest a conflict of interest.
- The company is changing auditors as a result of a disagreement between the company and the auditor on a matter of accounting principles or practices, financial statement disclosure, or auditing scope or procedures.

Compensation


Compensation Reports and Compensation Policies

Depending on the market, compensation report and policy vote proposals may be either advisory or binding, e.g. in the UK a non-binding compensation report based upon the most recent fiscal year is voted upon annually, and a forward-looking compensation policy will be subject to a binding vote every three years.

In all markets company filings are evaluated closely to determine how well information pertinent to Compensation practices has been disclosed, the extent to which overall compensation is tied to performance, which performance metrics have been employed, as well as how the company's remuneration practices compare to that of its peers.

The ESG Policy will vote against the approval of a compensation report or policy in the following scenarios:

- There is a significant disconnect between pay and performance;
- Performance goals and metrics are inappropriate or insufficiently challenging;
- There is a lack of disclosure regarding performance metrics as well as a lack of clarity surrounding the implementation of these metrics.
- Short-term (e.g., generally less than three year) performance measurement is weighted excessively in incentive plans;
- Excessive discretion is afforded to, or exercised by, management or the Compensation Committee to deviate from defined performance metrics and goals in determining awards;
- Ex gratia or other non-contractual payments have been made and the reasoning for this is inadequate;
- Guaranteed bonuses are established;
- Egregious or excessive bonuses, equity awards or severance payments have been granted;



- Excessive increases (e.g. over 10%) in fixed payments, such as salary or pension entitlements, that are not adequately justified
- Where there is an absence of structural safeguarding mechanisms such as clawback and malus policies included in the Incentive plan.

Linking Compensation to Environmental and Social Issues

On top of Glass Lewis' robust evaluation of companies' compensation plans, the ESG Policy will evaluate if, and to what extent, a company has provided a link between compensation and environmental and social criteria. In most markets, should a company not provide any environmental or social considerations in its remuneration scheme, the ESG Policy will vote against the proposed plan. For companies with a greater degree of exposure to environmental and climate-related issues (i.e., Climate Action 100+ focus list companies and those where SASB has deemed GHG emissions to be financially material), the ESG Policy will vote against compensation proposals if the company has not adequately incentivized executives to act in ways that mitigate a company's climate impact. The ESG Policy will also support shareholder resolutions requesting the inclusion of sustainability metrics in executive compensation plans.

Long-Term Incentive Plans

The ESG Policy recognizes the value of equity-based incentive programs. When used appropriately, they provide a means of linking an employee's pay to a company's performance, thereby aligning their interests with those of shareholders. In addition, equity-based compensation is an effective way to attract, retain and motivate key employees.

In order to allow for meaningful shareholder review, incentive programs should generally include:


- (i) specific and appropriate performance goals;
- (ii) a maximum award pool; and
- (iii) a maximum award amount per employee.

In addition, the payments made should be reasonable relative to the performance of the business and total compensation paid to those included under the plan should be in line with compensation paid by the company's peers.

Performance-Based Equity Compensation

The ESG Policy supports performance-based equity compensation plans for senior executives; where it is warranted by both their performance, and that of the company. While it is unnecessary to base equity-based compensation for all employees to company performance, placing such limitations on grants to senior executives is considered advisable (although in specific scenarios equity-based compensation granted to senior executives without performance criteria is acceptable under Glass Lewis guidelines, such as in the case of moderate incentive grants made in an initial offer of employment). While it is not uncommon for a board to state that tying equity compensation to performance goals may hinder them in attracting, and retaining, talented executives, the ESG Policy takes the stance that performance-based compensation aids in aligning executive interests to that of shareholders, and as such will support the company in achieving its objectives.





The ESG Policy will generally vote in favor of all performance-based option or share schemes; with the exception of plans that include a provision to allow for the re-testing of performance conditions; for which a vote against is recommended.

[Director Compensation](#)


The ESG Policy supports non-employee directors receiving an appropriate form, and level, of compensation for the time and effort they spend serving on the board and its committees; and director fees being at a level that allows a company to retain and attract qualified individuals. The ESG Policy compares the cost of director compensation to that of peer companies with similar market capitalizations in the same country so that compensation plans may be evaluated thoroughly, and a fair vote outcome reached.

[Retirement Benefits for Directors](#)

The ESG Policy will typically vote against the granting of retirement benefits to non-executive directors. Such extended payments can impair the objectivity and independence of these board members. Initial, and annual fees should be of a level that provides appropriate compensation to directors throughout their service to the company.

[Limits on Executive Compensation](#)

As a general rule, shareholders should not seek to micromanage executive compensation programs. Such matters should be left to the board's compensation committee. The election of directors, and specifically those who sit on the compensation committee, is viewed as an appropriate mechanism for shareholders to express their support, or disapproval, of board policy on this issue. Further, companies whose pay-for-performance is in line with their peers should be granted the flexibility to compensate their executives in a manner that drives sustainable growth. However, the ESG Policy favors performance-based compensation as an effective means of motivating executives to act in the best interests of shareholders. Performance-based compensation may be limited if a chief executive's pay is capped at a low level rather than flexibly tied to the performance of the company.



Governance Structure

Amendments to the Articles of Association

The ESG Policy will evaluate proposed amendments to a company's articles of association on a case-by-case basis. The ESG Policy is generally opposed to bundling several amendments under a single proposal as it prevents shareholders from evaluating each amendment on its own merits. In cases, where it is a bundled amendment, the ESG Policy will evaluate each amendment individually and only support the proposal if, in the aggregate, the amendments are in the best interests of shareholders.

Anti-Takeover Measures

Multi-Class Share Structures


The ESG Policy views multi-class share structures as not in the best interests of shareholders and instead is in favor of one vote per share. This structure operates as a safeguard for common shareholders by ensuring that those who hold a significant minority of shares are still able to weigh in on issues set forth by the board. The economic stake of each shareholder should match their voting power and that no small group of shareholders, family or otherwise, should have differing voting rights from those of all other shareholders.

The ESG Policy considers a multi-class share structure as having the potential to negatively impact the overall corporate governance of a company. Companies should have share class structures that protect the interests of non-controlling shareholders as well as any controlling entity. Therefore, the ESG Policy will generally vote in favor of recapitalization proposals to eliminate multi-class share structures. Similarly, the ESG Policy will typically vote against proposals to adopt a new class of common stock.

Cumulative Voting

When voting on cumulative voting proposals, the ESG Policy will factor in the independence of the board and the company's governance structure. Cumulative voting is often found on ballots at companies where independence is lacking and where the appropriate balances favoring the interests of shareholders are not in place. However, cumulative voting increases the ability of minority shareholders to elect a director by allowing shareholders to cast as many shares of stock they own multiplied by the number of directors to be elected. Cumulative voting allows shareholders to cast all their votes for one single nominee, or a smaller number of nominees than up for election, thereby raising the likelihood of electing one or more of their preferred nominees to the board. Accordingly, cumulative voting generally acts as a safeguard for shareholders by ensuring that those who hold a significant minority of shares can elect a candidate of their choosing to the board. As a result, the ESG Policy will typically vote in favor proposals concerning cumulative voting.

However, in the case where the company has adopted a true majority vote standard (i.e., where a director must receive a majority of votes cast to be elected, as opposed to a modified policy indicated by a resignation policy only), the ESG Policy will vote against cumulative voting proposals due to the incompatibility of the two election methods. For companies, that have not adopted the true majority vote standard but have some form of majority voting, the ESG Policy will also recommend voting against cumulative voting proposals if the company has also not adopted anti-takeover provisions and has been responsive to shareholders.



In instances where a company has not adopted majority voting standards and is facing both an election on the adoption of majority voting and a proposal to adopt cumulative voting, the ESG Policy will support only the majority voting proposal.

Fair Price Provision


Fair price provisions, which are rare, require that certain minimum price and procedural requirements to be observed by any party that acquires more than a specified percentage of a corporation's common stock. The intention of this provision is to protect minority shareholder value when an acquirer seeks to accomplish a merger or other transaction which would eliminate or change the rights of the shareholder. Fair price provisions sometimes protecting the rights of shareholders in a takeover situation. However, more often than not they act as an impediment to takeovers, potentially limiting gains to shareholders from a variety of transactions that could potentially increase share price. As a result, the ESG Policy will generally vote to fair price provisions.

Supermajority Vote Requirements

The ESG Policy favors a simple majority voting structure except where a supermajority voting requirement is explicitly intended to protect the rights of minority shareholders in a controlled company. In the case of non-controlled companies, supermajority vote requirements act as impediments to shareholder action on ballot items that are critical to their interests. For example, supermajority vote requirements can strongly limit the voice of shareholders in making decisions on critical matters such as the selling of the business. Supermajority vote requirements can also allow small groups of shareholders to overrule and dictate the will of the majority of shareholders. Thus, having a simple majority is appropriate for protecting the rights of all shareholders.

Poison Pills (Shareholder Rights Plan)

The ESG Policy will generally oppose companies' adoption of poison pills, as they can reduce management accountability by substantially limiting opportunities for corporate takeovers. As a result, rights plans can prevent shareholders from receiving a buy-out premium for their stock. Generally, the ESG Policy will vote against these plans to protect their financial interests. While boards should be given wide latitude in directing the activities of the company and charting the company's course, on an issue such as this where the link between the financial interests of shareholders and their right to consider and accept buyout offers is so substantial, shareholders should be allowed to vote on whether or not they support such a plan's implementation. In certain limited circumstances, the ESG Policy will support a limited poison pill to accomplish a particular objective, such as the closing of an important merger, or a pill that contains what we believe to be a reasonable 'qualifying offer' clause.




Increase in Authorized Shares

Adequate capital stock is important to a company's operation. When analyzing a request for additional shares, the ESG Policy will typically review four common reasons why a company may need additional capital stock:

1. Stock Split	Three Metrics: (a) Historical stock pre-split price (if any) (b) Current price relative to the company's most common trading price over the past 52 weeks (c) Some absolute limits on stock price (that will either make the split appropriate or would produce an unreasonable price)
2. Shareholder Defenses	Additional authorized shares could be used to bolster takeover defenses such as a poison pill. The proxy filings often discuss the usefulness of additional shares in defending against a hostile takeover.
3. Financing for Acquisitions	Examine whether the company has a history of using stock for acquisitions and attempts to determine what levels of stock have generally been required to accomplish such transactions.
4. Financing for Operations	Review the company's cash position and its ability to secure financing through borrowing or other means.

The ESG Policy will generally support proposals when a company could reasonably use the requested shares for financing, stock splits and stock dividends, as having adequate shares to allow management to make quick decisions and effectively operate the business is critical. The ESG Policy favors that, when a company is undertaking significant transactions, management will justify its use of additional shares rather than providing a blank check in the form of large pools of unallocated shares available for any purpose.

Generally, the ESG Policy will support proposals to increase authorized shares up to 100% of the number of shares currently authorized unless, after the increase the company would be left with less than 30% of its authorized shares outstanding. In markets where such authorities typically also authorize the board to issue new shares without separate shareholder approval, the ESG Policy applies the policy described below on the issuance of shares.



[Issuance of Shares](#)

The issuance of additional shares generally dilutes existing shareholders in most circumstances. Further, the availability of additional shares, where the board has discretion to implement a poison pill, can often serve as a deterrent to interested suitors. In cases where a company has not detailed a plan for use of the proposed shares, or where the number of shares far exceeds those needed to accomplish a detailed plan, the ESG Policy will typically vote against the authorization of additional shares. In the case of a private placement, the ESG Policy will also factor in whether the company is offering a discount to its share price.

Generally, the ESG Policy will support proposals to authorize the board to issue shares (with pre-emptive rights) when the requested increase is equal to or less than the current issued share capital. The authority of these shares should not exceed five years unless that is the market best practice. In accordance with the different market practices, the specific thresholds for share issuance can vary. And, as a result, the ESG Policy will vote on these proposals on a case-by-case basis.

The ESG Policy will also generally support proposals to suspend pre-emption rights for a maximum of 5-20% of the issued ordinary share capital of the company, depending on best practice in the country in which the company is located. This authority should not exceed five years, or less for some countries.

[Repurchase of Shares](#)

The ESG Policy typically supports proposals to repurchase shares when the plan includes the following provisions:


- (i) A maximum number of shares which may be purchased (typically not more than 10-15% of the issued share capital); and
- (ii) A maximum price which may be paid for each share (as a percentage of the market price).

[Reincorporation](#)

A company is in the best position to determine the appropriate jurisdiction of incorporation. The ESG Policy will factor in several elements when a management proposal to reincorporate the company is put to vote. These elements include reviewing the relevant financial benefits, generally related to incorporate tax treatment, as well as changes in corporate governance provisions, especially those related to shareholder rights, resulting from the change in domicile. In cases where the financial benefits are too small to be meaningful and there is a decrease in shareholder rights, the ESG Policy will vote against the transaction.

[Tax Havens](#)

The ESG Policy evaluates a company's potential exposure to risks related to a company's tax haven policies on an as-needed basis and will support shareholder proposals requesting that companies report on the risks associated with their use of tax havens or that request that companies adopt policies to discontinue operations or withdraw from tax havens. The ESG Policy will also vote against reincorporation proposals when companies have proposed to redomicile in known tax havens.



Advance Notice Requirements

Typically, the ESG Policy will recommend vote against provisions that would require advance notice of shareholder proposals or of director nominees. Advance notice requirements typically range between three to six months prior to the annual meeting. These requirements often make it impossible for a shareholder who misses the deadline to present a shareholder proposal or director nominee that may be in the best interests of the company. Shareholders should be able to review and vote on all proposals and director nominees and are able to vote against proposals that appear with little prior notice. Therefore, by setting advance notice requirements it limits the opportunity for shareholders to raise issues that may arise after the window closes.

Transaction of Other Business


In general, the ESG Policy will vote against proposals that put the transaction of other business items proposal up for vote at an annual or special meeting, as granting unfettered discretion is unwise.

Anti-Greenmail Proposals

The ESG Policy will support proposals to adopt a provision preventing the payment of greenmail, which would serve to prevent companies from buying back company stock at significant premiums from a certain shareholder. The anti-greenmail provision helps to protect the company as it requires that a majority of shareholders other than the majority shareholder approve the buyback, thus, eliminating cases where a majority shareholder could attempt to charge a board a large premium for the shares.

Virtual-Only Shareholder Meetings


A growing number of companies have elected to hold shareholder meetings by virtual means only. The ESG Policy supports companies allowing a virtual option alongside an in-person meeting, so long as the shareholder interests are not compromised. Without proper controls, conducting a virtual-only meeting of shareholders could eliminate or significantly limit the rights of shareholders to confront, and ask management on any concerns they may have. When companies decide to only hold virtual-only meetings, the ESG Policy will examine the level of disclosure provided by the company on the virtual meeting procedures and may vote against members of the nominating and governance committee if the company does not provide disclosure assuring that shareholders will be afforded the same rights and opportunities to participate as they would at an in-person meeting.



Mergers, Acquisitions & Contested Meetings

For merger and acquisition proposals, the ESG Policy undertakes a thorough examination of all elements of the transactions and determine the transaction's likelihood of maximizing shareholder return. In order to make a voting recommendation, the ESG Policy will examine the process conducted, the specific parties and individuals involved in negotiating an agreement, as well as the economic and governance terms of the proposal.

In the case of contested merger situations, or board proxy fights, the ESG Policy will evaluate the plan presented by the dissident party and how, if elected, it plans to enhance or protect shareholder value. The ESG Policy will also consider any concerns presented by the board, including any plans for improving the performance of the company, when making the ultimate recommendation. In addition, the ESG Policy will support shareholder proposals asking a company to consider the effects of a merger, spin-off, or other transaction on its employees and other stakeholders.



Shareholder Proposals

The ESG Policy has a strong emphasis on enhancing the environmental, social and governance performance of companies. Accordingly, the ESG Policy will be broadly supportive of environmental and social shareholder proposals aimed at enhancing a company's policies and performance with respect to such issues. The ESG Policy will carefully examine each proposal's merits in order to ensure it seeks enhanced environmental disclosure and/or practices, and is not conversely aimed at limiting environmental or social disclosure or practices. Accordingly, the ESG Policy will not support proposals aimed at limiting or rescinding companies' ESG-related disclosures, goals or initiatives.

Governance Proposals


The ESG Policy supports increased shareholder participation and access to a company and its board of directors. Accordingly, the ESG Policy will generally vote in favor of initiatives that seek to enhance shareholder rights, such as the introduction of majority voting to elect directors, the adoption and amendment of proxy access bylaws, the elimination/reduction of supermajority provisions, the declassification of the board, the submission of shareholder rights' plans to a shareholder vote, and the principle of one share, one vote.

The ESG Policy will also support proposals aimed at increasing the diversity of boards or management as well as those requesting additional information concerning workforce diversity and the adoption of more inclusive nondiscrimination policies. Further, the ESG Policy will support enhanced oversight of environmental and social issues at the board level by supporting resolutions calling for the creation of an environmental or social committee of the board or proposals requesting that the board adopt a subject-matter expert, such as one with deep knowledge and experience in human rights or climate change-related issues. The ESG Policy will also generally vote for proposals seeking to increase disclosure of a company's business ethics and code of conduct, as well as of its activities that relate to social welfare.

Environmental Proposals

The ESG Policy will generally support proposals regarding the environment, in particular, those seeking improved sustainability reporting and disclosure about company practices which impact the environment. The ESG Policy will vote in favor of increased disclosure of a company's environmental risk through company-specific disclosure as well as compliance with international environmental conventions and adherence to environmental principles. Similarly, the ESG Policy will support proposals requesting companies develop greenhouse gas emissions reduction goals, comprehensive recycling programs, and other proactive means to mitigate a company's environmental footprint.

The ESG Policy will also vote for proposals seeking that companies provide certain disclosures or adopt certain policies related to mitigating their climate change-related risks. For example, regardless of industry, the ESG Policy will support proposals requesting that companies disclose information concerning their scenario analyses or that request the company provide disclosure in line with certain globally-recognized environmental and social reporting recommendations. Further, the ESG Policy will support proposals requesting that a company consider energy efficiency and renewable energy sources in its project development and overall business strategy.



The ESG Policy will also evaluate a company's impact on the environment, in addition to the regulatory risk a company may face by not adopting environmentally responsible policies.

Say on Climate

Shareholder Proposals

Beginning in 2021, companies began placing management proposals on their ballots that ask shareholders to vote on their climate transition plans, or a Say on Climate vote. The ESG Policy will generally recommend in favor of shareholder proposals requesting that companies adopt a Say on Climate vote.

Management Proposals

When evaluating management-sponsored votes seeking approval of climate transition plans the ESG Policy looks to the board to provide information concerning the governance of the Say on Climate vote. Specifically, the ESG Policy evaluates whether companies provide sufficient disclosure concerning the board's role in setting strategy in light of this vote, and how the board intends to interpret the vote results for the proposal. In instances where disclosure concerning the governance of the Say on Climate vote is not present, the ESG Policy will either abstain, or, depending on the quality of the plan presented, will vote against the proposal.

The ESG Policy also looks to companies to clearly articulate their climate plans in a distinct and easily understandable document, this disclosure, it is important that companies clearly explain their goals, how their GHG emissions targets support achievement of broader goals (i.e. net zero emissions goals), and any foreseeable obstacles that could hinder their progress on these initiatives.

When evaluating these proposals, the ESG Policy will take into account a variety of factors, including: (i) the request of the resolution (e.g., whether companies are asking shareholders to approve its disclosure or its strategy); (ii) the board's role in overseeing the company's climate strategy; (iii) the company's industry and size; (iv) whether the company's GHG emissions targets and the disclosure of these targets appear reasonable in light of its operations and risk profile; and (iv) where the company is on its climate reporting journey (e.g., whether the company has been reporting and engaging with shareholders on climate risk for a number of years or if this is a relatively new initiative). In addition, the ESG Policy will determine if sufficient disclosure has been made concerning a company's capital allocations and expenditures in the context of its strategy and will also evaluate any stated net zero ambitions or targets. If either of these are absent, the ESG Policy will generally vote against management Say on Climate proposals.

Social Proposals

The ESG Policy will support proposals requesting that a company develop sustainable business practices, such as animal welfare policies, human rights policies, and fair lending policies. Furthermore, the ESG Policy will support reporting and reviewing a company's political and charitable spending as well as its lobbying practices. In addition, the ESG Policy will support proposals requesting that companies cease political spending or associated activities.

The ESG Policy will also generally support enhancing the rights of workers, as well as considering the communities and broader constituents in the areas in which companies do business. Accordingly, the ESG Policy will generally vote for proposals requesting that companies provide greater disclosure regarding impact on local



stakeholders, workers' rights and human rights in general. In addition, the ESG Policy will support proposals for companies to adopt or comply with certain codes of conduct relating to labor standards, human rights conventions, and corporate responsibility at large. The ESG Policy will also support proposals requesting independent verification of a company's contractors' compliance with labor and human rights standards. In addition, the ESG Policy supports the International Labor Organization standards and encourage companies to adopt such standards in its business operations.

The ESG Policy will provide for a review of the performance and oversight of certain directors in instances in which a company is found to have violated international human rights standards. Pursuant to the ESG Policy, if directors have not adequately overseen the overall business strategy of the company to ensure that basic human rights standards are met or if a company is subject to regulatory or legal action with a foreign government or entity due to human rights violations, the Policy may vote against directors taking into account the severity of the violations and the outcome of the claims.

The ESG Policy also generally votes in favor of proposals seeking increased disclosure regarding public health and safety issues, including those related to product responsibility. In particular, the ESG Policy supports proposals calling for the labeling of the use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs), the elimination or reduction of toxic emissions and use of toxic chemicals in manufacturing, and the prohibition of tobacco sales to minors. The ESG Policy also supports proposals seeking a report on a company's drug reimportation guidelines, as well as on a company's ethical responsibility as it relates to drug distribution and manufacture. The ESG Policy further supports proposals related to worker safety and companies' compliance with internationally recognized human rights or safety standards.

Compensation Proposals


The ESG Policy recognizes that ESG performance factors should be an important component of the overall consideration of proper levels of executive performance and compensation. Therefore, the ESG Policy generally votes in favor of proposals seeking to tie executive compensation to performance measures such as compliance with environmental regulations, health and safety regulations, nondiscrimination laws and compliance with international human rights standards. Furthermore, the ESG Policy will generally support proposals that seek to evaluate overall director performance based on environmental and social criteria.

The ESG Policy will support proposals seeking to prohibit or require more disclosure about stock hedging and pledging by executives. The ESG Policy will also generally support proposals requesting that companies adopt executive stock retention policies and prohibiting the accelerated vesting of equity awards. Furthermore, the ESG Policy will vote in favor of shareholder proposals to link pay with performance, to eliminate or require shareholder approval of golden coffins, and to clawback unearned bonuses. Finally, the ESG Policy will support proposals requesting disclosure from companies regarding gender pay inequity and company initiatives to reduce the gap in compensation paid to women compared to men.

Vote-No Campaigns

The ESG Policy will carefully review any "vote-no" campaigns launched by shareholders as a result of their concerns regarding a company's failure to adequately oversee environmental and social risks or those related to poor compensation or governance practices. When it is determined that such campaigns either address a failure





of oversight on behalf of the company or that broadly seek to promote more responsible corporate behavior, the ESG Policy may vote in line with the recommendations of the shareholder(s) running the vote-no campaign.



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
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The information included herein is not intended to be exhaustive and does not address all potential voting issues. Glass Lewis' proxy voting guidelines, as they generally apply to certain issues or types of proposals, are further explained in supplemental guidelines and reports that are made available on Glass Lewis' website – <http://www.glasslewis.com>. None of Glass Lewis' guidelines have been set or approved by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission or any other regulatory body. Additionally, none of the information contained herein is or should be relied upon as investment advice. The content of this document has been developed based on Glass Lewis' experience with proxy voting and corporate governance issues, engagement with clients and issuers, and review of relevant studies and surveys, and has not been tailored to any specific person or entity. Glass Lewis' proxy voting guidelines are grounded in corporate governance best practices, which often exceed minimum legal requirements. Accordingly, unless specifically noted otherwise, a failure to meet these guidelines should not be understood to mean that the company or individual involved has failed to meet applicable legal requirements.

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United States



2025 Benchmark Policy Guidelines

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




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




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


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About Glass Lewis

Glass Lewis is the world's choice for governance solutions. We enable institutional investors and publicly listed companies to make informed decisions based on research and data. We cover 30,000+ meetings each year, across approximately 100 global markets. Our team has been providing in-depth analysis of companies since 2003, relying solely on publicly available information to inform its policies, research, and voting recommendations.

Our customers include the majority of the world's largest pension plans, mutual funds, and asset managers, collectively managing over \$40 trillion in assets. We have teams located across the United States, Europe, and Asia-Pacific giving us global reach with a local perspective on the important governance issues.


Investors around the world depend on Glass Lewis' **[Viewpoint](#)** platform to manage their proxy voting, policy implementation, recordkeeping, and reporting. Our industry leading **[Proxy Paper](#)** product provides comprehensive environmental, social, and governance research and voting recommendations weeks ahead of voting deadlines. Public companies can also use our innovative **[Report Feedback Statement](#)** to deliver their opinion on our proxy research directly to the voting decision makers at every investor client in time for voting decisions to be made or changed.

The research team engages extensively with public companies, investors, regulators, and other industry stakeholders to gain relevant context into the realities surrounding companies, sectors, and the market in general. This enables us to provide the most comprehensive and pragmatic insights to our customers.

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Guidelines Introduction

Summary of Changes for 2025

Glass Lewis evaluates these guidelines on an ongoing basis and formally updates them on an annual basis. This year we've made noteworthy revisions in the following areas, which are summarized below but discussed in greater detail in the relevant section of this document:

Update: 10 March 2025. Glass Lewis has modified our approach to providing proxy voting guidance considering diversity factors at US companies under our Benchmark Policy. For more information, please see our [2025 Supplemental Statement on Diversity Considerations at US Companies](#).

Update: 17 December 2024. We have removed our discussion on page 42 of stock exchange diversity disclosure requirements.

Board Oversight of AI


We have included a new discussion on our approach to artificial intelligence (AI)-related risk oversight. In recent years, companies have rapidly begun to develop and adopt uses for artificial intelligence (AI) technologies throughout various aspects of their operations. Deployed and overseen effectively, AI technologies have the potential to make companies' operations and systems more efficient and productive. However, as the use of these technologies has grown, so have the potential risks associated with companies' development and use of AI. Given these potential risks, the benchmark policy takes the view that boards should be cognizant of, and take steps to mitigate exposure to, any material risks that could arise from their use or development of AI.

In the absence of material incidents related to a company's use or management of AI-related issues, our benchmark policy will generally not make voting recommendations on the basis of a company's oversight of, or disclosure concerning, AI-related issues. However, in instances where there is evidence that insufficient oversight and/or management of AI technologies has resulted in material harm to shareholders, Glass Lewis will review a company's overall governance practices and identify which directors or board-level committees have been charged with oversight of AI-related risks. We will also closely evaluate the board's response to, and management of, this issue as well as any associated disclosures and the benchmark policy may recommend against appropriate directors should we find the board's oversight, response or disclosure concerning AI-related issues to be insufficient.

Change-In-Control Provisions

We have updated our discussion of change-in-control provisions in the section "The Link Between Compensation and Performance" to define our benchmark policy view that companies that allow for committee discretion over the treatment of unvested awards should commit to providing clear rationale for how such awards are treated in the event a change in control occurs.





Clarifying Amendments

The following clarifications of our existing policies are included this year:

Board Responsiveness to Shareholder Proposals


We have revised our discussion of board responsiveness to shareholder proposal to reflect that when shareholder proposals receive significant shareholder support (generally more than 30% but less than majority of votes cast), the benchmark policy generally takes the view that boards should engage with shareholders on the issue and provide disclosure addressing shareholder concerns and outreach initiatives.

Reincorporation

We have revised our discussion on reincorporations to reflect that we review all proposals to reincorporate to a different state or country on a case-by-case basis. Our review includes the changes in corporate governance provisions, especially those relating to shareholder rights, material differences in corporate statutes and legal precedents, and relevant financial benefits, among other factors, resulting from the change in domicile.

Approach to Executive Pay Program

We have provided some clarifying statements to the discussion of in the section titled “The Link Between Compensation and Performance” to emphasize Glass Lewis’ holistic approach to analyzing executive compensation programs. There are few program features that, on their own, lead to an unfavorable recommendation from Glass Lewis for a say-on-pay proposal. Our analysis reviews pay programs on a case-by-case basis. We do not utilize a pre-determined scorecard approach when considering individual features such as the allocation of the long-term incentive between performance-based awards and time-based awards. Unfavorable factors in a pay program are reviewed in the context of rationale, overall structure, overall disclosure quality, the program’s ability to align executive pay with performance and the shareholder experience and the trajectory of the pay program resulting from changes introduced by the compensation committee.



A Board of Directors that Serves Shareholder Interest

Election of Directors

The purpose of Glass Lewis' proxy research and advice is to facilitate shareholder voting in favor of governance structures that will drive performance, create shareholder value and maintain a proper tone at the top. Glass Lewis looks for talented boards with a record of protecting shareholders and delivering value over the medium- and long-term. We believe that a board can best protect and enhance the interests of shareholders if it is sufficiently independent, has a record of positive performance, and consists of individuals with diverse backgrounds and a breadth and depth of relevant experience.

Independence


The independence of directors, or lack thereof, is ultimately demonstrated through the decisions they make. In assessing the independence of directors, we will take into consideration, when appropriate, whether a director has a track record indicative of making objective decisions. Likewise, when assessing the independence of directors we will also examine when a director's track record on multiple boards indicates a lack of objective decision-making. Ultimately, we believe the determination of whether a director is independent or not must take into consideration both compliance with the applicable independence listing requirements as well as judgments made by the director.

We look at each director nominee to examine the director's relationships with the company, the company's executives, and other directors. We do this to evaluate whether personal, familial, or financial relationships (not including director compensation) may impact the director's decisions. We believe that such relationships make it difficult for a director to put shareholders' interests above the director's or the related party's interests. We also believe that a director who owns more than 20% of a company can exert disproportionate influence on the board, and therefore believe such a director's independence may be hampered, in particular when serving on the audit committee.

Thus, we put directors into three categories based on an examination of the type of relationship they have with the company:

Independent Director — An independent director has no material financial, familial or other current relationships with the company, its executives, or other board members, except for board service and standard fees paid for that service. Relationships that existed within three to five years¹ before the

¹ NASDAQ originally proposed a five-year look-back period but both it and the NYSE ultimately settled on a three-year look-back prior to finalizing their rules. A five-year standard for former employment relationships is more appropriate, in our view, because we believe that the unwinding of conflicting relationships between former management and board members is more likely to be complete and final after five years. However, Glass Lewis does not apply the five-year look-back period to directors who have previously served as executives of the company on an interim basis for less than one year.



inquiry are usually considered “current” for purposes of this test. For material financial relationships with the company, we apply a three-year look back, and for former employment relationships with the company, we apply a five-year look back.

Affiliated Director — An affiliated director has, (or within the past three years, had) a material financial, familial or other relationship with the company or its executives, but is not an employee of the company.² This includes directors whose employers have a material financial relationship with the company.³ In addition, we view a director who either owns or controls 20% or more of the company’s voting stock, or is an employee or affiliate of an entity that controls such amount, as an affiliate.⁴

We view 20% shareholders as affiliates because they typically have access to and involvement with the management of a company that is fundamentally different from that of ordinary shareholders. More importantly, 20% holders may have interests that diverge from those of ordinary holders, for reasons such as the liquidity (or lack thereof) of their holdings, personal tax issues, etc.

Glass Lewis applies a three-year look back period to all directors who have an affiliation with the company other than former employment, for which we apply a five-year look back.

Definition of “Material”: A material relationship is one in which the dollar value exceeds:


- \$50,000 (or where no amount is disclosed) for directors who are paid for a service they have agreed to perform for the company, outside of their service as a director, including professional or other services. This threshold also applies to directors who are the majority or principal owner of a firm that receives such payments; or
- \$120,000 (or where no amount is disclosed) for those directors employed by a professional services firm such as a law firm, investment bank, or consulting firm and the company pays the firm, not the individual, for services.⁵ This dollar limit would also apply to charitable contributions to schools where a

² If a company does not consider a non-employee director to be independent, Glass Lewis will classify that director as an affiliate.

³ We allow a five-year grace period for former executives of the company or merged companies who have consulting agreements with the surviving company. (We do not automatically recommend voting against directors in such cases for the first five years.) If the consulting agreement persists after this five-year grace period, we apply the materiality thresholds outlined in the definition of “material.”

⁴ This includes a director who serves on a board as a representative (as part of his or her basic responsibilities) of an investment firm with greater than 20% ownership. However, while we will generally consider him/her to be affiliated, we will not recommend voting against unless (i) the investment firm has disproportionate board representation or (ii) the director serves on the audit committee.

⁵ We may deem such a transaction to be immaterial where the amount represents less than 1% of the firm’s annual revenues and the board provides a compelling rationale as to why the director’s independence is not affected by the relationship.



board member is a professor; or charities where a director serves on the board or is an executive;⁶ and any aircraft and real estate dealings between the company and the director's firm; or

- 1% of either company's consolidated gross revenue for other business relationships (e.g., where the director is an executive officer of a company that provides services or products to or receives services or products from the company).⁷

Definition of “Familial” — Familial relationships include a person's spouse, parents, children, siblings, grandparents, uncles, aunts, cousins, nieces, nephews, in-laws, and anyone (other than domestic employees) who shares such person's home. A director is an affiliate if: i) he or she has a family member who is employed by the company and receives more than \$120,000⁸ in annual compensation; or, ii) he or she has a family member who is employed by the company and the company does not disclose this individual's compensation.

Definition of “Company” — A company includes any parent or subsidiary in a group with the company or any entity that merged with, was acquired by, or acquired the company.

Inside Director — An inside director simultaneously serves as a director and as an employee of the company. This category may include a board chair who acts as an employee of the company or is paid as an employee of the company. In our view, an inside director who derives a greater amount of income as a result of affiliated transactions with the company rather than through compensation paid by the company (i.e., salary, bonus, etc. as a company employee) faces a conflict between making decisions that are in the best interests of the company versus those in the director's own best interests. Therefore, we will recommend voting against such a director.

Additionally, we believe a director who is currently serving in an interim management position should be considered an insider, while a director who previously served in an interim management position for less than one year and is no longer serving in such capacity is considered independent. Moreover, a director who previously served in an interim management position for over one year and is no longer serving in such capacity is considered an affiliate for five years following the date of the director's resignation or departure from the interim management position.


Voting Recommendations on the Basis of Board Independence

Glass Lewis believes a board will be most effective in protecting shareholders' interests if it is at least two-thirds independent. We note that each of the Business Roundtable, the Conference Board, and the Council of Institutional Investors advocates that two-thirds of the board be independent. Where more than one-third of

⁶ We will generally take into consideration the size and nature of such charitable entities in relation to the company's size and industry along with any other relevant factors such as the director's role at the charity. However, unlike for other types of related party transactions, Glass Lewis generally does not apply a look-back period to affiliated relationships involving charitable contributions; if the relationship between the director and the school or charity ceases, or if the company discontinues its donations to the entity, we will consider the director to be independent.

⁷ This includes cases where a director is employed by, or closely affiliated with, a private equity firm that profits from an acquisition made by the company. Unless disclosure suggests otherwise, we presume the director is affiliated.

⁸ Pursuant to SEC rule Item 404 of Regulation S-K under the Securities Exchange Act, compensation exceeding \$120,000 is the minimum threshold deemed material for disclosure of transactions involving family members of directors.



the members are affiliated or inside directors, we typically⁸ recommend voting against some of the inside and/or affiliated directors in order to satisfy the two-thirds threshold.

In the case of a less than two-thirds independent board, Glass Lewis strongly supports the existence of a presiding or lead director with authority to set the meeting agendas and to lead sessions outside the insider chair's presence.

In addition, we scrutinize avowedly "independent" chairs and lead directors. We believe that they should be unquestionably independent, or the company should not tout them as such.

Committee Independence

We believe that only independent directors should serve on a company's audit, compensation, nominating, and governance committees.⁹ We typically recommend that shareholders vote against any affiliated or inside director seeking appointment to an audit, compensation, nominating, or governance committee, or who has served in that capacity in the past year.

Pursuant to Section 952 of the Dodd-Frank Act, as of January 11, 2013, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) approved new listing requirements for both the NYSE and NASDAQ which require that boards apply enhanced standards of independence when making an affirmative determination of the independence of compensation committee members. Specifically, when making this determination, in addition to the factors considered when assessing general director independence, the board's considerations must include: (i) the source of compensation of the director, including any consulting, advisory or other compensatory fee paid by the listed company to the director (the "Fees Factor"); and (ii) whether the director is affiliated with the listing company, its subsidiaries, or affiliates of its subsidiaries (the "Affiliation Factor").


Glass Lewis believes it is important for boards to consider these enhanced independence factors when assessing compensation committee members. However, as discussed above in the section titled Independence, we apply our own standards when assessing the independence of directors, and these standards also take into account consulting and advisory fees paid to the director, as well as the director's affiliations with the company and its subsidiaries and affiliates. We may recommend voting against compensation committee members who are not independent based on our standards.

Independent Chair

Glass Lewis believes that separating the roles of CEO (or, more rarely, another executive position) and chair creates a better governance structure than a combined CEO/chair position. An executive manages the business

⁸ With a staggered board, if the affiliates or insiders that we believe should not be on the board are not up for election, we will express our concern regarding those directors, but we will not recommend voting against the other affiliates or insiders who are up for election just to achieve two-thirds independence. However, we will consider recommending voting against the directors subject to our concern at their next election if the issue giving rise to the concern is not resolved.

⁹ We will recommend voting against an audit committee member who owns 20% or more of the company's stock, and we believe that there should be a maximum of one director (or no directors if the committee is composed of less than three directors) who owns 20% or more of the company's stock on the compensation, nominating, and governance committees.



according to a course the board charts. Executives should report to the board regarding their performance in achieving goals set by the board. This is needlessly complicated when a CEO chairs the board, since a CEO/chair presumably will have a significant influence over the board.

While many companies have an independent lead or presiding director who performs many of the same functions of an independent chair (e.g., setting the board meeting agenda), we do not believe this alternate form of independent board leadership provides as robust protection for shareholders as an independent chair.

It can become difficult for a board to fulfill its role of overseer and policy setter when a CEO/chair controls the agenda and the boardroom discussion. Such control can allow a CEO to have an entrenched position, leading to longer-than-optimal terms, fewer checks on management, less scrutiny of the business operation, and limitations on independent, shareholder-focused goal-setting by the board.

A CEO should set the strategic course for the company, with the board's approval, and the board should enable the CEO to carry out the CEO's vision for accomplishing the board's objectives. Failure to achieve the board's objectives should lead the board to replace that CEO with someone in whom the board has confidence.

Likewise, an independent chair can better oversee executives and set a pro-shareholder agenda without the management conflicts that a CEO and other executive insiders often face. Such oversight and concern for shareholders allows for a more proactive and effective board of directors that is better able to look out for the interests of shareholders.

Further, it is the board's responsibility to select a chief executive who can best serve a company and its shareholders and to replace this person when his or her duties have not been appropriately fulfilled. Such a replacement becomes more difficult and happens less frequently when the chief executive is also in the position of overseeing the board.


Glass Lewis believes that the installation of an independent chair is almost always a positive step from a corporate governance perspective and promotes the best interests of shareholders. Further, the presence of an independent chair fosters the creation of a thoughtful and dynamic board, not dominated by the views of senior management. Encouragingly, many companies appear to be moving in this direction — one study indicates that only 10 percent of incoming CEOs in 2014 were awarded the chair title, versus 48 percent in 2002.¹⁰ Another study finds that 53 percent of S&P 500 boards now separate the CEO and chair roles, up from 37 percent in 2009, although the same study found that only 34 percent of S&P 500 boards have truly independent chairs.¹¹

We do not recommend that shareholders vote against CEOs who chair the board. However, we typically recommend that our clients support separating the roles of chair and CEO whenever that question is posed in a proxy (typically in the form of a shareholder proposal), as we believe that it is in the long-term best interests of the company and its shareholders.

Further, where the company has neither an independent chair nor independent lead director, we will recommend voting against the chair of the governance committee.

¹⁰ Ken Favaro, Per-Ola Karlsson and Gary L. Nelson. "The \$112 Billion CEO Succession Problem." (*Strategy+Business*, Issue 79, Summer 2015).

¹¹ Spencer Stuart Board Index, 2019, p. 6.



Performance

The most crucial test of a board's commitment to the company and its shareholders lies in the actions of the board and its members. We look at the performance of these individuals as directors and executives of the company and of other companies where they have served.

We find that a director's past conduct is often indicative of future conduct and performance. We often find directors with a history of overpaying executives or of serving on boards where avoidable disasters have occurred serving on the boards of companies with similar problems. Glass Lewis has a proprietary database of directors serving at over 8,000 of the most widely held U.S. companies. We use this database to track the performance of directors across companies.

Voting Recommendations on the Basis of Performance

We typically recommend that shareholders vote against directors who have served on boards or as executives of companies with records of poor performance, inadequate risk oversight, excessive compensation, audit- or accounting-related issues, and/or other indicators of mismanagement or actions against the interests of shareholders. We will reevaluate such directors based on, among other factors, the length of time passed since the incident giving rise to the concern, shareholder support for the director, the severity of the issue, the director's role (e.g., committee membership), director tenure at the subject company, whether ethical lapses accompanied the oversight lapse, and evidence of strong oversight at other companies.


Likewise, we examine the backgrounds of those who serve on key board committees to ensure that they have the required skills and diverse backgrounds to make informed judgments about the subject matter for which the committee is responsible.

We believe shareholders should avoid electing directors who have a record of not fulfilling their responsibilities to shareholders at any company where they have held a board or executive position. We typically recommend voting against:

- A director who fails to attend a minimum of 75% of board and applicable committee meetings, calculated in the aggregate.¹²
- A director who belatedly filed a significant form(s) 4 or 5, or who has a pattern of late filings if the late filing was the director's fault (we look at these late filing situations on a case-by-case basis).
- A director who is also the CEO of a company where a serious and material restatement has occurred after the CEO had previously certified the pre-restatement financial statements.
- A director who has received two against recommendations from Glass Lewis for identical reasons within the prior year at different companies (the same situation must also apply at the company being analyzed).

Furthermore, with consideration given to the company's overall corporate governance, pay-for-performance alignment and board responsiveness to shareholders, we may recommend voting against directors who served

¹² However, where a director has served for less than one full year, we will typically not recommend voting against for failure to attend 75% of meetings. Rather, we will note the poor attendance with a recommendation to track this issue going forward. We will also refrain from recommending to vote against directors when the proxy discloses that the director missed the meetings due to serious illness or other extenuating circumstances.



throughout a period in which the company performed significantly worse than peers and the directors have not taken reasonable steps to address the poor performance.

Board Responsiveness

Glass Lewis believes that boards should be responsive to shareholders when a significant percentage of shareholders vote contrary to the recommendation of management, depending on the issue.

When 20% or more of shareholders vote contrary to management (which occurs when more than 20% of votes on the proposal are cast as AGAINST and/or ABSTAIN), we believe that boards should engage with shareholders on the issue and demonstrate some initial level of responsiveness. These include instances when 20% or more of shareholders:

- (i) withhold votes from (or vote against) a director nominee; or
- (ii) vote against a management-sponsored proposal.


In our view, a 20% threshold is significant enough to warrant a close examination of the underlying issues and an evaluation of whether the board responded appropriately following the vote, particularly in the case of a compensation or director election proposal. While the 20% threshold alone will not automatically generate a negative vote recommendation from Glass Lewis on a future proposal (e.g., to recommend against a director nominee, against a say-on-pay proposal, etc.), it may be a contributing factor to our recommendation to vote against management's recommendation in the event we determine that the board did not respond appropriately.

When a majority of shareholders vote contrary to management, we believe that boards should engage with shareholders on the issue and provide a more robust response to fully address shareholder concerns. These include instances when a majority or more of shareholders:

- (i) withhold votes from (or vote against) a director nominee;
- (ii) vote against a management-sponsored proposal;

At controlled companies and companies that have multi-class share structures with unequal voting rights, we will carefully examine the level of approval or disapproval attributed to unaffiliated shareholders when determining whether board responsiveness is warranted. In the case of companies that have multi-class share structures with unequal voting rights, we will generally examine the level of approval or disapproval attributed to unaffiliated shareholders on a "one share, one vote" basis. At controlled and multi-class companies, when at least 20% or more of unaffiliated shareholders vote contrary to management, we believe that boards should engage with shareholders and demonstrate some initial level of responsiveness, and when a majority or more of unaffiliated shareholders vote contrary to management, we believe that boards should engage with shareholders and provide a more robust response to address shareholder concerns.

As a general framework, our evaluation of board responsiveness involves a review of publicly available disclosures (e.g., the proxy statement, annual report, 8-Ks, company website, etc.) released following the date of the company's last annual meeting up through the publication date of our most current Proxy Paper. Depending on the specific issue, our focus typically includes, but is not limited to, the following:



- At the board level, any changes in directorships, committee memberships, disclosure of related party transactions, meeting attendance, or other responsibilities;
- Any revisions made to the company's articles of incorporation, bylaws or other governance documents;
- Any press or news releases indicating changes in, or the adoption of, new company policies, business practices or special reports; and
- Any modifications made to the design and structure of the company's compensation program, as well as an assessment of the company's engagement with shareholders on compensation issues as discussed in the Compensation Discussion & Analysis (CD&A), particularly following a material vote against a company's say-on-pay.
- Proxy statement disclosure discussing the board's efforts to engage with shareholders and the actions taken to address shareholder concerns.

Our Proxy Paper analysis will include a case-by-case assessment of the specific elements of board responsiveness that we examined along with an explanation of how that assessment impacts our current voting recommendations.

Board Responsiveness to Shareholder Proposals

Majority-Supported Shareholder Proposals

We expect clear action from the board when shareholder proposals receive support from a majority of votes cast (excluding abstentions and broker non-votes). In our view, this may include fully implementing the request of the shareholder proposal and/or engaging with shareholders on the issue and providing sufficient disclosures to address shareholder concerns.


Significantly Supported Shareholder Proposals

When shareholder proposals receive significant support (generally more than 30% but less than majority of votes cast), we believe an initial level of board responsiveness is warranted. In instances where a shareholder proposal has received at least 30% shareholder support, we generally believe boards should engage with shareholders on the issue and provide disclosure addressing shareholder concerns and outreach initiatives.

Further, as discussed above, at controlled companies and companies that have multi-class share structures with unequal voting rights, we will carefully examine the level of approval or disapproval attributed to unaffiliated shareholders when determining whether board responsiveness is warranted.

The Role of a Committee Chair

Glass Lewis believes that a designated committee chair maintains primary responsibility for the actions of his or her respective committee. As such, many of our committee-specific voting recommendations are against the applicable committee chair rather than the entire committee (depending on the seriousness of the issue). In cases where the committee chair is not up for election due to a staggered board, and where we have identified multiple concerns, we will generally recommend voting against other members of the committee who are up for election, on a case-by-case basis.



In cases where we would ordinarily recommend voting against a committee chair but the chair is not specified, we apply the following general rules, which apply throughout our guidelines:

- If there is no committee chair, we recommend voting against the longest-serving committee member or, if the longest-serving committee member cannot be determined, the longest-serving board member serving on the committee (i.e., in either case, the “senior director”); and
- If there is no committee chair, but multiple senior directors serving on the committee, we recommend voting against both (or all) such senior directors.

In our view, companies should provide clear disclosure of which director is charged with overseeing each committee. In cases where that simple framework is ignored and a reasonable analysis cannot determine which committee member is the designated leader, we believe shareholder action against the longest serving committee member(s) is warranted. Again, this only applies if we would ordinarily recommend voting against the committee chair but there is either no such position or no designated director in such role.

Audit Committees and Performance

Audit committees play an integral role in overseeing the financial reporting process because stable capital markets depend on reliable, transparent, and objective financial information to support an efficient and effective capital market process. Audit committees play a vital role in providing this disclosure to shareholders.

When assessing an audit committee's performance, we are aware that an audit committee does not prepare financial statements, is not responsible for making the key judgments and assumptions that affect the financial statements, and does not audit the numbers or the disclosures provided to investors. Rather, an audit committee member monitors and oversees the process and procedures that management and auditors perform. The 1999 Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees stated it best:


A proper and well-functioning system exists, therefore, when the three main groups responsible for financial reporting — the full board including the audit committee, financial management including the internal auditors, and the outside auditors — form a ‘three legged stool’ that supports responsible financial disclosure and active participatory oversight. However, in the view of the Committee, the audit committee must be ‘first among equals’ in this process, since the audit committee is an extension of the full board and hence the ultimate monitor of the process.

Standards for Assessing the Audit Committee

For an audit committee to function effectively on investors' behalf, it must include members with sufficient knowledge to diligently carry out their responsibilities. In its audit and accounting recommendations, the Conference Board Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise said “members of the audit committee must be independent and have both knowledge and experience in auditing financial matters.”¹³

¹³ Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise. The Conference Board. 2003.






We are skeptical of audit committees where there are members that lack expertise as a Certified Public Accountant (CPA), Chief Financial Officer (CFO) or corporate controller, or similar experience. While we will not necessarily recommend voting against members of an audit committee when such expertise is lacking, we are more likely to recommend voting against committee members when a problem such as a restatement occurs and such expertise is lacking.

Glass Lewis generally assesses audit committees against the decisions they make with respect to their oversight and monitoring role. The quality and integrity of the financial statements and earnings reports, the completeness of disclosures necessary for investors to make informed decisions, and the effectiveness of the internal controls should provide reasonable assurance that the financial statements are materially free from errors. The independence of the external auditors and the results of their work all provide useful information by which to assess the audit committee.

When assessing the decisions and actions of the audit committee, we typically defer to its judgment and generally recommend voting in favor of its members. However, we will consider recommending that shareholders vote against the following:

- All members of the audit committee when options were backdated, there is a lack of adequate controls in place, there was a resulting restatement, and disclosures indicate there was a lack of documentation with respect to the option grants.
- The audit committee chair, if the audit committee does not have a financial expert or the committee's financial expert does not have a demonstrable financial background sufficient to understand the financial issues unique to public companies.
- The audit committee chair, if the audit committee did not meet at least four times during the year.
- The audit committee chair, if the committee has less than three members.
- Any audit committee member who sits on more than three public company audit committees, unless the audit committee member is a retired CPA, CFO, controller or has similar experience, in which case the limit shall be four committees, taking time and availability into consideration including a review of the audit committee member's attendance at all board and committee meetings.¹⁴
- All members of an audit committee who are up for election and who served on the committee at the time of the audit, if audit and audit-related fees total one-third or less of the total fees billed by the auditor.
- The audit committee chair when tax and/or other fees are greater than audit and audit-related fees paid to the auditor for more than one year in a row (in which case we also recommend against ratification of the auditor).
- The audit committee chair when fees paid to the auditor are not disclosed.
- All members of an audit committee where non-audit fees include fees for tax services (including, but not limited to, such things as tax avoidance or shelter schemes) for senior executives of the company. Such services are prohibited by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).

¹⁴ Glass Lewis may exempt certain audit committee members from the above threshold if, upon further analysis of relevant factors such as the director's experience, the size, industry-mix and location of the companies involved and the director's attendance at all the companies, we can reasonably determine that the audit committee member is likely not hindered by multiple audit committee commitments.




- All members of an audit committee that reappointed an auditor that we no longer consider to be independent for reasons unrelated to fee proportions.
- All members of an audit committee when audit fees are excessively low, especially when compared with other companies in the same industry.
- The audit committee chair if the committee failed to put auditor ratification on the ballot for shareholder approval. However, if the non-audit fees or tax fees exceed audit plus audit-related fees in either the current or the prior year, then Glass Lewis will recommend voting against the entire audit committee.
- All members of an audit committee where the auditor has resigned and reported that a section 10A¹⁵ letter has been issued.
- All members of an audit committee at a time when material accounting fraud occurred at the company.¹⁶
- All members of an audit committee at a time when annual and/or multiple quarterly financial statements had to be restated, and any of the following factors apply:¹⁷
 - The restatement involves fraud or manipulation by insiders;
 - The restatement is accompanied by an SEC inquiry or investigation;
 - The restatement involves revenue recognition;
 - The restatement results in a greater than 5% adjustment to costs of goods sold, operating expense, or operating cash flows; or
 - The restatement results in a greater than 5% adjustment to net income, 10% adjustment to assets or shareholders equity, or cash flows from financing or investing activities.
- All members of an audit committee if the company repeatedly fails to file its financial reports in a timely fashion. For example, the company has filed two or more quarterly or annual financial statements late within the last five quarters.
- All members of an audit committee when it has been disclosed that a law enforcement agency has charged the company and/or its employees with a violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).
- All members of an audit committee when the company has aggressive accounting policies and/or poor disclosure or lack of sufficient transparency in its financial statements.

¹⁵ Auditors are required to report all potential illegal acts to management and the audit committee unless they are clearly inconsequential in nature. If the audit committee or the board fails to take appropriate action on an act that has been determined to be a violation of the law, the independent auditor is required to send a section 10A letter to the SEC. Such letters are rare and therefore we believe should be taken seriously.

¹⁶ Research indicates that revenue fraud now accounts for over 60% of SEC fraud cases, and that companies that engage in fraud experience significant negative abnormal stock price declines—facing bankruptcy, delisting, and material asset sales at much higher rates than do non-fraud firms (Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission. “Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1998-2007.” May 2010).

¹⁷ The SEC issued guidance in March 2021 related to classification of warrants as liabilities at special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs). We will generally refrain from recommending against audit committee members when the restatement in question is solely as a result of the aforementioned SEC guidance.



- All members of the audit committee when there is a disagreement with the auditor and the auditor resigns or is dismissed (e.g., the company receives an adverse opinion on its financial statements from the auditor).
- All members of the audit committee if the contract with the auditor specifically limits the auditor's liability to the company for damages.¹⁸
- All members of the audit committee who served since the date of the company's last annual meeting if, since the last annual meeting, the company has reported a material weakness that has not yet been corrected and the company has not disclosed a remediation plan; or when a material weakness has been ongoing for more than one year and the company has not disclosed an updated remediation plan that clearly outlines the company's progress toward remediating the material weakness.

Material Weaknesses

Effective internal controls over financial reporting should ensure the integrity of companies' accounting and financial reporting.


The SEC guidance regarding Management's Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting requires that reports on internal control should include: (i) a statement of management's responsibility for establishing and maintaining adequate internal control over financial reporting for the company; (ii) management's assessment of the effectiveness of the company's internal control over financial reporting as of the end of the company's most recent fiscal year; (iii) a statement identifying the framework used by management to evaluate the effectiveness of the company's internal control over financial reporting; and (iv) a statement that the registered public accounting firm that audited the company's financial statements included in the annual report has issued an attestation report on management's assessment of the company's internal control over financial reporting.

A material weakness occurs when a company identifies a deficiency, or a combination of deficiencies, in internal controls over financial reporting, such that there is a reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of the company's annual or interim financial statements will not be prevented or detected on a timely basis. Failure to maintain effective internal controls can create doubts regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements in accordance with U.S. GAAP and may lead to companies publishing financial statements that are not free of errors or misstatements.

We believe it is the responsibility of audit committees to ensure that material weaknesses are remediated in a timely manner and that companies disclose remediation plans that include detailed steps to resolve a given material weakness. In cases where a material weakness has been ongoing for more than one fiscal year, we expect the company to disclose an updated remediation plan at least annually thereafter. Updates to existing remediation plans should state the progress the company has made toward remediating the material weakness and the remaining actions the company plans to take until the material weakness is fully remediated. As such, we are critical of audit committees when companies disclose remediation plans that remain unchanged from a prior period.

¹⁸ The Council of Institutional Investors. "Corporate Governance Policies," p. 4, April 5, 2006; and "Letter from Council of Institutional Investors to the AICPA," November 8, 2006.





When a material weakness is reported and the company has not disclosed a remediation plan, or when a material weakness has been ongoing for more than one year and the company has not disclosed an updated remediation plan that clearly outlines the company's progress toward remediating the material weakness, we will consider recommending that shareholders vote against all members of a company's audit committee who served on the committee during the time when the material weakness was identified.

We also take a dim view of audit committee reports that are boilerplate, and which provide little or no information or transparency to investors. When a problem such as a material weakness, restatement or late filings occurs, in forming our judgment with respect to the audit committee we take into consideration the transparency of the audit committee report.

Compensation Committee Performance


Compensation committees have a critical role in determining the compensation of executives. This includes deciding the basis on which compensation is determined, as well as the amounts and types of compensation to be paid. This process begins with the hiring and initial establishment of employment agreements, including the terms for such items as pay, pensions and severance arrangements. It is important in establishing compensation arrangements that compensation be consistent with, and based on the long-term economic performance of, the business's long-term shareholders returns.

Compensation committees are also responsible for the oversight of the transparency of compensation. This oversight includes disclosure of compensation arrangements, the matrix used in assessing pay for performance, and the use of compensation consultants. In order to ensure the independence of the board's compensation consultant, we believe the compensation committee should only engage a compensation consultant that is not also providing any services to the company or management apart from their contract with the compensation committee. It is important to investors that they have clear and complete disclosure of all the significant terms of compensation arrangements in order to make informed decisions with respect to the oversight and decisions of the compensation committee.

Finally, compensation committees are responsible for oversight of internal controls over the executive compensation process. This includes controls over gathering information used to determine compensation, establishment of equity award plans, and granting of equity awards. For example, the use of a compensation consultant who maintains a business relationship with company management may cause the committee to make decisions based on information that is compromised by the consultant's conflict of interests. Lax controls can also contribute to improper awards of compensation such as through granting of backdated or spring-loaded options, or granting of bonuses when triggers for bonus payments have not been met.


Central to understanding the actions of compensation committee is a careful review of the CD&A report included in each company's proxy. We review the CD&A in our evaluation of the overall compensation practices of a company, as overseen by the compensation committee. The CD&A is also integral to the evaluation of compensation proposals at companies, such as advisory votes on executive compensation, which allow shareholders to vote on the compensation paid to a company's top executives.

When assessing the performance of compensation committees, we will consider recommending that shareholders vote against the following:



- All members of a compensation committee during whose tenure the committee failed to address shareholder concerns following majority shareholder rejection of the say-on-pay proposal in the previous year. Where the proposal was approved but there was a significant shareholder vote (i.e., greater than 20% of votes cast) against the say-on-pay proposal in the prior year, if the board did not respond sufficiently to the vote including actively engaging shareholders on this issue, we will also consider recommending voting against the chair of the compensation committee or all members of the compensation committee, depending on the severity and history of the compensation problems and the level of shareholder opposition.
- All members of the compensation committee who are up for election and served when the company failed to align pay with performance if shareholders are not provided with an advisory vote on executive compensation at the annual meeting.¹⁹
- Any member of the compensation committee who has served on the compensation committee of at least two other public companies that have consistently failed to align pay with performance and whose oversight of compensation at the company in question is suspect.
- All members of the compensation committee (during the relevant time period) if the company entered into excessive employment agreements and/or severance agreements.
- All members of the compensation committee when performance goals were changed (i.e., lowered) when employees failed or were unlikely to meet original goals, or performance-based compensation was paid despite goals not being attained.
- All members of the compensation committee if excessive employee perquisites and benefits were allowed.
- The compensation committee chair if the compensation committee did not meet during the year.
- All members of the compensation committee when the company repriced options or completed a “self tender offer” without shareholder approval within the past two years.
- All members of the compensation committee when vesting of in-the-money options is accelerated.
- All members of the compensation committee when option exercise prices were backdated. Glass Lewis will recommend voting against an executive director who played a role in and participated in option backdating.
- All members of the compensation committee when option exercise prices were spring-loaded or otherwise timed around the release of material information.
- All members of the compensation committee when a new employment contract is given to an executive that does not include a clawback provision and the company had a material restatement, especially if the restatement was due to fraud.
- The chair of the compensation committee where the CD&A provides insufficient or unclear information about performance metrics and goals, where the CD&A indicates that pay is not tied to performance, or where the compensation committee or management has excessive discretion to alter performance terms or increase amounts of awards in contravention of previously defined targets.

¹⁹ If a company provides shareholders with a say-on-pay proposal, we will initially only recommend voting against the company's say-on-pay proposal and will not recommend voting against the members of the compensation committee unless there is a pattern of failing to align pay and performance and/or the company exhibits egregious compensation practices. For cases in which the disconnect between pay and performance is marginal and the company has outperformed its peers, we will consider not recommending against compensation committee members.



- All members of the compensation committee during whose tenure the committee failed to implement a shareholder proposal regarding a compensation-related issue, where the proposal received the affirmative vote of a majority of the voting shares at a shareholder meeting, and when a reasonable analysis suggests that the compensation committee (rather than the governance committee) should have taken steps to implement the request.²⁰
- All members of the compensation committee when the board has materially decreased proxy statement disclosure regarding executive compensation policies and procedures in a manner which substantially impacts shareholders' ability to make an informed assessment of the company's executive pay practices.
- All members of the compensation committee when new excise tax gross-up provisions are adopted in employment agreements with executives, particularly in cases where the company previously committed not to provide any such entitlements in the future.
- All members of the compensation committee when the board adopts a frequency for future advisory votes on executive compensation that differs from the frequency approved by shareholders.
- The chair of the compensation committee when "mega-grants" have been granted and the awards present concerns such as excessive quantum, lack of sufficient performance conditions, and/or are excessively dilutive, among others.

Nominating and Governance Committee Performance

The nominating and governance committee is responsible for the governance by the board of the company and its executives. In performing this role, the committee is responsible and accountable for selection of objective and competent board members. It is also responsible for providing leadership on governance policies adopted by the company, such as decisions to implement shareholder proposals that have received a majority vote. At most companies, a single committee is charged with these oversight functions; at others, the governance and nominating responsibilities are apportioned among two separate committees.


Consistent with Glass Lewis' philosophy that boards should have diverse backgrounds and members with a breadth and depth of relevant experience, we believe that nominating and governance committees should consider diversity when making director nominations within the context of each specific company and its industry. In our view, shareholders are best served when boards make an effort to ensure a constituency that is not only reasonably diverse on the basis of age, race, gender and ethnicity, but also on the basis of geographic knowledge, industry experience, board tenure and culture.

Regarding the committee responsible for governance, we will consider recommending that shareholders vote against the following:

- All members of the governance committee²¹ during whose tenure a shareholder proposal relating to important shareholder rights received support from a majority of the votes cast (excluding abstentions)

²⁰ In all other instances (i.e., a non-compensation-related shareholder proposal should have been implemented) we recommend that shareholders vote against the members of the governance committee.

²¹ If the board does not have a committee responsible for governance oversight and the board did not implement a shareholder proposal that received the requisite support, we will recommend voting against the entire board. If the




and broker non-votes) and the board has not begun to implement or enact the proposal's subject matter.²² Examples of such shareholder proposals include those seeking a declassified board structure, a majority vote standard for director elections, or a right to call a special meeting. In determining whether a board has sufficiently implemented such a proposal, we will examine the quality of the right enacted or proffered by the board for any conditions that may unreasonably interfere with the shareholders' ability to exercise the right (e.g., overly restrictive procedural requirements for calling a special meeting).

- All members of the governance committee when a shareholder resolution is excluded from the meeting agenda but the SEC has declined to state a view on whether such resolution should be excluded, or when the SEC has verbally permitted a company to exclude a shareholder proposal but there is no written record provided by the SEC about such determination and the company has not provided any disclosure concerning this no-action relief.
- The governance committee chair when the chair is not independent and an independent lead or presiding director has not been appointed.²³
- The governance committee chair at companies with a multi-class share structure and unequal voting rights when the company does not provide for a reasonable sunset of the multi-class share structure (generally seven years or less).
- In the absence of a nominating committee, the governance committee chair when there are fewer than five, or the whole governance committee when there are more than 20 members on the board.
- The governance committee chair when the committee fails to meet at all during the year.
- The governance committee chair, when for two consecutive years the company provides what we consider to be "inadequate" related party transaction disclosure (i.e., the nature of such transactions and/or the monetary amounts involved are unclear or excessively vague, thereby preventing a shareholder from being able to reasonably interpret the independence status of multiple directors above and beyond what the company maintains is compliant with SEC or applicable stock exchange listing requirements).
- The governance committee chair, when during the past year the board adopted a forum selection clause (i.e., an exclusive forum provision)²⁴ designating either a state's courts for intra-corporate disputes, shareholder proposal at issue requested that the board adopt a declassified structure, we will recommend voting against all director nominees up for election.

22 Where a compensation-related shareholder proposal should have been implemented, and when a reasonable analysis suggests that the members of the compensation committee (rather than the governance committee) bear the responsibility for failing to implement the request, we recommend that shareholders only vote against members of the compensation committee.

23 We believe that one independent individual should be appointed to serve as the lead or presiding director. When such a position is rotated among directors from meeting to meeting, we will recommend voting against the governance committee chair as we believe the lack of fixed lead or presiding director means that, effectively, the board does not have an independent board leader.

24 A forum selection clause is a bylaw provision stipulating that a certain state or federal jurisdiction is the exclusive forum for specified legal matters. Such a clause effectively limits a shareholder's legal remedy regarding appropriate choice of venue and related relief.



and/or federal courts for matters arising under the Securities Act of 1933 without shareholder approval,²⁵ or if the board is currently seeking shareholder approval of a forum selection clause pursuant to a bundled bylaw amendment rather than as a separate proposal.


- All members of the governance committee during whose tenure the board adopted, without shareholder approval, provisions in its charter or bylaws that, through rules on director compensation, may inhibit the ability of shareholders to nominate directors.
- The governance committee chair when the board takes actions to limit shareholders' ability to vote on matters material to shareholder rights (e.g., through the practice of excluding a shareholder proposal by means of ratifying a management proposal that is materially different from the shareholder proposal).
- The governance committee chair when directors' records for board and committee meeting attendance are not disclosed, or when it is indicated that a director attended less than 75% of board and committee meetings but disclosure is sufficiently vague that it is not possible to determine which specific director's attendance was lacking.
- The governance committee chair when a detailed record of proxy voting results from the prior annual meeting has not been disclosed.
- The governance committee chair when a company does not clearly disclose the identity of a shareholder proponent (or lead proponent when there are multiple filers) in their proxy statement. For a detailed explanation of this policy, please refer to our comprehensive *Proxy Paper Guidelines for Shareholder Proposals & ESG-Related Issues*, available at www.glasslewis.com/voting-policies-current/.

In addition, we may recommend that shareholders vote against the chair of the governance committee, or the entire committee, where the board has amended the company's governing documents to reduce or remove important shareholder rights, or to otherwise impede the ability of shareholders to exercise such right, and has done so without seeking shareholder approval. Examples of board actions that may cause such a recommendation include: the elimination of the ability of shareholders to call a special meeting or to act by written consent; an increase to the ownership threshold required for shareholders to call a special meeting; an increase to vote requirements for charter or bylaw amendments; the adoption of provisions that limit the ability of shareholders to pursue full legal recourse — such as bylaws that require arbitration of shareholder claims or that require shareholder plaintiffs to pay the company's legal expenses in the absence of a court victory (i.e., "fee-shifting" or "loser pays" bylaws); the adoption of a classified board structure; and the elimination of the ability of shareholders to remove a director without cause.

Regarding the nominating committee, we will consider recommending that shareholders vote against the following:

- All members of the nominating committee, when the committee nominated or renominated an individual who had a significant conflict of interest or whose past actions demonstrated a lack of integrity or inability to represent shareholder interests.
- The nominating committee chair, if the nominating committee did not meet during the year.

²⁵ Glass Lewis will evaluate the circumstances surrounding the adoption of any forum selection clause as well as the general provisions contained therein. Where it can be reasonably determined that a forum selection clause is narrowly crafted to suit the particular circumstances facing the company and/or a reasonable sunset provision is included, we may make an exception to this policy.



- In the absence of a governance committee, the nominating committee chair when the chair is not independent, and an independent lead or presiding director has not been appointed.
- The nominating committee chair, when there are fewer than five, or the whole nominating committee when there are more than 20 members on the board.
- The nominating committee chair, when a director received a greater than 50% against vote the prior year and not only was the director not removed, but the issues that raised shareholder concern were not corrected.²⁶
- The chair of the nominating committee of a board that is not at least 30 percent gender diverse,²⁷ or all members of the nominating committee of a board with no gender diverse directors, at companies within the Russell 3000 index. For companies outside of the Russell 3000 index, we will recommend voting against the chair of the nominating committee if there are no gender diverse directors.
- The chair of the nominating committee of a board with fewer than one director from an underrepresented community on the board, at companies within the Russell 1000 index.
- The nominating committee chair when, alongside other governance or board performance concerns, the average tenure of non-executive directors is 10 years or more and no new independent directors have joined the board in the past five years. We will not be making voting recommendations solely on this basis; rather, insufficient board refreshment may be a contributing factor in our recommendations when additional board-related concerns have been identified.


In addition, we may consider recommending shareholders vote against the chair of the nominating committee where the board's failure to ensure the board has directors with relevant experience, either through periodic director assessment or board refreshment, has contributed to a company's poor performance. Where these issues warrant an against vote in the absence of both a governance and a nominating committee, we will recommend voting against the board chair, unless the chair also serves as the CEO, in which case we will recommend voting against the longest-serving director.

Board-Level Risk Management Oversight

Glass Lewis evaluates the risk management function of a public company board on a strictly case-by-case basis. Sound risk management, while necessary at all companies, is particularly important at financial firms which inherently maintain significant exposure to financial risk. We believe such financial firms should have a chief risk officer reporting directly to the board and a dedicated risk committee or a committee of the board charged with risk oversight. Moreover, many non-financial firms maintain strategies which involve a high level of exposure to financial risk. Similarly, since many non-financial firms have complex hedging or trading strategies, those firms should also have a chief risk officer and a risk committee.

²⁶ Considering that shareholder disapproval clearly relates to the director who received a greater than 50% against vote rather than the nominating chair, we review the severity of the issue(s) that initially raised shareholder concern as well as company responsiveness to such matters, and will only recommend voting against the nominating chair if a reasonable analysis suggests that it would be most appropriate. In rare cases, we will consider recommending against the nominating chair when a director receives a substantial (i.e., 20% or more) vote against based on the same analysis.

²⁷ Women and directors that identify with a gender other than male or female.



Our views on risk oversight are consistent with those expressed by various regulatory bodies. In its December 2009 Final Rule release on Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, the SEC noted that risk oversight is a key competence of the board and that additional disclosures would improve investor and shareholder understanding of the role of the board in the organization's risk management practices. The final rules, which became effective on February 28, 2010, now explicitly require companies and mutual funds to describe (while allowing for some degree of flexibility) the board's role in the oversight of risk.

When analyzing the risk management practices of public companies, we take note of any significant losses or writedowns on financial assets and/or structured transactions. In cases where a company has disclosed a sizable loss or writedown, and where we find that the company's board-level risk committee's poor oversight contributed to the loss, we will recommend that shareholders vote against such committee members on that basis. In addition, in cases where a company maintains a significant level of financial risk exposure but fails to disclose any explicit form of board-level risk oversight (committee or otherwise),²⁸ we will consider recommending to vote against the board chair on that basis. However, we generally would not recommend voting against a combined chair/CEO, except in egregious cases.

Board Oversight of Environmental and Social Issues


Glass Lewis recognizes the importance of ensuring the sustainability of companies' operations. We believe that insufficient oversight of material environmental and social issues can present direct legal, financial, regulatory and reputational risks that could serve to harm shareholder interests. Therefore, we believe that these issues should be carefully monitored and managed by companies, and that all companies should have an appropriate oversight structure in place to ensure that they are mitigating attendant risks and capitalizing on related opportunities to the best extent possible.

To that end, Glass Lewis believes that companies should ensure that boards maintain clear oversight of material risks to their operations, including those that are environmental and social in nature. These risks could include, but are not limited to, matters related to climate change, human capital management, diversity, stakeholder relations, and health, safety & environment. Given the importance of the board's role in overseeing environmental and social risks, we believe this responsibility should be formally designated and codified in the appropriate committee charters or other governing documents.

While we believe that it is important that these issues are overseen at the board level and that shareholders are afforded meaningful disclosure of these oversight responsibilities, we believe that companies should determine the best structure for this oversight. In our view, this oversight can be effectively conducted by specific directors, the entire board, a separate committee, or combined with the responsibilities of a key committee.

For companies in the Russell 3000 index and in instances where we identify material oversight concerns, Glass Lewis will review a company's overall governance practices and identify which directors or board-level committees have been charged with oversight of environmental and/or social issues. Furthermore, given the importance of the board's role in overseeing environmental and social risks, Glass Lewis will generally

²⁸ A committee responsible for risk management could be a dedicated risk committee, the audit committee, or the finance committee, depending on a given company's board structure and method of disclosure. At some companies, the entire board is charged with risk management.



recommend voting against the governance committee chair of a company in the Russell 1000 index that fails to provide explicit disclosure concerning the board's role in overseeing these issues.

When evaluating the board's role in overseeing environmental and/or social issues, we will examine a company's committee charters and governing documents to determine if the company has codified and maintained a meaningful level of oversight of and accountability for a company's material environmental and social impacts.

Board Oversight of Technology

Cyber Risk Oversight

Companies and consumers are exposed to a growing risk of cyber-attacks. These attacks can result in customer or employee data breaches, harm to a company's reputation, significant fines or penalties, and interruption to a company's operations. Further, in some instances, cyber breaches can result in national security concerns, such as those impacting companies operating as utilities, defense contractors, and energy companies.

In response to these issues, regulators have increasingly been focused on ensuring companies are providing appropriate and timely disclosures and protections to stakeholders that could have been adversely impacted by a breach in a company's cyber infrastructure.


On July 26, 2023, the SEC approved final rules requiring public companies to report cybersecurity incidents deemed material within four days of identifying them, detailing their nature, scope, timing, and material impact under Item 1.05 on Form 8-K.

Furthermore, in annual reports, companies must disclose their processes for assessing, identifying, and managing material cybersecurity risks, along with their material effects; and describe whether any risks from prior incidents have materially affected its business strategy, results of operations, or financial condition (or are reasonably likely to), pursuant to Regulation S-K Item 106. Item 106 will also require registrants to describe the board of directors' oversight of risks from cybersecurity threats and management's role and expertise in assessing and managing material risks from cybersecurity threats. Similar rules were also adopted for foreign private issuers. The final rules became effective on September 5, 2023.

Given the regulatory focus on, and the potential adverse outcomes from, cyber-related issues, it is our view that cyber risk is material for all companies. We therefore believe that it is critical that companies evaluate and mitigate these risks to the greatest extent possible. With that view, we encourage all issuers to provide clear disclosure concerning the role of the board in overseeing issues related to cybersecurity, including how companies are ensuring directors are fully versed on this rapidly evolving and dynamic issue. We believe such disclosure can help shareholders understand the seriousness with which companies take this issue.

In the absence of material cyber incidents, we will generally not make voting recommendations on the basis of a company's oversight or disclosure concerning cyber-related issues. However, in instances where cyber-attacks have caused significant harm to shareholders we will closely evaluate the board's oversight of cybersecurity as well as the company's response and disclosures.

Moreover, in instances where a company has been materially impacted by a cyber-attack, we believe shareholders can reasonably expect periodic updates communicating the company's ongoing progress towards



resolving and remediating the impact of the cyber-attack. We generally believe shareholders are best served when such updates include (but are not necessarily limited to) details such as when the company has fully restored its information systems, when the company has returned to normal operations, what resources the company is providing for affected stakeholders, and any other potentially relevant information, until the company considers the impact of the cyber-attack to be fully remediated. These disclosures should focus on the company's response to address the impacts to affected stakeholders and should not reveal specific and/or technical details that could impede the company's response or remediation of the incident or that could assist threat actors.

In such instances, we may recommend against appropriate directors should we find the board's oversight, response or disclosure concerning cybersecurity-related issues to be insufficient, or are not provided to shareholders.


Board Oversight of Artificial Intelligence

In recent years, companies have rapidly begun to develop and adopt uses for artificial intelligence (AI) technologies throughout various aspects of their operations. Deployed and overseen effectively, AI technologies have the potential to make companies' operations and systems more efficient and productive. However, as the use of these technologies has grown, so have the potential risks associated with companies' development and use of AI. Given these potential risks, we believe that boards should be cognizant of, and take steps to mitigate exposure to, any material risks that could arise from their use or development of AI.

Companies that use or develop AI technologies should consider adopting strong internal frameworks that include ethical considerations and ensure they have provided a sufficient level of oversight of AI. As such, boards may seek to ensure effective oversight and address skills gaps by engaging in continued board education and/or appointing directors with AI expertise. With that view, we believe that all companies that develop or employ the use of AI in their operations should provide clear disclosure concerning the role of the board in overseeing issues related to AI, including how companies are ensuring directors are fully versed on this rapidly evolving and dynamic issue. We believe such disclosure can help shareholders understand the seriousness with which companies take this issue.

While we believe that it is important that these issues are overseen at the board level and that shareholders are afforded meaningful disclosure of these oversight responsibilities, we believe that companies should determine the best structure for this oversight. In our view, this oversight can be effectively conducted by specific directors, the entire board, a separate committee, or combined with the responsibilities of a key committee.

In the absence of material incidents related to a company's use or management of AI-related issues, we will generally not make voting recommendations on the basis of a company's oversight of, or disclosure concerning, AI-related issues. However, in instances where there is evidence that insufficient oversight and/or management of AI technologies has resulted in material harm to shareholders, Glass Lewis will review a company's overall governance practices and identify which directors or board-level committees have been charged with oversight of AI-related risks. We will also closely evaluate the board's response to, and management of, this issue as well as any associated disclosures and may recommend against appropriate directors should we find the board's oversight, response or disclosure concerning AI-related issues to be insufficient.



Board Accountability for Environmental and Social Performance

Glass Lewis carefully monitors companies' performance with respect to environmental and social issues, including those related to climate and human capital management. In situations where we believe that a company has not properly managed or mitigated material environmental or social risks to the detriment of shareholder value, or when such mismanagement has threatened shareholder value, Glass Lewis may recommend that shareholders vote against the members of the board who are responsible for oversight of environmental and social risks. In the absence of explicit board oversight of environmental and social issues, Glass Lewis may recommend that shareholders vote against members of the audit committee. In making these determinations, Glass Lewis will carefully review the situation, its effect on shareholder value, as well as any corrective action or other response made by the company.

For more information on how Glass Lewis evaluates environmental and social issues, please see Glass Lewis' Overall Approach to ESG as well as our comprehensive *Proxy Paper Guidelines for Shareholder Proposals &ESG- Related Issues*, available at www.glasslewis.com/voting-policies-current.


Board Accountability for Climate-related Issues

Given the exceptionally broad impacts of a changing climate on companies, the economy, and society in general, we view climate risk as a material risk for all companies. We therefore believe that boards should be considering and evaluating their operational resilience under lower-carbon scenarios. While all companies maintain exposure to climate-related risks, we believe that additional consideration should be given to, and that disclosure should be provided by those companies whose GHG emissions represent a financially material risk.

We believe that companies with this increased risk exposure should provide clear and comprehensive disclosure regarding these risks, including how they are being mitigated and overseen. We believe such information is crucial to allow investors to understand the company's management of this issue, as well as the impact of a lower carbon future on the company's operations.

In line with this view, Glass Lewis will carefully examine the climate-related disclosures provided by companies in the S&P 500 index with material exposure to climate risk stemming from their own operations²⁹, as well as companies where we believe emissions or climate impacts, or stakeholder scrutiny thereof, represent an outsized, financially material risk, in order to assess whether they have produced disclosures in line with the recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) or IFRS S2 Climate-related Disclosures. We will also assess whether these companies have disclosed explicit and clearly defined board-level oversight responsibilities for climate-related issues. In instances where we find either (or both) of these disclosures to be absent or significantly lacking, we may recommend voting against the chair of the committee (or board) charged with oversight of climate-related issues, or if no committee has been charged with such oversight, the chair of the governance committee. Further, we may extend our recommendation on this basis to additional members of the responsible committee in cases where the committee chair is not standing for

²⁹ This policy will generally apply to companies in the following SASB-defined industries: agricultural products, air freight & logistics, airlines, chemicals, construction materials, containers & packaging, cruise lines, electric utilities & power generators, food retailers & distributors, health care distributors, iron & steel producers, marine transportation, meat, poultry & dairy, metals & mining, non-alcoholic beverages, oil & gas, pulp & paper products, rail transportation, road transportation, semiconductors, waste management.



election due to a classified board, or based on other factors, including the company's size, industry and its overall governance profile.

Director Commitments

We believe that directors should have the necessary time to fulfill their duties to shareholders. In our view, an overcommitted director can pose a material risk to a company's shareholders, particularly during periods of crisis. In addition, recent research indicates that the time commitment associated with being a director has been on a significant upward trend in the past decade.³⁰ As a result, we generally recommend that shareholders vote against a director who serves as an executive officer (other than executive chair) of any public company³¹ while serving on more than one external public company board, a director who serves as an executive chair of any public company while serving on more than two external public company boards, and any other director who serves on more than five public company boards.


Because we believe that executives will primarily devote their attention to executive duties, we generally will not recommend that shareholders vote against overcommitted directors at the companies where they serve as an executive.

When determining whether a director's service on an excessive number of boards may limit the ability of the director to devote sufficient time to board duties, we may consider relevant factors such as the size and location of the other companies where the director serves on the board, the director's board roles at the companies in question, whether the director serves on the board of any large privately-held companies, the director's tenure on the boards in question, and the director's attendance record at all companies. In the case of directors who serve in executive roles other than CEO (e.g., executive chair), we will evaluate the specific duties and responsibilities of that role in determining whether an exception is warranted.

We may also refrain from recommending against certain directors if the company provides sufficient rationale for their continued board service. The rationale should allow shareholders to evaluate the scope of the directors' other commitments, as well as their contributions to the board including specialized knowledge of the company's industry, strategy or key markets, the diversity of skills, perspective and background they provide, and other relevant factors. We will also generally refrain from recommending to vote against a director who serves on an excessive number of boards within a consolidated group of companies in related industries, or a director that represents a firm whose sole purpose is to manage a portfolio of investments which include the company.

³⁰ For example, the 2015-2016 NACD Public Company Governance Survey states that, on average, directors spent a total of 248.2 hours annual on board-related matters during the past year, which it describes as a "historically high level" that is significantly above the average hours recorded in 2006. Additionally, the 2020 Spencer Stuart Board Index indicates that, while 39% of S&P 500 CEOs serve on one additional public board, just 2% of S&P 500 CEOs serve on two additional public boards and only one CEO serves on three.

³¹ When the executive officer in question serves only as an executive at a special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) we will generally apply the higher threshold of five public company directorships.



Other Considerations

In addition to the three key characteristics — independence, performance, experience — that we use to evaluate board members, we consider conflict-of-interest issues as well as the size of the board of directors when making voting recommendations.

Conflicts of Interest


We believe board members should be wholly free of identifiable and substantial conflicts of interest, regardless of the overall level of independent directors on the board. Accordingly, we recommend that shareholders vote against the following types of directors:

- A CFO who is on the board: In our view, the CFO holds a unique position relative to financial reporting and disclosure to shareholders. Due to the critical importance of financial disclosure and reporting, we believe the CFO should report to the board and not be a member of it.
- A director who provides — or a director who has an immediate family member who provides — material consulting or other material professional services to the company. These services may include legal, consulting,³² or financial services. We question the need for the company to have consulting relationships with its directors. We view such relationships as creating conflicts for directors, since they may be forced to weigh their own interests against shareholder interests when making board decisions. In addition, a company's decisions regarding where to turn for the best professional services may be compromised when doing business with the professional services firm of one of the company's directors.
- A director, or a director who has an immediate family member, engaging in airplane, real estate, or similar deals, including perquisite-type grants from the company, amounting to more than \$50,000. Directors who receive these sorts of payments from the company will have to make unnecessarily complicated decisions that may pit their interests against shareholder interests.
- Interlocking directorships: CEOs or other top executives who serve on each other's boards create an interlock that poses conflicts that should be avoided to ensure the promotion of shareholder interests above all else.³³
- All board members who served at a time when a poison pill with a term of longer than one year was adopted without shareholder approval within the prior twelve months.³⁴ In the event a board is classified and shareholders are therefore unable to vote against all directors, we will recommend voting against the remaining directors the next year they are up for a shareholder vote. If a poison pill with a

³² We will generally refrain from recommending against a director who provides consulting services for the company if the director is excluded from membership on the board's key committees and we have not identified significant governance concerns with the board.

³³ We do not apply a look-back period for this situation. The interlock policy applies to both public and private companies. On a case-by-case basis, we evaluate other types of interlocking relationships, such as interlocks with close family members of executives or within group companies. Further, we will also evaluate multiple board interlocks among non-insiders (i.e., multiple directors serving on the same boards at other companies), for evidence of a pattern of poor oversight.

³⁴ Refer to the "Governance Structure and the Shareholder Franchise" section for further discussion of our policies regarding anti-takeover measures, including poison pills.



term of one year or less was adopted without shareholder approval, and without adequate justification, we will consider recommending that shareholders vote against all members of the governance committee. If the board has, without seeking shareholder approval, and without adequate justification, extended the term of a poison pill by one year or less in two consecutive years, we will consider recommending that shareholders vote against the entire board.

Size of the Board of Directors

While we do not believe there is a universally applicable optimal board size, we do believe boards should have at least five directors to ensure sufficient diversity in decision-making and to enable the formation of key board committees with independent directors. Conversely, we believe that boards with more than 20 members will typically suffer under the weight of “too many cooks in the kitchen” and have difficulty reaching consensus and making timely decisions. Sometimes the presence of too many voices can make it difficult to draw on the wisdom and experience in the room by virtue of the need to limit the discussion so that each voice may be heard.

To that end, we typically recommend voting against the chair of the nominating committee (or the governance committee, in the absence of a nominating committee) at a board with fewer than five directors or more than 20 directors.


Controlled Companies

We believe controlled companies warrant certain exceptions to our independence standards. The board's function is to protect shareholder interests; however, when an individual, entity (or group of shareholders party to a formal agreement) owns more than 50% of the voting shares, the interests of the majority of shareholders are the interests of that entity or individual. Consequently, Glass Lewis does not apply our usual two-thirds board independence rule and therefore we will not recommend voting against boards whose composition reflects the makeup of the shareholder population.

Independence Exceptions

The independence exceptions that we make for controlled companies are as follows:

- We do not require that controlled companies have boards that are at least two-thirds independent. So long as the insiders and/or affiliates are connected with the controlling entity, we accept the presence of non-independent board members.
- The compensation committee and nominating and governance committees do not need to consist solely of independent directors.
 - We believe that standing nominating and corporate governance committees at controlled companies are unnecessary. Although having a committee charged with the duties of searching for, selecting, and nominating independent directors can be beneficial, the unique composition of a controlled company's shareholder base makes such committees weak and irrelevant.
 - Likewise, we believe that independent compensation committees at controlled companies are unnecessary. Although independent directors are the best choice for approving and monitoring senior executives' pay, controlled companies serve a unique shareholder population whose voting power ensures the protection of its interests. As such, we believe that having affiliated directors on a controlled company's compensation committee is acceptable. However, given



that a controlled company has certain obligations to minority shareholders we feel that an insider should not serve on the compensation committee. Therefore, Glass Lewis will recommend voting against any insider (the CEO or otherwise) serving on the compensation committee.

- Controlled companies do not need an independent chair or an independent lead or presiding director. Although an independent director in a position of authority on the board — such as chair or presiding director — can best carry out the board's duties, controlled companies serve a unique shareholder population whose voting power ensures the protection of its interests.

Size of the Board of Directors

We have no board size requirements for controlled companies.

Audit Committee Independence

Despite a controlled company's status, unlike for the other key committees, we nevertheless believe that audit committees should consist solely of independent directors. Regardless of a company's controlled status, the interests of all shareholders must be protected by ensuring the integrity and accuracy of the company's financial statements. Allowing affiliated directors to oversee the preparation of financial reports could create an insurmountable conflict of interest.

Board Responsiveness at Multi-Class Companies


At controlled companies and companies that have multi-class share structures with unequal voting rights, we will carefully examine the level of approval or disapproval attributed to unaffiliated shareholders when determining whether board responsiveness is warranted. In the case of companies that have multi-class share structures with unequal voting rights, we will generally examine the level of approval or disapproval attributed to unaffiliated shareholders on a "one share, one vote" basis. At controlled and multi-class companies, when at least 20% or more of unaffiliated shareholders vote contrary to management, we believe that boards should engage with shareholders and demonstrate some initial level of responsiveness, and when a majority or more of unaffiliated shareholders vote contrary to management we believe that boards should engage with shareholders and provide a more robust response to fully address shareholder concerns.

Significant Shareholders

Where an individual or entity holds between 20-50% of a company's voting power, we believe it is reasonable to allow proportional representation on the board and committees (excluding the audit committee) based on the individual or entity's percentage of ownership.

Governance Following an IPO, Spin-Off, or Direct Listing

We believe companies that have recently completed an initial public offering (IPO), spin-off, or direct listing should be allowed adequate time to fully comply with marketplace listing requirements and meet basic corporate governance standards. Generally speaking, we refrain from making recommendations on the basis of governance standards (e.g., board independence, committee membership and structure, meeting attendance, etc.) during the one-year period following an IPO.



However, some cases warrant shareholder action against the board of a company that have completed an IPO, spin-off, or direct listing within the past year. When evaluating companies that have recently gone public, Glass Lewis will review the terms of the applicable governing documents in order to determine whether shareholder rights are being severely restricted indefinitely. We believe boards that approve highly restrictive governing documents have demonstrated that they may subvert shareholder interests following the IPO. In conducting this evaluation, Glass Lewis will consider:


- The adoption of anti-takeover provisions such as a poison pill or classified board
- Supermajority vote requirements to amend governing documents
- The presence of exclusive forum or fee-shifting provisions
- Whether shareholders can call special meetings or act by written consent
- The voting standard provided for the election of directors
- The ability of shareholders to remove directors without cause
- The presence of evergreen provisions in the company's equity compensation arrangements
- The presence of a multi-class share structure which does not afford common shareholders voting power that is aligned with their economic interest

In cases where Glass Lewis determines that the board has approved overly restrictive governing documents, we will generally recommend voting against members of the governance committee. If there is no governance committee, or if a portion of such committee members are not standing for election due to a classified board structure, we will expand our recommendations to additional director nominees, based on who is standing for election.

In cases where, preceding an IPO, the board adopts a multi-class share structure where voting rights are not aligned with economic interest, or an anti-takeover provision, such as a poison pill or classified board, we will generally recommend voting against all members of the board who served at the time of the IPO if the board: (i) did not also commit to submitting these provisions to a shareholder vote at the company's first shareholder meeting following the IPO; or (ii) did not provide for a reasonable sunset of these provisions (generally three to five years in the case of a classified board or poison pill; or seven years or less in the case of a multi-class share structure). In the case of a multi-class share structure, if these provisions are put to a shareholder vote, we will examine the level of approval or disapproval attributed to unaffiliated shareholders when determining the vote outcome.

In our view, adopting an anti-takeover device unfairly penalizes future shareholders who (except for electing to buy or sell the stock) are unable to weigh in on a matter that could potentially negatively impact their ownership interest. This notion is strengthened when a board adopts a classified board with an infinite duration or a poison pill with a five- to ten-year term immediately prior to going public, thereby insulating management for a substantial amount of time.

In addition, shareholders should also be wary of companies that adopt supermajority voting requirements before their IPO. Absent explicit provisions in the articles or bylaws stipulating that certain policies will be phased out over a certain period of time, long-term shareholders could find themselves in the predicament of having to attain a supermajority vote to approve future proposals seeking to eliminate such policies.



Governance Following a Business Combination with a Special Purpose Acquisition Company

The business combination of a private company with a publicly traded special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) facilitates the private entity becoming a publicly traded corporation. Thus, the business combination represents the private company's de-facto IPO. We believe that some cases warrant shareholder action against the board of a company that have completed a business combination with a SPAC within the past year.

At meetings where shareholders vote on the business combination of a SPAC with a private company, shareholders are generally voting on a new corporate charter for the post-combination company as a condition to approval of the business combination. In many cases, shareholders are faced with the dilemma of having to approve corporate charters that severely restrict shareholder rights to facilitate the business combination. Therefore, when shareholders are required to approve binding charters as a condition to approval of a business combination with a SPAC, we believe shareholders should also be provided with advisory votes on material charter amendments as a means to voice their opinions on such restrictive governance provisions.


When evaluating companies that have recently gone public via business combination with a SPAC, Glass Lewis will review the terms of the applicable governing documents to determine whether shareholder rights are being severely restricted indefinitely and whether these restrictive provisions were put forth for a shareholder vote on an advisory basis at the prior meeting where shareholders voted on the business combination.

In cases where, prior to the combined company becoming publicly traded, the board adopts a multi-class share structure where voting rights are not aligned with economic interest, or an anti-takeover provision, such as a poison pill or classified board, we will generally recommend voting against all members of the board who served at the time of the combined company becoming publicly traded if the board: (i) did not also submit these provisions to a shareholder vote on an advisory basis at the prior meeting where shareholders voted on the business combination; (ii) did not also commit to submitting these provisions to a shareholder vote at the company's first shareholder meeting following the company becoming publicly traded; or (iii) did not provide for a reasonable sunset of these provisions (generally three to five years in the case of a classified board or poison pill; or seven years or less in the case of a multi-class share structure).

Consistent with our view on IPOs, adopting an anti-takeover device unfairly penalizes future shareholders who (except for electing to buy or sell the stock) are unable to weigh in on a matter that could potentially negatively impact their ownership interest.

Dual-Listed or Foreign-Incorporated Companies

For companies that trade on multiple exchanges or are incorporated in foreign jurisdictions but trade only in the U.S., we will apply the governance standard most relevant in each situation. We will consider a number of factors in determining which Glass Lewis country-specific policy to apply, including but not limited to: (i) the corporate governance structure and features of the company including whether the board structure is unique to a particular market; (ii) the nature of the proposals; (iii) the location of the company's primary listing, if one can be determined; (iv) the regulatory/governance regime that the board is reporting against; and (v) the availability and completeness of the company's SEC filings.



OTC-listed Companies

Companies trading on the OTC Bulletin Board are not considered “listed companies” under SEC rules and therefore not subject to the same governance standards as listed companies. However, we believe that more stringent corporate governance standards should be applied to these companies given that their shares are still publicly traded.

When reviewing OTC companies, Glass Lewis will review the available disclosure relating to the shareholder meeting to determine whether shareholders are able to evaluate several key pieces of information, including: (i) the composition of the board’s key committees, if any; (ii) the level of share ownership of company insiders or directors; (iii) the board meeting attendance record of directors; (iv) executive and non-employee director compensation; (v) related-party transactions conducted during the past year; and (vi) the board’s leadership structure and determinations regarding director independence.

We are particularly concerned when company disclosure lacks any information regarding the board’s key committees. We believe that committees of the board are an essential tool for clarifying how the responsibilities of the board are being delegated, and specifically for indicating which directors are accountable for ensuring: (i) the independence and quality of directors, and the transparency and integrity of the nominating process; (ii) compensation programs that are fair and appropriate; (iii) proper oversight of the company’s accounting, financial reporting, and internal and external audits; and (iv) general adherence to principles of good corporate governance.


In cases where shareholders are unable to identify which board members are responsible for ensuring oversight of the above-mentioned responsibilities, we may consider recommending against certain members of the board. Ordinarily, we believe it is the responsibility of the corporate governance committee to provide thorough disclosure of the board’s governance practices. In the absence of such a committee, we believe it is appropriate to hold the board’s chair or, if such individual is an executive of the company, the longest-serving non-executive board member accountable.

Mutual Fund Boards

Mutual funds, or investment companies, are structured differently from regular public companies (i.e., operating companies). Typically, members of a fund’s advisor are on the board and management takes on a different role from that of regular public companies. Thus, we focus on a short list of requirements, although many of our guidelines remain the same.

The following mutual fund policies are similar to the policies for regular public companies:

- **Size of the board of directors** — The board should be made up of between five and twenty directors.
- **The CFO on the board** — Neither the CFO of the fund nor the CFO of the fund’s registered investment advisor should serve on the board.
- **Independence of the audit committee** — The audit committee should consist solely of independent directors.
- **Audit committee financial expert** — At least one member of the audit committee should be designated as the audit committee financial expert.




The following differences from regular public companies apply at mutual funds:

- **Independence of the board** — We believe that three-fourths of an investment company's board should be made up of independent directors. This is consistent with a proposed SEC rule on investment company boards. The Investment Company Act requires 40% of the board to be independent, but in 2001, the SEC amended the Exemptive Rules to require that a majority of a mutual fund board be independent. In 2005, the SEC proposed increasing the independence threshold to 75%. In 2006, a federal appeals court ordered that this rule amendment be put back out for public comment, putting it back into "proposed rule" status. Since mutual fund boards play a vital role in overseeing the relationship between the fund and its investment manager, there is greater need for independent oversight than there is for an operating company board.
- **When the auditor is not up for ratification** — We do not recommend voting against the audit committee if the auditor is not up for ratification. Due to the different legal structure of an investment company compared to an operating company, the auditor for the investment company (i.e., mutual fund) does not conduct the same level of financial review for each investment company as for an operating company.
- **Non-independent chair** — The SEC has proposed that the chair of the fund board be independent. We agree that the roles of a mutual fund's chair and CEO should be separate. Although we believe this would be best at all companies, we recommend voting against the chair of an investment company's nominating committee as well as the board chair if the chair and CEO of a mutual fund are the same person and the fund does not have an independent lead or presiding director. Seven former SEC commissioners support the appointment of an independent chair and we agree with them that "an independent board chair would be better able to create conditions favoring the long-term interests of fund shareholders than would a chair who is an executive of the advisor." (See the comment letter sent to the SEC in support of the proposed rule at <http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/indchair.pdf>.)
- **Multiple funds overseen by the same director** — Unlike service on a public company board, mutual fund boards require much less of a time commitment. Mutual fund directors typically serve on dozens of other mutual fund boards, often within the same fund complex. The Investment Company Institute's (ICI) Overview of Fund Governance Practices, 1994-2012, indicates that the average number of funds served by an independent director in 2012 was 53. Absent evidence that a specific director is hindered from being an effective board member at a fund due to service on other funds' boards, we refrain from maintaining a cap on the number of outside mutual fund boards that we believe a director can serve on.

Declassified Boards

Glass Lewis favors the repeal of staggered boards and the annual election of directors. We believe staggered boards are less accountable to shareholders than boards that are elected annually. Furthermore, we feel the annual election of directors encourages board members to focus on shareholder interests.

Empirical studies have shown: (i) staggered boards are associated with a reduction in a firm's valuation; and (ii) in the context of hostile takeovers, staggered boards operate as a takeover defense, which entrenches management, discourages potential acquirers, and delivers a lower return to target shareholders.



In our view, there is no evidence to demonstrate that staggered boards improve shareholder returns in a takeover context. Some research has indicated that shareholders are worse off when a staggered board blocks a transaction; further, when a staggered board negotiates a friendly transaction, no statistically significant difference in premium occurs.³⁵ Additional research found that charter-based staggered boards “reduce the market value of a firm by 4% to 6% of its market capitalization” and that “staggered boards bring about and not merely reflect this reduction in market value.”³⁶ A subsequent study reaffirmed that classified boards reduce shareholder value, finding “that the ongoing process of dismantling staggered boards, encouraged by institutional investors, could well contribute to increasing shareholder wealth.”³⁷

Shareholders have increasingly come to agree with this view. In 2019, 90% of S&P 500 companies had declassified boards, up from 68% in 2009.³⁸ Management proposals to declassify boards are approved with near unanimity and shareholder proposals on the topic also receive strong shareholder support; in 2014, shareholder proposals requesting that companies declassify their boards received average support of 84% (excluding abstentions and broker non-votes), whereas in 1987, only 16.4% of votes cast favored board declassification.³⁹ Further, a growing number of companies, nearly half of all those targeted by shareholder proposals requesting that all directors stand for election annually, either recommended shareholders support the proposal or made no recommendation, a departure from the more traditional management recommendation to vote against shareholder proposals.

Given our belief that declassified boards promote director accountability, the empirical evidence suggesting staggered boards reduce a company’s value and the established shareholder opposition to such a structure, Glass Lewis supports the declassification of boards and the annual election of directors.

Board Composition and Refreshment

Glass Lewis strongly supports routine director evaluation, including independent external reviews, and periodic board refreshment to foster the sharing of diverse perspectives in the boardroom and the generation of new ideas and business strategies. Further, we believe the board should evaluate the need for changes to board composition based on an analysis of skills and experience necessary for the company, as well as the results of the director evaluations, as opposed to relying solely on age or tenure limits. When necessary, shareholders can address concerns regarding proper board composition through director elections.


³⁵ Lucian Bebchuk, John Coates IV, Guhan Subramanian, “The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Further Findings and a Reply to Symposium Participants,” 55 Stanford Law Review 885-917 (2002).

³⁶ Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, “The Costs of Entrenched Boards” (2004).

³⁷ Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen and Charles C.Y. Wang, “Staggered Boards and the Wealth of Shareholders: Evidence from a Natural Experiment,” SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1706806> (2010), p. 26.

³⁸ Spencer Stuart Board Index, 2019, p. 15.

³⁹ Lucian Bebchuk, John Coates IV and Guhan Subramanian, “The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy”.



In our view, a director's experience can be a valuable asset to shareholders because of the complex, critical issues that boards face. This said, we recognize that in rare circumstances, a lack of refreshment can contribute to a lack of board responsiveness to poor company performance.

We will note as a potential concern instances where the average tenure of non-executive directors is 10 years or more and no new directors have joined the board in the past five years. While we will be highlighting this as a potential area of concern, we will not be making voting recommendations strictly on this basis, unless we have identified other governance or board performance concerns.

On occasion, age or term limits can be used as a means to remove a director for boards that are unwilling to police their membership and enforce turnover. Some shareholders support term limits as a way to force change in such circumstances.

While we understand that age limits can aid board succession planning, the long-term impact of age limits restricts experienced and potentially valuable board members from service through an arbitrary means. We believe that shareholders are better off monitoring the board's overall composition, including the diversity of its members, the alignment of the board's areas of expertise with a company's strategy, the board's approach to corporate governance, and its stewardship of company performance, rather than imposing inflexible rules that don't necessarily correlate with returns or benefits for shareholders.

However, if a board adopts term/age limits, it should follow through and not waive such limits. In cases where the board waives its term/age limits for two or more consecutive years, Glass Lewis will generally recommend that shareholders vote against the nominating and/or governance committee chair, unless a compelling rationale is provided for why the board is proposing to waive this rule, such as consummation of a corporate transaction.


Board Diversity

Update: 10 March 2025. Glass Lewis has modified our approach to providing proxy voting guidance considering diversity factors at US companies under our Benchmark Policy. For more information, please see our [2025 Supplemental Statement on Diversity Considerations at US Companies](#).

Glass Lewis recognizes the importance of ensuring that the board is composed of directors who have a diversity of skills, thought and experience, as such diversity benefits companies by providing a broad range of perspectives and insights. Glass Lewis closely reviews the composition of the board for representation of diverse director candidates.

Board Gender Diversity

We consider the nominating and governance committee to be responsible for ensuring sufficient board diversity, or for publicly communicating its rationale or a plan for increasing diversity. As such, we will generally recommend voting against the chair of the nominating committee of a board that is not at least 30 percent gender diverse, or all members of the nominating committee of a board with no gender diverse directors, at companies within the Russell 3000 index. For companies outside the Russell 3000 index, our policy requires a minimum of one gender diverse director.



When making these voting recommendations, we will carefully review a company's disclosure of its diversity considerations and may refrain from recommending that shareholders vote against directors when boards have provided sufficient rationale for the lack of diversity or a plan to address the lack of diversity, including a timeline of when the board intends to appoint additional gender diverse directors (generally by the next annual meeting or as soon as reasonably practicable).

We may extend our gender diversity recommendations to additional members of the nominating committee in cases where the committee chair is not standing for election due to a classified board, or based on other factors, including the company's size and industry, applicable laws in its state of headquarters, and its overall governance profile.

Board Underrepresented Community Diversity

We will generally recommend against the chair of the nominating committee of a board with fewer than one director from an underrepresented community on the board at companies within the Russell 1000 index.

We define "underrepresented community director" as an individual who self-identifies as Black, African American, North African, Middle Eastern, Hispanic, Latino, Asian, Pacific Islander, Native American, Native Hawaiian, or Alaskan Native, or who self-identifies as a member of the LGBTQIA+ community. For the purposes of this evaluation, we will rely solely on self-identified demographic information as disclosed in company proxy statements.


When making these voting recommendations, we will carefully review a company's disclosure of its diversity considerations and may refrain from recommending that shareholders vote against directors when boards have provided a sufficient rationale or plan to address the lack of diversity on the board, including a timeline to appoint additional directors from an underrepresented community (generally by the next annual meeting or as soon as reasonably practicable).

We may extend our underrepresented community diversity recommendations to additional members of the nominating committee in cases where the committee chair is not standing for election due to a classified board, or based on other factors, including the company's size and industry, applicable laws in its state of headquarters, and its overall governance profile.

State Laws on Diversity

Several states have begun to encourage board diversity through legislation. Some state laws imposed mandatory board composition requirements, while other states have enacted or are considering legislation that encourages companies to diversify their boards but does not mandate board composition requirements. Furthermore, several states have enacted or are considering enacting certain disclosure or reporting requirements in filings made with each respective state annually.

Glass Lewis will recommend in accordance with mandatory board composition requirements set forth in applicable state laws when they come into effect. We will generally refrain from recommending against directors when applicable state laws do not mandate board composition requirements, are non-binding, or solely impose disclosure or reporting requirements.



We note that during 2022, California's Senate Bill 826 and Assembly Bill 979 regarding board gender and "underrepresented community" diversity, respectively, were both deemed to violate the equal protection clause of the California state constitution. These laws are currently in the appeals process.

Accordingly, where we previously recommended in accordance with mandatory board composition requirements set forth in California's SB 826 and AB 979, we will refrain from providing recommendations pursuant to these state board composition requirements until further notice while we continue to monitor the appeals process. However, we will continue to monitor compliance with these requirements.

Disclosure of Director Diversity and Skills

Because company disclosure is critical when measuring the mix of diverse attributes and skills of directors, Glass Lewis assesses the quality of such disclosure in companies' proxy statements. Accordingly, we reflect how a company's proxy statement presents: (i) the board's current percentage of racial/ethnic diversity; (ii) whether the board's definition of diversity explicitly includes gender and/or race/ethnicity; (iii) whether the board has adopted a policy requiring women and minorities to be included in the initial pool of candidates when selecting new director nominees (aka "Rooney Rule"); and (iv) board skills disclosure. Such ratings will help inform our assessment of a company's overall governance and may be a contributing factor in our recommendations when additional board-related concerns have been identified.


At companies in the Russell 1000 index that have not provided any disclosure in any of the above categories, we will generally recommend voting against the chair of the nominating and/or governance committee. Further, when companies in the Russell 1000 index have not provided any disclosure of individual or aggregate racial/ethnic minority board demographic information, we will generally recommend voting against the chair of the nominating and/or governance committee.

Proxy Access

In lieu of running their own contested election, proxy access would not only allow certain shareholders to nominate directors to company boards but the shareholder nominees would be included on the company's ballot, significantly enhancing the ability of shareholders to play a meaningful role in selecting their representatives. Glass Lewis generally supports affording shareholders the right to nominate director candidates to management's proxy as a means to ensure that significant, long-term shareholders have an ability to nominate candidates to the board.

Companies generally seek shareholder approval to amend company bylaws to adopt proxy access in response to shareholder engagement or pressure, usually in the form of a shareholder proposal requesting proxy access, although some companies may adopt some elements of proxy access without prompting. Glass Lewis considers several factors when evaluating whether to support proposals for companies to adopt proxy access including the specified minimum ownership and holding requirement for shareholders to nominate one or more directors, as well as company size, performance and responsiveness to shareholders.

For a discussion of recent regulatory events in this area, along with a detailed overview of the Glass Lewis approach to shareholder proposals regarding Proxy Access, refer to Glass Lewis' *Proxy Paper Guidelines for Shareholder Proposals & ESG-Related Issues*, available at www.glasslewis.com.



Majority Vote for Election of Directors

Majority voting for the election of directors is fast becoming the *de facto* standard in corporate board elections. In our view, the majority voting proposals are an effort to make the case for shareholder impact on director elections on a company-specific basis.

While this proposal would not give shareholders the opportunity to nominate directors or lead to elections where shareholders have a choice among director candidates, if implemented, the proposal would allow shareholders to have a voice in determining whether the nominees proposed by the board should actually serve as the overseer-representatives of shareholders in the boardroom. We believe this would be a favorable outcome for shareholders.

The number of shareholder proposals requesting that companies adopt a majority voting standard has declined significantly during the past decade, largely as a result of widespread adoption of majority voting or director resignation policies at U.S. companies. In 2019, 89% of the S&P 500 Index had implemented a resignation policy for directors failing to receive majority shareholder support, compared to 65% in 2009.⁴⁰

The Plurality Vote Standard

Today, most U.S. companies still elect directors by a plurality vote standard. Under that standard, if one shareholder holding only one share votes in favor of a nominee (including that director, if the director is a shareholder), that nominee “wins” the election and assumes a seat on the board. The common concern among companies with a plurality voting standard is the possibility that one or more directors would not receive a majority of votes, resulting in “failed elections.”


Advantages of a Majority Vote Standard

If a majority vote standard were implemented, a nominee would have to receive the support of a majority of the shares voted in order to be elected. Thus, shareholders could collectively vote to reject a director they believe will not pursue their best interests. Given that so few directors (less than 100 a year) do not receive majority support from shareholders, we think that a majority vote standard is reasonable since it will neither result in many failed director elections nor reduce the willingness of qualified, shareholder-focused directors to serve in the future. Further, most directors who fail to receive a majority shareholder vote in favor of their election do not step down, underscoring the need for true majority voting.

We believe that a majority vote standard will likely lead to more attentive directors. Although shareholders only rarely fail to support directors, the occasional majority vote against a director’s election will likely deter the election of directors with a record of ignoring shareholder interests. Glass Lewis will therefore generally support proposals calling for the election of directors by a majority vote, excepting contested director elections.

In response to the high level of support majority voting has garnered, many companies have voluntarily taken steps to implement majority voting or modified approaches to majority voting. These steps range from a

⁴⁰ Spencer Stuart Board Index, 2019, p. 15.



modified approach requiring directors that receive a majority of withheld votes to resign (i.e., a resignation policy) to actually requiring a majority vote of outstanding shares to elect directors.

We feel that the modified approach does not go far enough because requiring a director to resign is not the same as requiring a majority vote to elect a director and does not allow shareholders a definitive voice in the election process. Further, under the modified approach, the corporate governance committee could reject a resignation and, even if it accepts the resignation, the corporate governance committee decides on the director's replacement. And since the modified approach is usually adopted as a policy by the board or a board committee, it could be altered by the same board or committee at any time.

Conflicting and Excluded Proposals


SEC Rule 14a-8(i)(9) allows companies to exclude shareholder proposals "if the proposal directly conflicts with one of the company's own proposals to be submitted to shareholders at the same meeting." On October 22, 2015, the SEC issued Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14H (SLB 14H) clarifying its rule concerning the exclusion of certain shareholder proposals when similar items are also on the ballot. SLB 14H increased the burden on companies to prove to SEC staff that a conflict exists; therefore, many companies still chose to place management proposals alongside similar shareholder proposals in many cases.

During the 2018 proxy season, a new trend in the SEC's interpretation of this rule emerged. Upon submission of shareholder proposals requesting that companies adopt a lower special meeting threshold, several companies petitioned the SEC for no-action relief under the premise that the shareholder proposals conflicted with management's own special meeting proposals, even though the management proposals set a higher threshold than those requested by the proponent. No-action relief was granted to these companies; however, the SEC stipulated that the companies must state in the rationale for the management proposals that a vote in favor of management's proposal was tantamount to a vote against the adoption of a lower special meeting threshold. In certain instances, shareholder proposals to lower an existing special meeting right threshold were excluded on the basis that they conflicted with management proposals seeking to ratify the existing special meeting rights. We find the exclusion of these shareholder proposals to be especially problematic as, in these instances, shareholders are not offered any enhanced shareholder right, nor would the approval (or rejection) of the ratification proposal initiate any type of meaningful change to shareholders' rights.

In instances where companies have excluded shareholder proposals, such as those instances where special meeting shareholder proposals are excluded as a result of "conflicting" management proposals, Glass Lewis will take a case-by-case approach, taking into account the following issues:

- The threshold proposed by the shareholder resolution;
- The threshold proposed or established by management and the attendant rationale for the threshold;
- Whether management's proposal is seeking to ratify an existing special meeting right or adopt a bylaw that would establish a special meeting right; and
- The company's overall governance profile, including its overall responsiveness to and engagement with shareholders.

Glass Lewis generally favors a 10-15% special meeting right. Accordingly, Glass Lewis will generally recommend voting for management or shareholder proposals that fall within this range. When faced with conflicting



proposals, Glass Lewis will generally recommend in favor of the lower special meeting right and will recommend voting against the proposal with the higher threshold. However, in instances where there are conflicting management and shareholder proposals and a company has not established a special meeting right, Glass Lewis may recommend that shareholders vote in favor of the shareholder proposal and that they abstain from a management-proposed bylaw amendment seeking to establish a special meeting right. We believe that an abstention is appropriate in this instance in order to ensure that shareholders are sending a clear signal regarding their preference for the appropriate threshold for a special meeting right, while not directly opposing the establishment of such a right.

In cases where the company excludes a shareholder proposal seeking a reduced special meeting right by means of ratifying a management proposal that is materially different from the shareholder proposal, we will generally recommend voting against the chair or members of the governance committee.


In other instances of conflicting management and shareholder proposals, Glass Lewis will consider the following:

- The nature of the underlying issue;
- The benefit to shareholders of implementing the proposal;
- The materiality of the differences between the terms of the shareholder proposal and management proposal;
- The context of a company's shareholder base, corporate structure and other relevant circumstances; and
- A company's overall governance profile and, specifically, its responsiveness to shareholders as evidenced by a company's response to previous shareholder proposals and its adoption of progressive shareholder rights provisions.

In recent years, we have seen the dynamic nature of the considerations given by the SEC when determining whether companies may exclude certain shareholder proposals. We understand that not all shareholder proposals serve the long-term interests of shareholders, and value and respect the limitations placed on shareholder proponents, as certain shareholder proposals can unduly burden companies. However, Glass Lewis believes that shareholders should be able to vote on issues of material importance.

We view the shareholder proposal process as an important part of advancing shareholder rights and encouraging responsible and financially sustainable business practices. While recognizing that certain proposals cross the line between the purview of shareholders and that of the board, we generally believe that companies should not limit investors' ability to vote on shareholder proposals that advance certain rights or promote beneficial disclosure. Accordingly, Glass Lewis will make note of instances where a company has successfully petitioned the SEC to exclude shareholder proposals. If after review we believe that the exclusion of a shareholder proposal is detrimental to shareholders, we may, in certain very limited circumstances, recommend against members of the governance committee.

Transparency and Integrity in Financial Reporting



Auditor Ratification

The auditor's role as gatekeeper is crucial in ensuring the integrity and transparency of the financial information necessary for protecting shareholder value. Shareholders rely on the auditor to ask tough questions and to do a thorough analysis of a company's books to ensure that the information provided to shareholders is complete, accurate, fair, and that it is a reasonable representation of a company's financial position. The only way shareholders can make rational investment decisions is if the market is equipped with accurate information about a company's fiscal health. As stated in the October 6, 2008 Final Report of the Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession to the U.S. Department of the Treasury:

"The auditor is expected to offer critical and objective judgment on the financial matters under consideration, and actual and perceived absence of conflicts is critical to that expectation. The Committee believes that auditors, investors, public companies, and other market participants must understand the independence requirements and their objectives, and that auditors must adopt a mindset of skepticism when facing situations that may compromise their independence."


As such, shareholders should demand an objective, competent and diligent auditor who performs at or above professional standards at every company in which the investors hold an interest. Like directors, auditors should be free from conflicts of interest and should avoid situations requiring a choice between the auditor's interests and the public's interests. Almost without exception, shareholders should be able to annually review an auditor's performance and to annually ratify a board's auditor selection. Moreover, in October 2008, the Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession went even further, and recommended that "to further enhance audit committee oversight and auditor accountability... disclosure in the company proxy statement regarding shareholder ratification [should] include the name(s) of the senior auditing partner(s) staffed on the engagement."⁴¹

On August 16, 2011, the PCAOB issued a Concept Release seeking public comment on ways that auditor independence, objectivity and professional skepticism could be enhanced, with a specific emphasis on mandatory audit firm rotation. The PCAOB convened several public roundtable meetings during 2012 to further discuss such matters. Glass Lewis believes auditor rotation can ensure both the independence of the auditor and the integrity of the audit; we will typically recommend supporting proposals to require auditor rotation when the proposal uses a reasonable period of time (usually not less than 5-7 years), particularly at companies with a history of accounting problems.

On June 1, 2017, the PCAOB adopted new standards to enhance auditor reports by providing additional important information to investors. For companies with fiscal year end dates on or after December 15, 2017, reports were required to include the year in which the auditor began serving consecutively as the company's auditor. For large accelerated filers with fiscal year ends of June 30, 2019 or later, and for all other companies with fiscal year ends of December 15, 2020 or later, communication of critical audit matters (CAMs) will also be required. CAMs are matters that have been communicated to the audit committee, are related to accounts or

⁴¹ "Final Report of the Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession to the U.S. Department of the Treasury." p. VIII:20, October 6, 2008.





disclosures that are material to the financial statements, and involve especially challenging, subjective, or complex auditor judgment.

Glass Lewis believes the additional reporting requirements are beneficial for investors. The additional disclosures can provide investors with information that is critical to making an informed judgment about an auditor's independence and performance. Furthermore, we believe the additional requirements are an important step toward enhancing the relevance and usefulness of auditor reports, which too often are seen as boilerplate compliance documents that lack the relevant details to provide meaningful insight into a particular audit.


Voting Recommendations on Auditor Ratification

We generally support management's choice of auditor except when we believe the auditor's independence or audit integrity has been compromised. Where a board has not allowed shareholders to review and ratify an auditor, we typically recommend voting against the audit committee chair. When there have been material restatements of annual financial statements or material weaknesses in internal controls, we usually recommend voting against the entire audit committee.

Reasons why we may not recommend ratification of an auditor include:

- When audit fees plus audit-related fees total less than the tax fees and/or other non-audit fees.
- Recent material restatements of annual financial statements, including those resulting in the reporting of material weaknesses in internal controls and including late filings by the company where the auditor bears some responsibility for the restatement or late filing.⁴²
- When the auditor performs prohibited services such as tax-shelter work, tax services for the CEO or CFO, or contingent-fee work, such as a fee based on a percentage of economic benefit to the company.
- When audit fees are excessively low, especially when compared with other companies in the same industry.
- When the company has aggressive accounting policies.
- When the company has poor disclosure or lack of transparency in its financial statements.
- Where the auditor limited its liability through its contract with the company or the audit contract requires the corporation to use alternative dispute resolution procedures without adequate justification.
- We also look for other relationships or concerns with the auditor that might suggest a conflict between the auditor's interests and shareholder interests.
- In determining whether shareholders would benefit from rotating the company's auditor, where relevant we will consider factors that may call into question an auditor's effectiveness, including auditor tenure, a pattern of inaccurate audits, and any ongoing litigation or significant controversies. When Glass Lewis considers ongoing litigation and significant controversies, it is mindful that such matters may involve unadjudicated allegations. Glass Lewis does not assume the truth of such allegations or that the

⁴² An auditor does not audit interim financial statements. Thus, we generally do not believe that an auditor should be opposed due to a restatement of interim financial statements unless the nature of the misstatement is clear from a reading of the incorrect financial statements.




law has been violated. Instead, Glass Lewis focuses more broadly on whether, under the particular facts and circumstances presented, the nature and number of such lawsuits or other significant controversies reflects on the risk profile of the company or suggests that appropriate risk mitigation measures may be warranted.”

Pension Accounting Issues

A pension accounting question occasionally raised in proxy proposals is what effect, if any, projected returns on employee pension assets should have on a company's net income. This issue often arises in the executive- compensation context in a discussion of the extent to which pension accounting should be reflected in business performance for purposes of calculating payments to executives.

Glass Lewis believes that pension credits should not be included in measuring income that is used to award performance-based compensation. Because many of the assumptions used in accounting for retirement plans are subject to the company's discretion, management would have an obvious conflict of interest if pay were tied to pension income. In our view, projected income from pensions does not truly reflect a company's performance.



The Link Between Compensation and Performance

Glass Lewis carefully reviews the compensation awarded to senior executives, as we believe that this is an important area in which the board's priorities are revealed. Glass Lewis strongly believes executive compensation should be linked directly with the performance of the business the executive is charged with managing. We believe the most effective compensation arrangements provide for an appropriate mix of performance-based short- and long-term incentives in addition to fixed pay elements while promoting a prudent and sustainable level of risk-taking.

Glass Lewis believes that comprehensive, timely and transparent disclosure of executive pay is critical to allowing shareholders to evaluate the extent to which pay is aligned with company performance. When reviewing proxy materials, Glass Lewis examines whether the company discloses the performance metrics used to determine executive compensation. We recognize performance metrics must necessarily vary depending on the company and industry, among other factors, and may include a wide variety of financial measures as well as industry-specific performance indicators. However, we believe companies should disclose why the specific performance metrics were selected and how the actions they are designed to incentivize will lead to better corporate performance.


Moreover, it is rarely in shareholders' interests to disclose competitive data about individual salaries below the senior executive level. Such disclosure could create internal personnel discord that would be counterproductive for the company and its shareholders. We do not believe shareholders need or will benefit from detailed reports about individual management employees other than the most senior executives.

Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (Say-on-Pay)

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the "Dodd-Frank Act") required most companies to hold an advisory vote on executive compensation at the first shareholder meeting that occurs six months after enactment of the bill (January 21, 2011).

This practice of allowing shareholders a non-binding vote on a company's compensation report is standard practice in many non-U.S. countries, and has been a requirement for most companies in the United Kingdom since 2003 and in Australia since 2005. Although say-on-pay proposals are non-binding, a high level of "against" or "abstain" votes indicates substantial shareholder concern about a company's compensation policies and procedures.

Given the complexity of most companies' compensation programs, Glass Lewis applies a highly nuanced approach when analyzing advisory votes on executive compensation. We review each company's compensation on a case-by-case basis, recognizing that each company must be examined in the context of industry, size, maturity, performance, financial condition, its historic pay for performance practices, and any other relevant internal or external factors.



We believe that each company should design and apply specific compensation policies and practices that are appropriate to the circumstances of the company and, in particular, will attract and retain competent executives and other staff, while motivating them to grow the company's long-term shareholder value.

Where we find those specific policies and practices serve to reasonably align compensation with performance, and such practices are adequately disclosed, Glass Lewis will recommend supporting the company's approach. If, however, those specific policies and practices fail to demonstrably link compensation with performance, Glass Lewis will generally recommend voting against the say-on-pay proposal.

Glass Lewis reviews say-on-pay proposals on both a qualitative basis and a quantitative basis, with a focus on several main areas:

- The overall design and structure of the company's executive compensation programs including selection and challenging nature of performance metrics;
- The implementation and effectiveness of the company's executive compensation programs including pay mix and use of performance metrics in determining pay levels;
- The quality and content of the company's disclosure;
- The quantum paid to executives; and
- The link between compensation and performance as indicated by the company's current and past pay-for-performance grades.


We also review any significant changes or modifications, including post fiscal year-end changes and one-time awards, particularly where the changes touch upon issues that are material to Glass Lewis recommendations. Additionally, while we recognize their rarity in the U.S. market, beneficial features such as but not limited to post-vesting and/or post-retirement holding requirements may be viewed positively in our holistic analysis.

Say-on-Pay Voting Recommendations

In cases where we find deficiencies in a company's compensation program's design, implementation or management, we will recommend that shareholders vote against the say-on-pay proposal. Generally, such instances include:

- Evidence of a pattern of poor pay-for-performance practices (e.g., deficient or failing pay-for-performance grades or a misalignment between incentive payouts and the shareholder experience),
- Unclear or questionable disclosure regarding the overall compensation structure (e.g., limited information regarding benchmarking processes, limited rationale for bonus performance metrics and targets, etc.),
- Questionable adjustments to certain aspects of the overall compensation structure (e.g., limited rationale for significant changes to performance targets or metrics, the payout of guaranteed bonuses or sizable retention grants, etc.), and/or
- Other egregious compensation practices.

Glass Lewis approaches its analysis of executive compensation programs on a case-by-case basis. Glass Lewis reviews all factors related to named executive officer compensation, including quantitative analyses, structural features, the presence of effective best practice policies, disclosure quality and trajectory-related factors. Except for particularly egregious pay decisions and practices, no one factor would ordinarily lead to an unfavorable



recommendation without a review of the company's rationale and/or the influence of such decisions or practices on other aspects of the pay program, most notably the company's ability to align executive pay with performance and the shareholder experience.

Although not an exhaustive list, the following factors are viewed negatively. When weighed together, they may cause Glass Lewis to recommend voting against a say-on-pay vote:

- Inappropriate or outsized self-selected peer groups and/or benchmarking issues such as compensation targets set well above the median without adequate justification;
- Egregious or excessive bonuses, equity awards, perquisites or severance payments, including golden handshakes and golden parachutes;
- Insufficient response to low shareholder support;
- Problematic contractual payments, such as guaranteed bonuses;
- Adjustments to performance results that lead to problematic pay outcomes;
- Insufficiently challenging performance targets and/or high potential payout opportunities;
- Performance targets lowered without justification;
- Discretionary bonuses paid when short- or long-term incentive plan targets were not met;
- High executive pay relative to peers that is not justified by outstanding company performance; and
- The terms of the long-term incentive plans are inappropriate (please see "Long-Term Incentives").


The aforementioned issues influence Glass Lewis' assessment of the structure of a company's compensation program. We evaluate structure on a "Good, Fair, Poor" rating scale whereby a "Good" rating represents a compensation program with little to no concerns and market-leading practices, a "Fair" rating represents a compensation program with some concerns but general adherence to best practices and a "Poor" rating represents a compensation program that deviates significantly from best practice or contains one or more egregious compensation practices.

We believe that it is important for companies to provide investors with clear and complete disclosure of all the significant terms of compensation arrangements. Similar to structure, we evaluate disclosure on a "Good, Fair, Poor" rating scale. A "Good" rating represents a thorough discussion of all elements of compensation with rationale. A "Fair" rating represents an adequate discussion of all or most elements of compensation with rationale. A "Poor" rating represents an incomplete or absent discussion of compensation. In instances where a company has simply failed to provide sufficient disclosure of its policies, we may recommend shareholders vote against this proposal solely on this basis, regardless of the appropriateness of compensation levels. Glass Lewis understands that regulatory disclosure rules such as smaller reporting company disclosure standards may condone the omission of key executive compensation information. However, we believe that companies should provide sufficient information in the proxy statement to enable shareholders to vote in an informed manner.

In general, most companies will fall within the "Fair" range for both structure and disclosure, and Glass Lewis largely uses the "Good" and "Poor" ratings to highlight outliers.

Where we identify egregious compensation practices, we may also recommend voting against the compensation committee based on the practices or actions of its members during the year. Such practices may include approving large one-off payments, the inappropriate, unjustified use of discretion, or sustained poor pay for performance practices. (Refer to the section on "Compensation Committee Performance" for more information.)





Company Responsiveness

When companies receive a significant level of shareholder opposition to a say-on-pay proposal, which occurs when more than 20% of votes on the proposal are cast as AGAINST and/or ABSTAIN, we believe the board should demonstrate a commensurate level of engagement and responsiveness to the concerns behind the disapproval, with a particular focus on responding to shareholder feedback. When assessing the level of opposition to say-on-pay proposals, we may further examine the level of opposition among disinterested shareholders as an independent group. While we recognize that sweeping changes cannot be made to a compensation program without due consideration, and that often a majority of shareholders may have voted in favor of the proposal, given that the average approval rate for say-on-pay proposals is about 90%, we believe the compensation committee should demonstrate in its proxy statement a level of response to a significant vote against. In general, our expectations regarding the minimum appropriate levels of responsiveness will correspond with the level of shareholder opposition, as expressed both through the magnitude of opposition in a single year, and through the persistence of shareholder disapproval over time.

Responses we consider appropriate include engaging with large shareholders, especially dissenting shareholders, to identify their concerns, and, where reasonable, implementing changes and/or making commitments that directly address those concerns within the company's compensation program. In cases where particularly egregious pay decisions caused the say on pay proposal to fail, Glass Lewis will closely consider whether any changes were made directly relating to the pay decision that may address structural concerns that shareholders have. In the absence of any evidence in the disclosure that the board is actively engaging shareholders on these issues and responding accordingly, we may recommend holding compensation committee members accountable for failing to adequately respond to shareholder opposition. Regarding such recommendations, careful consideration will be given to the level of shareholder protest and the severity and history of compensation practices.


Pay for Performance

Glass Lewis believes an integral part of a well-structured compensation package is a successful link between pay and performance. Our proprietary pay-for-performance model, which serves as our primary quantitative analysis, was developed to better evaluate the link between pay and performance. Generally, compensation and performance are measured against a peer group of appropriate companies that may overlap, to a certain extent, with a company's self-disclosed peers. This quantitative analysis provides a consistent framework and historical context for our clients to determine how well companies link executive compensation to relative performance. Companies that demonstrate a weaker link are more likely to receive a negative recommendation; however, other qualitative factors such as overall incentive structure, significant forthcoming changes to the compensation program or reasonable long-term payout levels may mitigate our concerns to a certain extent.

While we assign companies a letter grade of A, B, C, D or F based on the alignment between pay and performance under our primary model, the grades derived from the Glass Lewis pay-for-performance analysis do not follow the traditional U.S. school letter grade system. Rather, the grades are generally interpreted as follows:

Grade of A: The company's percentile rank for pay is significantly less than its percentile rank for performance

Grade of B: The company's percentile rank for pay is moderately less than its percentile rank for performance



Grade of C: The company's percentile rank for pay is approximately aligned with its percentile rank for performance

Grade of D: The company's percentile rank for pay is higher than its percentile rank for performance

Grade of F: The company's percentile rank for pay is significantly higher than its percentile rank for performance

Separately, a specific comparison between the company's executive pay and its peers' executive pay levels may be discussed in the analysis for additional insight into the grade. Likewise, a specific comparison between the company's performance and its peers' performance is reflected in the analysis for further context.

We use this analysis to inform our voting decisions on say-on-pay proposals. If a company receives a "D" or "F" from our proprietary model, we are more likely to recommend that shareholders vote against the say-on-pay proposal. However, important supplemental quantitative factors like analyses of realized pay levels and the "compensation actually paid" data mandated by the SEC's 2022 final rule regarding pay versus performance may be considered, and other qualitative factors such as an effective overall incentive structure, the relevance of selected performance metrics, significant forthcoming enhancements or reasonable long-term payout levels may give us cause to recommend in favor of a proposal even when we have identified a disconnect between pay and performance.


In determining the peer groups used in our pay-for-performance letter grades, Glass Lewis utilizes a proprietary methodology that considers both market and industry peers, along with each company's self-disclosed peers and peers of those company-disclosed peers. Each component is considered on a weighted basis and is subject to size-based ranking and screening. Since the peer group used is based on an independent, proprietary technique, it will often differ from the one used by the company which, in turn, will affect the resulting analyses. While Glass Lewis believes that the independent, rigorous methodology it uses provides a valuable perspective on the company's compensation program, the company's self-selected peer group may also be presented in the Proxy Paper for comparative purposes and for supplemental analyses.

Short-Term Incentives

A short-term bonus or incentive (STI) should be demonstrably tied to performance. Whenever possible, we believe a mix of corporate and individual performance measures is appropriate. We would normally expect performance measures for STI plans to be based on company-wide or divisional financial measures as well as non-financial, qualitative or non-formulaic factors such as those related to safety, environmental issues, and customer satisfaction when they are material to the company's overall health. While we recognize that companies operating in different sectors or markets may seek to utilize a wide range of metrics, we expect such measures to be appropriately tied to a company's business drivers.

Further, the threshold, target and maximum performance goals and corresponding payout levels that can be achieved under STI plans should be disclosed. Shareholders should expect stretching performance targets for the maximum award to be achieved. Any increase in the potential target and maximum award should be clearly justified to shareholders, as should any decrease in target and maximum performance levels from the previous year.

Glass Lewis recognizes that disclosure of some measures or performance targets may include commercially confidential information. Therefore, we believe it may be reasonable to exclude such information in some cases.




as long as the company provides sufficient justification for non-disclosure. However, where a short-term bonus has been paid, companies should disclose the extent to which performance has been achieved against relevant targets, including disclosure of the actual target achieved.

Where management has received significant short-term incentive payments but overall performance and/or the shareholder experience over the measurement year *prima facie* appears to be poor or negative, we believe the company should provide a clear explanation of why these significant short-term payments were made. We also believe any significant changes to the program structure should be accompanied by rationalizing disclosure. Further, where a company has applied upward discretion, which includes lowering goals mid-year, increasing calculated payouts or retroactively pro-rating performance periods, we expect a robust discussion of why the decision was necessary.

Adjustments to GAAP figures may be considered in Glass Lewis' assessment of the effectiveness of the incentive at tying executive pay with performance. We believe that where companies use non-GAAP or bespoke metrics, clear reconciliations between these figures and GAAP figures in audited financial statements should be provided. Moreover, Glass Lewis believes that in circumstances where significant adjustments were applied to performance results, thorough, detailed discussion of adjustments akin to a GAAP-to-non-GAAP reconciliation and their impact on payouts within the proxy statement is warranted. The absence of such enhanced disclosure for significant adjustments will impact Glass Lewis' assessment of the quality of disclosure and, in turn, may play a role in the overall recommendation for the advisory vote on executive compensation.

Glass Lewis recognizes the importance of the compensation committee's prudent and responsible exercise of discretion over incentive pay outcomes to account for significant, material events that would otherwise be excluded from performance results of selected metrics of incentive programs. For instance, litigation settlement charges are typically removed from non-GAAP results before the determination of formulaic incentive payouts, or health and safety failures may not be reflected in performance results where companies do not expressly include health and safety metrics in incentive plans. Such events may nevertheless be consequential to corporate performance results, impact the shareholder experience, and, in some cases, may present material risks. Conversely, certain events may adversely impact formulaic payout results despite being outside executives' control. We believe that companies should provide thorough discussion of how such events were considered in the committee's decisions to exercise discretion over incentive payouts.

We do not generally recommend against a pay program due to the use of a non-formulaic plan. If a company has chosen to rely primarily on a subjective assessment or the board's discretion in determining short-term bonuses, we believe that the proxy statement should provide a meaningful discussion of the board's rationale in determining the bonuses paid as well as a rationale for the use of a non-formulaic mechanism. Particularly where the aforementioned disclosures are substantial and satisfactory, such a structure will not provoke serious concern in our analysis on its own. However, in conjunction with other significant issues in a program's design or operation, such as a disconnect between pay and performance, the absence of a cap on payouts, or a lack of performance-based long-term awards, the use of a non-formulaic bonus may help drive a negative recommendation.



Long-Term Incentives

Glass Lewis recognizes the value of equity-based incentive programs, which are often the primary long-term incentive for executives. When used appropriately, they can provide a vehicle for linking an executive's pay to company performance, thereby aligning their interests with those of shareholders. In addition, equity-based compensation can be an effective way to attract, retain and motivate key employees.


There are certain elements that Glass Lewis believes are common to most well-structured long-term incentive (LTI) plans. These include:

- No re-testing or lowering of performance conditions;
- Performance metrics that cannot be easily manipulated by management;
- Two or more performance metrics;
- At least one relative performance metric that compares the company's performance to a relevant peer group or index;
- Performance periods of at least three years;
- Stretching metrics that incentivize executives to strive for outstanding performance while not encouraging excessive risk-taking;
- Reasonable individual award limits;
- Equity granting practices that are clearly disclosed and
- Additional post-vesting holding periods to encourage long-term executive share ownership.

In evaluating long-term incentive grants, Glass Lewis generally believes that at least half of the grant should consist of performance-based awards, putting a material portion of executive compensation at-risk and demonstrably linked to the performance of the company. While we will consistently raise concern with programs that do not meet this criterion, we may refrain from a negative recommendation in the absence of other significant issues with the program's design or operation. However, in cases where performance-based awards are significantly rolled back or eliminated from a company's long-term incentive plan, such decisions will generally be viewed negatively outside of exceptional circumstances. Given the reduction in rigor and accountability in the pay program, Glass Lewis will assess the revision's impact on the pay program's ability to align executive pay with performance and shareholder experience; programs that fail our assessment may receive an unfavorable recommendation. They may also lead to an unfavorable recommendation from Glass Lewis if the change is not offset by meaningful revisions such as to pay quantum and vesting periods, particularly in the absence of cogent rationale.

As with the short-term incentive, Glass Lewis recognizes the importance of the compensation committee's judicious and responsible exercise of discretion over incentive pay outcomes to account for significant events that would otherwise be excluded from performance results of selected metrics of incentive programs. We believe that companies should provide thorough discussion of how such events were considered in the committee's decisions to exercise discretion or refrain from applying discretion over incentive pay outcomes. Furthermore, considerations related to the use of non-GAAP metrics under the STI plan similarly apply to the long-term incentive program.

Performance measures should be carefully selected and should relate to the specific business/industry in which the company operates and, especially, to the key value drivers of the company's business. As with short-term



incentive plans, the basis for any adjustments to metrics or results should be clearly explained, as should the company's judgment on the use of discretion and any significant changes to the performance program structure.

While cognizant of the inherent complexity of certain performance metrics, Glass Lewis generally believes that measuring a company's performance with multiple metrics serves to provide a more complete picture of the company's performance than a single metric. Further, reliance on just one metric may focus too much management attention on a single target and is therefore more susceptible to manipulation. When utilized for relative measurements, external benchmarks such as a sector index or peer group should be disclosed and transparent. The rationale behind the selection of a specific index or peer group should also be disclosed. Internal performance benchmarks should also be disclosed and transparent, unless a cogent case for confidentiality is made and fully explained. Similarly, actual performance and vesting levels for previous grants earned during the fiscal year should be disclosed.


We also believe shareholders should evaluate the relative success of a company's compensation programs, particularly with regard to existing equity-based incentive plans, in linking pay and performance when evaluating potential changes to LTI plans and determining the impact of additional stock awards. We will therefore review the company's pay-for-performance analyses (see above for more information) and specifically the proportion of total compensation that is stock-based.

Grants of Front-Loaded Awards

Many U.S. companies have chosen to provide large grants, usually in the form of equity awards, that are intended to serve as compensation for multiple years. This practice, often called front-loading, is taken up either in the regular course of business or as a response to specific business conditions and with a predetermined objective. The so-called "mega-grant", an outsized award to one individual sometimes valued at over \$100 million is sometimes but not always provided as a front-loaded award. We believe shareholders should generally be wary of this granting approach, and we accordingly weigh these grants with particular scrutiny.

While the use of front-loaded awards is intended to lock-in executive service and incentives, the same rigidity also raises the risk of effectively tying the hands of the compensation committee. As compared with a more responsive annual granting schedule program, front-loaded awards may preclude improvements or changes to reflect evolving business strategies or to respond to other unforeseen factors. Additionally, if structured poorly, early vesting of such awards may reduce or eliminate the retentive power at great cost to shareholders. The considerable emphasis on a single grant can place intense pressures on every facet of its design, amplifying any potential perverse incentives and creating greater room for unintended consequences. In particular, provisions around changes of control or separations of service must ensure that executives do not receive excessive payouts that do not reflect shareholder experience or company performance.

We consider a company's rationale for granting awards under this structure and also expect any front-loaded awards to include a firm commitment not to grant additional awards for a defined period, as is commonly associated with this practice. Even when such a commitment is provided, unexpected circumstances may lead the board to make additional payments or awards for retention purposes, or to incentivize management towards more realistic goals or a revised strategy. If a company breaks its commitment not to grant further awards, we may recommend against the pay program unless a convincing rationale is provided. The multiyear nature of these awards generally lends itself to significantly higher compensation figures in the year of grant.



than might otherwise be expected. In our qualitative analysis of the grants of front-loaded awards to executives, Glass Lewis considers the quantum of the award on an annualized basis and may compare this result to the prior practice and peer data, among other benchmarks. Additionally, for awards that are granted in the form of equity, Glass Lewis may consider the total potential dilutive effect of such award on shareholders.


In situations where the front-loaded award was meant to cover a certain portion of the regular long-term incentive grant for each year during the covered period, our analysis of the value of the remaining portion of the regular long-term incentives granted during the period covered by the award will account for the annualized value of the front-loaded portion, and we expect no supplemental grant be awarded during the vesting period of the front-loaded portion.

Linking Executive Pay to Environmental and Social Criteria

Glass Lewis believes that explicit environmental and/or social (E&S) criteria in executive incentive plans, when used appropriately, can serve to provide both executives and shareholders a clear line of sight into a company's ESG strategy, ambitions, and targets. Although we are strongly supportive of companies' incorporation of material E&S risks and opportunities in their long-term strategic planning, we believe that the inclusion of E&S metrics in compensation programs should be predicated on each company's unique circumstances. In order to establish a meaningful link between pay and performance, companies must consider factors including their industry, size, risk profile, maturity, performance, financial condition, and any other relevant internal or external factors.

When a company is introducing E&S criteria into executive incentive plans, we believe it is important that companies provide shareholders with sufficient disclosure to allow them to understand how these criteria align with their strategies. Additionally, Glass Lewis recognizes that there may be situations where certain E&S performance criteria are reasonably viewed as prerequisites for executive performance, as opposed to behaviors and conditions that need to be incentivized. For example, we believe that shareholders should interrogate the use of metrics that award executives for ethical behavior or compliance with policies and regulations. It is our view that companies should provide shareholders with disclosures that clearly lay out the rationale for selecting specific E&S metrics, the target-setting process, and corresponding payout opportunities. Further, particularly in the case of qualitative metrics, we believe that shareholders should be provided with a clear understanding of the basis on which the criteria will be assessed. Where quantitative targets have been set, we believe that shareholders are best served when these are disclosed on an ex-ante basis, or the board should outline why it believes it is unable to do so.

While we believe that companies should generally set long-term targets for their environmental and social ambitions, we are mindful that not all compensation schemes lend themselves to the inclusion of E&S metrics. We also are of the view that companies should retain flexibility in not only choosing to incorporate E&S metrics in their compensation plans, but also in the placement of these metrics. For example, some companies may resolve that including E&S criteria in the annual bonus may help to incentivize the achievement of short-term milestones and allow for more maneuverability in strategic adjustments to long-term goals. Other companies may determine that their long-term sustainability targets are best achieved by incentivizing executives through metrics included in their long-term incentive plans.



One-Time Awards

Glass Lewis believes shareholders should generally be wary of awards granted outside of the standard incentive schemes, as such awards have the potential to undermine the integrity of a company's regular incentive plans or the link between pay and performance, or both. We generally believe that if the existing incentive programs fail to provide adequate incentives to executives, companies should redesign their compensation programs rather than make additional grants.

However, Glass Lewis reviews grants of supplemental awards on a case-by-case, company-by-company basis to give adequate consideration for unique circumstances. Companies should provide a thorough description of the awards, including a cogent and convincing explanation of their necessity and why existing awards do not provide sufficient motivation and a discussion of how the quantum of the award and its structure were determined. Further, such awards should be tied to future service and performance whenever possible.

Additionally, we believe companies making supplemental or one-time awards should also describe if and how the regular compensation arrangements will be affected by these additional grants. In reviewing a company's use of supplemental awards, Glass Lewis will evaluate the terms and size of the grants in the context of the company's overall incentive strategy and granting practices, as well as the current operating environment.

Contractual Payments and Arrangements

Beyond the quantum of contractual payments, Glass Lewis will also consider the design of any entitlements. Certain executive employment terms may help to drive a negative recommendation, including, but not limited to:


- Excessively broad change in control triggers;
- Inappropriate severance entitlements;
- Inadequately explained or excessive sign-on arrangements;
- Guaranteed bonuses (especially as a multiyear occurrence); and
- Failure to address any concerning practices in amended employment agreements.

In general, we are wary of terms that are excessively restrictive in favor of the executive, or that could potentially incentivize behaviors that are not in a company's best interest.

Sign-on Awards and Severance Benefits

We acknowledge that there may be certain costs associated with transitions at the executive level. In evaluating the size of severance and sign-on arrangements, we may consider the executive's regular target compensation level, or the sums paid to other executives (including the recipient's predecessor, where applicable) in evaluating the appropriateness of such an arrangement.

We believe sign-on arrangements should be clearly disclosed and accompanied by a meaningful explanation of the payments and the process by which the amounts were reached. Further, the details of and basis for any "make-whole" payments (paid as compensation for awards forfeited from a previous employer) should be provided.



With respect to severance, we believe companies should abide by predetermined payouts in most circumstances. While in limited circumstances some deviations may not be inappropriate, we believe shareholders should be provided with a meaningful explanation of any additional or increased benefits agreed upon outside of regular arrangements. However, where Glass Lewis determines that such predetermined payouts are particularly problematic or unfavorable to shareholders, we may consider the execution of such payments in a negative recommendation for the advisory vote on executive compensation.

In the U.S. market, most companies maintain severance entitlements based on a multiple of salary and, in many cases, bonus. In almost all instances we see, the relevant multiple is three or less, even in the case of a change in control. We believe the basis and total value of severance should be reasonable and should not exceed the upper limit of general market practice. We consider the inclusion of long-term incentives in cash severance calculations to be inappropriate, particularly given the commonality of accelerated vesting and the proportional weight of long-term incentives as a component of total pay. Additional considerations, however, will be accounted for when reviewing atypically structured compensation approaches.

Change in Control


Glass Lewis considers double-trigger change in control arrangements, which require both a change in control and termination or constructive termination, to be best practice. Any arrangement that is not explicitly double-trigger may be considered a single-trigger or modified single-trigger arrangement. Companies that allow for committee discretion over the treatment of unvested awards should commit to providing clear rationale for the committee's ultimate decision as to how such awards should be treated in the event a change in control occurs.

Further, we believe that excessively broad definitions of change in control are potentially problematic as they may lead to situations where executives receive additional compensation where no meaningful change in status or duties has occurred.

Excise Tax Gross-ups

Among other entitlements, Glass Lewis is strongly opposed to excise tax gross-ups related to IRC § 4999 and their expansion, especially where no consideration is given to the safe harbor limit. We believe that under no normal circumstance is the inclusion of excise tax gross-up provisions in new agreements or the addition of such provisions to amended agreements acceptable. In consideration of the fact that minor increases in change-in-control payments can lead to disproportionately large excise taxes, the potential negative impact of tax gross-ups far outweighs any retentive benefit.

Depending on the circumstances, the addition of new gross-ups around this excise tax may lead to negative recommendations for a company's say-on-pay proposal, the chair of the compensation committee, or the entire committee, particularly in cases where a company had committed not to provide any such entitlements in the future. For situations in which the addition of new excise tax gross ups will be provided in connection with a specific change-in-control transaction, this policy may be applied to the say-on-pay proposal, the golden parachute proposal and recommendations related to the compensation committee for all involved corporate parties, as appropriate.



Amended Employment Agreements

Any contractual arrangements providing for problematic pay practices which are not addressed in materially amended employment agreements will potentially be viewed by Glass Lewis as a missed opportunity on the part of the company to align its policies with current best practices. Such problematic pay practices include, but are not limited to, excessive change in control entitlements, modified single-trigger change in control entitlements, excise tax gross-ups, and multi-year guaranteed awards.

Recoupment Provisions (Clawbacks)


On October 26, 2022, the SEC adopted Rule 10D-1 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The rule mandates national securities exchanges and associations to promulgate new listing standards requiring companies to maintain recoupment policies ("clawback provisions"). The final clawback listing standards were approved by the SEC, effective October 2, 2023 and required listed companies to adopt a compliant policy by December 1, 2023. Glass Lewis believes that clawback provisions play an important role in mitigating excessive risk-taking that may be encouraged by poorly structured variable incentive programs. Current listing standards require recoupment of erroneously awarded payouts to current and former executive officers in the event of an accounting restatement or correction to previous financial statements that is material to the current period, regardless of fault or misconduct.

Glass Lewis recognizes that excessive risk-taking that can materially and adversely impact shareholders may not necessarily result in such restatements. We believe that clawback policies should allow recovery from current and former executive officers in the event of a restatement of financial results or similar revision of performance indicators upon which the awards were based. Additionally, recoupment policies should provide companies with the ability to claw back variable incentive payments (whether time-based or performance-based) when there is evidence of problematic decisions or actions, such as material misconduct, a material reputational failure, material risk management failure, or a material operational failure, the consequences of which have not already been reflected in incentive payments and where recovery is warranted.

In situations where the company ultimately determines not to follow through with recovery, Glass Lewis will assess the appropriateness of such determination for each case. A thorough, detailed discussion of the company's decision to not pursue recoupment and, if applicable, how the company has otherwise rectified the disconnect between executive pay outcomes and negative impacts of their actions on the company and the shareholder experience will be considered. The absence of such enhanced disclosure may impact Glass Lewis' assessment of the quality of disclosure and, in turn, may play a role in Glass Lewis' overall recommendation for the advisory vote on executive compensation. The clawback policy should provide recoupment authority regardless of whether the employment of the executive officer was terminated with or without cause.

Hedging of Stock

Glass Lewis believes that the hedging of shares by executives in the shares of the companies where they are employed severs the alignment of interests of the executive with shareholders. We believe companies should adopt strict policies to prohibit executives from hedging the economic risk associated with their share ownership in the company.



Pledging of Stock

Glass Lewis believes that shareholders should examine the facts and circumstances of each company rather than apply a one-size-fits-all policy regarding employee stock pledging. Glass Lewis believes that shareholders benefit when employees, particularly senior executives, have meaningful financial interest in the success of the company under their management, and therefore we recognize the benefits of measures designed to encourage employees to both buy shares out of their own pocket and to retain shares they have been granted; blanket policies prohibiting stock pledging may discourage executives and employees from doing either.

However, we also recognize that the pledging of shares can present a risk that, depending on a host of factors, an executive with significant pledged shares and limited other assets may have an incentive to take steps to avoid a forced sale of shares in the face of a rapid stock price decline. Therefore, to avoid substantial losses from a forced sale to meet the terms of the loan, the executive may have an incentive to boost the stock price in the short term in a manner that is unsustainable, thus hurting shareholders in the long-term. We also recognize concerns regarding pledging may not apply to less senior employees, given the latter group's significantly more limited influence over a company's stock price. Therefore, we believe that the issue of pledging shares should be reviewed in that context, as should policies that distinguish between the two groups.


Glass Lewis believes that the benefits of stock ownership by executives and employees may outweigh the risks of stock pledging, depending on many factors. As such, Glass Lewis reviews all relevant factors in evaluating proposed policies, limitations and prohibitions on pledging stock, including:

- The number of shares pledged;
- The percentage executives' pledged shares are of outstanding shares;
- The percentage executives' pledged shares are of each executive's shares and total assets;
- Whether the pledged shares were purchased by the employee or granted by the company;
- Whether there are different policies for purchased and granted shares;
- Whether the granted shares were time-based or performance-based;
- The overall governance profile of the company;
- The volatility of the company's stock (in order to determine the likelihood of a sudden stock price drop);
- The nature and cyclical, if applicable, of the company's industry;
- The participation and eligibility of executives and employees in pledging;
- The company's current policies regarding pledging and any waiver from these policies for employees and executives; and
- Disclosure of the extent of any pledging, particularly among senior executives.

Executive Ownership Guidelines

The alignment between shareholder interests and those of executives helps to ensure that executives are acting in the best long-term interests of disinterested shareholders. Companies should facilitate this relationship through the adoption and enforcement of meaningful minimum executive share ownership requirements. Companies should clearly disclose their executive ownership requirements in their Compensation Discussion and Analysis section and how the various types of outstanding equity awards are counted or excluded from the ownership level calculation.





In determining whether executives have met the requirements or not, the inclusion of unearned performance- based full value awards and/or unexercised stock options without cogent rationale may be viewed as problematic. While Glass Lewis views the inclusion of unearned performance-based equity in the ownership determination renders executive share ownership policies less effective, we continue to believe that performance-based equity compensation plays an important role in the separate issue of aligning executive pay with performance.

Compensation Consultant Independence

As mandated by Section 952 of the Dodd-Frank Act, as of January 11, 2013, the SEC approved listing requirements for both the NYSE and NASDAQ which require compensation committees to consider six factors (<https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2012/33-9330.pdf>, p.31-32) in assessing compensation advisor independence. According to the SEC, "no one factor should be viewed as a determinative factor." Glass Lewis believes this six- factor assessment is an important process for every compensation committee to undertake but believes companies employing a consultant for board compensation, consulting and other corporate services should provide clear disclosure beyond just a reference to examining the six points, in order to allow shareholders to review the specific aspects of the various consultant relationships.

We believe compensation consultants are engaged to provide objective, disinterested, expert advice to the compensation committee. When the consultant or its affiliates receive substantial income from providing other services to the company, we believe the potential for a conflict of interest arises and the independence of the consultant may be jeopardized. Therefore, Glass Lewis will, when relevant, note the potential for a conflict of interest when the fees paid to the advisor or its affiliates for other services exceed those paid for compensation consulting.


CEO Pay Ratio

As mandated by Section 953(b) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Consumer and Protection Act, beginning in 2018, issuers will be required to disclose the median annual total compensation of all employees except the CEO, the total annual compensation of the CEO or equivalent position, and the ratio between the two amounts. Glass Lewis will display the pay ratio as a data point in our Proxy Papers, as available. While we recognize that the pay ratio has the potential to provide additional insight when assessing a company's pay practices, at this time it will not be a determinative factor in our voting recommendations. On the other hand, we believe the underlying data may help shareholders evaluate the rationale for certain executive pay decisions such as increases in fixed pay levels.

Frequency of Say-on-Pay

The Dodd-Frank Act also requires companies to allow shareholders a non-binding vote on the frequency of say- on-pay votes (i.e., every one, two or three years). Additionally, Dodd-Frank requires companies to hold such votes on the frequency of say-on-pay votes at least once every six years.

We believe companies should submit say-on-pay votes to shareholders every year. We believe that the time and financial burdens to a company with regard to an annual vote are relatively small and incremental and are



outweighed by the benefits to shareholders through more frequent accountability. Implementing biannual or triennial votes on executive compensation limits shareholders' ability to hold the board accountable for its compensation practices through means other than voting against the compensation committee. Unless a company provides a compelling rationale or unique circumstances for say-on-pay votes less frequent than annually, we will generally recommend that shareholders support annual votes on compensation.

Vote on Golden Parachute Arrangements

The Dodd-Frank Act also requires companies to provide shareholders with a separate non-binding vote on approval of golden parachute compensation arrangements in connection with certain change-in-control transactions. However, if the golden parachute arrangements have previously been subject to a say-on-pay vote which shareholders approved, then this required vote is waived.


Glass Lewis believes the narrative and tabular disclosure of golden parachute arrangements benefits all shareholders. Glass Lewis analyzes each golden parachute arrangement on a case-by-case basis, taking into account, among other items: the nature of the change-in-control transaction, the ultimate value of the payments particularly compared to the value of the transaction, any excise tax gross-up obligations, the tenure and position of the executives in question before and after the transaction, any new or amended employment agreements entered into in connection with the transaction, and the type of triggers involved (i.e., single vs. double). In cases where new problematic features, such as excise tax gross-up obligations or new and excessive single-trigger entitlements, are introduced in a golden parachute proposal, such features may contribute to a negative recommendation not only for the golden parachute proposal under review, but for the next say-on-pay proposal of any involved corporate parties, as well as recommendations against their compensation committee as appropriate.

Equity-Based Compensation Proposals

We believe that equity compensation awards, when not abused, are useful for retaining employees and providing an incentive for them to act in a way that will improve company performance. Glass Lewis recognizes that equity-based compensation plans are critical components of a company's overall compensation program, and we analyze such plans accordingly based on both quantitative and qualitative factors.

Our quantitative analysis assesses the plan's cost and the company's pace of granting utilizing a number of different analyses, comparing the program with absolute limits we believe are key to equity value creation and with a carefully chosen peer group. In general, our model seeks to determine whether the proposed plan is either absolutely excessive or is more than one standard deviation away from the average plan for the peer group on a range of criteria, including dilution to shareholders and the projected annual cost relative to the company's financial performance. Each of the analyses (and their constituent parts) is weighted and the plan is scored in accordance with that weight.

We compare the program's expected annual expense with the business's operating metrics to help determine whether the plan is excessive in light of company performance. We also compare the plan's expected annual cost to the enterprise value of the firm rather than to market capitalization because the employees, managers and directors of the firm contribute to the creation of enterprise value but not necessarily market capitalization.




(the biggest difference is seen where cash represents the vast majority of market capitalization). Finally, we do not rely exclusively on relative comparisons with averages because, in addition to creeping averages serving to inflate compensation, we believe that some absolute limits are warranted.

We then consider qualitative aspects of the plan such as plan administration, the method and terms of exercise, repricing history, express or implied rights to reprice, and the presence of evergreen provisions. We also closely review the choice and use of, and difficulty in meeting, the awards' performance metrics and targets, if any. We believe significant changes to the terms of a plan should be explained for shareholders and clearly indicated. Other factors such as a company's size and operating environment may also be relevant in assessing the severity of concerns or the benefits of certain changes. Finally, we may consider a company's executive compensation practices in certain situations, as applicable.

We evaluate equity plans based on certain overarching principles:

- Companies should seek more shares only when needed;
- Requested share amounts or share reserves should be conservative in size so that companies must seek shareholder approval every three to four years (or more frequently);
- If a plan is relatively expensive, it should not grant options solely to senior executives and board members;
- Dilution of annual net share count or voting power, along with the "overhang" of incentive plans, should be limited;
- Annual cost of the plan (especially if not shown on the income statement) should be reasonable as a percentage of financial results and should be in line with the peer group;
- The expected annual cost of the plan should be proportional to the business's value;
- The intrinsic value that option grantees received in the past should be reasonable compared with the business's financial results;
- Plans should not permit repricing of stock options without shareholder approval;
- Plans should not contain excessively liberal administrative or payment terms;
- Plans should not count shares in ways that understate the potential dilution, or cost, to common shareholders. This refers to "inverse" full-value award multipliers;
- Selected performance metrics should be challenging and appropriate, and should be subject to relative performance measurements; and
- Stock grants should be subject to minimum vesting and/or holding periods sufficient to ensure sustainable performance and promote retention.

Meanwhile, for individual equity award proposals where the recipient of the proposed grant is also a large shareholder of the company whose vote can materially affect the passage of the proposal, we believe that the company should strongly consider the level of approval from disinterested shareholders before proceeding with the proposed grant. Glass Lewis recognizes potential conflicts of interests when vote outcomes can be heavily influenced by the recipient of the grant. A required abstention vote or non-vote from the recipient for an equity award proposal in these situations can help to avoid such conflicts. This favorable feature will be weighed alongside the structure, disclosure, dilution, provided rationale, and other provisions related to the individual award to assess the award's alignment with long-term shareholder interests.



Option Exchanges and Repricing

Glass Lewis is generally opposed to the repricing of employee and director options regardless of how it is accomplished. Employees should have some downside risk in their equity-based compensation program and repricing eliminates any such risk. As shareholders have substantial risk in owning stock, we believe that the equity compensation of employees and directors should be similarly situated to align their interests with those of shareholders. We believe this will facilitate appropriate risk- and opportunity-taking for the company by employees.

We are concerned that option grantees who believe they will be “rescued” from underwater options will be more inclined to take unjustifiable risks. Moreover, a predictable pattern of repricing or exchanges substantially alters a stock option’s value because options that will practically never expire deeply out of the money are worth far more than options that carry a risk of expiration.

In short, repricings and option exchange programs change the bargain between shareholders and employees after the bargain has been struck.

There is one circumstance in which a repricing or option exchange program may be acceptable: if macroeconomic or industry trends, rather than specific company issues, cause a stock’s value to decline dramatically and the repricing is necessary to motivate and retain employees. In viewing the company’s stock decline as part of a larger trend, we would expect the impact to approximately reflect the market or industry price decline in terms of timing and magnitude. In this circumstance, we think it fair to conclude that option grantees may be suffering from a risk that was not foreseeable when the original “bargain” was struck. In such a scenario, we may opt to support a repricing or option exchange program only if sufficient conditions are met. We look for the following features in a repricing or exchange proposal:

- Officers and board members cannot participate in the program; and
- The exchange is value-neutral or value-creative to shareholders using very conservative assumptions.


In our evaluation of the appropriateness of the program design, we also consider the inclusion of the following features:

- The vesting requirements on exchanged or repriced options are extended beyond one year;
- Shares reserved for options that are reacquired in an option exchange will permanently retire (i.e., will not be available for future grants) so as to prevent additional shareholder dilution in the future; and
- Management and the board make a cogent case for needing to motivate and retain existing employees, such as being in a competitive employment market.

Option Backdating, Spring-Loading and Bullet-Dodging

Glass Lewis views option backdating, and the related practices of spring-loading and bullet-dodging, as egregious actions that warrant holding the appropriate management and board members responsible. These practices are similar to repricing options and eliminate much of the downside risk inherent in an option grant that is designed to induce recipients to maximize shareholder return.

Backdating an option is the act of changing an option’s grant date from the actual grant date to an earlier date when the market price of the underlying stock was lower, resulting in a lower exercise price for the option. In



past studies, Glass Lewis identified over 270 companies that have disclosed internal or government investigations into their past stock-option grants.

Spring-loading is granting stock options while in possession of material, positive information that has not been disclosed publicly. Bullet-dodging is delaying the grants of stock options until after the release of material, negative information. This can allow option grants to be made at a lower price either before the release of positive news or following the release of negative news, assuming the stock's price will move up or down in response to the information. This raises a concern similar to that of insider trading, or the trading on material non-public information.

The exercise price for an option is determined on the day of grant, providing the recipient with the same market risk as an investor who bought shares on that date. However, where options were backdated, the executive or the board (or the compensation committee) changed the grant date retroactively. The new date may be at or near the lowest price for the year or period. This would be like allowing an investor to look back and select the lowest price of the year at which to buy shares.


A 2006 study of option grants made between 1996 and 2005 at 8,000 companies found that option backdating can be an indication of poor internal controls. The study found that option backdating was more likely to occur at companies without a majority independent board and with a long-serving CEO; both factors, the study concluded, were associated with greater CEO influence on the company's compensation and governance practices.⁴³

Where a company granted backdated options to an executive who is also a director, Glass Lewis will recommend voting against that executive/director, regardless of who decided to make the award. In addition, Glass Lewis will recommend voting against those directors who either approved or allowed the backdating. Glass Lewis feels that executives and directors who either benefited from backdated options or authorized the practice have failed to act in the best interests of shareholders.

Given the severe tax and legal liabilities to the company from backdating, Glass Lewis will consider recommending voting against members of the audit committee who served when options were backdated, a restatement occurs, material weaknesses in internal controls exist and disclosures indicate there was a lack of documentation. These committee members failed in their responsibility to ensure the integrity of the company's financial reports.

When a company has engaged in spring-loading or bullet-dodging, Glass Lewis will consider recommending voting against the compensation committee members where there has been a pattern of granting options at or near historic lows. Glass Lewis will also recommend voting against executives serving on the board who benefited from the spring-loading or bullet-dodging.

⁴³ Lucian Bebchuk, Yaniv Grinstein and Urs Peyer. "LUCKY CEOs." November, 2006.



Director Compensation Plans

Glass Lewis believes that non-employee directors should receive reasonable and appropriate compensation for the time and effort they spend serving on the board and its committees. However, a balance is required. Fees should be competitive in order to retain and attract qualified individuals, but excessive fees represent a financial cost to the company and potentially compromise the objectivity and independence of non-employee directors. We will consider recommending support for compensation plans that include option grants or other equity-based awards that help to align the interests of outside directors with those of shareholders. However, to ensure directors are not incentivized in the same manner as executives but rather serve as a check on imprudent risk-taking in executive compensation plan design, equity grants to directors should not be performance-based. Where an equity plan exclusively or primarily covers non-employee directors as participants, we do not believe that the plan should provide for performance-based awards in any capacity.


When non-employee director equity grants are covered by the same equity plan that applies to a company's broader employee base, we will use our proprietary model and analyst review of this model to guide our voting recommendations. If such a plan broadly allows for performance-based awards to directors or explicitly provides for such grants, we may recommend against the overall plan on this basis, particularly if the company has granted performance-based awards to directors in past.

Employee Stock Purchase Plans

Glass Lewis believes that employee stock purchase plans (ESPPs) can provide employees with a sense of ownership in their company and help strengthen the alignment between the interests of employees and shareholders. We evaluate ESPPs by assessing the expected discount, purchase period, expected purchase activity (if previous activity has been disclosed) and whether the plan has a "lookback" feature. Except for the most extreme cases, Glass Lewis will generally support these plans given the regulatory purchase limit of \$25,000 per employee per year, which we believe is reasonable. We also look at the number of shares requested to see if a ESPP will significantly contribute to overall shareholder dilution or if shareholders will not have a chance to approve the program for an excessive period of time. As such, we will generally recommend against ESPPs that contain "evergreen" provisions that automatically increase the number of shares available under the ESPP each year.

Executive Compensation Tax Deductibility — Amendment to IRC 162(M)

The "Tax Cut and Jobs Act" had significant implications on Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code, a provision that allowed companies to deduct compensation in excess of \$1 million for the CEO and the next three most highly compensated executive officers, excluding the CFO, if the compensation is performance-based and is paid under shareholder-approved plans. Glass Lewis does not generally view amendments to equity plans and changes to compensation programs in response to the elimination of tax deductions under 162(m) as problematic. This specifically holds true if such modifications contribute to the maintenance of a sound performance-based compensation program.




As grandfathered contracts may continue to be eligible for tax deductions under the transition rule for Section 162(m), companies may therefore submit incentive plans for shareholder approval to take advantage of the tax deductibility afforded under 162(m) for certain types of compensation.

We believe the best practice for companies is to provide robust disclosure to shareholders so that they can make fully informed judgments about the reasonableness of the proposed compensation plan. To allow for meaningful shareholder review, we prefer that disclosure should include specific performance metrics, a maximum award pool, and a maximum award amount per employee. We also believe it is important to analyze the estimated grants to see if they are reasonable and in line with the company's peers.

We typically recommend voting against a 162(m) proposal where: (i) a company fails to provide at least a list of performance targets; (ii) a company fails to provide one of either a total maximum or an individual maximum; or (iii) the proposed plan or individual maximum award limit is excessive when compared with the plans of the company's peers.

The company's record of aligning pay with performance (as evaluated using our proprietary pay-for- performance model) also plays a role in our recommendation. Where a company has a record of setting reasonable pay relative to business performance, we generally recommend voting in favor of a plan even if the plan caps seem large relative to peers because we recognize the value in special pay arrangements for continued exceptional performance.

As with all other issues we review, our goal is to provide consistent but contextual advice given the specifics of the company and ongoing performance. Overall, we recognize that it is generally not in shareholders' best interests to vote against such a plan and forgo the potential tax benefit since shareholder rejection of such plans will not curtail the awards; it will only prevent the tax deduction associated with them.



Governance Structure and the Shareholder Franchise

Anti-Takeover Measures

Poison Pills (Shareholder Rights Plans)

Glass Lewis believes that poison pill plans are not generally in shareholders' best interests. They can reduce management accountability by substantially limiting opportunities for corporate takeovers. Rights plans can thus prevent shareholders from receiving a buy-out premium for their stock. Typically we recommend that shareholders vote against these plans to protect their financial interests and ensure that they have an opportunity to consider any offer for their shares, especially those at a premium.

We believe boards should be given wide latitude in directing company activities and in charting the company's course. However, on an issue such as this, where the link between the shareholders' financial interests and their right to consider and accept buyout offers is substantial, we believe that shareholders should be allowed to vote on whether they support such a plan's implementation. This issue is different from other matters that are typically left to board discretion. Its potential impact on and relation to shareholders is direct and substantial. It is also an issue in which management interests may be different from those of shareholders; thus, ensuring that shareholders have a voice is the only way to safeguard their interests.


In certain circumstances, we will support a poison pill that is limited in scope to accomplish a particular objective, such as the closing of an important merger, or a pill that contains what we believe to be a reasonable qualifying offer clause. We will consider supporting a poison pill plan if the qualifying offer clause includes each of the following attributes:

- The form of offer is not required to be an all-cash transaction;
- The offer is not required to remain open for more than 90 business days;
- The offeror is permitted to amend the offer, reduce the offer, or otherwise change the terms;
- There is no fairness opinion requirement; and
- There is a low to no premium requirement.

Where these requirements are met, we typically feel comfortable that shareholders will have the opportunity to voice their opinion on any legitimate offer.

NOL Poison Pills

Similarly, Glass Lewis may consider supporting a limited poison pill in the event that a company seeks shareholder approval of a rights plan for the express purpose of preserving Net Operating Losses (NOLs). While companies with NOLs can generally carry these losses forward to offset future taxable income, Section 382



of the Internal Revenue Code limits companies' ability to use NOLs in the event of a "change of ownership."⁴⁴ In this case, a company may adopt or amend a poison pill (NOL pill) in order to prevent an inadvertent change of ownership by multiple investors purchasing small chunks of stock at the same time, and thereby preserve the ability to carry the NOLs forward. Often such NOL pills have trigger thresholds much lower than the common 15% or 20% thresholds, with some NOL pill triggers as low as 5%.

In many cases, companies will propose the adoption of bylaw amendments specifically restricting certain share transfers, in addition to proposing the adoption of a NOL pill. In general, if we support the terms of a particular NOL pill, we will generally support the additional protective amendment in the absence of significant concerns with the specific terms of that proposal.

As with traditional poison pills, NOL pills may deter shareholders and potentially serve as entrenchment mechanisms. Certain features such as low thresholds combined with acting in concert provisions, among other concerning terms, may disempower shareholders and insulate the board and management. When acting in concert provisions are present within the terms of a NOL pill, we believe this may raise concerns as to the true objective of the pill.


Acting in concert provisions broaden the definition of beneficial ownership to prohibit parallel conduct, or multiple shareholders party to a formal or informal agreement collaborating to influence the board and management of a company, and aggregate the ownership of such shareholders towards the triggering threshold. In our view, acting in concert provisions broadly limit the voice of shareholders and may diminish their ability to engage in a productive dialogue with the company and with other shareholders. When a board adopts defensive measures without engaging with shareholders, we take a dim view of the board and the overall governance of the company.

As such, Glass Lewis evaluates NOL pills on a strictly case-by-case basis, taking into consideration, among other factors: (i) the value of the NOLs to the company; (ii) the likelihood of a change of ownership based on the size of the holdings and the nature of the larger shareholders; (iii) the trigger threshold; (iv) the duration of the plan (i.e., whether it contains a reasonable "sunset" provision, generally one year or less); (v) the inclusion of an acting in concert provision; (vi) whether the pill is implemented following the filing of a Schedule 13D by a shareholder or there is evidence of hostile activity or shareholder activism; and (vii) if the pill is subject to periodic board review and/or shareholder ratification.

We believe that shareholders should be offered the opportunity to vote on any adoption or renewal of a NOL pill regardless of any potential tax benefit that it offers a company. As such, we will consider recommending voting against those members of the board who served at the time when an NOL pill was adopted without shareholder approval within the prior twelve months and where the NOL pill is not subject to shareholder ratification.

⁴⁴ Section 382 of the Internal Revenue Code refers to a "change of ownership" of more than 50 percentage points by one or more 5% shareholders within a three-year period. The statute is intended to deter the "trafficking" of net operating losses.





Fair Price Provisions

Fair price provisions, which are rare, require that certain minimum price and procedural requirements be observed by any party that acquires more than a specified percentage of a corporation's common stock. The provision is intended to protect minority shareholder value when an acquirer seeks to accomplish a merger or other transaction which would eliminate or change the interests of the minority shareholders. The provision is generally applied against the acquirer unless the takeover is approved by a majority of "continuing directors" and holders of a majority, in some cases a supermajority as high as 80%, of the combined voting power of all stock entitled to vote to alter, amend, or repeal the above provisions.

The effect of a fair price provision is to require approval of any merger or business combination with an "interested shareholder" by 51% of the voting stock of the company, excluding the shares held by the interested shareholder. An interested shareholder is generally considered to be a holder of 10% or more of the company's outstanding stock, but the trigger can vary.


Generally, provisions are put in place for the ostensible purpose of preventing a back-end merger where the interested shareholder would be able to pay a lower price for the remaining shares of the company than he or she paid to gain control. The effect of a fair price provision on shareholders, however, is to limit their ability to gain a premium for their shares through a partial tender offer or open market acquisition which typically raise the share price, often significantly. A fair price provision discourages such transactions because of the potential costs of seeking shareholder approval and because of the restrictions on purchase price for completing a merger or other transaction at a later time.

Glass Lewis believes that fair price provisions, while sometimes protecting shareholders from abuse in a takeover situation, more often act as an impediment to takeovers, potentially limiting gains to shareholders from a variety of transactions that could significantly increase share price. In some cases, even the independent directors of the board cannot make exceptions when such exceptions may be in the best interests of shareholders. Given the existence of state law protections for minority shareholders such as Section 203 of the Delaware Corporations Code, we believe it is in the best interests of shareholders to remove fair price provisions.

Control Share Statutes

Certain states, including Delaware, have adopted control share acquisition statutes as an anti-takeover defense for certain closed-end investment companies and business development companies. Control share statutes may prevent changes in control by limiting voting rights of a person that acquires the ownership of "control shares." Control shares are shares of stock equal to or exceeding specified percentages of company voting power, and a control share statute prevents shares in excess of the specified percentage from being voted, unless: (i) the board approves them to be voted; or (ii) the holder of the "control shares" receives approval from a supermajority of "non-interested" shareholders.

Depending on the state of incorporation, companies may automatically rely on control share statutes unless the fund's board of trustees eliminates the application of the control share statute to any or all fund share acquisitions, through adoption of a provision in the fund's governing instrument or by fund board action alone. In certain other states, companies must adopt control share statutes.



In our view, control share statutes disenfranchise shareholders by reducing their voting power to a level less than their economic interest and effectively function as an anti-takeover device. We believe all shareholders should have an opportunity to vote all of their shares. Moreover, anti-takeover measures may prevent shareholders from receiving a buy-out premium for their stock.

As such, we will generally recommend voting for proposals to opt out of control share acquisition statutes, unless doing so would allow the completion of a takeover that is not in the best interests of shareholders; and against proposals to amend the charter to include control share acquisition provisions.

Further, in cases where a closed-end fund or business development company has received a public buyout offer and has relied on a control share statute as a defense mechanism in the prior year, we will generally recommend shareholders vote against the chair of the nominating and governance committee, absent a compelling rationale as to why a rejected acquisition was not in the best interests of shareholders.

Quorum Requirements

Glass Lewis believes that a company's quorum requirement should be set at a level high enough to ensure that a broad range of shareholders are represented in person or by proxy, but low enough that the company can transact necessary business. Companies in the U.S. are generally subject to quorum requirements under the laws of their specific state of incorporation. Additionally, those companies listed on the NASDAQ Stock Market are required to specify a quorum in their bylaws, provided however that such quorum may not be less than one-third of outstanding shares. Prior to 2013, the New York Stock Exchange required a quorum of 50% for listed companies, although this requirement was dropped in recognition of individual state requirements and potential confusion for issuers. Delaware, for example, required companies to provide for a quorum of no less than one-third of outstanding shares; otherwise such quorum shall default to a majority.


We generally believe a majority of outstanding shares entitled to vote is an appropriate quorum for the transaction of business at shareholder meetings. However, should a company seek shareholder approval of a lower quorum requirement we will generally support a reduced quorum of at least one-third of shares entitled to vote, either in person or by proxy. When evaluating such proposals, we also consider the specific facts and circumstances of the company, such as size and shareholder base.

Director and Officer Indemnification

While Glass Lewis strongly believes that directors and officers should be held to the highest standard when carrying out their duties to shareholders, some protection from liability is reasonable to protect them against certain suits so that these officers feel comfortable taking measured risks that may benefit shareholders. As such, we find it appropriate for a company to provide indemnification and/or enroll in liability insurance to cover its directors and officers so long as the terms of such agreements are reasonable.

Officer Exculpation

In August 2022, the Delaware General Assembly amended Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law ("DGCL") to authorize corporations to adopt a provision in their certificate of incorporation to



eliminate or limit monetary liability of certain corporate officers for breach of fiduciary duty of care. Previously, the DGCL allowed only exculpation of corporate directors from breach of fiduciary duty of care claims if the corporation's certificate of incorporation includes an exculpation provision.

The amendment authorizes corporations to provide for exculpation of the following officers: (i) the corporation's president, chief executive officer, chief operating officer, chief financial officer, chief legal officer, controller, treasurer or chief accounting officer, (ii) "named executive officers" identified in the corporation's SEC filings, and (iii) individuals who have agreed to be identified as officers of the corporation.

Corporate exculpation provisions under the DGCL only apply to claims for breach of the duty of care, and not to breaches of the duty of loyalty. Exculpation provisions also do not apply to acts or omissions not in good faith or that involve intentional misconduct, knowing violations of the law, or transactions involving the receipt of any improper personal benefits. Furthermore, officers may not be exculpated from claims brought against them by, or in the right of, the corporation (i.e., derivative actions).

Under Section 102(b)(7), a corporation must affirmatively elect to include an exculpation provision in its certificate of incorporation. We will closely evaluate proposals to adopt officer exculpation provisions on a case- by-case basis. We will generally recommend voting against such proposals eliminating monetary liability for breaches of the duty of care for certain corporate officers, unless compelling rationale for the adoption is provided by the board, and the provisions are reasonable.

Reincorporation


In general, Glass Lewis believes that the board is in the best position to determine the appropriate jurisdiction of incorporation for the company. We review all proposals to reincorporate to a different state or country on a case-by-case basis. Our review includes the changes in corporate governance provisions, especially those relating to shareholder rights, material differences in corporate statutes and legal precedents, and relevant financial benefits, among other factors, resulting from the change in domicile.

Glass Lewis closely examines the impact on shareholder rights arising from a change in domicile and governing law, including the following:

- Will shareholders gain/retain certain rights (i.e. the right to call special meetings, the right to act by written consent, the ability to remove directors)?
- Does the proposed new jurisdiction allow for director and officer exculpation and/or exclusive forum provisions?
- What are the fiduciary duties (if any) of directors, officers, and majority shareholders under the new jurisdiction's statutes?
- What are the material differences in corporate statutes, case law, and judicial systems?
- Is the company proposing to reincorporate to a jurisdiction considered to be a "tax haven"?

In addition, when examining a proposal to reincorporate, we will also consider the overall governance of the company, including, but not limited to, the following:

- Does the company have anti-takeover protections such as a poison pill or classified board in place?



- Does the company have a significant shareholder or is the company otherwise considered controlled?⁴⁵
- Has the board been previously unresponsive to shareholders (such as failing to implement a shareholder proposal that received majority shareholder support)?
- Does the company have an independent chair and is the board sufficiently independent?
- Are there other material governance issues of concern at the company? Has the company's performance matched or exceeded its peers in the past one and three years?
- How has the company ranked in Glass Lewis' pay-for-performance analysis during the last three years?

Where there is a decline in shareholder rights, the financial benefits are de minimis, and the proposed jurisdiction has significantly worse shareholder protections, we will generally recommend voting against the transaction.

In addition, costly, shareholder-initiated reincorporations are typically not the best route to achieve the furtherance of shareholder rights. We believe shareholders are generally better served by proposing specific shareholder resolutions addressing pertinent issues which may be implemented at a lower cost, and perhaps even with board approval. However, when shareholders propose a shift into a jurisdiction with enhanced shareholder rights, Glass Lewis examines the significant ways the company would benefit from shifting jurisdictions including an evaluation of the criteria listed above. We note, however, that we will only support shareholder proposals to change a company's place of incorporation in exceptional circumstances.


Exclusive Forum and Fee-Shifting Bylaw Provisions

Glass Lewis recognizes that companies may be subject to frivolous and opportunistic lawsuits, particularly in conjunction with a merger or acquisition, that are expensive and distracting. In response, companies have sought ways to prevent or limit the risk of such suits by adopting bylaws regarding where the suits must be brought or shifting the burden of the legal expenses to the plaintiff, if unsuccessful at trial.

Glass Lewis believes that charter or bylaw provisions limiting a shareholder's choice of legal venue are not in the best interests of shareholders. Such clauses may effectively discourage the use of shareholder claims by increasing their associated costs and making them more difficult to pursue. As such, shareholders should be wary about approving any limitation on their legal recourse including limiting themselves to a single jurisdiction (e.g., Delaware or federal courts for matters arising under the Securities Act of 1933) without compelling evidence that it will benefit shareholders.

For this reason, we recommend that shareholders vote against any bylaw or charter amendment seeking to adopt an exclusive forum provision unless the company: (i) provides a compelling argument on why the provision would directly benefit shareholders; (ii) provides evidence of abuse of legal process in other, non- favored jurisdictions; (iii) narrowly tailors such provision to the risks involved; and (iv) maintains a strong record of good corporate governance practices.

⁴⁵ In cases where a controlled company is seeking to change its domicile, we will closely evaluate how the independent members of the board came to its recommendation, if the controlling shareholder had any ability to influence the board, and if the proposal is also put to a vote of disinterested shareholders.



Moreover, in the event a board seeks shareholder approval of a forum selection clause pursuant to a bundled bylaw amendment rather than as a separate proposal, we will weigh the importance of the other bundled provisions when determining the vote recommendation on the proposal. We will nonetheless recommend voting against the chair of the governance committee for bundling disparate proposals into a single proposal (refer to our discussion of nominating and governance committee performance in Section I of the guidelines).


Similarly, some companies have adopted bylaws requiring plaintiffs who sue the company and fail to receive a judgment in their favor pay the legal expenses of the company. These bylaws, also known as “fee-shifting” or “loser pays” bylaws, will likely have a chilling effect on even meritorious shareholder lawsuits as shareholders would face a strong financial disincentive not to sue a company. Glass Lewis therefore strongly opposes the adoption of such fee-shifting bylaws and, if adopted without shareholder approval, will recommend voting against the governance committee. While we note that in June of 2015 the State of Delaware banned the adoption of fee-shifting bylaws, such provisions could still be adopted by companies incorporated in other states.

Authorized Shares

Glass Lewis believes that adequate capital stock is important to a company’s operation. When analyzing a request for additional shares, we typically review four common reasons why a company might need additional capital stock:

1. **Stock Split** — We typically consider three metrics when evaluating whether we think a stock split is likely or necessary: The historical stock pre-split price, if any; the current price relative to the company’s most common trading price over the past 52 weeks; and some absolute limits on stock price that, in our view, either always make a stock split appropriate if desired by management or would almost never be a reasonable price at which to split a stock.
2. **Shareholder Defenses** — Additional authorized shares could be used to bolster takeover defenses such as a poison pill. Proxy filings often discuss the usefulness of additional shares in defending against or discouraging a hostile takeover as a reason for a requested increase. Glass Lewis is typically against such defenses and will oppose actions intended to bolster such defenses.
3. **Financing for Acquisitions** — We look at whether the company has a history of using stock for acquisitions and attempt to determine what levels of stock have typically been required to accomplish such transactions. Likewise, we look to see whether this is discussed as a reason for additional shares in the proxy.
4. **Financing for Operations** — We review the company’s cash position and its ability to secure financing through borrowing or other means. We look at the company’s history of capitalization and whether the company has had to use stock in the recent past as a means of raising capital.

Issuing additional shares generally dilutes existing holders in most circumstances. Further, the availability of additional shares, where the board has discretion to implement a poison pill, can often serve as a deterrent to interested suitors. Accordingly, where we find that the company has not detailed a plan for use of the proposed shares, or where the number of shares far exceeds those needed to accomplish a detailed plan, we typically recommend against the authorization of additional shares. Similar concerns may also lead us to recommend



against a proposal to conduct a reverse stock split if the board does not state that it will reduce the number of authorized common shares in a ratio proportionate to the split.

With regard to authorizations and/or increases in preferred shares, Glass Lewis is generally against such authorizations, which allow the board to determine the preferences, limitations and rights of the preferred shares (known as “blank-check preferred stock”). We believe that granting such broad discretion should be of concern to common shareholders, since blank-check preferred stock could be used as an anti-takeover device or in some other fashion that adversely affects the voting power or financial interests of common shareholders. Therefore, we will generally recommend voting against such requests, unless the company discloses a commitment to not use such shares as an anti-takeover defense or in a shareholder rights plan, or discloses a commitment to submit any shareholder rights plan to a shareholder vote prior to its adoption.

While we think that having adequate shares to allow management to make quick decisions and effectively operate the business is critical, we prefer that, for significant transactions, management come to shareholders to justify their use of additional shares rather than providing a blank check in the form of a large pool of unallocated shares available for any purpose.

Advance Notice Requirements

We typically recommend that shareholders vote against proposals that would require advance notice of shareholder proposals or of director nominees.


These proposals typically attempt to require a certain amount of notice before shareholders are allowed to place proposals on the ballot. Notice requirements typically range between three to six months prior to the annual meeting. Advance notice requirements typically make it impossible for a shareholder who misses the deadline to present a shareholder proposal or a director nominee that might be in the best interests of the company and its shareholders.

We believe shareholders should be able to review and vote on all proposals and director nominees. Shareholders can always vote against proposals that appear with little prior notice. Shareholders, as owners of a business, are capable of identifying issues on which they have sufficient information and ignoring issues on which they have insufficient information. Setting arbitrary notice restrictions limits the opportunity for shareholders to raise issues that may come up after the window closes.

Virtual Shareholder Meetings

A growing contingent of companies have elected to hold shareholder meetings by virtual means only. Glass Lewis believes that virtual meeting technology can be a useful complement to a traditional, in-person shareholder meeting by expanding participation of shareholders who are unable to attend a shareholder meeting in person (i.e., a “hybrid meeting”). However, we also believe that virtual-only meetings have the potential to curb the ability of a company’s shareholders to meaningfully communicate with the company’s management.

Prominent shareholder rights advocates, including the Council of Institutional Investors, have expressed concerns that such virtual-only meetings do not approximate an in-person experience and may serve to reduce



the board's accountability to shareholders. When analyzing the governance profile of companies that choose to hold virtual-only meetings, we look for robust disclosure in a company's proxy statement which assures shareholders that they will be afforded the same rights and opportunities to participate as they would at an in-person meeting.

Examples of effective disclosure include: (i) addressing the ability of shareholders to ask questions during the meeting, including time guidelines for shareholder questions, rules around what types of questions are allowed, and rules for how questions and comments will be recognized and disclosed to meeting participants; (ii) procedures, if any, for posting appropriate questions received during the meeting and the company's answers, on the investor page of their website as soon as is practical after the meeting; (iii) addressing technical and logistical issues related to accessing the virtual meeting platform; and (iv) procedures for accessing technical support to assist in the event of any difficulties accessing the virtual meeting.

We will generally recommend voting against members of the governance committee where the board is planning to hold a virtual-only shareholder meeting and the company does not provide such disclosure.

Voting Structure


Multi-Class Share Structures

Glass Lewis believes multi-class voting structures are typically not in the best interests of common shareholders. Allowing one vote per share generally operates as a safeguard for common shareholders by ensuring that those who hold a significant minority of shares are able to weigh in on issues set forth by the board.

Furthermore, we believe that the economic stake of each shareholder should match their voting power and that no small group of shareholders, family or otherwise, should have voting rights different from those of other shareholders. On matters of governance and shareholder rights, we believe shareholders should have the power to speak and the opportunity to effect change. That power should not be concentrated in the hands of a few for reasons other than economic stake.

We generally consider a multi-class share structure to reflect negatively on a company's overall corporate governance. Because we believe that companies should have share capital structures that protect the interests of non-controlling shareholders as well as any controlling entity, we typically recommend that shareholders vote in favor of recapitalization proposals to eliminate dual-class share structures. Similarly, we will generally recommend against proposals to adopt a new class of common stock. We will generally recommend voting against the chair of the governance committee at companies with a multi-class share structure and unequal voting rights when the company does not provide for a reasonable sunset of the multi-class share structure (generally seven years or less).

In the case of a board that adopts a multi-class share structure in connection with an IPO, spin-off, or direct listing within the past year, we will generally recommend voting against all members of the board who served at the time of the IPO if the board: (i) did not also commit to submitting the multi-class structure to a shareholder vote at the company's first shareholder meeting following the IPO; or (ii) did not provide for a reasonable sunset of the multi-class structure (generally seven years or less). If the multi-class share structure is put to a



shareholder vote, we will examine the level of approval or disapproval attributed to unaffiliated shareholders when determining the vote outcome.

At companies that have multi-class share structures with unequal voting rights, we will carefully examine the level of approval or disapproval attributed to unaffiliated shareholders when determining whether board responsiveness is warranted. In the case of companies that have multi-class share structures with unequal voting rights, we will generally examine the level of approval or disapproval attributed to unaffiliated shareholders on a “one share, one vote” basis. At controlled and multi-class companies, when at least 20% or more of unaffiliated shareholders vote contrary to management, we believe that boards should engage with shareholders and demonstrate some initial level of responsiveness, and when a majority or more of unaffiliated shareholders vote contrary to management we believe that boards should engage with shareholders and provide a more robust response to fully address shareholder concerns.

Cumulative Voting


Cumulative voting increases the ability of minority shareholders to elect a director by allowing shareholders to cast as many shares of the stock they own multiplied by the number of directors to be elected. As companies generally have multiple nominees up for election, cumulative voting allows shareholders to cast all of their votes for a single nominee, or a smaller number of nominees than up for election, thereby raising the likelihood of electing one or more of their preferred nominees to the board. It can be important when a board is controlled by insiders or affiliates and where the company’s ownership structure includes one or more shareholders who control a majority-voting block of company stock.

Glass Lewis believes that cumulative voting generally acts as a safeguard for shareholders by ensuring that those who hold a significant minority of shares can elect a candidate of their choosing to the board. This allows the creation of boards that are responsive to the interests of all shareholders rather than just a small group of large holders.

We review cumulative voting proposals on a case-by-case basis, factoring in the independence of the board and the status of the company’s governance structure. But we typically find these proposals on ballots at companies where independence is lacking and where the appropriate checks and balances favoring shareholders are not in place. In those instances we typically recommend in favor of cumulative voting.

Where a company has adopted a true majority vote standard (i.e., where a director must receive a majority of votes cast to be elected, as opposed to a modified policy indicated by a resignation policy only), Glass Lewis will recommend voting against cumulative voting proposals due to the incompatibility of the two election methods. For companies that have not adopted a true majority voting standard but have adopted some form of majority voting, Glass Lewis will also generally recommend voting against cumulative voting proposals if the company has not adopted anti-takeover protections and has been responsive to shareholders.

Where a company has not adopted a majority voting standard and is facing both a shareholder proposal to adopt majority voting and a shareholder proposal to adopt cumulative voting, Glass Lewis will support only the majority voting proposal. When a company has both majority voting and cumulative voting in place, there is a higher likelihood of one or more directors not being elected as a result of not receiving a majority vote. This is because shareholders exercising the right to cumulate their votes could unintentionally cause the failed election of one or more directors for whom shareholders do not cumulate votes.



Supermajority Vote Requirements

Glass Lewis believes that supermajority vote requirements impede shareholder action on ballot items critical to shareholder interests. An example is in the takeover context, where supermajority vote requirements can strongly limit the voice of shareholders in making decisions on such crucial matters as selling the business. This in turn degrades share value and can limit the possibility of buyout premiums to shareholders. Moreover, we believe that a supermajority vote requirement can enable a small group of shareholders to overrule the will of the majority shareholders. We believe that a simple majority is appropriate to approve all matters presented to shareholders.

Transaction of Other Business

We typically recommend that shareholders not give their proxy to management to vote on any other business items that may properly come before an annual or special meeting. In our opinion, granting unfettered discretion is unwise.

Anti-Greenmail Proposals


Glass Lewis will support proposals to adopt a provision preventing the payment of greenmail, which would serve to prevent companies from buying back company stock at significant premiums from a certain shareholder. Since a large or majority shareholder could attempt to compel a board into purchasing its shares at a large premium, the anti-greenmail provision would generally require that a majority of shareholders other than the majority shareholder approve the buyback.

Mutual Funds: Investment Policies and Advisory Agreements

Glass Lewis believes that decisions about a fund's structure and/or a fund's relationship with its investment advisor or sub-advisors are generally best left to management and the members of the board, absent a showing of egregious or illegal conduct that might threaten shareholder value. As such, we focus our analyses of such proposals on the following main areas:

- The terms of any amended advisory or sub-advisory agreement;
- Any changes in the fee structure paid to the investment advisor; and
- Any material changes to the fund's investment objective or strategy.

We generally support amendments to a fund's investment advisory agreement absent a material change that is not in the best interests of shareholders. A significant increase in the fees paid to an investment advisor would be reason for us to consider recommending voting against a proposed amendment to an investment advisory agreement or fund reorganization. However, in certain cases, we are more inclined to support an increase in advisory fees if such increases result from being performance-based rather than asset-based. Furthermore, we



generally support sub-advisory agreements between a fund's advisor and sub-advisor, primarily because the fees received by the sub-advisor are paid by the advisor, and not by the fund.

In matters pertaining to a fund's investment objective or strategy, we believe shareholders are best served when a fund's objective or strategy closely resembles the investment discipline shareholders understood and selected when they initially bought into the fund. As such, we generally recommend voting against amendments to a fund's investment objective or strategy when the proposed changes would leave shareholders with stakes in a fund that is noticeably different than when originally purchased, and which could therefore potentially negatively impact some investors' diversification strategies.

Real Estate Investment Trusts

The complex organizational, operational, tax and compliance requirements of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) provide for a unique shareholder evaluation. In simple terms, a REIT must have a minimum of 100 shareholders (the 100 Shareholder Test) and no more than 50% of the value of its shares can be held by five or fewer individuals (the "5/50 Test"). At least 75% of a REITs' assets must be in real estate, it must derive 75% of its gross income from rents or mortgage interest, and it must pay out 90% of its taxable earnings as dividends. In addition, as a publicly traded security listed on a stock exchange, a REIT must comply with the same general listing requirements as a publicly traded equity.


In order to comply with such requirements, REITs typically include percentage ownership limitations in their organizational documents, usually in the range of 5% to 10% of the REITs outstanding shares. Given the complexities of REITs as an asset class, Glass Lewis applies a highly nuanced approach in our evaluation of REIT proposals, especially regarding changes in authorized share capital, including preferred stock.

Preferred Stock Issuances at REITs

Glass Lewis is generally against the authorization of "blank-check preferred stock." However, given the requirement that a REIT must distribute 90% of its net income annually, it is inhibited from retaining capital to make investments in its business. As such, we recognize that equity financing likely plays a key role in a REIT's growth and creation of shareholder value. Moreover, shareholder concern regarding the use of preferred stock as an anti-takeover mechanism may be allayed by the fact that most REITs maintain ownership limitations in their certificates of incorporation. For these reasons, along with the fact that REITs typically do not engage in private placements of preferred stock (which result in the rights of common shareholders being adversely impacted), we may support requests to authorize shares of blank-check preferred stock at REITs.

Business Development Companies

Business Development Companies (BDCs) were created by the U.S. Congress in 1980; they are regulated under the Investment Company Act of 1940 and are taxed as regulated investment companies (RICs) under the Internal Revenue Code. BDCs typically operate as publicly traded private equity firms that invest in early stage to mature private companies as well as small public companies. BDCs realize operating income when their investments are sold off, and therefore maintain complex organizational, operational, tax and compliance requirements that are



similar to those of REITs—the most evident of which is that BDCs must distribute at least 90% of their taxable earnings as dividends.

Authorization to Sell Shares at a Price Below Net Asset Value

Considering that BDCs are required to distribute nearly all their earnings to shareholders, they sometimes need to offer additional shares of common stock in the public markets to finance operations and acquisitions. However, shareholder approval is required in order for a BDC to sell shares of common stock at a price below Net Asset Value (NAV). Glass Lewis evaluates these proposals using a case-by-case approach, but will recommend supporting such requests if the following conditions are met:


- The authorization to allow share issuances below NAV has an expiration date of one year or less from the date that shareholders approve the underlying proposal (i.e., the meeting date);
- The proposed discount below NAV is minimal (ideally no greater than 20%);
- The board specifies that the issuance will have a minimal or modest dilutive effect (ideally no greater than 25% of the company's then-outstanding common stock prior to the issuance); and
- A majority of the company's independent directors who do not have a financial interest in the issuance approve the sale.

In short, we believe BDCs should demonstrate a responsible approach to issuing shares below NAV, by proactively addressing shareholder concerns regarding the potential dilution of the requested share issuance, and explaining if and how the company's past below-NAV share issuances have benefitted the company.

Auditor Ratification and Below-NAV Issuances

When a BDC submits a below-NAV issuance for shareholder approval, we will refrain from recommending against the audit committee chair for not including auditor ratification on the same ballot. Because of the unique way these proposals interact, votes may be tabulated in a manner that is not in shareholders' interests. In cases where these proposals appear on the same ballot, auditor ratification is generally the only "routine proposal," the presence of which triggers a scenario where broker non-votes may be counted toward shareholder quorum, with unintended consequences.

Under the 1940 Act, below-NAV issuance proposals require relatively high shareholder approval. Specifically, these proposals must be approved by the lesser of: (i) 67% of votes cast if a majority of shares are represented at the meeting; or (ii) a majority of outstanding shares. Meanwhile, any broker non-votes counted toward quorum will automatically be registered as "against" votes for purposes of this proposal. The unintended result can be a case where the issuance proposal is not approved, despite sufficient voting shares being cast in favor. Because broker non-votes result from a lack of voting instruction by the shareholder, we do not believe shareholders' ability to weigh in on the selection of auditor outweighs the consequences of failing to approve an issuance proposal due to such technicality.



Special Purpose Acquisition Companies

Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs), also known as “blank check companies,” are publicly traded entities with no commercial operations and are formed specifically to pool funds in order to complete a merger or acquisition within a set time frame. In general, the acquisition target of a SPAC is either not yet identified or otherwise not explicitly disclosed to the public even when the founders of the SPAC may have at least one target in mind. Consequently, IPO investors often do not know what company they will ultimately be investing in.

SPACs are therefore very different from typical operating companies. Shareholders do not have the same expectations associated with an ordinary publicly traded company and executive officers of a SPAC typically do not continue in employment roles with an acquired company.

Extension of Business Combination Deadline

Governing documents of SPACs typically provide for the return of IPO proceeds to common shareholders if no qualifying business combination is consummated before a certain date. Because the time frames for the consummation of such transactions are relatively short, SPACs will sometimes hold special shareholder meetings at which shareholders are asked to extend the business combination deadline. In such cases, an acquisition target will typically have been identified, but additional time is required to allow management of the SPAC to finalize the terms of the deal.


Glass Lewis believes management and the board are generally in the best position to determine when the extension of a business combination deadline is needed. We therefore generally defer to the recommendation of management and support reasonable extension requests.

SPAC Board Independence

The board of directors of a SPAC’s acquisition target is in many cases already established prior to the business combination. In some cases, however, the board’s composition may change in connection with the business combination, including the potential addition of individuals who served in management roles with the SPAC. The role of a SPAC executive is unlike that of a typical operating company executive. Because the SPAC’s only business is identifying and executing an acquisition deal, the interests of a former SPAC executive are also different. Glass Lewis does not automatically consider a former SPAC executive to be affiliated with the acquired operating entity when their only position on the board of the combined entity is that of an otherwise independent director. Absent any evidence of an employment relationship or continuing material financial interest in the combined entity, we will therefore consider such directors to be independent.

Director Commitments of SPAC Executives

We believe the primary role of executive officers at SPACs is identifying acquisition targets for the SPAC and consummating a business combination. Given the nature of these executive roles and the limited business operations of SPACs, when a directors’ only executive role is at a SPAC, we will generally apply our higher limit for company directorships. As a result, we generally recommend that shareholders vote against a director who serves in an executive role only at a SPAC while serving on more than five public company boards.




Shareholder Proposals

Glass Lewis believes that shareholders should seek to promote governance structures that protect shareholders, support effective ESG oversight and reporting, and encourage director accountability. Accordingly, Glass Lewis places a significant emphasis on promoting transparency, robust governance structures and companies' responsiveness to and engagement with shareholders. We also believe that companies should be transparent on how they are mitigating material ESG risks, including those related to climate change, human capital management, and stakeholder relations.

To that end, we evaluate all shareholder proposals on a case-by-case basis with a view to protecting long-term shareholder value. While we are generally supportive of those that promote board accountability, shareholder rights, and transparency, we consider all proposals in the context of a company's unique operations and risk profile.

For a detailed review of our policies concerning compensation, environmental, social, and governance shareholder proposals, please refer to our comprehensive *Proxy Paper Guidelines for Shareholder Proposals & ESG-Related Issues*, available at www.glasslewis.com/voting-policies-current/.





Overall Approach to Environmental, Social & Governance Issues

Glass Lewis evaluates all environmental and social issues through the lens of long-term shareholder value. We believe that companies should be considering material environmental and social factors in all aspects of their operations and that companies should provide shareholders with disclosures that allow them to understand how these factors are being considered and how attendant risks are being mitigated. We also are of the view that governance is a critical factor in how companies manage environmental and social risks and opportunities and that a well-governed company will be generally managing these issues better than one without a governance structure that promotes board independence and accountability.


We believe part of the board's role is to ensure that management conducts a complete risk analysis of company operations, including those that have material environmental and social implications. We believe that directors should monitor management's performance in both capitalizing on environmental and social opportunities and mitigating environmental and social risks related to operations in order to best serve the interests of shareholders. Companies face significant financial, legal and reputational risks resulting from poor environmental and social practices, or negligent oversight thereof. Therefore, in cases where the board or management has neglected to take action on a pressing issue that could negatively impact shareholder value, we believe that shareholders should take necessary action in order to effect changes that will safeguard their financial interests.

Given the importance of the role of the board in executing a sustainable business strategy that allows for the realization of environmental and social opportunities and the mitigation of related risks, relating to environmental risks and opportunities, we believe shareholders should seek to promote governance structures that protect shareholders and promote director accountability. When management and the board have displayed disregard for environmental or social risks, have engaged in egregious or illegal conduct, or have failed to adequately respond to current or imminent environmental and social risks that threaten shareholder value, we believe shareholders should consider holding directors accountable. In such instances, we will generally recommend against responsible members of the board that are specifically charged with oversight of the issue in question.

When evaluating environmental and social factors that may be relevant to a given company, Glass Lewis does so in the context of the financial materiality of the issue to the company's operations. We believe that all companies face risks associated with environmental and social issues. However, we recognize that these risks manifest themselves differently at each company as a result of a company's operations, workforce, structure, and geography, among other factors. Accordingly, we place a significant emphasis on the financial implications of a company's actions with regard to impacts on its stakeholders and the environment.

When evaluating environmental and social issues, Glass Lewis examines companies':

Direct environmental and social risk — Companies should evaluate financial exposure to direct environmental risks associated with their operations. Examples of direct environmental risks include those associated with oil or gas spills, contamination, hazardous leakages, explosions, or reduced water or air quality, among others. Social risks may include non-inclusive employment policies, inadequate human rights policies, or issues that




adversely affect the company's stakeholders. Further, we believe that firms should consider their exposure to risks emanating from a broad range of issues, over which they may have no or only limited control, such as insurance companies being affected by increased storm severity and frequency resulting from climate change

Risk due to legislation and regulation — Companies should evaluate their exposure to changes or potential changes in regulation that affect current and planned operations. Regulation should be carefully monitored in all jurisdictions in which the company operates. We look closely at relevant and proposed legislation and evaluate whether the company has responded proactively.

Legal and reputational risk — Failure to take action on important environmental or social issues may carry the risk of inciting negative publicity and potentially costly litigation. While the effect of high-profile campaigns on shareholder value may not be directly measurable, we believe it is prudent for companies to carefully evaluate the potential impacts of the public perception of their impacts on stakeholders and the environment. When considering investigations and lawsuits, Glass Lewis is mindful that such matters may involve unadjudicated allegations or other charges that have not been resolved. Glass Lewis does not assume the truth of such allegations or charges or that the law has been violated. Instead, Glass Lewis focuses more broadly on whether, under the particular facts and circumstances presented, the nature and number of such concerns, lawsuits or investigations reflects on the risk profile of the company or suggests that appropriate risk mitigation measures may be warranted.

Governance risk — Inadequate oversight of environmental and social issues carries significant risks to companies. When leadership is ineffective or fails to thoroughly consider potential risks, such risks are likely unmitigated and could thus present substantial risks to the company, ultimately leading to loss of shareholder value.

Glass Lewis believes that one of the most crucial factors in analyzing the risks presented to companies in the form of environmental and social issues is the level and quality of oversight over such issues. When management and the board have displayed disregard for environmental risks, have engaged in egregious or illegal conduct, or have failed to adequately respond to current or imminent environmental risks that threaten shareholder value, we believe shareholders should consider holding directors accountable. When companies have not provided for explicit, board-level oversight of environmental and social matters and/or when a substantial environmental or social risk has been ignored or inadequately addressed, we may recommend voting against members of the board. In addition, or alternatively, depending on the proposals presented, we may also consider recommending voting in favor of relevant shareholder proposals or against other relevant management-proposed items, such as the ratification of auditor, a company's accounts and reports, or ratification of management and board acts.



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
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Glass Lewis' proxy voting guidelines are grounded in corporate governance best practices, which often exceed minimum legal requirements. Accordingly, unless specifically noted otherwise, a failure to meet these guidelines should not be understood to mean that the company or individual involved has failed to meet applicable legal requirements.

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APPENDIX B – DESCRIPTION OF SECURITIES RATINGS

Corporate and Municipal Long-Term Bond Ratings

China Lianhe Credit Ratings

AAA: Strong ability to repay debt. Not adversely affected by the economic environment. The risk of default is very low.

AA: Strong ability to repay debt. Less adversely affected by the economic environment. The risk of default is very low.

A: Strong ability to repay debt. More susceptible adversely affected by the economic environment. The risk of default is very low.

BBB: Adequate ability to repay debt. Business is affected by unfavorable economic environment. Greater default risk in general.

BB: Weak ability to repay debt. Business is affected by unfavorable economic environment. Greater default risk in general.

B: Business's ability to repay debt is largely dependent on favorable economic environment. There is a high risk of default.

CCC: Business's ability to repay debt is extremely dependent on favorable economic environment. There is a high risk of default.

CC: Business's ability to repay debt is extremely dependent on favorable economic environment. Business is at risk of bankruptcy or reorganization. Default is likely.

C: Business cannot repay the debt.

In addition to AAA and CCC grade level (inclusive) level, every one credit rating available, “+”, “-” symbol to fine tune, which means that a slightly higher or slightly below this level.

China Chengxin (Asia Pacific) Credit Ratings Company, Limited (“CCXAP”) long-term credit ratings:

AAAg: Capacity to meet commitments on short-term and long-term debts is extremely strong. Business is operated in a virtuous circle. The foreseeable uncertainty on business operations is minimal.

AAg+, AAg, AAg-: Capacity to meet short-term and long-term financial commitments is very strong. Business is operated in a virtuous circle. Foreseeable uncertainty in business operations is relatively low.

Ag+, Ag, Ag-: Capacity to meet short-term and long-term commitments is strong. Business is operated in a virtuous circle. Business operation and development may be affected by internal uncertain factors, which may create fluctuations in profitability and solvency of the issuer.

BBBg+, BBBg, BBBg-: Capacity to meet financial commitment is considered adequate and capacity to meet short-term and long-term commitments is satisfactory. Business is operated in a virtuous circle. Business is affected by internal and external uncertainties. Profitability and solvency may experience significant fluctuation. Principal and interest may not be sufficiently protected by the terms of agreement.

BBg+, BBg, BBg-: Capacity to meet short-term and long-term financial commitment is relatively weak. Financial commitment towards short-term and long-term debts is below average. Status of business operation and development is not good. Solvency is unstable and subject to sustainable risk.

Bg+, Bg, Bg-: Financial commitment towards short-term and long-term debts is bad. Business is affected by internal and external uncertain factors. There are difficulties in business operations. Solvency is uncertain and subject to high credit risk.

CCG: Financial commitment towards short-term and long-term debts is very bad. Business is affected by internal and external uncertain factors. There are difficulties in business operations. Poor solvency with very high credit risk.

CCg: Financial commitment towards short-term and long-term debts is extremely bad. Business operations are poor. There are very limited positive internal and external factors to support business operation and development. Extremely high credit risk is found.

Cg: Financial commitment towards short-term and long-term debts is insolvent. Business falls into a vicious circle. Very limited positive internal and external factors are found to support business operations and development in positive cycle. Extremely high credit risk is seen and is near default.

Dg: Unable to meet financial commitments. Default is confirmed.

Dagong Global Credit Rating Co. (“Dagong”) Corporate and Financial Institution Issuer, Borrowing Companies, and Long-term Debt Facility Credit Ratings:

AAA - Highest Credit Quality: “AAA” ratings denote the lowest expectation of default risk. It indicates that the issuer has exceptionally strong capacity for payment of financial commitments. Although the debt protection factors may change, this capacity is highly unlikely to be adversely affected by any foreseeable event. “AAA” is the highest issuer credit rating assigned by Dagong.

AA - Very High Credit Quality: “AA” ratings denote expectations of very low default risk. It indicates that the issuer has very strong capacity for payment of financial commitments. Although due to its relatively higher long-term risk, this capacity is not significantly vulnerable to any foreseeable event.

A - High Credit Quality: “A” ratings denote expectations of relatively low default risk. The capacity for payment of financial commitments is considered sufficient. However, this capacity may be more vulnerable than those of the higher ratings to adverse business or economic conditions due to any foreseeable event.

BBB - Medium Credit Quality: “BBB” ratings indicate that expectations of default risk are currently low and it has medium default risk. In normal conditions, the capacity for payment of financial commitments is considered adequate, whereas under adverse business or economic conditions risks of default are more likely to exist under this scale.

BB - Low Medium Credit Quality: “BB” ratings indicate that the issuer faces major ongoing uncertainties and exposure to adverse business, financial, or economic conditions, which could lead to the obligor’s inadequate capacity to meet its financial commitments.

B - Relatively Low Credit Quality: “B” ratings indicate that expectations of default risk are relatively high but a limited margin of safety remains. Adverse business, financial, or economic conditions will likely impair the obligor’s capacity or willingness to meet its financial commitments. This is a lower scale than that of the “BB” rating and an obligor rated “B” is more vulnerable to adverse developments than the obligors rated “BB”.

CCC - Low Credit Quality: “CCC” ratings indicate very high default risk. The issuer is currently vulnerable, and is dependent upon favorable business, financial, and economic conditions to meet its financial commitments. Some practical risks exist and this will impair the obligor’s ability to meet its financial commitments.

CC - Very Low Credit Quality: “CC” ratings indicate that the issuer is currently highly vulnerable and entities with this rating have a seriously high risk of default.

C - Lowest Credit Quality: “C” ratings indicate the highest default risk and the issuer is currently unable to meet its financial commitments or may even be in the process of compulsory debt reconstruction, or a takeover by regulatory organizations or in bankruptcy liquidation.

China Bond Rating Co.

AAAR: Strong ability to repay debt. Basically unaffected by adverse economic conditions, and the risk of default is extremely low.

AAR: Strong ability to repay debt. Not affected by the economic environment. The risk of default is very low.

AR: Strong ability to repay debt. More susceptible adversely affected by the economic environment. The risk of default is very low.

BBR: Adequate ability to repay debt. Business is affected by unfavorable economic environment. Greater default risk in general.

BB: Weak ability to repay debt. Business is affected by unfavorable economic environment. Greater default risk in general.

BR: Business's ability to repay debt is largely dependent on favorable economic environment. There is a high risk of default.

CCCR: Business's ability to repay debt is extremely dependent on favorable economic environment. There is a high risk of default.

CCR: Business's ability to repay debt is extremely dependent on favorable economic environment. Business is at risk of bankruptcy or reorganization. Default is likely.

CR: Business cannot repay the debt.

DR: Default is confirmed.

In addition to AAA and CCC grade level (inclusive) level, every one credit rating available, “+”, “-” symbol to fine tune, which means that a slightly higher or slightly below this level.

CSCI Pengyuan Credit Rating Co.

AAA: The ability to repay debt is extremely strong. Not adversely affected by the economic environment. The risk of default is very low.

AA: The ability to repay debt is strong. Less adversely affected by the economic environment. The risk of default is very low.

A: Strong ability to repay debt. More susceptible adversely affected by the economic environment. The risk of default is very low.

BBB: Adequate ability to repay debt. Business is affected by unfavorable economic environment. Greater default risk in general.

BB: Weak ability to repay debt. Business is affected by unfavorable economic environment. Greater default risk in general.

B: Business's ability to repay debt is largely dependent on favorable economic environment. There is an extremely high risk of default.

CCC: Business's ability to repay debt is extremely dependent on favorable economic environment. There is a high risk of default.

CC: In the case of bankruptcy or restructuring, there is less protection and there is basically no guarantee of repayment of debts.

C: Business cannot repay the debt.

In addition to AAA and CCC grade level (inclusive) level, every one credit rating available, “+”, “-” symbol to fine tune, which means that a slightly higher or slightly below this level.

Standard & Poor's Financial Services LLC ("S&P") Long-Term Issue Credit Ratings:

The following descriptions of S&P's long-term issue credit ratings have been published by Standard & Poor's Financial Services LLC.

AAA - An obligation rated 'AAA' has the highest rating assigned by S&P Global Ratings. The obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitments on the obligation is extremely strong.

AA - An obligation rated 'AA' differs from the highest-rated obligations only to a small degree. The obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitments on the obligation is very strong.

A - An obligation rated 'A' is somewhat more susceptible to the adverse effects of changes in circumstances and economic conditions than obligations in higher-rated categories. However, the obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitments on the obligation is still strong.

BBB - An obligation rated 'BBB' exhibits adequate protection parameters. However, adverse economic conditions or changing circumstances are more likely to weaken the obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitments on the obligation.

BB, B, CCC, CC, and C - Obligations rated 'BB', 'B', 'CCC', 'CC', and 'C' are regarded as having significant speculative characteristics. 'BB' indicates the least degree of speculation and 'C' the highest. While such obligations will likely have some quality and protective characteristics, these may be outweighed by large uncertainties or major exposure to adverse conditions.

BB - An obligation rated 'BB' is less vulnerable to nonpayment than other speculative issues. However, it faces major ongoing uncertainties or exposure to adverse business, financial, or economic conditions that could lead to the obligor's inadequate capacity to meet its financial commitments on the obligation.

B - An obligation rated 'B' is more vulnerable to nonpayment than obligations rated 'BB', but the obligor currently has the capacity to meet its financial commitments on the obligation. Adverse business, financial, or economic conditions will likely impair the obligor's capacity or willingness to meet its financial commitments on the obligation.

CCC - An obligation rated 'CCC' is currently vulnerable to nonpayment and is dependent upon favorable business, financial, and economic conditions for the obligor to meet its financial commitments on the obligation. In the event of adverse business, financial, or economic conditions, the obligor is not likely to have the capacity to meet its financial commitments on the obligation.

CC - An obligation rated 'CC' is currently highly vulnerable to nonpayment. The 'CC' rating is used when a default has not yet occurred but S&P Global Ratings expects default to be a virtual certainty, regardless of the anticipated time to default.

C - An obligation rated 'C' is currently highly vulnerable to nonpayment, and the obligation is expected to have lower relative seniority or lower ultimate recovery compared with obligations that are rated higher.

D - An obligation rated 'D' is in default or in breach of an imputed promise. For non-hybrid capital instruments, the 'D' rating category is used when payments on an obligation are not made on the date due, unless S&P Global Ratings believes that such payments will be made within the next five business days in the absence of a stated grace period or within the earlier of the stated grace period or the next 30 calendar days. The 'D' rating also will be used upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition or the taking of similar action and where default on an obligation is a virtual certainty, for example due to automatic stay provisions. A rating on an obligation is lowered to 'D' if it is subject to a distressed debt restructuring.

Plus (+) or Minus (-) - Ratings from 'AA' to 'CCC' may be modified by the addition of a plus (+) or minus (-) sign to show relative standing within the rating categories.

NR - This indicates that a rating has not been assigned or is no longer assigned.

Moody's Investors Service, Inc. ("Moody's") Global Long-Term Ratings:

The following descriptions of Moody's long-term corporate bond ratings have been published by Moody's Investors Service, Inc. and Moody's Analytics Inc.

Aaa - Obligations rated Aaa are judged to be of the highest quality, with minimal risk.

Aa - Obligations rated Aa are judged to be of high quality and are subject to very low credit risk.

A - Obligations rated A are considered upper medium-grade and are subject to low credit risk.

Baa - Obligations rated Baa are subject to moderate credit risk. They are considered medium-grade and as such may possess speculative characteristics.

Ba - Obligations rated Ba are judged to have speculative elements and are subject to substantial credit risk.

B - Obligations rated B are considered speculative and are subject to high credit risk.

Caa - Obligations rated Caa are judged to be of poor standing and are subject to very high credit risk.

Ca - Obligations rated Ca are highly speculative and are likely in, or very near, default, with some prospect of recovery in principal and interest.

C - Obligations rated C are the lowest-rated class of bonds and are typically in default, with little prospect for recovery of principal and interest.

Modifiers: Moody's appends numerical modifiers 1, 2, and 3 to each generic rating classification from Aa through Caa.

The modifier 1 indicates that the obligation ranks in the higher end of its generic rating category; the modifier 2 indicates a mid-range ranking; and the modifier 3 indicates a ranking in the lower end of that generic rating category.

Additionally, a "(hyb)" indicator is appended to all ratings of hybrid securities issued by banks, insurers, finance companies, and securities firms. By their terms, hybrid securities allow for the omission of scheduled dividends, interest, or principal payments, which can potentially result in impairment if such an omission occurs. Hybrid securities may also be subject to contractually allowable write-downs of principal that could result in impairment. Together with the hybrid indicator, the long-term obligation rating assigned to a hybrid security is an expression of the relative credit risk associated with that security.

Fitch Ratings Ltd. ("Fitch") Corporate Finance Obligations Ratings:

The following descriptions of Fitch's long-term corporate bond ratings have been published by Fitch Ratings, Inc. and Fitch Ratings Ltd.

AAA - Highest credit quality. 'AAA' ratings denote the lowest expectation of credit risk. They are assigned only in cases of exceptionally strong capacity for payment of financial commitments. This capacity is highly unlikely to be adversely affected by foreseeable events.

AA - Very high credit quality. 'AA' ratings denote expectations of very low credit risk. They indicate very strong capacity for payment of financial commitments. This capacity is not significantly vulnerable to foreseeable events.

A - High credit quality. 'A' ratings denote expectations of low credit risk. The capacity for payment of financial commitments is considered strong. This capacity may, nevertheless, be more vulnerable to adverse business or economic conditions than is the case for higher ratings.

BBB - Good credit quality. ‘**BBB**’ ratings indicate that expectations of credit risk are currently low. The capacity for payment of financial commitments is considered adequate, but adverse business or economic conditions are more likely to impair this capacity.

BB - Speculative. ‘**BB**’ ratings indicate an elevated vulnerability to credit risk, particularly in the event of adverse changes in business or economic conditions over time; however, business or financial alternatives may be available to allow financial commitments to be met.

B - Highly speculative. ‘**B**’ ratings indicate that material credit risk is present.

CCC - Substantial credit risk. ‘**CCC**’ ratings indicate that substantial credit risk is present.

CC - Very high levels of credit risk. ‘**CC**’ ratings indicate very high levels of credit risk.

C - Exceptionally high levels of credit risk. ‘**C**’ indicates exceptionally high levels of credit risk.

Corporate Finance defaulted obligations typically are not assigned ‘RD’ or ‘D’ ratings but are instead rated in the ‘CCC’ to ‘C’ rating categories, depending on their recovery prospects and other relevant characteristics. This approach better aligns obligations that have comparable overall expected loss but varying vulnerability to default and loss.

Plus (+) or Minus (-) - The modifiers “+” or “-” may be appended to a rating to denote relative status within major rating categories. Such suffixes are not added to ‘AAA’ ratings and ratings below the ‘CCC’ category.

Fitch’s credit rating scale for issuers and issues is expressed using the categories ‘AAA’ to ‘BBB’ (investment grade) and ‘BB’ to ‘D’ (speculative grade) with an additional +/- for ‘AA’ through ‘CCC’ levels, indicating relative differences of probability of default or recovery for issues. The terms “investment grade” and “speculative grade” are market conventions and do not imply any recommendation or endorsement of a specific security for investment purposes. Investment-grade categories indicate relatively low to moderate credit risk, while ratings in the speculative categories signal either a higher level of credit risk or that a default already occurred.

Fitch’s Municipal Bond Long-Term Ratings:

The following descriptions of Fitch’s long-term municipal bond ratings have been published by Fitch Ratings, Inc. and Fitch Ratings Ltd.

AAA - Highest credit quality. ‘**AAA**’ ratings denote the lowest expectation of default risk. They are assigned only in cases of exceptionally strong capacity for payment of financial commitments. This capacity is highly unlikely to be adversely affected by foreseeable events.

AA - Very high credit quality. ‘**AA**’ ratings denote expectations of very low default risk. They indicate very strong capacity for payment of financial commitments. This capacity is not significantly vulnerable to foreseeable events.

A - High credit quality. ‘**A**’ ratings denote expectations of low default risk. The capacity for payment of financial commitments is considered strong. This capacity may, nevertheless, be more vulnerable to adverse business or economic conditions than is the case for higher ratings.

BBB - Good credit quality. ‘**BBB**’ ratings indicate that expectations of default risk are currently low. The capacity for payment of financial commitments is considered adequate, but adverse business or economic conditions are more likely to impair this capacity.

BB - Speculative. ‘**BB**’ ratings indicate an elevated vulnerability to default risk, particularly in the event of adverse changes in business or economic conditions over time.

B - Highly speculative. ‘**B**’ ratings indicate that material default risk is present, but a limited margin of safety remains. Financial commitments are currently being met; however, capacity for continued payment is vulnerable to deterioration in the business and economic environment.

CCC - Substantial credit risk. ‘**CCC**’ ratings indicate very low margin for safety. Default is a real possibility.

CC - Very high levels of credit risk. ‘**CC**’ ratings indicate default of some kind appears probable.

C - Exceptionally high levels of credit risk. ‘**C**’ ratings indicate default appears imminent or inevitable.

D - Default. ‘**D**’ ratings indicates a default. Default generally is defined as one of the following:

- failure to make payment of principal and/or interest under the contractual terms of the rated obligation;
- bankruptcy filings, administration, receivership, liquidation or other winding-up or cessation of the business of an issuer/obligor where payment default on an obligation is a virtual certainty; or
- distressed exchange of an obligation, where creditors were offered securities with diminished structural or economic terms compared with the existing obligation to avoid a probable payment default.

Structured Finance Defaults – Imminent default, categorized under ‘**C**’, typically refers to the occasion where a payment default has been intimated by the issuer and is all but inevitable. This may, for example, be where an issuer has missed a scheduled payment but (as is typical) has a grace period during which it may cure the payment default. Another alternative would be where an issuer has formally announced a distressed debt exchange, but the date of the exchange still lies several days or weeks in the immediate future.

Additionally, in structured finance transactions, where analysis indicates that an instrument is irrevocably impaired such that it is not expected to pay interest and/or principal in full in accordance with the terms of the obligation’s documentation during the life of the transaction, but where no payment default in accordance with the terms of the documentation is imminent, the obligation will typically be rated in the ‘**C**’ category.

Structured Finance Write-Downs – Where an instrument has experienced an involuntary and, in the agency’s opinion, irreversible write-down of principal (i.e. other than through amortization, and resulting in a loss to the investor), a credit rating of ‘**D**’ will be assigned to the instrument. Where the agency believes the write-down may prove to be temporary (and the loss may be written up again in future if and when performance improves), then a credit rating of ‘**C**’ will typically be assigned. Should the write-down then later be reversed, the credit rating will be raised to an appropriate level for that instrument. Should the write-down later be deemed as irreversible, the credit rating will be lowered to ‘**D**’.

Notes: In the case of structured finance, while the ratings do not address the loss severity given default of the rated liability, loss severity assumptions on the underlying assets are nonetheless typically included as part of the analysis. Loss severity assumptions are used to derive pool cash flows available to service the rated liability. The suffix ‘sf’ denotes an issue that is a structured finance transaction.

Plus (+) or Minus (-) - The modifiers “+” or “-” may be appended to a rating to denote relative status within major rating categories. Such suffixes are not added to the ‘AAA’ obligation rating category, or to ratings below the ‘**CCC**’ category.

Municipal Short-Term Bond Ratings

CCXAP short-term credit ratings:

Ag-1: Capacity to meet short-term financial commitments is extremely strong with a high level of safety.

Ag-2: Capacity to meet short-term financial commitments is strong with a high level of safety.

Ag-3: Capacity to meet short-term financial commitments is average but the safety may be easily affected by adverse business, financial, or economic conditions.

Bg: Capacity to meet short-term financial commitments is weak with a high probability of default.

Cg: Capacity to meet short-term financial commitments is very weak and the probability of default is very high.

Dg: Unable to meet financial commitments. Default is confirmed.

S&P's Municipal Short-Term Note Ratings:

The following descriptions of S&P's short-term municipal ratings have been published by Standard & Poor's Financial Services LLC.

SP-1 - Strong capacity to pay principal and interest. An issue determined to possess a very strong capacity to pay debt service is given a plus (+) designation.

SP-2 - Satisfactory capacity to pay principal and interest, with some vulnerability to adverse financial and economic changes over the term of the notes.

SP-3 - Speculative capacity to pay principal and interest.

D - 'D' is assigned upon failure to pay the note when due, completion of a distressed debt restructuring, or the filing of a bankruptcy petition or the taking of similar action and where default on an obligation is a virtual certainty, for example due to automatic stay provisions.

Moody's Global Short-Term Ratings:

The following descriptions of Moody's short-term municipal ratings have been published by Moody's Investors Service, Inc. and Moody's Analytics Inc.

P-1 - Issuers (or supporting institutions) rated Prime-1 have a superior ability to repay short-term debt obligations.

P-2 - Issuers (or supporting institutions) rated Prime-2 have a strong ability to repay short-term debt obligations.

P-3 - Issuers (or supporting institutions) rated Prime-3 have an acceptable ability to repay short-term obligations.

NP - Issuers (or supporting institutions) rated Not Prime do not fall within any of the Prime rating categories.

Note: Canadian issuers rated P-1 or P-2 have their short-term ratings enhanced by the senior-most long-term rating of the issuer, its guarantor or support-provider.

Fitch's Short-Term Ratings:

The following descriptions of Fitch's short-term ratings have been published by Fitch Ratings, Inc. and Fitch Ratings Ltd.

F1 - Highest short-term credit quality. Indicates the strongest intrinsic capacity for timely payment of financial commitments; may have an added ‘+’ to denote any exceptionally strong credit feature.

F2 - Good short-term credit quality. Good intrinsic capacity for timely payment of financial commitments.

F3 - Fair short-term credit quality. The intrinsic capacity for timely payment of financial commitments is adequate.

B - Speculative short-term credit quality. Minimal capacity for timely payment of financial commitments, plus heightened vulnerability to near term adverse changes in financial and economic conditions.

C - High short-term default risk. Default is a real possibility.

RD - Restricted default. Indicates an entity that has defaulted on one or more of its financial commitments, although it continues to meet other financial obligations. Typically applicable to entity ratings only.

D - Default. Indicates a broad-based default event for an entity, or the default of a short-term obligation.

The modifiers “+” or “-” may be appended to a rating to denote relative status within major rating categories. For the short-term rating category of ‘F1’, a ‘+’ may be appended.

Commercial Paper Ratings

S&P's Short-Term Issue Credit Ratings:

The following descriptions of S&P's commercial paper ratings have been published by Standard & Poor's Financial Service LLC.

A-1 - A short-term obligation rated ‘A-1’ is rated in the highest category by S&P Global Ratings. The obligor’s capacity to meet its financial commitments on the obligation is strong. Within this category, certain obligations are designated with a plus sign (+). This indicates that the obligor’s capacity to meet its financial commitments on these obligations is extremely strong.

A-2 - A short-term obligation rated ‘A-2’ is somewhat more susceptible to the adverse effects of changes in circumstances and economic conditions than obligations in higher rating categories. However, the obligor’s capacity to meet its financial commitments on the obligation is satisfactory.

A-3 - A short-term obligation rated ‘A-3’ exhibits adequate protection parameters. However, adverse economic conditions or changing circumstances are more likely to weaken an obligor’s capacity to meet its financial commitments on the obligation.

B - A short-term obligation rated ‘B’ is regarded as vulnerable and has significant speculative characteristics. The obligor currently has the capacity to meet its financial commitments; however, it faces major ongoing uncertainties that could lead to the obligor’s inadequate capacity to meet its financial commitments.

C - A short-term obligation rated ‘C’ is currently vulnerable to nonpayment and is dependent upon favorable business, financial, and economic conditions for the obligor to meet its financial commitments on the obligation.

D - A short-term obligation rated 'D' is in default or in breach of an imputed promise. For non-hybrid capital instruments, the 'D' rating category is used when payments on an obligation are not made on the date due, unless S&P Global Ratings believes that such payments will be made within any stated grace period. However, any stated grace period longer than five business days will be treated as five business days. The 'D' rating also will be used upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition or the taking of a similar action and where default on an obligation is a virtual certainty, for example due to automatic stay provisions. A rating on an obligation is lowered to 'D' if it is subject to a distressed debt restructuring.

Dual Ratings – S&P may assign dual ratings to debt issues that have a put option or demand feature. The first component of the rating addresses the likelihood of repayment of principal and interest as due, and the second component of the rating addresses only the demand feature. The first component of the rating can relate to either a short-term or long-term transaction and accordingly use either short-term or long-term rating symbols. The second component of the rating relates to the put option and is assigned a short-term rating symbol (for example, 'AAA/A-1+' or 'A-1+/A-1'). With U.S. municipal short-term demand debt, the U.S. municipal short-term note rating symbols are used for the first component of the rating (for example, 'SP-1+/A-1+').

Moody's U.S. Municipal Short-Term Debt Ratings:

The following descriptions of Moody's commercial paper ratings have been published by Moody's Investors Service, Inc. and Moody's Analytics Inc.

MIG 1 - This designation denotes superior credit quality. Excellent protection is afforded by established cash flows, highly reliable liquidity support, or demonstrated broad-based access to the market for refinancing.

MIG 2 - This designation denotes strong credit quality. Margins of protection are ample, although not as large as in the preceding group.

MIG 3 - This designation denotes acceptable credit quality. Liquidity and cash-flow protection may be narrow, and market access for refinancing is likely to be less well-established.

SG - This designation denotes speculative-grade credit quality. Debt instruments in this category may lack sufficient margins of protection.

Fitch's Commercial Paper Ratings:

The following descriptions of Fitch's commercial paper ratings have been published by Fitch Ratings, Inc. and Fitch Ratings Ltd.

F1 - Highest short-term credit quality. Indicates the strongest intrinsic capacity for timely payment of financial commitments; may have an added '+' to denote any exceptionally strong credit feature.

F2 - Good short-term credit quality. Good intrinsic capacity for timely payment of financial commitments.

F3 - Fair short-term credit quality. The intrinsic capacity for timely payment of financial commitments is adequate.

B - Speculative short-term credit quality. Minimal capacity for timely payment of financial commitments, plus heightened vulnerability to near term adverse changes in financial and economic conditions.

C - High short-term default risk. Default is a real possibility.

RD - Restricted default. Indicates an entity that has defaulted on one or more of its financial commitments, although it continues to meet other financial obligations. Typically applicable to entity ratings only.

D - Default. Indicates a broad-based default event for an entity, or the default of a short-term obligation.

The modifiers "+" or "-" may be appended to a rating to denote relative status within major rating categories. Such suffixes are not added to the 'AAA' Long-term rating category, to categories below 'CCC', or to Short-term ratings other than 'F1'.